that he was aware of its contents. But in many cases there may be special reasons for requiring more careful inquiry into the fact of the testator's knowledge of the contents of the paper executed as his will. If he is in extreme old age, more or less imbecile in understanding, surrounded by interested parties, incapable of reading or writing, either from loss of sight or want of education, and in some other cases, probably, it might be no more than reasonable to require something more than the ordinary ground of assurance upon that point. And this will be so in an especial manner where the provisions of the will are extraordinary or unnatural. But, notwithstanding all these considerations, and some others which might occur, we are not aware that any rule of law can be laid down in regard to it. It must be left to the consideration of the triers of the facts, under all the circumstances of the case, whether the testator executed it understandingly.22 15. In one case where the question received considerable attention,23 it was held, that where the testator, having sufficient 22 Billinghurst v. Vickers, 1 Phillim. 187; Rodd v. Lewis, 2 Cas. temp. Lee, 176; Goose v. Brown, 1 Curt. 707; Fawcett v. Jones, 3 Phillim. 434, 476; Wheeler v. Alderson, 3 Hagg. 574, 587; Browning v. Budd, 6 Moo. P. C. C. 430; Durnell v. Corfield, 1 Rob. 51. If the party benefited under the will drew it up, very satisfactory proof should be given that the dispositions were freely made by the testator. Croft v. Day, 1 Curt. 784; s. c. 3 Moore P. C. C. 136. And the same rule seems to have been acted upon in the Ecclesiastical Court, where the testator was blind, or unable to read from defect of education. Barton v. Robins, 3 Phillim. 455, n. (b); Fincham v. Edwards, 3 Curt. 63; s. c. affirmed, 4 Moo. P. C. C. 198; ante, pt. 1, pp. 54, 58. But this rule will only apply to such wills as are unofficious, or contrary in some respects to the natural affections of the testator. 1 Wms. Exrs. 312; Brogden v. Brown, 2 Add. 441, 449. * Burger v. Hill, 1 Bradf. Sur. Rep. 360. The Surrogate, Mr. Bradford, here discussed, with great learning and ability, both the authorities and the principles involved. It is declared in the subsequent case of Creeley v. Ostrander, 3 Bradf. Sur. Rep. 107, that the jurisdiction of the surrogate, in respect to the correction of testamentary capacity, but with his mind in a debilitated and prostrate condition, himself gave instructions to counsel for drawing his will shortly previous to his death, but did not himself comprehend the legal force of the general disposition which he directed to be made by the terms of his will, by reason of supposing that a leasehold interest in land would pass as real estate, it being in fact mere personalty, and passing as such in law, that the will could only be admitted to probate under a limited decree, and to the extent only that it correctly expressed the testamentary intentions of the testator. 16. It was not here attempted to reform the instrument so as to make it speak the real intentions of the testator. No court can do this. But, inasmuch as he gave his personalty to one and his real estate to others, intending thereby to pass a valuable leasehold interest, but which, by the terms of his will, would pass under the clause intended to embrace only the remaining personalty, the probate court excluded it from the operation of the will, thus leaving it to pass under the general statutes of distribution, having no power to direct that it should pass according to the intention of the testator, as real estate under the general clause directed by him to be inserted in his will for that purpose. 17. It is no sufficient ground to refuse the probate of the will that error in matter of fact has been committed by the testator, unless it be of a character to defeat his testamentary intentions.24 18. It is suggested elsewhere that there is but slight occasion for courts of equity to interpose in aid of the courts of probate, mistakes, is, by the necessary operation of the statute, merely negative, and limited to refusing probate of a will or part of a will, and does not extend to inserting any matter into the instrument, however certain it may be that it was the purpose of the testator that it should have so read. These decisions go upon general grounds, and not upon any special provisions of the New York statutes. 24 Boell v. Schwartz, 4 Bradf. Sur. Rep. 12. in this country, by way of compelling discovery, since the probate courts have that power, to a considerable extent, upon general principles, and fully, under the statutes which exist in most of the states, admitting the parties to give testimony without restriction. The same course of practice obtained in the English courts of equity, and for similiar reasons, except as to that last stated, while the probate jurisdiction remained in the ecclesiastical courts. But since the change of probate jurisdiction in England to a separate tribunal, which has not the same power to compel discovery from parties, it has been considered that a bill for discovery in aid of proceedings in the probate court may be maintained in the courts of equity.25 19. In the case of testators being deaf and dumb, or blind, there will obviously arise greater necessity for circumspection on the part of the tribunals where the testamentary act is offered for probate. It is said, in a recent English case,26 that in the case of a deaf and dumb testator, who could neither read nor write, and who conversed by signs and not by means of the deaf and dumb alphabet, probate would not be granted, unless the nature of the signs by which the testator signified his knowledge and approval of the contents of the will were made known to the court, so that they could form an estimate of their reliability. 