funds, and had £10,000 consols at his death, it was held to be a specific bequest.2 3. In Fontaine v. Tyler3 Chief Baron Richards discussed the: distinction between general and specific legacies in regard to a bequest of £10,000 stock to which the following qualification was attached: "If I shall not have so much as £10,000 capital stock in the three per cent reduced or consolidated bank annuities, or one or both of them, I will that my executors shall make up the capital sum of £10,000 in the three per cent reduced or consolidated bank annuities, or one or both of them." He died, leaving £70,000 three per cent consols, and £9000 three per cent reduced annuities, and the legacy was held to be specific. 2 Stephenson v. Dowson, 3 Beav. 342. Lord Langdale, M. R., here said: "A specific legacy is something distinguished from the rest of the testator's estate; and it is sufficient if it can be specified and distinguished from the rest of the testator's estate, at the time of his decease. . . . . A bequest of the horses the testator had in his stable, . . . . of all the plate which should be at a certain house, ....or a library or collection of books which the testator should have in a particular room," or " of all the testator's wearing apparel and things of that sort," and in such instance limited to the time of his death, are here put as illustrations of specific legacies. * 9 Price, 94, 104. It is here said, that, "if the testator had not had £10,000 in the stock specified at the time of his death, it would have been in that case a pecuniary legacy beyond all doubt." The gift of a particular horse, “would unquestionably be specific; yet if in the event of the testator having no horse at the time of his death, he should give the legatee some other chattel to supply the loss, that would not have the effect of making the first gift not specific..... I am clearly of opinion this was a specific and not a pecuniary legacy." The term "pecuniary," as applied to legacies, is here used as synonymous with "general"; but it is not regarded as altogether so definite in its import, since some general legacies are not pecuniary, and some pecuniary legacies are. not general, as a specific legacy may be pecuniary. And the question has actually arisen in one case, at least, whether the terms "pecuniary legacies" included specific legacies. Douglas v. Congreve, 1 Keen, 410. In this case it was held that a specific legacy in stock was not a pecuniary legacy, but the decision turned upon the distinction between stock and money, and not upon that between general and specific legacies. It was here held that such a legacy is specific, with the substitution of a general pecuniary legacy, in case of its failure, to be satisfied in a specific manner. The same legacy may be specific where it can be specifically satisfied, and general where it cannot. 4. Since specific legacies wholly fail, if the testator never had the thing described, or if he part with it, or convert it into other property before his decease, it becomes important to determine what is the precise intention of the testator and what forms of expression in the will are sufficient to render the legacy specific. The common illustration taken from the Civil Law, "If he had said, I bequeathe .... my watch, or my diamond ring," and there were not found in the succession, either diamond ring or watch, the legacy would be null. But if he had said, "I bequeath a diamond ring, or a watch, the legacy would be due and would have its effect," is quite intelligible, and fully recognized in the English law at the present time.5 5. A mistake in the description of the thing bequeathed, specifically, which is susceptible of correction by the context, or by any fair intendment, shall not be allowed to defeat the legacy; as where the testator had one horse only, which is white, and gives "my black horse," it is said there can be no doubt of that being the horse intended, and the legatee shall therefore have the horse as a specific legacy. But if the testator have two white horses and bequeath "my white horse," parol evidence may be received to show which he intended to give." 6. There is no doubt money may be the subject of a specific bequest, as where the testator gave £1000, deposited in a certain place, or in the hands of a certain person. In Lawson v. Stitch, the Lord Chancellor said: "It is pretty difficult to make 4 2 Domat, 520, pl. 3546; Dig. L. 32, § 5, D. de leg. 2. 1 Roper, 193. Ante, part 1, §§ 40, 41, and cases cited; 1 Roper, 193, 194, and notes. 8 1 Atk. 507. specific ones, but some such there are, as in the case of a sum of money in such a bag, the devise of a bond or other security the devise of money out of such a security." Where a legacy was of the "value" of securities then in the testator's possession, being navy bills, which were afterwards paid by exchequer bills and money, the money being also invested in exchequer bills, and all remaining on hand at the decease of the testator, it was held to create a specific legacy.9 7. The testator gave his partner £2000, being a balance found due him on the last settlement, adding, "if I do not draw it out of trade," 10 and it was held to create a specific legacy. Lord Hardwicke said: "If those latter words had not been inserted, I should have been inclined to think it was not specific, but I cannot get rid of those words. . . . . The court leans against considering legacies as specific." 