4. Shares, or annuities, in the Bank of England, and all property in the public funds, by express statutes 5 in England, are declared personal estate; and it is also provided by statute that the same shall not descend to the heir. The same rule extends to all the public, state, and national stocks in America. It was at one time doubted in England, whether, in case of the specific bequest of public stocks, the same vested, as assets, in the executor, so as to require his assent to give effect to the legacy; but it was finally held, that it did so vest, and that it should be regarded and treated, in all respects, as pure personalty, and will pass under a bequest as such.8

6

5. It seems to be a settled rule of the English law, that in the ordinary case of apprenticeship, after the death of the master, the executor will have no interest in the apprentice. The early cases are numerous and full to this point, the obligation to instruct being regarded as personal to the master, and as the continuing consideration for the apprentice's duty of service. There are statutory regulations by which, in England and some of the American states, apprentices may be bound to others, under some circumstances, in case of the death of the master.10

6. The interest in literary property, and that in works of art, or in patent rights, will, upon the decease of the original proprietor, vest in the personal representative, and he may obtain the renewal of copyright, or of the patent.11

1 Geo. 1, § 2, ch. 19; 8 and 9 Vic. ch. 91, § 1.

'Pearson v. Bank of England, 2 Br. C. C. 529; s. c. 2 Cox, 175.

'Bank of England v. Moffat, 3 Br. C. C. 260; Bank of England v. Lunn, 15 Vesey, 569.

* Lord Eldon, in Ripley v. Waterworth, 7 Vesey, 425, 440; Franklin v. Bank of England, 1 Russ. Ch. Cas. 575, 589.

'Baxter v. Burfield, 2 Str. 1266; Coventry v. Woodhall, Hob. 134; Rex v. Peck, 1 Salk. 66, and cases cited; post, § 39, pl. 38.

12 N. Y. Rev. Stat. 160, §§ 41, 42.

"1 Wms. Exrs. 730; Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. U. S. 646, where it is held the personal representative may obtain the renewal of a patent for the benefit of an assignee of the deceased patentee.

7. In all cases where the owner of a fee, or of an estate in land descendible to the heir, leases the estate for a term extending beyond his own life, but for less than the whole period of the duration of his interest, so that there is a reversion in the estate reserved to himself and his heirs, the rent accruing after the decease of the lessor will go to the heir, as an incident of the reversion, and not to the personal representative.12

8. But if the estate leased be of a term of years in the lessor, which was a mere chattel interest, the rent reserved will go to the personal representative, whether there be any reversion of part of the term, or it be all embraced in the lease.13

9. But if part of the land leased was held by the lessor in fee, and part for a term of years, so that part of the rent belongs to the heir, and part to the executor or administrator, then the rent shall be apportioned, according to the proportion of each.14

10. And if the lease cover the entire estate of the lessor, so that there is no reversion, the rent will belong to the personal representative and not to the heir. 15 And where the rent is severed from the reversion by being devised to a third person, it will then go to the executor or administrator of the devisee, in the event of his decease before the term expires.16

11. At common law, no portion of the rent reserved could be recovered unless the tenant was suffered to enjoy the premises for the full term for which the rent was reserved, there being no apportionment of the rent, unless by the special provision of the demise, so that if tenant for life had underlet for years, the rent being payable on a certain day, and the lessor died the day before the rent became due, or even on the same day, but

Sacheverell v. Froggatt, 2 Saund. 367 a, 367 b, and note, where the early authorities are collected and carefully reviewed.

13 Ibid. But see contra, Stinson v. Stinson, 38 Me. R. 598.

14 1 Wms. Exrs. 731.

15 Baker v. Gostling, 1 Bing. N. C. 19.

16 1 Wms. Exrs. 732.

before the hour of sunset, when rent was demandable, no rent could be recovered for that unexpired term. But by a late English statute the courts are allowed to make an equitable apportionment in such cases.17

12. But always, in these cases, where the lease is binding upon the one entitled in remainder as well as upon him who is seised for life only, the tenant will be compellable to pay rent, for he will be secured in the enjoyment of his full term. But in all such cases, where the lessor who is tenant for life dies before the rent becomes due, it will all go to the remainder-man, although most of it was earned before his estate took effect in possession.18

13. There is a distinction in regard to apportionment, between an annuity and the accruing interest upon a given sum, which produces the same amount. In the former case, unless the annuitant live till the annuity becomes due, nothing can be recovered by his personal representative, but in the latter case, he will be entitled to claim all the interest which had accrued at the time of the decease.19 And there is an analogous distinction between annuities and accruing interest, when made the subject of bequests, as to the time the bequest becomes operative. In the case of an annuity bequeathed, it begins from the

