PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.

(Parties-Release of principal-General equity.) The bill stated that the creditor had, with the verbal consent of the surety, released the principal by deed, and that in an action he had brought against the surety, the latter had set up this release as a defence, against which no evidence or a parol consent was admissible at law. The principal was not made a party to the bill. A demurrer for want of parties and equity was allowed for want of parties—the Court intimating it would not have been allowed for want of equity.—Brooks v. Stuart, 512.

PROVISIONAL ASSIGNEE.

(Costs.) The provisional assignee of an insolvent, no creditor's assignee being as yet appointed, having been made a party to a foreclosure suit, it was ordered that the plaintiff should pay him his costs and add them to his security.Boswell v. Tucker, 493.

RECEIVER,

(West India produce-Crops severed.) A receiver is entitled generally to rent in arrear at the time of his appointment; but it was held that a receiver of a West India estate, appointed at the suit of a mortgagee, was not entitled to the produce of crops severed and shipped to the consignees or the mortgagor before the date of the receiver's appointment.-Codrington v. Johnstone, 520. REFERENCE.-See PRACTICE, 11, 12.

RESULTING TRUST.-See PERSONAL ESTATE.

SOLICITOR AND CLIENT.

1. (Lien on deeds.) A solicitor, who had by deposit of his client a lien on deeds for costs and other monies, was ordered to deliver them up to his client on payment into Court by the latter of a sum sufficient to cover the demand, to be stated by affidavit of solicitor, the case being distinguished from that of Livesey v. Harding, 1 Bea. 343, by the relation between the parties as solicitor and client.-Mills v. Finlay, 560.

2. (Taxation of costs.) Where in an administration suit the claim of a solicitor for costs had upon taxation been reduced by more than one-sixth, he was made to pay the costs of taxation.-Silvertop v. Ramsay, 434.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS.

(Demurrer.) The Statute of Frauds may be taken advantage of on general demurrer; but where a bill for specific performance did not expressly admit that the agreement was not signed, and contained allegations of part-performance, a general demurrer was overruled.-Field v. Hutchinson, 599. SUPPLEMENTAL SUIT.-See PRACTICE, 9.

TAXATION OF COSTS.

(Joint liability.) Where an action for costs had been brought at law against two parties who were jointly liable, the Court refused to stay proceedings at law, and direct taxation on the undertaking of one defendant only to pay what should be found due.-Re Chilcote, 421.

TRUSTEE.

1. (Bankruptcy.) A bankrupt trustee was ordered to be removed, although he had obtained his certificate, and the estates was in the hands of a receiver.Bainbrigge v. Blair, 495.

2. (Compensation for Loss of Time.) When testator declared that "his trustees should be entitled to receive all costs, charges, and expences, fees to counsel, and for advice and for professional assistance and loss of time," one of the trustees who was a land surveyor, was held entitled to compensation for loss of time.-Willis v. Kibble, 559.

3. (Feme sole.) The Court refused to make an order allowing a feme sole to be proposed as trustee.-Brook v. Brook, 521.

4. (Liabilities of, on failure of bank.) Where executors and trustees deposited in a bank at interest money of the testator which it was not pretended they were likely to want on account of the estate, the debts and legacies having been duly paid, and the bank broke, the executors were held liable for the loss. -Darke v. Martyn, 525.

5. (Reparation of breach of trust--New appointment.) The representatives of a surviving trustee who had concurred with his co-trustee in a breach of trust by lending to the tenant for life on his promissory note, were held entitled to file a bill against such tenant for life, and the other cestuique trusts, for replacing the funds, and the appointment of new trustees, with costs against the tenant for life, or out of the fund.-Greenwood v. Wakeford, 576. And see (Feme Sole,) PRACTICE, 12.

WILL.

1. (Construction-Absolute interest.) Testator desired his daughter's share to be secured in the funds, and for his trustee to pay her the dividends, and he wished that neither the principal, or interest, or the funds, should be subject to the control or debts of any husband she marries, but the same shall stand under the direction of the Court, subject to her will only: Held, that the daughter took an absolute interest.-Tawney v. Ward, 563.

2. (Construction-Bequest to debtor.) Where a testator gave a legacy to his debtor on condition of his paying the debt before his the testator's decease, or immediately afterwards to his executors, and then accepted a composition; Held, that the debtor was entitled to the legacy,-Gath v. Burton, 478. 3. (Construction-Cumulative legacy.) Several annuities given by will and codicils, held to be cumulative, though with some hesitation, the chief doubt being whether a legacy of 20l. to a husband was revoked by a subsequent bequest of 107. each to him and his wife.-Spire v. Smith, 419.

4. (Construction-Description of property.) Stock which was standing in the joint names of a husband and wife, was held not to be included in the will of the former by the description of "all the property he was in possession of," but it was held that the executors were justified in seeking the opinion of the Court upon the point.-Low v. Carter, 427.

5. (Construction," one child”—Estate in fee.) A testator at the time of making his will had four children, one of them married (who had then one daughter), and three others unmarried. He gave an estate to one of the four for life, remainder to "one child” of each, provided that if the three then unmarried, naming them, should never have any lawful children, their part should go to the next of kin : Held, that the first born child of each of the four children took a fourth share in fee, as they successively come in esse.-Powell v. Davies, 532.

6. (Construction-Specific legacy.) A legacy given in the following terms, "I give to A. B. the sum of 100l., which said sum is owing to me by bond from

her father :" Held to be specific and not demonstrative.—Davies v. Morgan,

405.

