the necessity of enforcing strict adherence to it, and multiplying the chances of dispute and disagreement. From the vague and indefinite way in which the treaty is worded, differences have arisen, and must arise; the Siamese will put just such a construction upon the several stipulations as best suits their own selfish views, and adhere no longer to them than meets their own convenience. The trifling extent of direct trade with Siam since the date of Captain Burney's treaty, is a wretched compensation for the sacrifice of other interests, and the immense expense involved in obtaining it.

It was observed by Mr. Crawfurd, the former envoy to Siam, a gentleman well known as an able diplomatic officer, “that it was hopeless to prevail on the Siamese by treaty to yield up their supremacy over the Malayan states; but that if alliances, offensive and defensive, were entered into with those states (Pantam excepted, which is now peopled with Siamese), the prudent government of Bankok would pocket the affront." But there is a previous question to be answered. Had the government of Bankok any legitimate right to consider such an act as an affront? Siamese supremacy over the Malay peninsula has been set forth, but it was a thing taken for granted, and not proved. No authority has been produced for it, beyond the vague tradition of events said to have passed seven hundred years ago; and in so far as the history of every state has been traced in the Malayan annals, is directly disproved. The occasion of war between the Siamese and the Malay states, in which the latter were generally successful, we find set forth in history; but not one instance of the acknowledged dependency of any one or supremacy of the other has been proved.

The Malays certainly never were the natural subjects of Siam; they are of a different origin, descent, religion, and language. The Malay states are weak, that of Siam comparatively powerful; the dependence, therefore, is the result of power, not of right, and has operation only in respect to those whose proximity has enabled the latter to turn its power to the subjugation of its neighbours. The mere assertion of a claim which the asserter never has and never could establish, and which the relative state never acknowledged, is a mere nullity, and can never surely be urged as a legitimate bar to a connexion with another state, if it suits the policy of such to contract it.

It is scarcely necessary to recapitulate the history of the connexion between Siam and Quedah. It was the northernmost of the Malay states, and next to the Siamese government of Ligore; the first, therefore, to feel the effects of their proximity. It is admitted, at the time of the cession of the island of Penang, to have presented the Boongah Mas to Siam; but it is clear that it also occasionally sent the Boongah Mas to Ava. By those who attentively read the first agreement proposed for the cession, no doubt can be entertained that the protection of the British Government against both Ava and Siam was the object in view. It certainly was not considered at the time that the mere presentation of the Boongah Mas placed the king in such a state of subjection as to authorize the direct interference, exaction, and oppression, afterwards practised; had it been so considered, it must have followed that the king had no right to cede, that we had no right to accept the island; but, in reality, the presentation of the Boongah Mas, according to the general practice of these countries, bears no such construction of dependence as has been put upon it. Siam sends the Boongah Mas to China; but we have never heard of China exercising any control or interference in the internal government of Siam. Much misconstruction has arisen, as usual on such occasions, by the erroneous application of European ideas and terms to Indian customs. Boongah Mas has been confounded with tribute; and then followed homage, vassalage, liege-lordship and supremacy, and all the feudal jargon of Europe, which, when applied to that part of the world, has never failed to mislead the judgment and confound the understanding. The triennial presentation of the Boongah Mas being the only connexion that subsisted between Quedah and Siam, the British Government was fully justified in supporting the king against all future interference and encroachment. Had the king ceded the whole

kingdom to the British Government, instead of the island of Penang, all the legitimate obligation the Government incurred to Siam would have been the regular presentation of the Boongah Mas, as done by their predecessors; beyond that, all undue aggression of power on one part, and the unavoidable submission of weakness on the other, against which the weak state had a right to protect itself by a connexion with a more powerful one, and another powerful state, provided it suited its own interests, had an unquestionable right to bestow it. That a course of policy founded on this principle would not have been opposed by Siam itself, seems perfectly clear.

