1922 CAMERON, CAMERON, J.A.-These are cases stated by R. M. Noble, Judgment. Esquire, police magistrate, for the opinion of the Court under sec. 761 of The Criminal Code. In each case the accused was found guilty of an infraction of sec. 215 of The Canada Grain Act, ch. 27, of 2 Geo. V., for having sold grain on commission without having first secured a license as provided by said Act. The circumstances of the two cases differ in this respect: in case No. 1 (the Regnier case) the transaction involved in the sale of grain occurred wholly at Winnipeg in this province, while in case No. 2 (the Decker case) the grain in question was consigned to the accused company from a point in the province of Saskatchewan. This difference is not material in view of the wording of sec. 215, which in general terms prohibits persons and corporations from engaging in the business of grain commission merchants without taking out a license as thereby prescribed. The questions submitted by the magistrate raise the issue of the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Canada to enact said sec. 215 of The Canada Grain Act and other sections connected therewith as well as its jurisdiction to enact the Act. Notwithstanding the considerations pressed on our attention by counsel for the Minister of Justice, I am unable to see how this case can be distinguished from that before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Atty.-Gen. for Canada v. Attys.-Gen. for for Alberta, Etc., (The Insurance Case) [1916] 1 A.C. 588, 85 L.J.P.C. 124, 10 W.W.R. 405, 34 W.L.R. 192. There as here it was sought to uphold the provisions of the Dominion Insurance Act, 1910, ch. 32, in question as within the authority conferred on Parliament by The B.N.A. Act, sec. 91, head (2) to legislate for the “regulation of trade and commerce,” and under the general power conferred by sec. 91, to legislate for the peace, order and good government of Canada. Against these contentions it was argued that the provisions in question went far beyond the regulation of trade and commerce and vitally affected civil rights in the provinces, and that they were not authorized under the general power given to Parliament to legislate for the peace, order and good government of Canada because they affected such civil rights. In The Insurance Case also the importance of the trade was insisted on as an important element affecting the interpretation of the constitutional Act. Lord Haldane at p. 407 (10 W.W.R.) thus deals with the effect of sec. 4 of The Insurance Act: It will be observed that s. 4 deprives private individuals of their liberty to carry on the business of insurance, even when that business is confined within the limits of a province. It will also be observed that even a provincial company operating within the limits of the province where it has been incorporated cannot, notwithstanding that it may obtain permission from the authorities of another province, operate within that other province without the license of the Dominion Minister. In other words, the capacity is interfered with which, according to the judgment just delivered by their Lordships in the case of the Bonanza Company, such a company possesses to take advantage of powers and rights proffered to it by authorities outside the provincial limits. Such an interference with its status appears to their Lordships to interfere with its civil rights within the province of incorporation, as well as with the power of the Legislature of every other province to confer civil rights upon it. Private individuals are likewise deprived of civil rights within their provinces. It must be taken to be now settled that the general authority to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Canada, which the initial part of s. 91 of The British North America Act confers, does not, unless the subject-matter of legislation falls within some one of the enumerated heads which follow, enable the Dominion Parliament to trench on the subject-matters entrusted to the provincial Legislatures by the enumeration in s. 92. His Lordship then goes on to point out that there is only one case outside the heads enumerated in sec. 91 in which the Dominion Parliament can effectively legislate as regards a province, and that is where the subject-matter is outside of those assigned to the provinces by sec. 92. Russell v. Reg., 7 App. Cas. 829, 51 L.J.P.C. 77, is an instance in point, but that decision is to be applied with great caution in view of the subsequent decision in Hodge v. Reg., 9 App. Cas. 117, 53 L.J. P.C. 1, and the decision of the Board holding the McCarthy Act ultra vires of the Dominion Parliament. He says, at p. 408 (10 W.W.R.): Their Lordships think that as the result of these decisions it must now be taken that the authority to legislate for the regulation of trade and commerce does not extend to the regulation by a licensing system of a particular trade in which Canadians would otherwise be free to engage in 5-M.L.R. 1922 Judgment. CAMERON, 1922 Judgment. CAMERON, the provinces. S. 4 of the statute under consideration cannot, in their opinion, be justified under this head. Nor do they think that it can be justified for any such reasons as appear to have prevailed in Russell v. Reg., supra. No doubt the business of insurance is a very important one, which has attained to great dimensions in Canada. But this is equally true of other highly important and extensive forms of business in Canada which are today freely transacted under provincial authority. Where The British North America Act has taken such forms of business out of provincial jurisdiction, as in the case of banking, it has done so by express words which would have been unnecessary had the argument for the Dominion Government addressed to the Board from the Bar been well founded. This illuminating decision further clarifies the meaning to be attached to the words "civil