usury laws by the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 98, s. 7. (6 Ad. & E. 932.)—King v. Braddon, 2 P. & D. 548.

VENUE.

1. (Affidavit to bring back.) An affidavit to bring back the venue, made by the plaintiff's wife, is insufficient, unless it appear that the husband was too ill to attend before a commissioner to make one, and that she is fully acquainted with the nature and particulars of the action. The proper person to make the affidavit, under such circumstances, is the attorney.-Williams v. Higgs, 6 M. & W. 133; 8 D. P. C. 165.

2. (Changing to third county.) The venue was originally laid in A., and changed by the defendant to B. The plaintiff then obtained, by the defendant's consent, an order to change it to C. on an undertaking to give material evidence there: Held, that a judge had power to make the order.-Leach v. Swallow, 8 D. P. C. 199.

WARRANT OF ATTORNEY.

1. (Attestation.) A warrant of attorney is not vitiated by the fact that the name of the attorney who attests it on behalf of the defendant was first suggested by the plaintiff's attorney, if he was expressly adopted by the defendant as his attorney for that purpose.

A defendant may apply to set aside a warrant of attorney and the judgment thereon, on the ground of a non-compliance with the requisitions of the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 9, although he have become bankrupt since the execution of it. (1 C., M. & R. 651.)—Taylor v. Nicholls, 6 M. & W. 91; 8 D. P. C. 242. 2. (Same.) Where, on the execution of a warrant of attorney, one attorney only was present, and attested it on behalf of the defendant, who had acted on previous occasions for the plaintiff, and who made out his bill for the obtaining and preparation of the warrant of attorney to the plaintiff, the Court held that he was not such an attorney "attending on behalf of the defendant," as to satisfy the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 9, and set aside the warrant of attorney.-Sanderson v. Westley, 6 M. & W. 98.

3. (Same.) Where an attesting witness to a warrant of attorney refused to make an affidavit of the execution, to support a motion for judgment upon it, and it appeared that he colluded with the defendant, the Court made absolute with costs a rule to compel him to do so.—Exp. Morrison, 8 D. P. C. 94.

4. (Judgment on old warrant of attorney.) To obtain judgment on an old warrant of attorney, there must be a positive affidavit that the defendant has been seen alive within a reasonable period: mere inference is not sufficient, even though it appears that the defendant keeps out of the way.

Personal service of the rule nisi on the defendant will be dispensed with, where it appears that he keeps out of the way.-Croft v. Lord Egmont, 8 D. P. C. 95.

5. (Same.) In order to enter up judgment on an old warrant of attorney, an affidavit by the plaintiff that the money is still due, is necessary, unless its absence be accounted for, although the defendant has agreed that judgment shall be entered up.-Barton v. Turner, 8 D. P. C. 122.

6. (Same.) For such purpose it is indispensable that the warrant of attorney itself be produced.-Jacobs v. Neville, 8 D. P. C. 125.

7. (Judgment against feme covert on.) Where judgment was signed by mistake

against a married woman alone, on a warrant of attorney given by her dum sola, a rule nisi only was granted for vacating the judgment.-Pocock v. Fry, 1 D. P. C. 126.

8. (Judgment against husband on.) Judgment may be entered up against a husband, on a warrant of attorney given by his wife dum sola. (2 D. P. C. 764; 2 Chit. R. 117.)-Higginbottom v. Higginbottom, 8 D. P. C. 126.

9. (Entering up judgment on.) Where a warrant of attorney is given as a security to a person giving a guarantee, it is not necessary, in order to enter up judgment, to swear that any sum is owing upon it, if it be sworn that the guarantee is still in force.-Pickering v. Carnell, 8 D. P. C. 300.

10. (Attestation.) Where an attorney, although usually acting on behalf of the defendant, acts on the part of the plaintiff in preparing the warrant of attorney, his attestation is not sufficient to satisfy the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, s. 9. (4 B. & Adol. 371; 8 D. P. C. 207.)—Rising v. Dolphin, 8 D. P. C. 309.