20. It makes no difference in regard to admitting a will to probate, in the place where the testator had his last domicil, that the instrument professes to deal exclusively with property Fuller v. Ingraham, 5 Jur. N. s. 510. Sir W. Page Wood, V. C., here said: "It is possible the court of probate may examine witnesses upon interrogatories, but a question might arise whether, when you have the answer to the interrogatory as to documents, you could enforce the production of those documents as you can in equity." For this reason alone, if for no other, he considered the bill should be retained, and that, after interrogatories filed, proceedings should be stayed until they were answered, and all proper redress afforded. *Geale in re, 33 L. J. Prob. 125; 12 W. R. 1027; Dig. 10 Jur. N. s. 185. out of that jurisdiction, since personal property, wherever situate, follows the person.27 SECTION IV. SPECIAL FORMS OF PROBATE AND OF LETTERS TESTAMENTARY. 1. Separate letters of administration not granted to co-ordinate and joint ex ecutors. n. 2. Probate of will in fac-simile. 2. Portions of the will excluded from probate if not legitimately of it. 3. Different executors may have separate and distinct functions by their letters. 4. Will limited in operation, general administration may be granted of remainder. 5. Form of probate. Translation of foreign wills. 6. Probate court may be compelled to proceed by mandamus, having no valid excuse. n. 15. Prohibitions may issue to probate court. 7. All papers of testamentary character must be probated. 8. Wills in execution of powers required to be proved. 9. But paper appointing guardian not entitled to probate. § 4. 1. In the English practice, several joint executors may come in and take letters testamentary and of administration at different times, a copy of the probate of the will being attached to each; and the powers thus conferred will be joint and co-ordinate, it would seem. But nothing of this kind, as a general thing, exists in the American courts of probate. All the executors who accept the trust join in the application for probate and for letters testamentary; and where the powers of the executors are co-ordinate and joint, but one letter of administration, with the probate of the will, is issued.2 27 Winter in re, 30 Law J. Prob. 56. 11 Wms. Exrs. 334. In the English practice, in cases where the construction of the will is liable to be affected by the precise form in which erasures, interlineations, or alterations appear upon the face of the instrument, the court will order the probate to pass in fac-simile. 1 Wms. Exrs. 298. But in all such cases it is understood, that the fac-simile copy made for the probate will embrace only such alterations 2. It is customary in the English practice to exclude portions of the will from probate, where they do not legitimately belong to the instrument; as, for instance, where a particular clause has been inserted by fraud, without the knowledge of the testator, in his lifetime; or where it is done by forgery after the death of the testator; or where a particular portion of the will has been induced by fraud of the party in whose favor it is; 5 or where actual incapacity is shown at the time of making the latter portion of the will. In all these, and other analogous cases, the court of probate, in England, is accustomed to grant probate and letters testamentary of that portion of the will which is established. And we see no reason why the same as are shown satisfactorily to have been made before execution. 1 Wms. Exrs. 298; Gann v. Gregory, 3 DeG., M. & G. 777. The object of the fac-simile is, that the form of the alterations may help to show the intention of the testator in making them, as where he writes in his will, “I give A. B. an annuity of £500, and I give him also £ 1000," and then strikes out down to and including the word * £ 500." 3 DeG., M. & G. 780. Or, we may suppose the words "to be equally divided amongst them" interlined, without any caret to show where they were intended to come in, and in such a position that they are applicable to two sets of legatees. In such a case, a fac-simile probate is the only one which can preserve the true force of the original; and for the court of probate to determine where they are to be inserted, is to settle the construction of the instrument in that particular beyond all recall. 1 Wms. Exrs. 298, and n. In a recent English case, where the name of an executor in a duly executed will had been obliterated, and another name substituted by the testator, the obliteration and substitution not being duly executed, the court will direct the original name restored in the probate, if satisfied by testimony aliunde what it was. Harris in re, 1 Sw. & Tr. 536. Barton v. Robins, 3 Phillim. 455, n. (b). Plume v. Beale, 1 P. Wms, 388. Allen v. McPherson, 1 H. Ld. Cas. 191. • Billinghurst v. Vickers, 1 Phillim. 187; Wood v. Wood, id. 357. 1 Wms. Exrs. 331. But the court will not expunge any portion of the instrument, but only engross in the registry such portions as are established. And where the portions failing are so connected with the remaining portions as to render them unintelligible, or excessively unequal or insensible, the whole |