had been given which showed that fact on the part of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's counsel admitted in his reply, that the existence of the debt from T. to the defendant had been sufficiently established. The defence turned on a point collateral to this question. This evidence having been rejected: Held,

that rejection of it did not form a sufficient ground for a new trial.

Held, also, that the allegation in the declaration, of the acceptance of stock from the plaintiff, was sufficiently shown, although made through the medium of W.-Mortimer v. M'Callan, 6 M. & W. 58.

PRISONER.

(Discharge under 48 Geo. 3, c. 123.) It is not necessary, on giving notice to move for the discharge of a debtor under the 48 Geo. 3, c. 123, to have a copy of the affidavit made in support of the application.—Wilcox v. Lemon, 8 D. P. C. 144.

PROCESS.

1. Service of distringas of lunatic.-Humphreys v. Griffiths, 6 M. & W. 90. 2. (Return of writs in vacation.) An attachment lies against the sheriff for not returning a writ of venditioni exponas pursuant to a judge's order made in vacation, under the rule of M. T., 3 Will. 4, s. 13, although that writ is not mentioned in the rule. (7 D. P. C. 56.)—Reg. v. Sheriff of Berkshire, 8 D. P. C. 98. 3. (Distringas.) Where the time for appearance to a writ of summons is out on Friday, a motion to issue a distringas may be made on Monday, on an affidavit sworn on Saturday, stating that no appearance had been entered by the defendant.-Spence v. Barker, 8 D. P. C. 296.

4. (Indorsement on writ of summons.) Where a firm described themselves, on the back of the writ, as agents for another attorney, stated to be the plaintiff's attorney: Held, to be no objection that one of the firm appeared in the declaration as the attorney.-Armstrong v. King, 8 D. P. C. 297.

5. (Service of writ of summons.) In an action against a writer to the signet, resident at Edinburgh, as administrator, the Court refused to allow service of the writ on the party resident in London who had acted as agent in obtaining the letters of administration, to be good service.-Kerr v. Miller, 8 D. P. C. 322. 6. (Amendment of writ.) A writ of ca. sa. issued after the 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, but before the late form, H. T. 3 Vict., commanded the sheriff to take the defendant to satisfy the plaintiff for the debt, costs, and interest, at the rate of four per cent., and that the sheriff should do all such things as by the 2 Vict. authorized and required: Held, that as the statute gave an additional remedy upon executions, the party might alter the writ accordingly, though no new form had been promulgated by the judges.-Erdy v. Martin, 8 D. P. C. 343.

7. (Service of writ of summons before arrest, under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 100, s. 3.) Though a writ of summons must be sued out before a capias can be applied for, under 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110, it is not necessary that the defendant should be served with a copy thereof previously to his arrest; but where there has been no service of such writ, the Court will grant a rule to discharge the defendant out of custody, unless he be served within a limited time.-Brooke v. Snell, 8 D. P. C. 370. QUO WARRANTO.

1. (Staying proceedings under 1 Vict. c. 78.) Quo warranto information for exercising a borough office, the ground of proceeding being, that the officers presiding at the election were not qualified. The defendant pleaded that he was duly

elected. Pending the information, the stat. 7 Will. 4 and 1 Vict. c. 78, passed. The prosecutor thereupon moved for a stay of proceedings, and payment of costs by the defendant down to the passing of the act, under the 20th section. The Court made the rule absolute, although the defendant suggested that he had a defence independent of the statute (not specifying its nature), and offered to pay all costs of the trial if he failed in establishing such defence.-Reg. v. Hooker, 9 Ad. & E. 680.

2. If the relator of a quo warranto information and the defendant employ the same attorney, the Court will make a rule absolute to change the attorney for the prosecution, although there be no collusion between the parties, and the attorney intended to proceed bonâ fide to obtain the judgment of the Court.—Reg. v. Alderson, 3 P. & D. 2.

RAILWAY ACT.

1. (Mandamus to complete railway.) A company empowered by act of parliament to make a railway from London to Norwich and Yarmouth, passing through Colchester, and required thereby to set out any deviations from the parliamentary plan before the 27th July, 1839, and to make their compulsory purchases of land before the 27th July, 1840, had for two or three years proceeded with great activity to complete the line as far as Colchester, but on May 6th, 1839, had not commenced proceedings for carrying on the line below Colchester. This course was approved of by the shareholders at large, and the funds of the company were nearly exhausted; but it appearing doubtful whether the company had any bonâ fide intention of completing the entire line, the Court of Queen's Bench, at the instance of a small proportion of the shareholders, and of a few landholders on the line, made absolute a rule for a mandamus to the company to set out their deviations, and make their purchases below Colchester. (1 Myl. & K. 154; 3 B. & Adol. 108; 2 M. & W. 824.)-Reg. v. Eastern Counties' Railway Company, 2 P. & D. 648.