8. It seems to be clearly settled that no direction, out of what fund the money is to be raised, unless it so identify the money that the legatee can say to the executor that all or a portion of the very moneys of the fund are thereby transferred to him, will render the bequest specific. Nor will it render the legacy specific, that it is directed to be for some specific use, as for rings,11 or for the payment of executor's services,12 or for servants,13 or for charity,14 or to be laid out in lands,15 or in government securities.16 Pulsford v. Hunter, 3 Br. C. C. 416. 10 Ellis v. Walker, Amb. 309. It is here said a distinction has prevailed where there has been a legacy of a sum of money out of a debt, that it is not specific, but considered to be given out of the debt as a readier fund, and therefore only demonstrative. And the good-will of a business may be specifically bequeathed. Fryer v. Ward, 9 Jur. N. s. 164; s. c. 31 Beav. 602. 11 Apreece v. Apreece, 1 Vesey & B. 364. "Attorney-General v. Robins, supra. Masters v. Masters, 1 P. Wms. 421, 423. 15 Hinton v. Pinke, 1 P. Wms. 539. 1 Lawson v. Stitch, 1 Atk. 507. 9. One important consequence of a legacy being specific is, that it is not subject to contribute to make up any unexpected deficiency which may arise in regard to the other portion of the estate; nor can the specific legatees claim to have any deficiency, which may arise in regard to their legacy, made up to them. Specific legatees must depend exclusively upon the particular money, security, fund, or thing, which is specifically identified in the gift. If that can be found among the effects of the testator the legatee is entitled to demand it of the executor; and if it cannot be so found and identified, he has no claim upon the estate on that account.17 Upon this ground it has sometimes been said, that only such legacies as might be adeemed,18 could be treated as specific. But it seems now to be regarded no such distinction as can avail towards determining whether the legacy is general or specific.19 We shall have occasion to speak of the subject of ademption hereafter. 10. There is an intermediate class of legacies, between general and specific legacies, where a certain amount of money is given to come out of a particular fund. These are sometimes called, after the denomination in the Civil Law, demonstrative legacies. This class of legacies is not liable to be adeemed 17 1 Roper, 191; Ashton v. Ashton, 3 P. Wms. 384, 385; Pitt v. Lord Camelford, 3 Br. C. C. 160. 15 Parrott v. Horsfold, 1 Jac. & W. 594, 601. Sir Thomas Plumer, M. R., here said: "The ordinary criterion of a specific bequest is, that it is liable to ademption; that if the thing bequeathed is once gone, it is lost to the legatee. The word 'my' is evidence of its being specific, when the particular stock is also referred to, but it is not enough alone." 19 Jacques v. Chambers, 2 Coll. 435. In this case the testator bequeathed thirty shares of railway stock in a company in which he owned one hundred and twenty shares, to his executors, in trust for certain legatees, and provided in his will that the legacy should not be deemed specific, so as to be capable of ademption. But the legatee was held to have thus become entitled to elect his number of shares, there being different classes, and to have the dividends from the death of the testator, and to be liable to all assessments upon the shares, thus declaring the legacy specific. and so fail, by the fund being called in or changed, but is still payable out of the general assets.20 In this respect it partakes more of the nature of a general legacy. But in another particular, in that it is not liable to abatement, where the funds are insufficient to meet all the legacies, it partakes more of the nature of a specific legacy.21 11. The principal difficulty in distinguishing general and specific legacies seems to have arisen, of late certainly, in regard to the class called, or claimed to be, demonstrative. In a modern case 22 a legacy of a sum of money owing to the testator by A B, upon a mortgage of certain premises therein mentioned, and which was paid off in the testator's lifetime, after the date of the will, was held to be a specific, and not a merely demonstrative legacy, and to have been adeemed by such payment. And where the testator placed part of the mortgage money received by him upon the mortgage, in the bank, and afterwards drew out part of said deposit, leaving in bank, at the time of his decease, a balance, amounting to a moiety of the sum constituting the mortgage debt, it was held that the specific legatee of the mortgage debt was not entitled, in respect of such legacy, to the money so remaining in the bank. The Vice-Chancellor, Sir William Page Wood, in giving judgment, commented upon some of the leading cases bearing upon the particular phase of the question thus brought before him,23 and the "Chaworth v. Beech, 4 Ves. 555. But in this case, where the testator gave money due upon a note, it was held a specific legacy upon the intention of the testator. And it is here held that an indorsement upon a note or bond, "I give this note, or bond, to A," may be proved as testamentary, which would not hold true under the present English statute of wills, or in the American states, where wills are required to be executed with due formalities, as well in regard to personalty as real estate. Such an indorsement could only operate now as a donatio mortis causa, where the security was delivered in the lifetime of the testator to the donee, or to some one for him. Ante, § 42, pl. 5. 1 2 Wms. Exrs. 1043; Coleman v. Coleman, 2 Ves. Jr. 639. "Sidebotham v. Watson, 11 Hare, 170. "The learned judge considered the case of Le Grice v. Finch, 3 Mer. 50, as |