Mr. Crawfurd, formerly Resident at Singapore, observed, "A firm tone and vigorous conduct will be indispensably requisite. The Siamese are surrounded by weak neighbours, whom they have subjugated, and to whom they dictate without resistance. This, and their great ignorance of all foreign nations, has rendered them, although essentially weak and puerile, avaricious, vain, and arrogant to such an extreme, as to fancy themselves nothing less than the very first nation on the globe. These unfounded pretensions mislead them so egregiously, that it is scarcely safe even to attempt to conciliate them; and thus the most moderate policy on the part of other nations will always be in danger of being construed by them into timidity and apprehension of their own powers. From my own experience of their singular and impracticable character, it is my own conviction that, had the circumstances of the time warranted the Penang Government in promptly repelling, even by military force, the threatened invasion of the island, the partial invasion of the opposite coast, and the threatening and arrogant language of the Government of Ligore, that the fears of the Siamese court would have induced it to have made ample atonement, to have retraced its steps, to have withdrawn its forces from Quedah, and even foreborne, in future, from meddling in the affairs of that state." It was deemed advisable, however, to follow another course. The encroachments of the Siamese were allowed; they made endless exactions from the King of Quedah, compelled him to attack Perak, and, when his resources were completely destroyed, drove him out of his kingdom.

Colonel Burney has alluded to the opinion of Captain (now Major-General) MeInnes, who held the office of Malay translator a short time prior to the writer succeeding to that situation, and endeavours, upon that officer's authority, to trace the history of Siamese connexion with Perak back many centuries, overlooking entirely, as Captain McInnes appears to have done, the very important fact, that that state had actually been taken from the Dutch by a British force from Penang, many years before the date of his report. The fact of its being adverted to at the time, might have saved Captain McInnes the trouble of recurring to events centuries back, in order to establish a claim of Siamese supremacy, and would have prevented all the calamities which befel that country and have since befallen Quedah, and saved an enormous expense to the East-India Company, the amount of which it would be difficult to calculate.

nese.

With respect to Perak (which is now independent), its history and political rela tions are known, and have been clearly traced since the year of the Heijirat, 1021A. D. 1612. It had all along been a dependency of Malacca. In 1619, it was conquered, with Quedah, by the King of Acheen, and sent the Boongah Mas to that king. In 1642, Malacca was taken by the Dutch, with the assistance of the AcheFrom that period, Perak has been a dependency of the Dutch at Malacca; it is presumable that they got their title to it from the King of Acheen. Perak remained subject to the Dutch, who established a factory and stockade there, for the purpose of securing their tin monopoly, up to the year 1795, when Malacca was taken possession of by the British Government; a detachment from Penang took possession of the fort of Perak, and after expelling the Dutch, delivered up the whole country to its own king. In 1804-5, a difference arose between the kings of Perak and Salengore respecting the boundary, when the former took possession of the country. In 1814, we find the King of Quedah remonstrating to the Penang Government, and

earnestly requesting advice on the cruel order he had received to attack the King of Perak. The subject was referred to the then Malay translator, Captain (now MajorGeneral) McInnes.

That gentleman's report refers principally to Quedah; his observations in respect to Perak, it is quite unnecessary to repeat. He seems to have drawn his conclusions from the mere representations of the Quedah vakeels, and the whole narrative is directly contradicted by the known history of Perak. There is not a vestige of proof that Siam ever demanded or that Perak ever gave the Boongah Mas; the inferences of the Malay translator seem to be drawn from occurrences at least six hundred years old. We have traced the political connexion of Perak from 1612, a period of more than two hundred years: there is no mention of any dependence on Siam; so far from it, it is clearly shown that Perak was connected with and dependent on quite another power, as a little farther inquiry from other sources might have proved. The view of the Malay translator, taken from the casual report of ignorant or interested Malays, seems to have been adopted and communicated to the Bengal Government, who intimated their anxiety on the welfare and security of the King of Quedah, and their conviction of the undesirable consequences likely to result from the extension of Siamese conquests in the vicinity of Malacca, and authorized a mission to mediate all the differences.