7. (Construction-Survivors.) "Testator gave the residue among his five grandchildren, A., B., C., D., and E., his grandson A.'s two children, and the two children of his niece, one of them a son, the other a daughter; and in case any of the said last mentioned children should die before twenty-one and should leave no lawful issue, then the survivors were to have his or her share; one of the children of A. died under twenty-one without issue: Held, that his share was divisible among all the surviving legatees.—Walker v. Moore, 607.

8. (Construction-Vesting-Survivorship.) Where there was a bequest and devise to a trustee to pay the proceeds to testator's wife so long as she continued unmarried, and after her decease testator bequeathed his property to his children who should be then living, and an allowance uncertain in amount was to be made to the wife if she married again and the children continued to reside with her: Held, that there was no vested interest in the children during the mother's life.-Tawney v. Ward, 563.

BANKRUPTCY.

[Containing 1 Montagu and Chitty, Part 2, omitting cases noticed in former digests.]

ACT OF BANKRUPTCY.

(Conditional declaration of insolvency.) Where the bankrupt signed a declaration at the instance of his creditors, not to be used or filed unless it afterwards became necessary; Held, that in the absence of evidence of bad faith, the cre ditors had a discretionary right to file the declaration.-Ex parte and re Rowe, 334.

ASSIGNEES.

(Suit by-Consent of creditors.) Where assignees had instituted a suit with the consent of the majority of the creditors who had then proved, but afterwards many other creditors having proved, an application was made on behalf of the then majority to restrain the assignees from further proceeding with the action, the Court refused to make the order, (Sir G. Rose observing that they had no authority to do so) but it was referred to the commissioners to inquire how much of the estate in the hands of the assignees ought to be reserved to abide the result of the suit, to answer the costs of the assignees, if it should be held that they were entitled to such costs.-Ex parte May re Jones, 285. EQUITABLE MORTGAGE.-See SPECIAL CASES, 1.

EVIDENCE.-See PRACTICE, 11.

FIAT.

(Time of suing out-What amounts to "suing out.") The date of the application for the fiat is with reference to the two months allowed after act of bankruptcy, to be taken at the date of the suing out; and the fiat will not be prejudiced by a subsequent delay either in the signing or the delivery, not arising from the fault of the creditor.-Ex parte and re Rowe, 334.

JURISDICTION.-See OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE; PETITIONING Creditor, 1.

OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE.

( Remuneration—Per-centage.) The Court of Review has no jurisdiction over the amount of allowance made by the commissioners to the official assignee if it is put merely on the footing of quantum meruit, but when it was alleged that the allowance had been made by way of commission or per-centage as it usually is, in pursuance of the recommendation in the general orders of 12th January, 1832, the Court of Review has jurisdiction as to whether the per-centage has been properly allowed on any particular fund, and where it had been allowed on the proceeds of a lease mortgaged by the bankrupt, which on a sale by the official assignee and creditors' assignee were paid directly to the equitable

mortgagee by the purchaser, the Court declared that such allowance was wrong, and the certificate of the commissioner not being before the Court, it was ordered that he should review the allowance, having regard to the above declaration.-Whisson, Ex parte re Carter, 274.

PETITIONING CREDITOR.

1. (Alleged misconduct.) Where the petitioning creditor was a solicitor, and the debt his bill of costs, on petition to supersede for the insufficiency of the debt the Court refused to entertain charges of neglect and misconduct against the petitioning creditor, as solicitor, whereby he had lost as was alleged his right to recover his bill.—Ex parte and re Southall, 346.

2. (Disqualification.) A party to the deed creating the act of bankruptcy cannot be petitioning creditor.-Re Cook, 349.

3. (Irregularity.) Where a petitioning creditor after the issuing of the fiat had with bona fides, and being ignorant of the illegality of the act, received part payment of his debt, and had since refunded the money, the fiat was sustained. -Ex parte Nesbitt re Mould, 363.

4. (Substitution.) Where the debt sworn to by the first petitioning creditor was on a bill of exchange not then in his hands; a second petitioning creditor was substituted, at the costs of the former.- Ex parte Cattley re Goodwyn, 360.

PRACTICE.

1. (Alteration of date.) Where the date of the certificate by commissioner, of consent of creditors to annulling, appeared to have been altered, on affidavit made that the alteration was before signing, ordered that the cetificate pass.Ex parte and re Brown, 361.

2. (Amendment of fiat-Mistake.)

Where a fiat had by mistake been taken out

in the name of two as for a joint debt, whereas in fact the debt was a single one, the Court refused leave to amend the fiat, but gave leave to take out a new one.-Ex parte Rhands re Morris, 348.

3. (Bankrupt-Trustee.) Where the property was small a new trustee was appointed in lieu of the bankrupt, without a reference, but in such a case there must be an affidavit of fitness.—Ex parte Palmer re Peach, 364.

4. (Direction of fiat.) Venue of fiat changed from Southampton to London; the alleged object being to set aside fraudulent preference to a creditor in London, where the witnesses resided, and the property of the bankrupt was supposed to be concealed.-Re William James, 349.

5. (Same.) Not changed from Newcastle to Manchester, though more than two thirds in number and value of the creditors, as well as the witnesses of the act of bankruptcy (which was there committed), resided in the latter place.-Re Storey, 362.

6. (Joint fiat-Error in title of petition.) A petition to supersede a joint fiat under which one only had been declared a bankrupt, being entitled in the matter of the one so declared only, was held defective, but the order was made on the title being amended.-Ex parte and re Fisher, 345.

7. (Second fiat by same creditor.) Leave given to a creditor to issue a second fiat, after he had through inadvertence allowed the time for prosecuting the first (under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110) to expire.-Re Knibb, 290.

8. (Mistake in name.) An error in the christian name of petitioning creditor,