(i. e. in the exercise of its illegal claims,)" or the daughters of the uncircumcised will rejoice, the daughters of the Philistine will triumph." When those in authority with the Church entertain and avow such sentiments, it is not surprising that the healing and highly conciliatory measure of Lord Aberdeen should have met with so unfortunate a reception, greatly favourable, perhaps too favourable, as it was, to the promotion of ecclesiastical power; for, to borrow the irreverent but apposite comparison of the Examiner:-" The Church is at this moment like a drunken man in a ditch who kicks at every one who attempts to pick him up, and in his indiscriminate fury even deals a buffet at the friendly hand which offers more gin."

S.

DIGEST OF CASES.

COMMON LAW.

[Comprising 9 Adolphus & Ellis, Part 3; 2 Perry & Davison, Part 4; 3 Perry & Davison, Part 1; 1 Scott's New Reports, Part 1: 6 Meeson & Welsby, Part 1; 8 Dowling, Parts 1 & 2; and 2 Moody's Crown Cases, Part 1-all cases included in former digests being omitted.]

ACCOUNT STATED.

The mere production by the plaintiff of an I O U signed by the defendant, but not addressed, is primâ facie evidence that it was given by the defendant to the plaintiff, in support of an account stated. (1 Esp. 426.)--Curtis v. Rickards, 1 Scott's N. C. 155.

ACTION ON THE CASE.

(By reversioner.) The erection on the defendant's house of eaves and a pipe, overhanging, and conducting water on land in the occupation of a tenant, is a permanent injury, which gives a right of action to the reversioner.-Tucker v. Newman, 3 P. & D. 14.

ADVERSE POSSESSION.

(Limitation Act-Pleading.) Trespass for breaking the plaintiff's close. The plea stated a seisin in fee by W. and his demise, in 1791, to J. Hedger and Griffith, for ninety years, that they entered and were possessed; and being so possessed, in 1812 Griffith died, whereupon J. H., the survivor, became sole possessed for the remainder of the term; and being so possessed, in 1812 bequeathed to W. Hedger; that J. H. died in 1820 so possessed, the probate of his will &c., whereby W. H. became possessed; that plaintiff under colour, &c. entered, and that the defendant entered as servant to W. H. Replication: that the defendant's entry was after the passing of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, and that the right to enter did not accrue to W. Hedger or the defendant, &c. any time within twenty years before the entry. Rejoinder: that the close was not, at the time of the passing of the act, possessed by the plaintiff or any other person adversely to W. H. Surrejoinder: that it was at that time possessed adversely, to wit, by W. S. The dates were laid under a videlicet. The issue was found for the plaintiff: Held, as the dates were under a videlicet, and not in their nature material, that the replication was not contradictory, on the ground that it admitted W. H.'s right of entry to have accrued since 1820, and denied it to have accrued within twenty years; and the rejoinder admitted W. H.'s right of entry did

not accrue within twenty years, and put the case on the question of adverse pos session.

That as the rejoinder admitted the right of entry not to have accrued within twenty years, and the question of adverse possession at the passing of the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, had been found against the defendant, he was not entitled to the five additional years given by section 15, and was in the situation of a mere wrongdoer; that it was therefore not necessary for the plaintiff to plead specially title in himself, in answer to the title in the plea, because his mere possession, as stated in the declaration, and admitted by the plea, was sufficient to maintain trespass against the wrongdoer.

That the rejoinder was not contradictory to the declaration, as the plaintiff might have been in possession at the time of the trespass, though W. S. was in possession at the passing of the act.-Holmes v. Newlands, 3 P. & D. 128.

AFFIDAVIT.

1. (Jurat.) The place of swearing an affidavit may be stated in the jurat by reference to the place in the body of the affidavit.-Grant v. Fry, 8 D. P. C. 234.

2. (Time for filing.) Where an enlarged rule requires affidavits to be filed within a limited time, the Court will not allow them to be filed afterwards, unless the omission arose from inevitable accident. (4 D. P. C. 16.)—Wright v. Lewis, 8 D. P. C. 298.

3. So, where a matter has been referred to the master, and he, in his discretion, has refused to allow affidavits to be filed after a particular day, the Court will not interfere.-Hall v. Anderton, 8 D. P. C. 326.

AGREEMENT.

(Second action for breach of same agreement.) It was agreed between the plaintiff and defendant, partners, that the plaintiff should relinquish his share of the business to the defendant, the latter agreeing to give the plaintiff a promissory note for 7301. payable by instalments, and in case a certain mortgage on property of the plaintiff's should be called in before the note should be fully paid, to pay the whole amount that should remain due, or provide a fresh mortgage. The plaintiff (after the mortgagee had given notice to redeem the mortgage) sued the defendant on this agreement in the Exchequer, alleging as a breach the non-delivery of the note. This cause was terminated by a judge's order, directing a certain note and securities to be given. The plaintiff afterwards brought a second action on the agreement in the Common Pleas, alleging as a breach the damages resulting from the calling in of the mortgage. Held, that a plea setting up the recovery in the former action afforded no answer, it having been brought in respect of a different breach.-Bristowe v. Fairclough, 1 Scott's N. R. 161. AMENDMENT.

1. A declaration on a wager stated that the plaintiff bet the defendant that a railroad would be completed by a certain day, for the general conveyance of passengers. The wager proved was simply that the railroad would be completed by that day. The judge at the trial amended by striking out of the record the words "for the general conveyance of passengers." Held, that the amendment was properly made, as the amended declaration increased the plaintiff's burthen, by rendering it necessary for him to prove that the road was completed for all its purposes; and that therefore, as far as the defendant was concerned, the amendment was not in any material particular,-Evans v. Fryer, 2 P. & D. 540.