WITNESS.

1. (Competency-Release.) Whether the objection to the competency of a witness appears on the record, or comes out on the voir dire, his competency is restored by his statement that he has a release, without his producing it. (M. & M. 319, 321, n.; 1 C. & P. 239; 8 C. & P. 97.)—Lunniss v. Row, 2 P. & D. 538.

2. (Competency of.) To prove the delivery of goods for which an action was brought, the plaintiff called his son, who on cross-examination admitted that the bill of parcels delivered with the goods, and headed, "Dr. to B. & Son," was in his handwriting, and that the "son" meant himself, the witness: but he swore that he was not partner with his father, and received no share of the profits: Held, that he was a competent witness.- Barker v. Stubbs, 1 Scott's N. R. 131.

3. (Commission for examination of.) A commission for the examination of witnesses abroad, under the 1 Will. 4, c. 22, s. 4, issued under a judge's order, which neither named the commissioners, nor the time, place, or manner of examination. The court set aside a verdict, which had been influenced by the evidence so obtained.-Steinkeller v. Newton, 1 Scott's N. R. 148.

4. (Competency-Wife of bankrupt.) The wife of an uncertificated bankrupt, who has released the assignees, is not a competent witness, in an action by the assignees, to prove a payment by the bankrupt to the defendant after the bankruptcy.-Williams v. Williams, 8 D. P. C. 220.

5. (Commission for examination of.) A rule to examine witnesses abroad, under 1 Will. 4, c. 22, s. 4, will be granted, if the names of some of the witnesses proposed to be examined are mentioned in the affidavits, though the names of others are not. (7 D. P. C. 294.)—Beresford v. Easthope, 8 D. P. C. 294. 6. (Same.) The court will grant a rule absolute in the first instance for quashing, at the plaintiff's instance, a commission obtained by him for the examination of witnesses abroad.-Hodges v. Daly, 8 D. P. C. 308.

7. (Affirmation.) A person, formerly a Quaker, who seceded from that sect on some points of doctrine, retaining their opinion on the unlawfulness of swearing, but refuses to affirm under the forms given, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 49, and 3 &

4 Will. 4, c. 82, is not admissible as a witness in criminal cases upon making the affirmation according to Geo. 4, c. 32.—Reg. v. Doran, 2 Moo. C. C. 37.

WOUNDING.

1. (Punishment of hard labour.) Under 1 Vict. c. 85, it is no defence to a charge for maliciously wounding, &c., that the offence would not have been murder, if death had ensued. Sentence of hard labour may be pronounced on all persons convicted of assaults under 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 11, upon indictments for felonies.-Anonymous, 2 Moo. C. C. 40.

2. A wound produced by a blow from the butt-end of a gun on the head, is within the 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 2, though the part of the hat struck by the gun intervened, and was the cutting substance.-Rex v. Sheard, 2 Moo. C. C. 13.

3. An indictment under 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 12, charging a person with "feloniously, wilfully and maliciously" cutting, &c., is not enough, inasmuch as the statute, in creating the offence, uses the word "unlawfully."-Rex v. Ryan, 2 Moo. C. C. 15.

4. An indictment under 7 Will. 4 and 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 5, need not specify the bodily injury dangerous to life; it is enough to specify the means. On an indictment for felony under that section against husband and wife, both may be convicted of assault.-Reg. v. Cruise, 2 Moo. C. C. 53.

WRIT OF ERROR.

1. Error lies in the Exchequer Chamber on a judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, in error from the Common Pleas at Lancaster. (1 Ad. & E. 434; 8 Bing. 204.)-Nesbit v, Rishton, 2 P. & D. 706.