The suggestions of Captain McInnes having been adopted and acted upon, and Perak, in consequence, then subdued, it can only be a source of regret that, on such mistaken premises, a course of policy should have been pursued which proved so destructive and embarrassing to British as well as Malayan interests in the Malay peninsula; but happily, under the able management of Governor Fullerton, the error was rectified as regarded Perak, which is now, and has been for sixteen years, entirely independent of Siamese control, as well as Salengore; but the evil effects of permitting Siamese supremacy over Quedah, unfortunately, still continue to operate. It is painful to have occasion to make these reflections upon any public officer, but when we consider the atrocities that have been committed, the blood that has been shed, and the miseries of which the writer was many years ago an eye-witness, he cannot allow any false delicacy to restrain him from the attempt to put a stop to such iniquity and horrors, although he has long been in retirement in his native country, and has now no interest beyond those feelings of humanity which all persons who understand that subject must have, and the desire to see justice done, however tardily. In the year 1818, Perak was subdued by Quedah, acting under orders from Ligore; and the king, at the instigation and persuasion of the Penang Government, agreed, and has twice sent the Boongah Mas to Siam; and here, for the first time, commenced the slightest marks of dependence on Siam by that state. The writer defies any one to show, by any historical evidence whatever, or by oral tradition, that Perak was in any way subject to Siam; and there is not a difference of opinion upon the subject at the present time in the Straits' settlements. It was the writer's lot to arrive at Perak, on a commercial mission, in 1818, ten days after the Quedah force had taken full possession of the country, and the scenes of misery and suffering he witnessed, were harrowing to the soul. He had, however, the satisfaction of relieving hundreds of poor famishing human beings-men, women, and children, who had lost their all, and were literally starving-by getting a large supply of rice from Penang within a few days. To return from this digression, the Siamese were again driven out in 1822 by the Rajah of Salengore, who restored the King of Perak by treaty, but settled his son and Tuanko Hussain some distance up the river. These were the transactions which formed the subject of the late negotiations. It must be evident that Siam can have no legitimate right over Perak, and with which they have not interfered since 1826.

While on this subject, it becomes necessary to refer back to the past effects of that influence long exercised over the peninsula by the Dutch Government, which has now ceased, as well as the alteration likely to be produced from extension of Siamese means, resulting from the diminished power of their great enemies, the Burmese.

And here it may be observed, that by forming Tavoy and Mergui into British pos-
sessions, we relieved the Siamese from a troublesome neighbour, and enabled them
the more effectually to concentrate their means for our annoyance in another quarter.
It is probable that, if the Burmese had not been deprived of these possessions, the
Siamese would long since have evacuated Quedah. The Dutch, as already explained,
withdrew from Malacca in 1795. So long as they remained, their presence, on the
principles they acted upon, must have served as a complete barrier against Siamese
encroachment on Perak and Salengore; and had they remained, it is probable that
Quedah also would have been saved. There is little doubt the king, when pressed
hard by the Siamese, and disappointed of aid from the English, would have thrown
himself on the Dutch, and there can be little doubt that power would have eagerly
received him, on the terms invariably observed by them, that is to say, their political
alliance would have been afforded to save them from Siamese interference, their
military force to protect them against native powers, receiving in return the exclusive
privilege of the trade of the country. Captain Light, the first superintendent of
Penang, always dreaded lest the King of Quedah should throw himself into the hands
of some foreign European power, the French, Dutch, and Danes, having all held
out to him the most promising terms for a settlement in his country. From those
dangers, the war with the French in 1793, and with the Dutch in 1795, relieved the
British; but it, at the same time, removed the main barrier against Siamese encroach-
ment. On taking possession of Malacca and Perak, the English did not continue
the controlling authority exercised over Salengore and Perak by the Dutch; they
followed the more liberal policy of declaring them free and independent; but on
thus foregoing for themselves the right evidently derivable from conquest, the great
subject of regret is, that they afterwards, on a mistaken view of Siamese claims,
allowed one at least (Perak) to fall ostensibly under the dominion of a native power,
equally actuated by a spirit of commercial monopoly, and far more severe, oppres-
sive, and cruel, in its conduct towards its Malay subjects. The Dutch resumed
their possession of Malacca in the year 1818. In the year 1819, they renewed their
political relations with Salengore, and the Dutch governor at Malacca addressed the
King of Perak preparatory to the same arrangement. The treaty with Salengore
was, in the meantime (1820), annulled by orders from Batavia, and the King of
Salengore again declared free and independent. It is probable that the Government
of Batavia had, by that time, made up their mind on the abandonment and with-
drawal from the Malay peninsula, afterwards carried into effect by the treaty of
March, 1824. Their object in contemplating the final cession was, no doubt, the
same which actuated them in the temporary cession of 1795, namely, to lessen the
value of the acquisition, by diminishing the political influence of a settlement which
they were soon to abandon. The Dutch authority is now finally withdrawn from
the peninsula; the great barrier that has for centuries opposed the subjugation of
the peninsula is permanently removed; and it therefore becomes the British to con-
sider whether, in taking the place of the Dutch, they are to permit or prevent the
result.
The revival of Dutch treaties and obligations, involving generally the exclu-
sive monopoly of trade, could not be desirable, and since the cessation of the com-
mercial transactions of the East-India Company, is not to be thought of. All that
is required is a protecting influence, and perfect freedom of trade. On the same
principle that the temporary policy of 1795 was to be considered as liberal, so must
we consider the same as a permanent measure; but we must not forget that the
admission of their independence of our own power will be little benefit to them, and
of infinite prejudice to ourselves, if we allow another native state, possessing no
claim whatever, to reduce them, as they have done Quedah, to the wretched con-
dition of abject slavery and dependence. As far as regards Perak and Salengore,
these anticipated evils have, perhaps, been overcome; but these principles will, it
is hoped, not be overlooked in the event of the Siamese attempting to interfere in
any shape at any future time.