2. Under the provisions of a railway act (4 Will. 4, c. cxxv.), a party had called upon the company to issue their warrant to the sheriff to impanel a jury, and assess the damage sustained by him in consequence of certain of his land having been taken for the purposes of the railway. The company however refused to do so, and a rule for a mandamus having been obtained against them, an objec tion on behalf of the company, on showing cause, that the party had not entered into the bond required by the act, (s. 72), was held too late.-Reg. v. Northern Union Railway Company, 8 D. P. C. 329.

RAPE.

1. (Conviction for assault, under indictment for.) A boy under fourteen years of age, indicted for a rape, may be acquitted of the felony, and convicted of an assault, under 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 11.-Reg. v. Brimilow, 2 Moo. C. C. 122; 9 C. & P. 366.

2. (Same.) A prisoner cannot be convicted of an assault with an intent to know, &c. a girl above ten and under twelve years of age, nor of a common assault, if she be consenting. The proper charge is of misdemeanour in attempting to commit a statutable offence.-Reg. v. Martin, 2 Moo. C. C. 123; 9 C. & P. 213, 215.

RECEIVING GOODS OBTAINED BY FALSE PRETENCES.

To bring a case of receiving within the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 55, the indictment must allege the goods to have been obtained by false pretences, and known

to have been so. It is not enough to allege them to have been "unlawfully obtained, taken, and carried away."— Reg. v. Wilson, 2 Moo. C. C. 52. RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS.

(Indictment.)

An indictment charging that a certain evil-disposed person feloniously stole certain goods, and that A. B. feloniously incited the said evildisposed person to commit the said felony, and that C. D. and E. F. feloniously received the said goods knowingly, &c., is bad as against A. B., but good against the receivers, as for a substantive felony.-Reg. v. Caspar, 2 Moo. C. C.

101.

RESTRAINT OF TRADE.

The defendant demised to the plaintiff for ten years a brewery and premises at S., "and also the exclusive or such other privilege as the defendant then enjoyed for supplying ale, &c. to the Punch Bowl, and certain other public houses (naming them), which were then the property of the defendant, or were then under his control," the defendant at the time of the demise himself occupied the Punch Bowl, but during the term assigned it to one G. In an action upon the above covenant, the plaintiff assigned as a breach that G. while tenant of the Punch Bowl, did not purchase all the ale, &c. consumed on the premises from the plaintiff, but purchased it from the defendant, and from divers other persons to the plaintiff unknown : Held, that this breach was not well assigned.

Quare, whether the supposed privilege could properly form the subject-matter of a demise, or, if it could, whether it could be implied from the word "demise." The indenture contained a covenant that the defendant "would not, during the continuance of the demise, either by himself, or for, by, or with any person or persons, or for the use or benefit or advantage of any other person or persons whomsoever, exercise or carry on the trade or business of a brewer, or merchant or agent for the sale of ale, &c. in S. or elsewhere, or in any manner howsoever be concerned in the said trade or business:" Held void, as being a general restraint of trade during the term. (5 M. & W. 548.)—Hinde v. Gray, 1 Scott's N. R. 123.

ROBBERY.

Since the 1 Vict. c. 87, an indictment in the ordinary form for robbery cannot be supported by proof of extorting money by threats of charging an infamous crime, and a person present to aid A. B. to extort money by such charges cannot be convicted of robbery with A. B., effected by him with actual violence, the prisoner being no party to such violence.-Reg. v. Henry, 2 Moo. C. C. 118; 9 C. & P. 309.

SEDUCTION.

(Form of action for.) An action cannot be maintained by a father for the seduction of his daughter while she was in the domestic service of another person; although it be alleged in the declaration that she was there with the intention on the part of her father and herself that she should return to her father's when she quitted her service, unless she should go into another service.-Blaymire v. Haley, 6 M. & W. 55.

SEQUESTRATION.

Where a writ of sequestration was returned to the Exchequer before the plaintiff's execution was satisfied, the Court allowed it to be taken off the file and sent back to the bishop, that he might take the return off the writ, and certify to the Court what he had done under it. The rule for that purpose is absolute in the first instance.-Alderton v. St. Aubyn, 6 M. & W. 150; 8 D. P. C. 223.

SETTLEMENT.

1. (By apprenticeship.) Where the pauper is bound to and resides with his master during the indenture, a settlement is gained, though he never serves his master at his trade, or is instructed by him. (3 B. & Adol. 413.)—Reg. v. Inhabitants of Burslem, 3 P. & D. 38.

2. (Statement of grounds of appeal.) Where the statement of grounds of appeal set up a settlement by payment of rates, in or about the year 1830, "in respect of a tenement in T.:" Held, that the name of the landlord being omitted, evidence of the settlement was inadmissible. (6 Ad. & E. 885.)—Reg. v. Justices of Sussex, 3 P. & D. 42.

3. (By apprenticeship.) A master, not having sufficient employment for a parish apprentice, agreed with another person in the same trade as himself, but in a different parish, that the apprentice should work for him, he paying to the first 5s. per week, the apprentice worked accordingly, and lived with the second master for about three years, and until the expiration of his indenture, except for an interval of ten days when his first master, who was ill, sent for him back Held, that this was putting away of the apprentice, without the consent of justices, within 56 Geo. 3, c. 139, s. 9, and that no settlement was gained in the parish of the second master.-Reg. v. Inhabitants of Wainfleet, All Saints, 3 P. & D. 72.

