had been entered, it would not have been a judgments were rendered, though the deeds final decree, for the action of the court upon for these lands had not been recorded. the report of sale would still have been necessary." To the same effect, see Rawlings v. Rawlings, 75 Va. 76; Spoor v. Tilson, 97 Va. 279, 33 S. E. 609; Gills, by etc., v. Gills, 126 Va. 526, 101 S. E. 900; 2 Barton's Chy. Pr. (1st Ed.) § 233, p. 773. These authorities have never been shaken nor departed from, and afford ample authority for the conclusion reached by this court that the decree in question, while it adjudicated the principles of the controversy, was an interlocutory and not a final decree. This being so, the petition for appeal was presented in time, and the motion to dismiss the same is overruled. The question, therefore, to be disposed of is, whether there is error in the decree of November 16, 1917, appearing on the face of the record. "Until a final decree is entered and the court adjourned, all the proceedings from the first decree onward, though had or entered at former terms of the court, are interlocutory and in the breast of the court. Where, therefore, before final decree, any material error is discovered in any decree, the court on having its attention directed to the error, or the newly discovered evidence, is free to hear the parties, and to make such correction as justice demands. This is done by means of a petition to rehear." The statutes with respect to indexing and docketing judgments are as follows: "In such docket there shall be stated, in separate columns, the date and amount of the thereto; the alternate value of any specific judgment; the names of all of the parties property recovered by it; the date of docketing it; the amount and date of any credits thereon; the court in which, or the justice by whom it was rendered; and when paid off or discharged, in whole or in part, the time thereof, and by whom such payment or discharge was made, where there is more than one defendant." Code 1904, § 3560. "No judgment shall be a lien on real estate consideration without notice, unless it be dockas against a purchaser thereof for valuable eted according to the provisions of this chapter, in the county * * wherein such real estate is, either within twenty days next after the date of the said judgment, or fifteen days before the conveyance of said real estate to such purchaser." Code 1887, § 3570. "Every judgment shall, as soon as it is docketed, be indexed by the clerk in the name of each defendant, and shall not be regarded as docketed as to any defendant in whose name it is not so indexed." Code 1904, § 3561. "The clerk of every court shall have an index to each book he is required to keep, making convenient reference to every order, record, or entry therein. Every execution, and every judgment or decree for money, shall be indexed, as well in the name of the person against whom as in the name of the person in whose favor the same is." Code 1904, § 3183. Being thus in the breast of the court, such .decrees (i. e., interlocutory decrees), do not [3] These sections require the docket to constitute final records, and hence they are show the names of all of the parties to the subject to alteration and amendment, in the judgment. These names must be set out, and sound discretion of the court, at any future the omission of the Christian name is fatal term, and until the entry of the final decree. to the lien. See 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. L. Hence, where considerations of justice re-(2d Ed.) 775, and also Ridgway's Appeal, 15 quire it, there is not the same judicial reluc- Pa. 177, 53 Am. Dec. 586. tance to grant relief under a petition to rehear, as in the case of a bill of review. Lile's Equity Pl. & Pr. §§ 148, 157. [2] In the case in judgment, the trial court does not appear to have undertaken to determine whether the petition was a bill of review, or one to rehear, but sustained a demurrer to it whether considered as the one or the other. The petition, however, for the reasons given, supra, was one to rehear. The petition does not state its case very clearly or satisfactorily, but it sufficiently appears therefrom that the error imputed to the decree of November, 1917, is that it establishes judgments as binding liens upon the lands of the complainants which upon the face of the commissioner's report do not appear to have been docketed and indexed as required by the statute. The complainants allege that they had no notice, actual or constructive, of these judgments, and that as a matter of fact, in many instances, the lands subjected by the decree complained of had In the latter case a judgment was obtained against various parties by name, doing business under the partnership name of Mitchell, Green & Watson, but when the judgment was entered on the judgment lien docket, it was entered against Green, Watson, and Mitchell, omitting the Christian names. The court said: "We think that the failure to add the Christian names is fatal to the claim; that, though good as between the parties, it cannot affect subsequent purchasers." See, also, Fulkerson v. Taylor, 102 Va. 314, 46 S. E. 309. [4] The sections cited also require that a docketed judgment shall be indexed in the name of each defendant, and shall not be regarded as docketed as to any defendant in whose name it is not so indexed. Looking to the commissioner's report, it will be seen that he reports the Ould judgments and the "other judgments" in very different fashion. The (105 S.E.) "other judgments" are reported in like | statement, in itself, would indicate that the fashion) is as follows: judgments were never docketed, and the conclusion to that effect is aided by the very natural reflection that if these judgments had ......