#1 Wms. Exrs. 739, 740; 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, § 15, and the explanatory act, 4 Wm. 4, c. 22. And similar statutes exist in many of the American states. But it was held in New York, that such a statute only applies to leases made by the tenant for life and not to those made by the testator. Stillwell v. Doughty, 3 Bradf. Sur. Rep. 359. And where the will provides for the payment of an annuity in quarterly instalments, upon the first days of January, April, July, and October, and to commence immediately after the testator's death, which occurred in the month of August, it was held, there could be no apportionment of the first instalment, but that a full quarter should be paid on the first day of October following the death of the testator. Griswold v. Griswold, 4 Bradf. Sur. Rep. 216. The rule of the common law against apportionment of annuities has been often recognized in the American states. Wiggin v. Swett, 6 Met. 194; Phelps v. Culver, 6 Vt. R. 430.

"Norris v. Harrison, 2 Madd. 268; 1 Wms. Exrs. 736, 737.

1 Story Eq. Jur. § 480, and cases cited in notes.

death of the testator, and the first payment becomes due in one year thereafter; but where the interest, or net income of a certain sum is given, it will not begin to run until one year from the decease of the testator, and the first payment, consequently, becomes due in two years from that date.20

14. Choses in action, made payable to copartnerships, or to joint-owners merely, can be sued only in the name of the survivors, on the death of one of the parties to whom made payable.21 But in cases of mere partnership, the surviving partner holds in trust for the firm, and after paying all debts due, must account for the share of any remaining surplus to the personal representative of the party entitled.

15. The personal representative may maintain an action upon all choses in action made payable to the decedent, although at the time of his decease he retained no interest in the chose, having parted with the same by sale or gift,22 the executor or administrator suing as trustee for the real owner in such cases.

SECTION XI.

RIGHT OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO CHOSES IN ACTION AS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. The wife's right to her choses in action, accruing both before and after coverture, defined.

2. Rent due upon a demise of her land in their joint names will survive to her.

3. What acts on the part of the husband will defeat the wife's survivorship.

(1.) Husband receiving the accruing interest upon her choses in action will not defeat her right of survivorship.

Lawrence v. Embree, 3 Bradf. Sur. Rep. 364. See note 17, ante.

" Martin v. Crompe, 1 Ld. Raym. 340; s. c. 2 Salk. 444. By this case it seems, tenants in common may either join or sever in an action for rent, and in ejectment they must commonly sever. 1 Chit. Pl. 56. But the rule is otherwise

in some of the American states. Jackson v. Bradt, 2 v. Rogers, 4 Cranch, 165.

Brandt v. Heating, 2 B. Moore, 184, 186, 187.

Caines Rep. 169; Hicks

(2.) There must be some effective act on his part to defeat her right.

(3.) The wife's choses in action include all personal property not in possession. Reduction to husband's possession.

(4.) Not sufficient that husband is in possession as executor or trustee.

(5.) A decree or award of execution in favor of husband will have that effect.

(6.) An award of arbitrators will have the same effect.

(7.) An ante-nuptial contract will give the husband exclusive right to wife's personalty; but a settlement upon the wife, to have that effect, must show such intention. Mr. Roper's statement of the effect of settlements.

(8.) A settlement made during coverture cannot transfer the wife's choses in action to husband.

4. If the husband survive the wife, he will take her choses in action as administrator, and will hold them jure marito.

5. Some other cases stated affecting the wife's choses in action.

26. 1. WHERE the wife survives, she will be entitled, by right of survivorship, to all her choses in action which the husband had not reduced to possession during the coverture. This is an elementary principle of universal application.1 And this applies equally to equitable, as well as legal property or estate. And there seems to be no distinction in this respect between choses in action which accrued to the wife before, or during the coverture, except perhaps in regard to the different acts requisite on the part of the husband to defeat the wife's right of survivorship. The general rule of the wife's right to her choses in action accruing before coverture, until actually reduced to the possession of the husband, as against his assignees in bankruptcy, is largely and learnedly discussed in the Exchequer Chamber, both by court and counsel, in Sherrington v. Yates,

1 Co. Litt. 351 a.

* Osborn v. Morgan, 9 Hare, 432, 433.

• Dalton v. Midland Counties Railway Co. 13 C. B. 474, 478; s. c. 20 Eng. L. & Eq. 273. Jervis, Ch. J., here said: "There is a settled rule, that a married woman, though incapable of making a contract, is capable of having a chose in action conferred upon her, which, upon the death of her husband, will survive to her, unless he shall have reduced it into possession by doing some act of his own."

12 M. & W. 855. The rule of law upon the general question of the wife's