2. (Supersedeas.) A writ of error coram vobis is not a supersedeas in itself, but it is necessary to apply to the court for leave to issue execution. (8 East, 412; 2 M. & W. 533.)-Semple v. Turner, 8 D. P. C. 246. See Gibbs v. Trevanion, ib. 140.

WRIT OF INQUIRY.

(Staying proceedings on-Privileges of Parliament.) The court will not, at the instance of the sheriff, stay the excution of a writ of inquiry on a judgment by default in an action for a libel, on the ground that the House of Commons has voted the libel to be a privileged publication and all persons concerned in bringing any action in respect of such publication guilty of a breach of the privileges of the House.-Stockdale v. Hansard, 8 D. P. C. 148.

And if the sheriff do not return the writ in due time, the court will compel him, by rule absolute in the first instance, to do so.-S. C. ibid. 297.

WRIT OF RIGHT.

Where the tenant, in a writ of right, demurred specially to the court, and on nil dicit by the demandant, entered up final judgment, viz. that the demandant be in mercy, &c., and he, the tenant, hold the tenements quit of the demandant and his heirs for ever, the Court of King's Bench, on a writ of error from the Common Pleas at Lancaster, reversed so much of the judgment below as adjudged that the tenant should hold the tenements quit of the demandant and his heirs for ever, no issue having been joined: and the Court of Exche

quer Chamber affirmed the decision of the King's Bench. (Bro. Abr., Droit de recto, pl. 16; Q. B. 26 Hen. 8, f. 8, pl. 6; Co. Lit. 295, b; Goldsb. 60.) -Rishton v. Nesbit, 2 P. & D. 706, 712.

WRIT OF TRIAL.

(Amendment of issue in.) Where the copy of the issue delivered to the defendant

varied from the roll, blanks being left therein for the teste and return of the writ of trial, the court allowed it to be amended on payment of costs.-Watts v. Bull, 1 Scott's N. R. 173.

EQUITY.

[Containing 1 Beavan, Part 3.]

ADMINISTRATION OF ASSETS.

(What amounts to appropriation.) An executor, who was also trustee, having paid to the adult legatees their shares of the then ascertained residue, invested in his own name the shares of infant legatees, for whose maintenance he was bound as trustee to apply the dividends, but did not execute any declaration of trust. He subsequently applied these shares to his own use, after which further assets of the testator's estate fell in: Held, that they were applicable in the first instance in making good the infant's legacies.—Willmott v. Jenkyns, 402.

ADOPTION. See AGREEMENT, 1.

AGREEMENT.

1. (Right of third parties under an agreement.) The father of the plaintiff, when the latter was only five years old, entered into an agreement with A., whereby the latter, in consideration of 100l. paid him by the father, undertook from that time to board, lodge, educate and maintain the plaintiff as if he were his own son, and to leave him all his property at his death. No sufficient evidence was given of the 100l. having been paid, or that the plaintiff ever resided with A. under the agreement: Held, in a suit against the representatives of A., that both parties to the agreement must be taken to have renounced it by consent, and that they were entitled to do so, no alteration in the status or condition of the plaintiff having taken place in consequence of it. (Colyear v. Lady Mulgrave, 2 Keen, 81.)-Hill v. Gomme, 540.

2. (Waiver.) A. being entitled to an undivided moiety of a piece of ground, agreed with B. that in case either of them should purchase the other moiety, they would divide the whole between them in a particular manner; the moiety was bought by a third person; whereupon A. and B. further agreed that neither of them would purchase such moiety until they had agreed upon a sum to be given for it, subject to the stipulations of the former agreement. B. afterwards entered into negotiations for the purchase of the property, to which he solicited the concurrence of A., and particularly as to fixing the price; but A. declined doing so; upon which B. bought the property, but afterwards offered to A. to carry the original agreement for partition into effect, but A. refused to have any thing to do with him: Held, that this was a waiver of the agreement by A., and that he could not set it up as a defence to a suit by B. for partition in the ordinary way.—Morris v. Timmins, 411.