$750 been duly docketed, the commissioner would have made the same statement in his entries of said judgments that he had made touching the Eaves and other judgments included in his report. The manifest difference appearing in his statements with respect to the several judgments reported, without apparent reason $19 96 Feb. 9, The entries with respect to the Ould judg- therefor, suggests that there was a difference ments are as follows: "G. W. Ould. Judgment v. Moon and Harris (R. P. Harris being a partner) rendered at the term of the circuit court for Pulaski county which began on July 25, 1892 (Law Order Book No. 4, p. 212). Principal of judgment..... ......... Amt, due Aug. 20, 1917.. $314 18 26 45 in the facts, and that a statement of docketing that could be properly made in respect of the Eaves and other judgments could not be properly made, and hence was not made with respect to the Ould judgments. Having his attention called to this state of the record by the allegations of the petition for rehearing, the trial court should not have dismissed this petition. He may have been justified in $854 83 declining to consider the exhibits accompanying the petition, on the ground that in the exercise of due diligence they could have been procured at an earlier period; but the deficiencies of the report in the vital respect noted, and the error in the decree confirming that report, and subjecting the lands of the complainants to judgments that apparently were never docketed, and of which said com14 71 plainants had no notice, the demurrer admitting the allegations of fact, were errors appearing on the face of the record. "Judgment v. Moon, Hawley & Co.-R. P. Harris being a partner-rendered at same term of same court as above: $ 566 82 158 76 161 86 $1,475 12 "These errors, in case of an interlocutory decree, can be corrected by a petition to rehear long after the errors have been committed. There is no prescribed time in which such a petition must be filed, though a complainant may be denied relief on the ground of laches." [5] Commissioner Morton reports all of the Judgments contained in his report as "subsistIng liens against the estate of R. P. Harris," but judgments might be liens against the estate of R. P. Harris, and not liens upon But in the case in judgment, the principle, lands derived by purchase from R. P. Harris, or doctrine, of laches does not support the without notice of such judgments. The statute action of the trial court in dismissing the prescribes the manner in which the owner of complainant's petition. In the view of this a judgment shall secure a lien against a court, the petition should have been received, purchaser of lands for valuable consideration the demurrer overruled, and the questions without notice. A commissioner's report that raised by said petition considered on their reports a judgment as a subsisting lien merits. No order should be entered subjectagainst land held by such a purchaser, with- ing the lands of the complainants to the disout showing, or even stating, that the Judg-charge of the Ould judgments until it satisment has ever been docketed, reports a con- factorily appears in the record that such clusion of law that a court should not be content to accept. For all that the court knows, and for all that the record shows, the Ould judgments were never docketed at all, much less docketed as prescribed by the statute. In the case in judgment, the commissioner states, in connection with the Eaves and other judgments, that they were docketed, giving in each case the date of such docketing; but with respect to the Ould judgments the report merely states that "they were rendered in the circuit court of Pulaski county during the term beginning July 25, 1892." This steps have been taken in connection with these judgments as to make them, under the Virginia statutes, subsisting liens upon these lands. For the reasons given, the decree of the circuit court of Pulaski county, bearing date September 10, 1918, is reversed, and this case is remanded to said court for further proceedings therein conforming to the principles herein announced and conclusions reached. Reversed. BURKS, J., absent. (127 Va. 640) (Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. Sept. 16, 1920.) 1. Taxation ation. 