4. (Execution Signature.) A will must be signed at the end, and probate was refused of a will written on two sides of a sheet of paper, and signed and attested at the bottom of the first side.-In the goods of Milward, 912. 5. (Knowledge of testator.) A will of an aged testator, prepared by a solicitor, from instructions given by an executor and legatee, and not read over to the testator at the time of execution, nor signed by him in the presence of the attesting witnesses, but only acknowledged in their presence to be his will; the circumstances upon the whole not being suspicious, admitted to proof in the absence of an opposing plea.-Goose v. Brown, 707. 6. (Knowledge and capacity of testator.) A will and five codicils being propounded, the will and four codicils were established, but the last codicil, which was drawn up by a solicitor in his own favour, was rejected, the testator being of fluctuating capacity, and the proof that he knew the contents of the instrument being insufficient.-Croft v. Duy, 784. * 7. (Misdescription.) The executor and sole legatee being by mistake described by his wrong surname, the christian name being rightly given, probate was granted to him in his proper name, with consent of parties interested.—In the goods of Shuttleworth, 911. 8. (Revocation-Delirium.) A partial tearing of a will by a tesrator, while in a state of delirium, held not to be a revocation; and probate of such will was granted on motion. In the goods of Shaw, 905. 9. (Revocation by excision, 1 Vict. c. 26.) The statute 1 Vict. applies to all wills made before the 1st January, 1838, as regards the revocation of such wills, or any alteration to be made in them, and the excision of the name of testator was held to amount to a revocation, under the words " tearing, or otherwise destroying," of the 10th sect. of that act. Semble also, that the excision of the names of the attesting witnesses would have the like effect.-Hobbs v. Knight, 768. 10. (Revocation, whether conditional.) A testator having made a new will since the statute, but without two witnesses, cut out his signature from the previous will: Held, that this was an absolute and not a conditional revocation dependent on the validity of the second will, as it appeared the testator knew that such will was incomplete without two witnesses.-S. C. 11. (Same.) A testator having, since the 1st January, 1838, erased the words "three" or "five," whichever it was, and substituted the word "one," the alteration being attested according to the 1 Vict. c. 26, probate of the will was granted, with this part in blank. Quare if the original word could have been read.--In the goods of Livock, 906. 12. (Solicitor Legacy to.) Where a legacy is given the party employed to draw the will, it may raise a presumption more or less strong, according to circumstances, against the validity of the will; but there is no such rule as that it is necessary in every such case to prove that the will was actually read over to the testator, or prepared from instructions given by him.— Barry v. Butlin, 637. (Privy Council.) 13. (Suspicious circumstances-Costs.) The only son of a testator, who succeeded, on the death of his father, to a considerable landed estate, was condemned in costs for contesting, in a litigious and vexatious manner, the validity of a will, by which his father, who was a weak old man, bequeathed the whole of his personal estate, about £12,000, to persons in no way related to him, including his solicitor, medical man, and butler.- S. C. And see PRACTICE, 1. WITNESS. (Competency-Liability for costs.) A person employed by one of the parties as solicitor, who retained the proctor in the suit, and thereby became legally liable to him for the costs, held to be incompetent as a witness for the parties employing him.-Handley v. Edwards, 722. (Prerog.) HOUSE OF LORDS. [Containing cases in 5 Clark & Finnelly, Part II.] APPEAL. (Decree-When issue waived.) When on motion for a new trial of an issue, the parties, to avoid expense and delay, consented to take a decree from the Lord Chancellor upon the evidence taken on the former trials: Held, that such decree was subject to appeal.-Morris v. Davis, 163. EVIDENCE. (Proceedings in former suit.) When a suit had been previously instituted between parties holding the same right as the parties to the present suit, and involving the same question, but not relating to the same land, as the present suit: Held, that proceedings and depositions on the former suit were nevertheless admissible as evidence.-Viscount Lorton v. Earl of Kingston, 269. And see PEERAGE, 2. INTEREST ON JUDGMENT. Where the judgment of the Exchequer Chamber on writ of error affirming the decision of the Court below, is affirmed by the House of Lords, interest will be given by the House on the sum stated in the judgment, from the day of its affirmance by the Exchequer Chamber; pursuant to the statute, 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 42, s. 30.-Garland v. Carlisle, 354. ISSUE. (New trial- Misconception of jury.) It is no sufficient ground of itself for the new trial of an issue, that the jury should appear to have misconceived the way in which certain evidence was left for their consideration, as that they should have treated certain depositions as direct evidence of the fact to which they related, instead of receiving them as they ought to have done, as a proof of the notice that certain parties had of the question at issue, and important only with reference to the conduct of those parties.-Viscount Lorton v. Earl of Kingston, 269. LEGITIMACY. Where husband and wife were separated, but they resided only at the distance of sixteen miles apart, but occasionally met, the wife being at the time living in adultery. A child, of which the birth was concealed from the husband, and denied by the wife to him, of whose existence the husband never took notice, but which was brought up partly at the expense of the paramour, and generally treated as his child, was held to be illegitimate. -Morris v. Davis, 163. PEERAGE. 1. (Practice-Form of petition.) In a claim of peerage, it is not sufficient that the petition to the crown should state that the claimant is of right entitled to. the dignity, but it must also pray that he may be declared so entitled; and the defect cannot be supplied by the House, but there must be a new petition to the crown. It makes no difference in such a case, that the claimant is already a peer by another title.-Huntly Peerage, 349. 2. (Secondary evidence.) Upon a claim to a Scotch peerage, where no patent of creation could be found; but it appeared from the records of parliament, that the ancestor, through whom the claim was made, had sat in parliament by the title alleged to have been vested in him, an original instrument, purporting to be a grant under the great seal of the dignity in question, which was extracted from the repositories of the family, was admitted in evidence.Huntly Peerage, 349. PRACTICE.-See APPEAL; PEERAGE, 1. WILL. (Issue-Heir and devisee.) Where the point at issue was the validity of the will of A., and the party claiming under it was, at the time of the institution of the suit, the heir at law of the testator, while the party opposing it was divisee of the immediate heir of A.: Held, that the former party claiming as a devisee could not insist upon the privilege of an heir to have an issue aś a matter of course.-Viscount Lorton v. Earl of Kingston, 269. d. Payne v. Bristol and Exeter Railway Company, 6 M. & W. 320. d. Sabin v. Sabin, 8 D. P. C. 468 d. Smith v. Roe, 8 D. P. C. 509 d. Street v. Roe, 8 D. P. C. 444 Dolly v. Isles, 3 P. & D. 287 Railway Act, 1 Attorney, 4 Ejectment, 5 Ejectment, 1 Payment into Court, 1 Writ of Trial, 5 |