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Forgeries

other statutes.

the court; so also for any other person to use such Maximum, seven years (sect. 28).

false process.

Instruments made evidence by statute. seven years (sect. 29).

Maximum,

Court roll, or copy thereof, relating to copyhold estates (sect. 30).

Certificates and other writings relating to the registry of deeds. Maximum, fourteen years (sect. 31).

Summons, conviction, order or warrant of magistrates. Maximum, five years (sect, 32).

Name of Accountant-General of Chancery (y). Maximum, fourteen years (sect. 33).

Licence or certificate of marriage. Maximum, seven years (sect. 35).

Register of births, baptism, deaths, marriages, burials (z), &c. (sect. 36).

Making false entries in copies of registers sent to registrars (sect. 37).

In addition to the above-mentioned instruments, &c., dealt with in the forgery of which is dealt with in the Forgery Consolidation Act, there are other cases provided for by many statutes too numerous to notice. One or two of the more important are the following:

Stock certificates or coupons, &c., issued by the Bank of England for the payment of interest of national debt (33 & 34 Vict. c. 58, s. 3, v. also sect. 6).

Inland Revenue stamps (33 & 34 Vict. c. 98, s. 18).
Election documents (35 & 36 Vict. c. 33, s. 3).

(y) Now Paymaster-General, 35 & 36 Vict. c. 42, s. 12.

(2) Destroying, injuring the above, and other offences connected with the same subject are also dealt with in this section.

Trade-marks (25 & 26 Vict. c. 88; 38 & 39 Vict. c. 91) (a).

Falsification of accounts by clerks, officers, servants, and other employés (38 & 39 Vict. c. 24) (b).

Under Land Transfer and Declaration of Title Acts (25 & 26 Vict. c. 67; 38 & 39 Vict. c. 87) (c).

Printing a copy of any Act, proclamation, order, regulation, royal warrant, circular, list, gazette, or document which falsely purports to have been printed under the superintendence of Her Majesty's Stationery Office, or tendering in evidence any such falsely printed copy, is also forgery (d).

common law.

So much for forgeries provided against by particular Forgery at statutes. Forgery at common law is a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment, or both. It is only in virtue of the particular statute that any forgery is made a felony; the facility with which certain forgeries can be perpetrated, and the dangerousness of their tendency, necessitating this course. Cases of forgery which have not been specially dealt with by statute are nevertheless crimes, and left to their punishment at common law; for example, forging a testimonial to character in order to obtain an appointment (e).

In viewing the crime generally, we shall have to treat of two classes of acts, each entailing the same consequences, and both usually appearing in different counts of the same indictment.

i. The actual forgery.

ii. The knowingly uttering the forged instrument.

(a) v. p. 125.

(b) v. p. 237.
(c) v. p. 271.

(d) 45 Vict. c. 9. s. 3.

(e) R. v. Sharman, 23 L. J. (M.C.) 51.

The instrument.

Nature of the fabrication.

i. The Forgery.-As to the instrument itself. It must have some apparent validity, that is, it must purport on the face of it to be good and valid for the purpose for which it is created. So that a bill of ex

change, which, for want of signature, is incomplete, cannot be the subject of forgery, because the defect is on the face of the instrument (ƒ). But in such a case the prisoner may be convicted of a forgery at common law (g). But there need not be an exact resemblance; it will be sufficient if it is capable of deceiving persons of ordinary observation (h). The forgery must be of some document or writing; therefore the painting an artist's name in the corner of a picture, in order to pass it off as an original picture by that artist, is not forgery (i).

As to what fabrication will constitute a forgery.—It need not be of the whole instrument. Very frequently the only false statement is the use of a name to which the defendant is not entitled. It does not matter whether the name wrongly applied be a real or a fictitious one (j). And a person may be guilty of forgery by making a false deed in his own name, as when a person has made a conveyance in fee of land to A., and afterwards makes a lease for 999 years of the same land to B. of a date prior to that of the conveyance to A., for the purpose of defrauding A., the latter deed is a forgery (k). Even to make a mark in the name of another person, with intent to defraud that person, is forgery (1). Of course the forgery need not be in the name; it may equally be in some other part of the instrument. For example, it is forgery

(f) R. v. Pateman, R. & R. 455. See also R. v. Harper, 7 Q. B. D. 78; 50 L. J. (M.C.) 90.

(g) Per Stephen, J., in R. v. Harper, supra.

(h) R. v. Collicott, R. & R. 212.

(i) R. v. Closs, 27 L. J. (M.C.) 54.

(j) R. v. Lockett, 1 Leach, 94.

(k) R. v. Ritson, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 200; 39 L. J. (M.C.) 10.
(1) R. v. Dunn 1 Leach, 57.

to fill in without authority a form of cheque already signed, with blanks left for the insertion of the sum (m).

will suffice.

Not only a fabrication, but even an alteration, how- An alteration ever slight, if material, will constitute a forgery; for example, making a lease of the manor of Dale appear to be a lease of the manor of Sale by changing the D to S (n); making a bill of exchange for £8 appear to be for £80 by adding a cipher (o).

the writing.

It must be proved that the alleged forgery was in- Evidence as to tended to represent the handwriting of the person whose handwriting it appears to be and is proved not to be, or that of a person who never existed. How is it to be proved that it is not the handwriting of the person of whom it purports to be? The most natural evidence is the denial of such person on his being produced as a witness. Even before the change in the law, which made interested parties competent witnesses, it was allowable to call as a witness the party whose writing had been forged (p). Whether he be or be not called as a witness, the handwriting may be proved not to be his by any person acquainted with his handwriting, either from having seen him write, or from being in the habit of corresponding with him (q). It is also provided by statute that comparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine, may be made by witnesses; and that such writings and the evidence of witnesses concerning the same may be submitted to the court and jury as evidence of the genuineness, or otherwise, of the writing in dispute (r). It appears

(m) Flower v. Shaw, 2 C. & K. 703.

(n) I Hawk. c 70, s. 2.

(0) R. v. Elsworth, 2 East, P. C. 986.

(p) 9 Geo. 4, c. 32.

(q) v. p. 439.

(r) 28 Vict. c. 18, s. 8.

The intent to defraud.

The uttering.

Under the

tender will

suffice.

not to be settled whether an expert may give evidence as to whether the writing is in a feigned hand from its appearance (s). It is sufficient to disprove the handwriting of the person, and he need not be called to disprove an authority to others to use his name; circumstances shewing guilty knowledge are enough (t).

As to the intent to defraud.-It is not necessary to prove an intent to defraud any particular person; it will suffice to prove generally an intent to defraud (u). So it need not appear that the prisoner had any intention ultimately to defraud the person whose signature he had forged, he having defrauded the person to whom he uttered the instrument (v). But it is not necessary that any person should be actually defrauded, or that any person should be in a situation to be defrauded by the Act (x).

ii. The Uttering.-In an indictment for forgery it is usual to add a second count, charging the prisoner with knowingly uttering the forged instrument. So that if the prosecution fail to prove the actual forgery, the prisoner may be convicted of the uttering.

The words of the Consolidation Act, which deals Forgery Act a with all instruments in ordinary use, are, "offer, utter, dispose of, and put off." Therefore, in cases falling within that statute, it will suffice if there be a tender, or attempt to pass off the instrument; there need not be an acceptance by the other. Where such accept

ance is requisite in order to constitute the crime, there

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