We must keep in mind that the Siamese and Burmese were at war for more than
Asial. Journ.N.S.VOL. 35. No. 139.
X

fifty years. All the country between Mergui and Junk Ceylon has been the scene of alternate conquest. Junk Ceylon itself was plundered by the Burmese in 1810. The whole time, troops, and attention of the Siamese states of Champoan, Pungah, and Ligore, were directed to the one object of keeping off the Burmese. From all that expense and trouble, they were relieved by our conquest of Tavoy and Mergui, and consequent interposition between them and their inveterate foe; for all the resources directed to the above object were set at liberty for other pursuits; and late events sufficiently demonstrated that the first of these objects was the subjuga tion of the Malayan peninsula. It was contended by an officer that, the Malay states being of unsettled and predatory habits, and given to piracy, it would be better that the peninsula should be under the dominion of a settled and powerful state. This does not correspond with the political principles generally pursued, and it could be shown that the same person who maintained this doctrine, expressed himself of a directly opposite opinion at other times. It appears consistent with reason, that a few petty states, who never could possibly be dangerous-who themselves, looking up to the British for protection, are not likely to harbour views of hostility against them-would be infinitely safer neighbours to petty commercial states, than a powerful state, able to draw a large force to a given point whenever it suited its purpose.

In respect to commercial considerations, we can draw the best conclusion of probable results from a reference to principles which are in fullest operation, and it has never been understood that the Siamese at Bankok are more liberal in their regulations of trade, or more fair in their dealings, than the Malay rajahs. That the Malay states are much addicted to piracy, is true; such, probably, will never be entirely eradicated by local application; but it may surely be hoped that the discreet exercise of that influence which the British Government will always possess, will tend to the progressive amelioration of the government of those states, and the introduction of more peaceful habits, and the prevention of such occurrences.

But against the admission of Siamese supremacy at all, there occurs another serious objection. The detestation and aversion of the Malays themselves to Siamese government is so great, that we may be assured that they would not yield without many struggles, as has been shown by the repeated attacks upon Quedah of late years, and a long course of anarchy, confusion, and interruption of commerce has been, and will it is feared be, the inevitable result, notwithstanding the active part taken by the Penang Government to secure to the Siamese the possession of Quedah. By the treaty with the Dutch, we have given up the right of forming any settlement or new political connection on the island of Sumatra; we have, in return, received the corresponding right to the Malay peninsula; but a line of policy, by which the admission of Siamese supremacy would exclude us from the first purchase of its valuable productions, would ill compensate for the loss of what we relinquished.

It was observed by a high authority, directly after the conclusion of the treaty with the Dutch, in the year 1824, and the transfer of Malacca, that the "Malay peninsula may be said to be virtually under the protection of our nation, and it therefore assumes a degree of importance which belonged to it at no former period." Such was also the impression of the Cabinet of England. Mr. Secretary Canning stated in the House of Commons, that the cession of Malacca gave us the continuous possession of the whole of the Malayan peninsula.

It is the opinion of the most experienced men, that we ought, from the date of our first occupation of Malacca in 1795, to have declared the whole of these Malay states under our protection. When the Dutch ceded Malacca to us in that year, they declared all the Malay states, connected with them for years, to have been only a few months previous rendered independent. Those states were, Perak, Salengore, Rhumbo, Rhio, and Johore. The declaration was made with the usual crooked policy of that nation; it was done with the sole view of lessening the political importance of Malacca. The independence of those states was fully admitted by the British captors, in consequence of the above declaration. Whatever the motive