2. (Costs Disclaimer.) A trustee, who disclaimed by his answer, but was continued as a party till the hearing, was held entitled to his costs only as between party and party.-Bray v. West, 429.

And see MORTGAGE, 3.

WILL.

1. (Construction-Annuity.) Held, that a bequest to two of testatrix's servants, who were man and wife, of "an annuity of 2001. each for their joint lives and the life of the survivor," gave to each an annuity of 2001. for their joint lives and the life of the survivor.-Eales v. The Earl of Cardigan, 384.

2. (Construction-Cousins.) Testator by his will gave legacies to several persons by name, describing each of them as his cousin, By a codicil he gave his residuary estate to all such of his cousins both on his father's and mother's side as should be living at his decease, and to all the children of such of his said cousins as might theretofore have died or might die in his lifetime. The testator left several first cousins and children of first and second cousins, and also one first cousin once removed, but all the persons named in the will were first cousins: Held, that they alone, and the children of such of them as had died in testator's lifetime, were entitled to the residue under the codicil.-Caldecott v. Harrison, 457.

3. (Same.) Testatrix bequeathed her residue to her second cousins of the name of S., and the issue of such of them as were dead (per stirpes). She had no second cousins, but had had three first cousins once removed of the name of S., two of whom were living at her death, and the other had died leaving children : Held, that these two, together with the children of the one who was dead, were entitled, to the exclusion of first cousins twice removed, i. e. grandchildren of a first cousin, though standing in the same degree of relationship as second cousins. Slade v. Fooks, 386.

4. (Construction-Description of residue.) The testator, after directing that his property should be realised, and after payment of his debts and funeral expenses should be invested in the 3 per cent. consols., left the annual interest to his executor to be paid to five persons by way of annuities, two of which were given simply in the words "30l. to A., 20l. to B." In a subsequent part of his will he gave all his household furniture, the whole of his personal property of every kind not specified above, to his wife. Held, that the capital producing the two sums above-mentioned, subject to the life-interest of the annuitants, passed to the wife.-Clowes v. Clowes, 403.

5. (Construction-Forfeiture.) Testatrix gave legacies to A., B. and C., and declared that if any of them should be dead at his decease, or should not then be heard of to be then living, or should not respectively claim their legacies within twelve months after her death, then the legacies given to such of them as should be dead at her decease, or as should neglect to claim the same within the time aforesaid, should sink into her residuary estate. Three years after the testatrix's death, C. who had not been heard of upwards of twenty years, claimed her legacy. Held, that she was not entitled to it, although she had been ignorant until a short time before that the testatrix was dead.-Hawkes v. Baldwin, 355. 6. (Construction-Maintenance.) Testatrix gave one-third of his residue to his wife, the other two-thirds to trustees in trust for his two sons, to be paid them at twenty-one, in equal shares, with benefit of survivorship, the income until the shares should be payable, to be paid to the wife, to be applied by her, or in

case of her death, by the trustees, for the maintenance and education of the two sons: Held, that the wife was entitled to the income of the children's shares during their respective minorities, and one son having died, to the income of the whole during the minority of the survivor.-Hadow v. Hadow, 438. 7. (Construction-Reference.) Testator bequeathed one-sixth part of his residuary estate amongst the children of his late sister J. T., and directed that their share should be paid to them at twenty-one, and that in case any of them should die under that age leaving issue, their shares should be paid to their issue at a certain time, but if any died without leaving issue, their shares to be paid to the surviving children, and the issue of such of them as were dead, per stirpes; and he bequeathed another sixth-part to his sister M. C. for life, and after her death unto and amongst her issue, and to be payable at the like time, and with the like benefit of survivorship, and in like manner as before-expressed as to the other sixth-part. M. C. had six children living at testator's death, and had had another, who died before the date of the will, leaving a daughter: Held, that she was not entitled to take either in her own right under the description of issue, which by reference meant the children of M. C., or by substitution for her mother, as she died in the life time of the testator.-Peel v. Catlow, 372. 8. (Construction-Vesting.) Testator bequeathed a sum of stock to his wife and after her decease to his three sons, to be equally divided amongst them, if they should be all living at the decease of his wife, but if any or either of them should die in her life-time, leaving a child or children, such child or children who should be living at the time of the wife's death, should be substituted in the place of such of his sons who should so happen to die, and take his, her, or their parent's share. All the sons died in the wife's lifetime, two of them leaving children who survived the wife, the third died a bachelor: Held, that one-third of the stock fell into the residue.-Hustler v. Tillbrook, 368.