rights." It was contended in Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons, 7 App. Cas. 96, 51 L.J.P.C. 11, that these words meant only such rights as flowed from the law, as for example, the status of persons. But that interpretation was not accepted and it was held that they include "rights arising from contracts," and that the words “property” and "civil rights" are used in their largest sense, an interpretation that is exemplified in Lord Haldane's instructive judg ment. It is obvious that the licensing authorized by the provisions of The Canada Grain Act has as its object the control of the grain trade by the Grain Board. But, whatever the object, it cannot be within the powers of the Dominion Parliament to deprive individuals of their civil rights within their provinces or to limit their freedom in engaging in a particular trade. To attempt to do that is distinctly to trench upon the subject matters entrusted to the provincial Legislatures by sec. 92. In In re Board of Commerce Act and Combines and Fair Prices Act; Atty.-Gen. for Canada v. Atty.-Gen. for Alberta [1922] 1 W.W.R. 20, at p. 24, Lord Haldane holds: It is to the Legislatures of the provinces that the regulation and restriction of their civil rights have in general been exclusively confided, and as to these the provincial Legislatures possess quasi-sovereign authority. Consequently it can only be in highly exceptional circumstances that the liberty of the inhabitants of the provinces may be restricted by the Parliament of Canada. Where there was no such power in that Parliament, as in the case of the Dominion Insurance Act, it was held otherwise, and that the authority of the Dominion Parliament to legislate for the regulation of trade and commerce did not, by itself, enable interference with particular trades in which Canadians would, apart from any right of interference conferred by these words above, be free to engage in the provinces. It appears to me that the questions raised with reference to the validity of sec. 215 of The Canada Grain Act are fully disposed of by these two recent decisions of the Judicial Committee. The attention of the Court was directed to sec. 95 of The B.N.A. Act giving the Parliament of Canada power to make laws in relation to agriculture in all or any of the provinces. I cannot see that the power so conferred authorizes such an enactment as sec. 215, and I agree with the remarks of Mr. Justice Dennistoun on this subject and with his view and that of the Chief Justice as to the answers to be made to the questions submitted. FULLERTON, J.A. The stated cases submit a number of questions for the opinion of this Court. In the view I take it is only necessary to answer that portion of the second question which asks whether the Parliament of Canada has jurisdiction to enact sec. 215 of The Canada Grain Act. That section is in these terms: No person shall engage in the business of selling grain on commission, or receive or solicit consignments of grain for sale on commission, in the Western Inspection Division, without first obtaining such annual license from the Board. Sec. 21 provides that the Western Inspection Division shall consist of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia, The Northwest Territories and that portion of Ontario lying west of and including the City of Port Arthur. The convictions are founded on a breach of sec. 215. Counsel for the defendant contends that sec. 215 is ultra vires of the Parliament of Canada inasmuch as it deals with the subject-matter of "civil rights" which by sec. 92, subsec. 13, of The B.N.A. Act, is assigned exclusively to the provinces. Counsel for the Crown, on the other hand, contends that this legislation comes either under the general authority to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of 1922 Judgment. CAMERON, J.A. 1922 Canada, which the initial part of sec. 91 of The B.N.A. Act Judgment. confers, or under the specific authority given by sec. 91, subsec. 2, to legislate for the regulation of trade and commerce. FULLERTON, Counsel for the defendant relies, and I think rightly, upon the decision of the Privy Council in the case of Atty.-Gen. for Canada v. Atty.-Gen. for Alberta, Etc. (The Insurance Case) [1916] 1 A.C. 588, 85 L.J.P.C. 124, 10 W.W.R. 405, 34 W.L. R. 192. In that case the validity of sec. 4 of The Insurance Act, 1910 (9 & 10 Edw. VII., ch. 32), was in question. This section prohibits anyone carrying on the business of insurance in Canada without a license from the Minister of Finance. The contentions of counsel for and against the validity of this section were practically the same as in the present case. The Judicial Committee held the legislation beyond the competence of the Dominion Parliament as an attempted "regulation by a licensing system of a particular trade in which Canadians would otherwise be free to engage in the provinces," and in consequence an interference with the civil rights of individuals within the provinces. Upon the authority of this case I hold that sec. 215 of The Canada Grain Act is ultra vires of the Parliament of Canada. DENNISTOUN, J.A.-These are cases stated by R. M. Noble, Esquire, one of His Majesty's police magistrates in and for the province of Manitoba under the provisions of sec. 761 of The Criminal Code. The Manitoba Grain Company, Limited, has been found guilty of two infractions of sec. 215 of The Canada Grain Act, ch. 27, 2 Geo. V (Dom.) by selling grain on commission without having secured a license from the Board of Grain Commissioners for Canada as provided by that Act, and has been fined $500 and costs in each case, following the provisions of sec. 119 of the Act as enacted by sec. 10 of ch. 40 of 9-10 Geo. V. The facts in these two cases are similar, with this exception, that in the Decker case the car of wheat sold was consigned by a resident of the province of Saskatchewan, and in the Reg |