2. The plaintiffs sued the secretary of a joint-stock company, incorporated by letters patent under the 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 73, for the infringement of a patent by the company. After verdict for the plaintiffs, and a rule granted to arrest the judgment, the plaintiffs were not allowed to amend the declaration, by showing that the company was so incorporated, and that the defendant was their registered officer.-Galloway v. Bleaden, 1 Scott's N. R. 170.

ARBITRATION.

1. (Award, when sufficiently certain—Excess of authority in respect to costs.) All matters in difference on the record in a cause were referred to arbitration, the costs of the action and of the reference and the award to be in the discretion of the arbitrator. The arbitrator awarded that the action should cease, and no further proceedings be taken therein; that the defendant should pay to the plaintiff 50l. towards the costs of the cause and reference; that the plaintiff should pay his own and the defendant's costs of the cause and reference, the said costs to be taxed as between attorney and client; and that the plaintiff should pay the arbi trator 251. for his fees, &c.: Held, that this award was not uncertain or inconsistent; but that the arbitrator had exceeded his authority in awarding costs as between attorney and client; and that the order as to costs was so connected with the rest of the award, that it could not be rejected as surplusage.—Seccombe V. Babb, 6 M. & W. 129; 8 D. P. C. 167.

2. (Making enlargements part of rule of Court.)

Where an arbitrator, pursuant

to a power reserved to him by a submission, enlarges the time for making his award, the enlargement is to be considered as part of the original submission, and must be made part of the rule of Court, in order to move to set aside the award. And where there are two parts of the deed of submission, but the enlargements were indorsed on one part only, the Court compelled the party in whose possession it was to make it a rule of Court. (5 East, 189.)—Smith v. Blake, 8 D. P. C. 130.

3. (Time for setting aside award.)-A motion to set aside an award, pursuant to the 9 & 10 Will. 3, c. 15, made two terms after the publication of the award, was held too late, although the opposite party had improperly occasioned a part of the delay, by preventing the submission from being made a rule of Court.— Smith v. Blake, 8 D. P. C. 133.

4. (Amending rule for setting aside award.) A rule to set aside an award, under 9 & 10 Will. 3, c. 15, cannot be amended by the production of an affidavit made on the last day of the term next after the award was published.-Holloway v. Monk, 8 D. P. C. 138.

5. (Attachment for non-performance of award.) After the lapse of four years from the making of the award, the Court refused an attachment for non-performance of it, without an affidavit explaining the delay.-Storey v. Garry, 8 D. P. C. 299.

ASSAULT.

(Plea of, certificate under 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 27.) A plea, to an action of assault, that the defendant had been summoned before two justices for the same assault, who dismissed the complaint, and granted the defendant a certificate of such dismissal, under the 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 27, is bad, unless it set forth the grounds of the certificate, so as to show that it was given under such circumstances as to make it a bar to the action.

The venue of the declaration was in Surrey, and the plea stated that the complaint was dismissed by justices of Surrey: Held, that it sufficiently appeared that the assault was committed in the same county, so as to give jurisdiction to such justices.-Skuse v. Davis, 2 P. & D. 550.

ASSUMPSIT.

(When it lies against a stakeholder.) The plaintiff agreed with G. to pay him 251. if he performed certain work to the satisfaction of a referee, and that a check for 251. should be deposited with the defendant, to be handed over to G., if the work succeeded; if not, to be returned to the plaintiff. The check was so deposited, and the defendant presented and obtained cash for it. The referee subsequently disapproved of the work, but no decision by him was communicated to the defendant: Held, that under these circumstances, the plaintiff could not sue the defendant for the amount of the check; and that the turning of it into money was not a breach of the defendant's duty as stake-holder, which entitled the plaintiff to recover it as money received to his use, it not appearing by the evidence that the parties had contemplated any distinction between a check and money.—Wilkinson v. Godefroy, 9 Ad. & E. 536.

ATTACHMENT.

(Service necessary for.) Upon a motion for an attachment, the affidavit stated that the deponent left a copy of the rule with the party at his dwelling house, and at the same time showed him the original rule: Held, a sufficient allegation of personal service.-Short v. Smith, 1 Scott's N. R. 153.

ATTORNEY.

1. (Summary jurisdiction over.) To subject an attorney to the summary jurisdiction of the Court, it must appear, either that he is an attorney of the Court, (having signed the roll) or that he has acted as such.

An attorney in the country, to whom a writ of summons and notice of declaration were transmitted for the purpose of serving them, afterwards became the attorney for the defendant in the cause: Held, that his employment for the plaintiff was not such as to constitute him his attorney, and render him summarily amenable in that character.-Cole v. Grove, 1 Scott's N. R. 30.

2. (Admission-Non-payment of stamp duty, effect of.) In an action upon a bill of exchange, the consideration for which was business done by one W., as the attorney and solicitor for the defendant, the acceptor, the latter pleaded that W. was admitted an attorney of the King's Bench, and a solicitor in chancery in 1810, but took out no certificate till 1813, when he first commenced practising; that he thence continued to practise, duly taking out his annual certificate, until 1820, when he ceased to practise, and remained uncertificated; that he was readmitted in the King's Bench in 1823, and neglected for more than a year to obtain a certificate, and that at the time the work in question was done, he had not been re-admitted in any of the courts at law, except as aforesaid. The replication admitted the facts stated in the plea, relied upon the subsequent admission of W. in the Common Pleas, and in Chancery, in 1826. And the rejoinder, assuming that W. was de facto admitted in the Common Pleas, as alleged in the replication, sought to avoid such admission in point of law, by alleging it to have been "without payment of further duty in that behalf, according to the form of the statute in that behalf:" Held, that the admission of W. in this Court must be taken to have been an original admission, that there was