SHEEP STEALING AND KILLING.

Inflicting a wound on a sheep, of which it afterwards dies, with intent to kill, will support an indictment for killing with intent to steal the carcase, though the sheep does not die till two days afterwards.-Reg. v. Sutton, 2 Moo. C. C.

29.

An indictment under 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 25, for stealing a sheep, is supported by proof of stealing an ewe or ram, though the statute specifies "ram, ewe, sheep, or lamb."-Reg. v. M'Culley, 2 Moo. C. C. 34.

SHERIFF.

1. (Action for false return, how waived.) A right of action against the sheriff for a false return to a fieri facias, is not waived by accepting the sum levied on account and in part satisfaction of the sum indorsed on the writ. (Overruling Benzon v. Garratt, 1 C. & P. 154.)—Holmes v. Clifton, 2 P. & D. 556.

2. (Liability of, for not arresting.)—A sheriff is not liable, under the Uniformity of Process Act, for neglecting to arrest on a capias ad respondendum within the four months, unless special damage accrue: And semble, that he is in no case liable, unless it appears that he has been guilty of some default, when the writ was returnable, either on his being ruled to return it, on the expiration of the four months. Therefore, where a declaration alleged that a writ of capias ad respondendum was delivered to the sheriff to be executed against R. T., and that the sheriff did not arrest in a reasonable time, and that R. T. did not cause bail to be put in according to the exigency of the writ, whereby the plaintiff was injured, and likely to lose his debt: Held, that the action was not maintainable, as it was consistent with the facts alleged that the sheriff might have arrested R. T. after the negligence averred, so as to enable the plaintiff to proceed with his action as speedily as if the sheriff had made the arrest on the first opportunity. (1 M. & W. 704; 7 D. P. C. 38; 2 C. & M. 413; 9 Bing. 740.)-Randell v. Wheble, 2 P. & D. 602.

3. (Affidavit to discharge attachment against.) A sheriff obtained a rule to discharge an attachment against him for not bringing in the body, on an affidavit stating that the application to be made" on his behalf, at his expense, and for his protection, and without collusion with the plaintiff or defendant, or any other person or persons whatsoever." The court held the affidavit insufficient within Reg. Gen. 59 Geo. 3, K. B. Mich., refused to allow it to be amended, and discharged the rule. The rule of court, K. B. 59 Geo. 3, is not superseded by 1 & 2 Vict. c. 110.-Reg. v. Sheriff of Middlesex, 3 P. & D. 120. 4. (Application of payments by.) In an action against the sheriff of Surrey for a false return of nulla bona; it appeared that the plaintiff's execution issued in June 1839, upon a judgment recovered against a mining company. In the year 1837, two writs of fieri facias had issued against the company at the suit of S. and E., under which A., the then sheriff, took in execution property to a considerable amount. Proceedings were taken in the Court of Chancery, and it was referred to the master to report as to the validity of the claims of S. and E. The goods were sold and valued at 943l. 18s. 8d., which was paid by the undersheriff into a banker's in Middlesex to his own account. Subsequently the master reported that 5301. only was due to S., and that nothing was due to E.; and it was ordered that the sheriff should be at liberty, after payment of the sum due to Solari, to pay the balance to the company. In 1837 the plaintiff had levied another execution against the effects of the company, and the balance of the proceeds of the sale was recovered by the under-sheriff, and paid by him into the above-mentioned bankers; on the 14th of June, 1838, the plaintiff lodged in the office of C., the then sheriff, the original fi. fa. ; but no further step was taken until the 6th of June, 1839, when an alias was lodged with the present defendant; the same under-sheriff continued in office during the years 1837, 1838, 1839, and the balance of the money deposited in 1857 remained in the bank where the plaintiff's alias fi. fa. issued: Held, that the defendant could not apply the balance in satisfaction of the plaintiff's execution.— Harrison v. Paynter, 8 D. P. C. 349.

SHIPPING.

1. (Liability of charterer for detention of ship by frost.) The charterer of a ship for the conveyance of a cargo from a foreign port, is not liable to the owner for the unavoidable detention of the ship by the frost, after the completion of the loading.-Pringle v. Mollett, 6 M. & W. 80.

2. (Authority of master to borrow money.) The master of a ship has authority by law to pledge the credit of his owner, resident in England, for money advanced to the master in an English port where the owner has no agent, if such advance of money was necessary for the prosecution of the voyage; and whether it was so or not is a question for the jury. (7 Price, 592; Abbott on Shipping, 116.) -Arthur v. Barton, 6 M. & W. 138.

USURY.

To an action against the acceptor of a bill of exchange, he pleaded that before &c., he was indebted to the plaintiff on an account stated; that it was corruptly agreed between them that the defendant should pay part of the debt, and should have three months' forbearance, and accept a bill at that date for payment of the residue, and should pay a sum, exceeding 51. per cent., for such forbearance; and that the stipulated sums were paid, and the bill in question was given accordingly: Held, that the transaction was exempted from the