8. Taxation 868 (1) Stock in a Missouri national bank owned by Virginia decedent, subject to Virginia inheritance tax; "estate within commonwealth." Under Tax Bill 1910, § 44, subsec. (a), imposing inheritance taxes upon estates within the 868(1)-Domicile of owner fix-commonwealth, stock in a Missouri national bank owned by a Virginia decedent is subject to an inheritance tax, the expression "estate within the commonwealth" including, not only such bank stock, but funds derived from the shares thereof, for the stock had a taxable situs in Virginia because of the testator's domicile. Intangible personal property, such as stocks, bonds, and other evidence of indebtedness, are subject to an inheritance tax in the state in which the owner was domiciled at the time of his death, without reference to actual location of the evidences of such indebtedness, because the domicile of the owner fixes for taxation the situs of personalty of this character. 2. Taxation 856-"Inheritance tax" is merely an excise imposed on the transmission of property. An inheritance tax is not a tax on the property itself, but is merely an impost or excise which is imposed as a condition precedent to the transmission or transfer of property from the dead to the living. [Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Inheritance Tax.] 3. Descent and distribution -Wills Right to succeed to property of a decedent rests in the discretion of the Legislature. The right to succeed to property of a decedent is a privilege which is granted by the state on such terms as may be imposed, and it depends on the statute of wills and statutes of descent and distribution. 4. Taxation 865-Inheritance taxes may be imposed on federal securities and bonds. An inheritance tax is not a tax upon property transferred, and so may be imposed on federal bonds and securities which are exempt by federal law from taxation. 865-Inheritance taxes may be imposed, though the property of the beneficiary is exempt. As inheritance taxes are merely on the succession, they can be collected though the property of the beneficiary is immune from state taxation, as in case of a legacy to the United States. 7. Taxation 204 (2) Exemptions are not favored, and burden is on one asserting exemption. 9. Taxation 868 (2)-Domiciliary state may impose inheritance taxes, though state of situs has also imposed such tax. Stock in a Missouri national bank owned by a Virginia decedent are subject to Virginia inheritance taxes as are funds derived from Where stock in a Missouri national bank owned by a Virginia decedent was sold, and after payment of the Missouri inheritance tax the fund was taken into Virginia for distribution, such fund was subject to inheritance taxes imposed by the state of Virginia. Error to Circuit Court, Grayson County. Proceedings between Cornett's executors and the Commonwealth. There was a judgment for latter, and the former bring error. Affirmed. Rhudy, of Galox, for plaintiffs in error. Jno. R. Saunders, Attorney General and J. D. Hank, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth. PRENTIS, J. The question raised by this record is whether a fund held by the Virginia executors of M. W. Cornett, constituting the proceeds of sale of 200 shares of stock of a national bank located in Missouri, made the laws of that state, there subjected to by the Missouri administrators, and, under a collateral inheritance tax, is also subject in this state to an inheritance tax under the Virginia statute. The decedent was domiciled in Grayson county, Va., and made a will disposing of his estate by pecuniary legacies to his sister, nephews, and nieces. The collateral inheritance tax having been imposed under the laws of Missouri, it is claimed that the imExemptions from taxation are not favored, position of the tax here complained of unand burden is on one who is included in the der the Virginia law is erroneous for two general language and claims exemption to show reasons: First, because under a proper consome exclusive language creating such exemp-struction of subsection (a) of section 44 of tion. the tax bill (Acts 1902-3-4, c. 148) the fund (105 S.E.) is not thereby made subject to a collateral, are so drawn as to exempt such property, the inheritance tax, upon the ground that it is not estate in this commonwealth; and, second, because it is in the nature of a double tax on the transfer of the same property. The nature of the inheritance tax and the conditions under which such a tax may be imposed have been so frequently and elaborately stated by the courts that it is unnecessary to do more in this case than to repeat a few generally accepted propositions. [1] The intangible personal property, stocks, bonds and other evidences of debt, are subject to an inheritance tax by the state in which its owner was domiciled at the time of his death, and this without reference to the actual location of the evidences of such ownership. This, because personal property of this character follows the person of the owner, and his domicile fixes its situs for taxation. Commonwealth v. Williams, 102 Va. 778, 47 S. E. 867, 1 Ann. Cas. 434; Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 110 Va. 229, 65 S. E. 536; Cooper v. Commonwealth, 121 Va. 338, 93 S. E. 680; Wise v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 693, 95 S. E. 632; Taylor v. Commonwealth, 124 Va. 445, 98 S. E. 5; Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473, 60 L. Ed. 830; In re Hodges, 170 Cal. 492, 150 Pac. 344, L. R. A. 1916A, 837; People v. Union