issued to the husband during his lifetime, and at his death became an asset of his es

tate, subject to the claim for a year's support. "Among the necessary expenses of administration, and to be preferred before all other debts, except as otherwise specially provided, is the provision for the support of the family." See Park's Code, § 4041. The year's support valued at $4,550.82, including five shares of stock in the Farmers' State Bank, was duly set aside to the widow and her three minor children as a support. The widow's request to the bank that the stock be transferred to herself and her children was declined until the bank was furnished with a certified copy of the year's support proceedings, and, when such certified copy was filed with the bank, it issued a certificate for the five shares of stock in the name of the widow alone and sent it to her. The bank could not defeat the interests of the minors in any part of the support, and, under the reasoning of the case of Allen v. Lindsey, 113 Ga. 521, 38 S. E. 975 (3), the title to this stock vested in the widow and children in common. "Except as otherwise specially provided," this title is superior to all other debts of the husband's estate, and the widow has no right to sell, or mortgage, or otherwise incumber any part of the support except for the benefit of the beneficia

ries.

"The stockholder in whose name the capital stock stands upon the books of such corporation ble to respond upon such individual liability.” at the date of its failure shall be primarily lia

The contention is that the stock stood in the widow's name when the bank failed; that the statute unqualifiedly fixes the liability for the unpaid stock subscription upon her, and her alone; that the suit is not brought to subject any part of the support; and that a general judgment against her is proper and legal. This section must be construed in the light of the older section (4041) cited above and the decisions of the courts construing that section. If this judgment is allowed to stand, I see no reason why an execution based thereon could not be levied on all the property of the widow, including her one-fourth undivided interest in the year's support. See Lowe v. Webb, 85 Ga. 731, 11 S. E. 845. In the case of Ullman v. Brunswick Title, etc., Co., 96 Ga. 625, 24 S. E. 409, certain stock was actually pledged in writing to secure the balance due for the purchase money of the stock, and it was held that the title to the pledged stock remained in the pledgor; that it was subject to be set aside as a year's support; that the lien of the pledgee was inferior to the claim of the beneficiaries of such support; and that the company could not subject the pledged stock for the payment of the unpaid subscription. In the case at bar the stock is valueless, and a judgment has been procured that might subject a part of the support itself to the payment of the balance of the unpaid subscription. I do not think that the verdict in this case should stand, and for this reason do not agree with the majority view.

(No. 11737.)

Jan. 28, 1921.)

(26 Ga. App. 257)

The unpaid purchase money for the stock in question was a credit extended to the husband during his lifetime, and was not an obligation subsequently incurred by the widow for the benefit of the beneficiaries. The writer is aware that by the act of 1891 (Park's Code, § 4048) a purchase-money mortgage for realty takes precedence over the year's support, and that by the act of August 17, 1903 (Park's Code, § 4049), a purchase-money mortgage on personalty was likewise made superior to the support. I think, however, that both the language of STANTON v. FIRST NAT. BANK OF DUNN. the statute and the decisions of our courts evidence an extreme solicitude on the part of our lawmakers and judiciary for the bene- (Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1. ficiaries of the support, and that, unless in the case of clear and specific exceptions, the property to which the deceased head of a family had title at his death is subject to this superior claim. It is not the policy of our law that the year's support, or any part of it, should be saddled with a debt like the one under consideration. It this were not true, it is conceivable that sufficient stock might be set aside to raise a liability exceeding the value of the remainder of the support. If in such a case the entire year's support could be held liable for such debt, it would be consumed; and if only the widow's interest therein could be so subjected, to that extent at least the support would be encroached upon.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Contempt 26 - Refusal of bank cashier to disclose numbers of debtor's stock certificates not punishable as contempt.

Under the particular facts of this case, the judgment adjudging the plaintiff in error in contempt of court was an abuse of the wide discretion vested in the court.

(Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) 2. Contempt 26 Bank cashier, disclosing number of debtor's shares and par value, not required to disclose numbers of stock certificates.

Under Civ. Code 1910, § 6035, providing that on demand by any officer holding an execution against the owner of stock in a bank Section 2248 of the Code provides that- or corporation on any officer of the corpora

(105 S.E.)

tion having access to its books, such officer shall | president, superintendent, manager, or other disclose the number of shares and par value owned by the defendant, a bank cashier complies with the statute by disclosing the number and par value of shares, and is not required to give the numbers of the stock certificates held by such stockholder.

officer of any corporation or joint-stock company having access to the books thereof, said president, superintendent, manager, or other officer aforesaid shall disclose to said levying officer the number of shares and the par value thereof owned by the defendant in said execution or attachment, and on refusal to do so,

Error from City Court of Waycross; J. L. shall be considered in contempt of court and Crawley, Judge. punished accordingly."

*

While courts of this state have the power to "inflict summary punishment for contempt of court, disobedience or resistance by any officer of said courts, party, juror, lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or witness, or other person or persons to any command of the said courts" (Civil Code of 1910, § 4643), we are constrained to hold that in the instant case the wide discretion of the

court was abused in adjudging the defendant in contempt, since the undisputed facts show that he complied with the strict letter of the

LUKE, J. [1, 2] This case grew out of the following facts: The First National Bank of Dunn obtained a judgment against L. J. statute; and until the General Assembly sees Cooper and J. S. Williams. Execution was placed in the hands of the sheriff, who made fit to supplement this statute, we do not think demand upon Stanton, as cashier and vice a person who complies with its every propresident of the First National Bank of Way- Vision can legally be said to be in contempt. cross, for information as to the number of In other words, if the statute in question is shares of the capital stock of that bank own- imperfect (and it seems to so be, as it does not ed by Cooper, and the numbers of the stock provide for such information as would enable certificates held by him, and as to the para levying officer to make a legal sale of shares value of the shares; and in response to this demand Stanton notified the sheriff that the books of the bank indicated that Cooper owned 874 shares of the capital stock, of the par value of $100 per share, but declined to give the additional information requested. Thereupon the First National Bank of Dunn presented to the judge of the city court of Waycross a petition, complaining of the aforesaid refusal and praying for a rule directed to Stanton, calling upon him to show cause why the information demanded was refused. Stanton answered that if the statute law of Georgia as embodied in Civil Code 1910,

of stock), it cannot be made perfect by con-
tempt proceedings, but can only be made so
by legislative enactment.
Judgment reversed.

BROYLES, C. J., and BLOODWORTH, J.

concur.

(26 Ga. App. 233)

INGRAM v. STATE. (No. 11943.) (Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1. Jan. 27, 1921.)

6035, was applicable to a national bank, he had given all the information required of. him by that section. The court nevertheless required him to furnish the information refused, and upon his failure to do so adjudged him in contempt of court; and the case came to this court on exceptions to that judg

ment.

The Code section in question provides as follows:

"Shares in a bank or other corporation may be levied on and sold, either under attachment or fi. fa. in any county where the corporation does business-notice of such levy being given to the defendant, if his residence be known, and also to the officers or agent of the corporation in the county where the levy is made. Upon demand by any sheriff, constable, or other levying officer of this state, having in his hands any execution or attachment against any person who is the owner of any shares or stock of said bank or joint-stock company, upon the

(Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) Criminal law 1064(4)-Grounds of motion for new trial not showing objections to evidence present nothing for review.

Grounds of a motion for a new trial complaining of admission of evidence "over the timely objection of the defendant," but not showing what objections were urged, present nothing for decision in the Court of Appeals. 2. Homicide 340 (4)-Erroneous charge on malice not ground for new trial when accused convicted of manslaughter.

An erroneous instruction on malice, being applicable to the offense of murder only, was not cause for a new trial when defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter.