9. (Construction—Vesting-Mesne profits.) Testator directed his trustees to apply the rents of his freehold estates during the life of his wife for the maintenance and education of his two great nieces, and after his wife's death to sell the estates of which he gave the proceeds equally between both his great nieces, or if there should be but one of them then living, to her only. One of the great nieces died an infant in the lifetime of the widow: Held, that a moiety of the rents from her death to the death of the widow belonged to her, the niece's, representatives.-Webb v. Kelly, 469.

ECCLESIASTICAL.

[Containing cases in 1 Curteis, Part 4. N.B. All the cases not otherwise marked were decided in the Prerogative Court of Canterbury.]

ADULTERY. See SEPARATION.

APPEAL.

(Competency of.) It having been held by the Judicial Committee, in the case of Butlin against Barry, that it was not competent for a party to appeal against an interlocutory decision of the Ecclesiastical Court (see Moore, Privy Council Cases, vol. i. p. 98), the Court refused to allow a cause to stand over, for the purpose of allowing a party to appeal against the rejection of a witness.— Handley v. Edwards, 722.

BRAWLING.

(Extenuating circumstances—Costs.) A party was sentenced to be suspended ab ingressu ecclesiæ for one week, for brawling in the vestry room, but was not condemned in the whole costs, by reason of irritating expressions having been used by the promoter.-Williams v. Hall, 497. (Consist.)

CHURCH RATE.

(Mortgage Notice.) A committee having been appointed at a vestry, held the 17th March," to consider a plan then produced, and to report whether it would be advisable to adopt that or any other plan for affording additional accommodation in the church;" another vestry was subsequently held, upon a notice "to receive the report of the committee appointed, &c.," and at such vestry it was resolved to adopt such plan, and to borrow on the security of the church rate a sum of money to carry it into effect: Held, that the latter part of the resolution was not justified by the terms of the notice.-Blunt v. Harwood, 655. (Arches.)

2. (Pleading.) In a suit for subtraction of a church rate, made in virtue of the statutes 58 Geo. 3, c. 45, and 59 Geo. 3, c. 131, the libel ought to show upon the face of it that the conditions required by the acts have been complied with. Libel to be reformed.—S. C.

COSTS. See WILL, 12.

DOMICILE.

(Intention to abandon.) A new domicile can only be acquired by residence, coupled with intention to abandon the old one; and accordingly a Frenchman, who having left France in 1792, resided in England till 1814, after which time he resided occasionally in both countries, and died in England, having made two wills, one intended to operate on his property in France, the other on his

property in England, was held to have been domiciled in France.- De Bonneval v. De Boneval, 856.

EVIDENCE.

1. (Entries in office journal.) The clerk in a solicitor's office, when speaking of facts within his own knowledge, may refer to the "Office Journal," in order to fix the date of those facts.- Butlin v. Barry, 617.

2. (Pleading.) Upon an allegation, pleading only instructions by the testator, and execution in the presence of the subscribing witnesses, the evidence of a clerk who drew the will, though he knew nothing directly of the instructions, nor of the execution, was held gnerally admissible.-S. C.

And see SEPARATION.

FOREIGN JUDGMENT.

(Evidence.) In all cases where the decisions of foreign courts are relied on, an exemplification of the judgment is required, and a certificate of sequestration (itself not sufficiently proved) was held not sufficient evidence of a decree of a foreign court, declaring the nullity of a will proved in this country, in pursuance of which decree the sequestration purported to have been issued.-Koster v. Supte, 691.

FOREIGN LAWS.