Trust Co., 255 Ill. 168, 99 N. E. 377, L. R. A. 1915D, 450, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 514, note; Frothingham v. Shaw, 175 Mass. 59, 55 N. E. 623, 78 Am. St. Rep. 475, and note; State v. Ramsey County Probate Ct., 124 Minn. 508, 145 N. W. 390, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 262, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 861; In re Swift, 137 N. Y. 77, 32 N. E. 1096, 18 L. R. A. 709; In re Bullen, 143 Wis. 512, 128 N. W. 109, 139 Am. St. Rep. 1114; notes, 41 Am. St. Rep. 583; 127 Am. St. Rep. 1092; 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1179. transfer of United States bonds or securities by will or succession is subject to inheritance taxes. The reason is stated to be because there is no doubt that the Legislature of a state is competent to impose such a tax, since the charge is not on the bonds or securities themselves, but rather upon the transfer thereof, or the privilege of receiving them by will or descent. The fact that the property itself is exempt from taxation is therefore immaterial. Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115, 20 Sup. Ct. 829, 44. L. Ed. 998. Such a tax does not impair the obligation of the contract or the borrowing power of the United States government. Estate of Sherman, 153 N. Y. 1, 46 N. E. 1032; Estate of Whiting, 2 App. Div. 590, 38 N. Y. Supp. 131; Estate of Carver, 4 Misc. Rep. 592, 25 N. Y. Supp. 991; Matter of Howard, 5 Dem. Sur. (N. Y.) 483; Strode v. Commonwealth, 52 Pa. 181; Wallace v. Myers (C. C.) 38 Fed. 184, 4 L. R. A. 171; Orr v. Gilman, 183 U. S. 278, 22 Sup. Ct. 213, 46 L. Ed. 196; 26 R. C. L. 202. It is also held that under the federal War Revenue Act of 1898 (30 Stat. 448), United States bonds are not exempt from inheritance tax. It is provided that such bonds are exempt from taxation, but, as it has been stated, the tax is not upon the bonds, but upon the transmission thereof. Murdock v. Ward, 178 U. S. 139, 20 Sup. Ct. 775, 44 L. Ed. 1009. [6] Nor does the fact that the property of the beneficiary is immune from state taxation affect the question, for it is held that a legacy to the United States is subject to the New York state inheritance tax. United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 630, 16 Sup. Ct. 1075, 41 L. Ed. 289, affirming In re Merriam's Estate, 141 N. Y. 479, 36 N. E. 505. In that case the Supreme Court of the United states said this: "The act in question is not open to the objection that it is an attempt to tax the property of the United States, since the tax is imposed upon the legacy before it reaches the hands of the government. The legacy becomes the property of the United States only after it has suffered a diminution to the amount of the tax, and it is only upon this condition that the Legislature assents to a bequest of it. It What the corporations are to which the exemption was intended to apply are indicated by the tax laws of New York, and are confined to those of a religious, educational, charitable, or reformatory purpose. We think it was not intended to apply it to a purely political or governmental corporation like the United States." Note, 127 Am. St. Rep. 1025. [2, 3] Such a tax is not a tax upon the property itself, but is an impost or excise, which is imposed as a condition precedent to the transmission or transfer of property from the dead to the living. The right to succeed to the property of a decedent is a creature of the law, only secured and protected by its authority, which right the Legislature may, in its discretion, restrict, for it depends upon the statute of wills and the statute of descents and distributions. is a tax upon a civil right or privilege which is granted by the state upon such terms as may be imposed. Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Grat. (55 Va.) 422, 73 Am. Dec. 367; Peters v. Lynchburg, 76 Va. 931; Magoun v. Illinois, etc., Co., 170 U. S. 283, 18 Sup. Ct. 594, 42 L. Ed. 1037; Commonwealth v. Carter, 126 Va. 469, 102 S. E. 58; Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 578, 22 Sup. Ct. 515, 46 L. Ed. €97; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 44 L. Ed. 969. [4, 5] So clear is it that an inheritance tax is not a tax upon the property transferred [7, 8] (a) It is claimed that as the Virginia statute under consideration (subsection “a," section 44, as amended by section 1, Tax Bill 1910, Acts 1910, p. 229) under which these taxes were imposed, uses different which have been construed, these cases have, sustaining such taxation under statutes imlittle application; that as the bank was in Missouri, therefore the property here involved was neither in Virginia nor subject to its jurisdiction, and hence was not intended by the Virginia statute to be subjected to the collateral inheritance tax. In Mann v. Carter, 74 N. H. 352, 68 Atl. 134, this is said: tax laws and for the support of its institutions, the exercise of such power, whether rightful ilar power by this state, for the support of or wrongful, does not make the exercise of simits institutions, illegal on the ground of double taxation. The two burdens are created by two different and independent states, for wholly different