3. Homicide 309 (4)-Evidence held to make question for jury as to killing in passion so as to authorize charge on manslaughter.

Evidence tending to show that while deceased was at defendant's home a quarrel arose and deceased assaulted defendant and struck

him in the abdomen with his fist, whereupon de-approved by the trial judge, will not be confendant drew his pistol and shot deceased, made sidered. a question for the jury as to whether the killing was the result of malice or of passion, and authorized a charge on the law of voluntary manslaughter.

Error from Superior Court, Dooly County; HINES, Director General of Railroads, et al. O. T. Gower, Judge. v. FOWLSTOWN TOBACCO CO. et al. (No. 11427.)

manslaughter, and he brings error. Affirmed. (Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.

BROYLES, C. J., and BLOODWORTH, J., ings on the pleadings.

concur.

(26 Ga. App. 206)

WATSON V. STATE. (No. 11977.)

(Additional Syllabus by Editorial Staff.) 2. Corporations 199-Party to stockholders' voting agreement held to have right of action for breach.

Where plaintiff and others owning a ma

(Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1. jority of the stock of a private corporation

Jan. 25, 1921.)

(Syllabus by Editorial Staff.)

entered into a voting agreement, under which plaintiff in a certain contingency was entitled to vote the stock of all of the parties in the

Criminal law 863(1)-Proper to recall jury election of a vice president, a salaried office, to charge on only defense urged.

Where the court had failed to charge on the subject of alibi, which was defendant's only defense, it was not error to recall the jury and charge on the law of alibi, where the jury had not been out of the courtroom more than three minutes.

but in violation of the agreement the other parties voted their stock for a resolution authorizing the directors to elect the officers, and, though plaintiff attempted to vote all of the stock for herself as vice president, the directors ignored such action, and elected another, plaintiff had a right of action for damages for the breach of the contract.

Error from Superior Court, Webster Coun- 3. Corporations ty; Z. A. Littlejohn, Judge.

Henry Watson was convicted of an offense, and he brings error. Affirmed.

M. A. Walker, of Preston, for plaintiff in

error.

Jule Felton, Sol. Gen., of Montezuma, for the State.

LUKE, J. There was some evidence in this case to authorize the conviction of the defendant. The verdict has the approval of the trial judge, and this court cannot say that it was error not to grant a new trial upon the general grounds. The only other assignment of error is upon the ground that, although the defendant's only defense was an alibi, the jury were sent out to find their verdict without being charged on that subject, although they were subsequently recalled and properly charged thereon. The court certi

199-Voting agreement between stockholders held not without sufficient consideration.

Where plaintiff, her husband, and her father-in-law acquired stock of a third party in a corporation in which they were interested, but plaintiff and her husband claimed they were entitled to more of the stock than was allotted to them by the father-in-law, and the parties entered into a voting agreement providing how the stock should be voted in the election of

officers, and authorizing plaintiff, in case of
the death of her husband, to vote all of the
stock for herself or any other person in the
election of a vice president, the contract was
based upon a sufficient consideration.
4. Corporations

199-Voting agreement between stockholders held not contrary to public policy.

A voting agreement between the parties owning a majority of the stock in a private business corporation, specifying how the stock should be voted in the election of officers, and

authorizing plaintiff in a certain contingency | for the office of president, and she was favorto vote all of the stock in the election of a vice president, was valid and not contrary to public policy.

5. Corporations 199-Party to voting agreement held not to have lost rights by divorce, remarriage, or death of first husband. Where plaintiff, her husband, her father-in-between J. W. English, Sr., and J. W. English, law, and others owning a majority of the stock in a corporation entered into a voting agreement under which plaintiff in a certain contingency was to be permitted to vote all of the stock in the election of a vice president, plaintiff held not to have lost her rights by her divorce, her subsequent remarriage, or the death of the first husband.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; tioned above, and insisted on having for himJ. T. Pendleton, Judge.