appropriated his master's property to his own use, after receiving it from another on his master's account, was for all purposes in precisely the same position as the servant who did the same thing after receiving it from his master. The Courts, however, decided otherwise. They have held on many occasions that, though the master's possession continues when he gives the custody of a thing to his servant, it does not begin when the servant receives anything on account of his master; on the contrary, the servant has the possession, as distinguished from the custody, until he does some act which vests the possession in his master, though it may leave the custody in himself. If during that interval he appropriates the thing, he commits embezzlement. If afterwards, theft. The most pointed illustration of this singular doctrine which can be given occurs in the case of R. v. Reed 1854; D. and P. 256. B. sent A., his servant, with a cart to fetch coals. A. put the coals into the cart, and on the way home sold some of them and kept the money. A. was convicted of larceny, and the question was whether he ought to have been convicted of embezzlement. It was held that the conviction was right, because, though A. had the custody of the cart all along, yet the possession of it and its contents was in B., and though A. had the possession of the coals whilst he was carrying them to the cart, that possession was reduced to a mere custody when they were deposited in the cart, so that A.'s offence was larceny, and not embezzlement, which it would have been if he had misappropriated the coals before they were put into the cart.

These explanations will, I hope, render the article in the Digest intelligible. In order to justify it legally, it is necessary to state the manner in which I arrived at it. I examined a large number of cases, of which I have put eleven in the form of illustrations to the article. In some of these cases it was decided that the offence was theft; in others, that the offence was embezzlement. I have assumed (as I was entitled to do, as appears from the explanations given above) that whenever an offence was held to be theft the property stolen was in the possession of the owner or master, although it might be in the custody of a guest or servant; and that whenever the offence was held to be embezzlement the property embezzled was in the possession, as distinguished from the custody, of the servant. I might easily have enlarged the number of illustrations to any

conceivable extent; but if those given are not enough to make the matter plain, I despair of making it plain or understanding it, and I do not wish to make it darker than it is. It is, perhaps, just worth while to add once more that I am in this work merely stating, and not attempting to justify, the law. The technicalities on this subject appear to me to be altogether superfluous, and I think they might be easily dispensed with by re-defining the offence of theft, or even by removing the distinction between theft, embezzlement, and false pretences.

Adulteration

Statement of Offence.

Statute, etc., by which it is created.

Punishment.

Whether triable at
Quarter Sessions.

Page of this book.

Arms

unlawfully training or being trained to the M. 60 G. 3 & 1, G. 4 c. 1, s. 1 P. S. 7 yrs. or No. use of.

Arson

church, &c., or place of worship.

63

impr. h. 1. 2 yrs.
for being trained

F. 24 & 25 V. c. 97, s.

1

P. S. life

No.

364

dwelling house, any person being therein.. house, farm, building, &c., with intent to

injure or defraud.

station or building belonging to a railway or

F.

S.

No.

365

of a stack the same

Assaults

hindering any person endeavouring to save his life from a ship in distress.

F. 24 & 25 V. c. 100, s. 17 P. S. life

No...

197