local purposes, and are as distinct and as irrelevant, the one to the other, on the question of double taxation, as were the two taxes assessed upon the plaintiffs' ice in Winkley v. Newton, supra. posing collateral inheritance taxes. Hawley v. Malden, 232 U. S. 1, 34 Sup. Ct. 201, 58 L. Ed. 477, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 842; Fidelity & C. Trust Co. v. Louisville, 245 U. S. 54, 38 Sup. Ct. 40, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 150, 62 L. Ed. 145, L. R. A. 1918C, 124; Cream of Wheat The pertinent words of the Virginia stat- | Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U. S. 325, ute are, "estate within the commonwealth," 40 Sup. Ct. 558, 64 L. Ed. 931. while the language construed in some of the other statutes is, "personalty in the territorial limits of the commonwealth," and "Whether the burden imposed by the inher"property within the Jurisdiction of the itance law is properly called a tax, it is unnecstate." Bearing in mind that the general essary to inquire; for if it is, the Legislature purpose of the Virginia statute is to impose has not attempted to impose more than a sininheritance taxes, it seems to us that this gle tax on the property of a decedent passing difference in verbiage does not signify any collaterally under our laws. If some other different intendment, or change the true in-state makes a claim to the property under its tent, purpose, or meaning of the statute, as indicated by its language, because it is so well settled that if the owner of the property is domiciled in the state of Virginia, then his tangible personal property is, for the purpose of taxation, located in this state. Upon his death, it must be distributed in accordance with the law of his domicile, is estate within the commonwealth, and therefore within its jurisdiction. The Virginia statute does relieve part of a decedent's estate from inheritance taxes-that is, prop- trend of the authorities upon the subject. "This result is also in accord with the general erty which is devised or bequeathed "exclu- said in Hartman's Case, 70 N. J. Eq. 664, 667: sively for state, county, municipal, benevo- The great weight of authority favors the prinlent, charitable, educational, or religious pur-ciple adopted by the New York Court of Apposes," and if the Legislature had intended peals, holding that the tax imposed is on the to make further exemptions of the estates of right of succession under a will, or by devoluits deceased domiciled residents from in- tion in case of intestacy; and that as to perheritance taxes, surely some language in- sonal property, its situs, for the purpose of a dicative of such a purpose would have been legacy or succession tax, is the domicile of the used. We are of opinion that a fair con- decedent, and the right to its imposition is not sideration of the language used and the affected by the statute of a foreign state, which general purposes of the statute inevitably the personal estate of any nonresident testasubjects to similar taxation such portion of leads to the conclusion that the words, "es-tor or intestate as he may take and leave there tate in the commonwealth," in this statute, for safe-keeping, or until it should suit his includes the proceeds of the sale of the convenience to carry it away.' In addition to shares of national bank stock referred to, which constituted part of the estate of the decedent, which estate at his death had a legal situs in this state. Exemptions from taxation are not favored, and the burden is upon one who is included within the gen eral language and claims exemption to show some exclusive language creating such exemption. 26 R. C. L. § 206, p. 233; Ann. Cas. 1915C, 324. In this statute there is no specific language involved except the words "estate in the commonwealth," and these words do not import any purpose to exclude such property as is here involved. [9] (b) It is also claimed that because the fund has been assessed with a collateral inheritance tax in Missouri, therefore this tax is invalid. That double taxation is vexatious, burdensome, and contrary to the common sense of justice is true, but this does not determine the question of its validity. There are many instances of valid double As cases already cited, see Hopkins' Appeal, 77 Conn. 644; Bridgeport Trust Co.'s Appeal, 77 Conn. 657; Matter of Swift's Estate, 137 N. Y. 77; Matter of Houdayer, 150 N. Y. 37; State v. Dalrymple, 70 Md. 294; Eidman v. her. Tax, § 29; Dicey, Conf. Laws, 682 et seq. Martinez, 184 U. S. 578, 581; Dos Passos In But see In re Joyslin's Estate, 76 Vt. 88." The two taxes are based upon different theories. The state in which the owner is domiciled has the right to fix the conditions and limitations of succession. On the other hand, the state within which the property is actually located has the right to impose the condition upon which such property may be transferred; and so it is held in Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277, 47 L. Ed. 445, that the fact that two states, each dealing with its own law of succession, have taxed the rights which they respectively confer, gives no ground for complaint on constitutional grounds. Under |