(Effect of.) The effect of foreign laws upon rights of persons domiciled in this country, seems liable to be modified by circumstances. And the courts shewed very little disposition to recognize, as affecting personal property in England, a state of the law in Italy arising from the Berlin and Milan decrees of Buonaparte, by which it was alleged that persons resident in this country were made incapable of succession. The case however was decided upon the ground of laches and acquiescence in the foreign claimant, and the want of proper evidence of the foreign law.-Koster v. Sapte, 691.

FOREIGNER.

(Foreign guardian.) Where the children of a Frenchman deceased were minors, resident in France, administration for their use and benefit was granted to the guardians appointed by the French authorities.—In the goods of Sartoris, 910. HUSBAND AND WIFE. See PRESUMPTION.

JEW.

(Lunatic Jew.) Where the next of kin of deceased was a lunatic jewess, administration was granted to the secretary of the Great Synagogue for her use and benefit, her next of kin having been first cited.—In the goods of Joseph, 907. MARRIAGE.

1. (4 Geo. 4, c. 76, s. 22.) The undue publication of banns, as where one of the parties disguises his or her name, for the purpose of misleading the public, does not avoid a marriage, unless both parties were privy to the fraud.Wright v. Elgood, 662. (Arches.)

2. (Same.) A similar decision was made in the case of an invalid license, the invalidity, which consisted in the fact of it being granted by the bishop of a different diocese from the right one, not being known to both parties.-Dormer v. Williams, 870. (Consist.)

3. (Proof of marriage abroad.) A collated copy of a register of Barbadoes, where

British laws prevail, is admissible as evidence of a marriage, but an extract from the register, purporting to be signed by the present incumbent, whose signature was attested by a notarial certificate, was held not admissible.-Coode v. Coode, 755. (Consist.)

4. (Publication of banns.)

Publication of banns, made in the lifetime of the first husband or the wife, such husband being dead before the solemnization of the marriage, held good.-Wright v. Elgood, 603. (Arches.)

PRACTICE.

1. (Proof of intestacy.) Where the signature of testator purported to be attested by two witnesses, but the attestation clause was not full, the Court refused to decree the deceased to be dead intestate, upon affidavits that the will was not duly executed. In the goods of Aylins, 913.

2. (Proof of Scotch law.) Administration of the effects of a party deceased, domiciled in Scotland, granted according to the law of Scotland, on proof by affidavit from a Scotch solicitor of what the provisions of that law were.Stewart, deceased, 904.

PRESUMPTION.

(Priority of death.) Where husband and wife are drowned together by the same accident, the presumption is, in the absence of other evidence, that they both died at the same time; and the next of kin of each are entitled to the property of each, as if they had died single.-Satterthwaite v. Powell, 705.

SEPARATION.

(Adultery-Proof of.) Separation decreed at suit of wife by reason of adultery of husband, the proof being the cummunication to her of the venereal disease. Mode of treating such evidence.-Collett v. Collett, 678. (Consist.)

N.B. The decision was affirmed by the Arches, but has since been reversed by the Privy Council.

(Illegal inscription--Prayers for the dead.) In a criminal proceeding for erecting a tombstone with an inscription, calling on the reader "to pray for the soul" of the person who was buried; it was held that prayers for the dead are not prohibited by the articles of the Church of England, as they do not necessarily infer a belief in the doctrine of purgatory, having been in use by the Church before that doctrine was known, though from their natural connection with that doc. trine they have been discouraged by the Church of England.—Breeks v. Woolfrey, 880. (Arches.)

WILL.

1. (Attestation.) Probate of a codicil refused because not attested in the presence of the testator, though signed in the presence of the witnesses.-In the goods of Newman, 915.

2. (Attesting witness.) An attesting witness may also sign the will for the testator, by his direction. In the goods of Bailey, 914.

3. (Execution Acknowledgement of signature.) The acknowledgment of the signature in the presence of two witnesses is sufficient, under the 1 Vict. c. 26, even though the will should not have been actually signed by the testator, but only by his direction, for him.--In the goods of Regan, 908.