The incapacities of imperial administration were keenly discussed within and without the doors of Parliament. There was hardly a session of the legislature in which the miscarriages of the navy and the losses of the merchants were not the subjects of loud complaint.92 The House of Commons, smarting under the severe injuries to the economic and maritime interests of the nation and incited to action by the influence of the merchants, closely examined into the whole matter, and, as Bishop Burnet records, "when all the errors, with relation to the protection of our trade, were set out and much aggravated, a motion was made to create by act of parliament, a council of trade". On December 12, 1695, the very day on which this decision was reached, the king countered it by announcing his purpose to establish by royal authority a council composed of "some of the Greatest Quality, and others of Lesser Rank, and acquainted with trade ".94 Thus was the constitutional issue. joined. The attempt of the Commons to erect a council, not only drawn from the legislature but clothed by it with powers of administration, raised the significant question, "how far the government should continue on its ancient bottom of monarchy, as to the executive part, or how far it should turn to a commonwealth ".9 Embraced in the movement were the efforts of the unprivileged merchants, persisting through many years, to break down the political and commercial dominance of the monopolistic London companies in favor of a more open trade and free ports. Bristol and the outports, unconcerned by what authority a council was established, royal or parliamentary, worked to secure one so modelled that it should be representative and non-partizan as well as expert.9

95

96

Diary (ed. Bray), III. 355-356; Davenant, Discourses on the Publick Revenues and on the Trade of England (London, 1698), II. 126–135; "Memoriall concerning a Council of Trade", Br. Mus., Harleian MSS. 1223, no. 9, ff. 184-188; Letters of the merchants of Bristol to the city's representatives in the Commons, Br. Mus., Add. MSS. 5540, ff. 83-96.

92 House of Lords MSS., n. s. (1693–1695), I. i-xix.

93 House of Commons Journal, XI. 359, 376, 398; House of Lords Journal, XV. 606, 608-609, 611-612; Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, III. 560-561; Burnet, Hist. Own Time, p. 621.

94" Heads of his Majesty's commission for a Council of Trade", 1696, Br. Mus., Add. MSS. 9764, f. 101; Fox Bourne, Life of John Locke, II. 348; Luttrell, Brief Historical Relation, III. 562; Bristol representatives to merchants, December 19, 1695, Add. MSS. 5540; Cal. St. P., Col., 1693–1696, § 2207.

95 Cobbett, Parl. Hist., V. 977; Commons Journ., XI. 423-424, 440, 454; Luttrell, Brief Hist. Rel., III. 568; IV. 7, 19; Burnet, Hist. Own Time, p. 621.

96 The Bristol merchants declared that if the proposed council of trade "be made up of Courtiers unexperienced in Trade, twill become only a matter of charge to the Nation; if of Londoners, They will endeavour to overrule things so as they shall best conduce to bringing all Trade to that great City, without

William III., jealous of the traditional prerogatives of the crown and anxious to thwart a step fraught with serious portent to their integrity, was driven to set up a Board of Trade and Plantations by commission of May 15, 1696. This step marks the close of the constant activities of the Lords of Trade as the directors of trade and plantation affairs and a return, in almost exact lines of organization, functions, and position, to the select council abolished in 1674. The Board of Trade lived through a varied experience of nearly ninety years. It was not however till 1768 that American affairs were finally differentiated from foreign and domestic relations and entrusted to the care of a separate department of state. But the recognition of the peculiar importance and character of colonial interests came too late to be of any advantage.

WINFRED T. ROOT.

respect to other Ports "; it was urged that the body be composed of "Men well verst" in trade, chosen from "all the parts thereof, as well the countys, as some particular Trading Citys and ports". Add. MSS. 5540, December 16, 1695; Andrews, Brit. Comm., p. 113.

97 Dickerson, Am. Colonial Govt., pp. 20-22.

THE MISSION AS A FRONTIER INSTITUTION IN THE SPANISH-AMERICAN COLONIES

Of the missions in Spanish America, particularly those in California, much has been written. But most of what has been produced consists of chronicles of the deeds of the Fathers, polemic discussions by sectarian partizans, or sentimental effusions with literary, edifying, or financial intent. They deal with the heroic exploits of individuals, with mooted questions of belief and practice, or with the romance that hovers round the mission ruins. All this is very well, and not to be ridiculed, but it is none the less true that little has been said of these missions in their relation to the general Spanish colonial policy, of which they were an integral and a most important part. Father Engelhardt's learned books are a notable exception, but his view is confined closely to California, whereas the mission, in the Spanish colonies, was an almost universal establishment.

One of the marvels in the history of the modern world is the way in which that little Iberian nation, Spain, when most of her blood and treasure were absorbed in European wars, with a handful of men took possession of the Caribbean archipelago, and by rapid yet steady advance spread her culture, her religion, her law, and her language over more than half of the two American continents, where they still are dominant and still are secure-in South America, Central America, and a large fraction of North America, for fifty million people in America to-day are tinged with Spanish blood, still speak the Spanish language, still worship at the altar set up by the Catholic kings, still live under laws essentially Spanish, and still possess a culture largely inherited from Spain.

These results are an index of the vigor and the virility of Spain's frontier forces; they should give pause to those who glibly speak of Spain's failure as a colonizing nation; and they suggest the importance of a thoughtful study of Spain's frontier institutions and methods. Professor Turner has devoted his life to a study of the Anglo-American frontier, and rich has been his reward. Scarcely less conspicuous in the history of the Western world than the advance of the Anglo-American frontier has been the spread of Spanish culture, and for him who interprets, with Turner's insight, the methods

and the significance of the Spanish-American frontier, there awaits. a recognition not less marked or less deserved.

Whoever essays this task, whoever undertakes to interpret the forces by which Spain extended her rule, her language, her law, and her traditions, over the frontiers of her vast American possessions, must give close attention to the missions, for in that work they constituted a primary agency. Each of the colonizing nations in America had its peculiar frontier institutions and classes. In the French colonies the pioneers of pioneers were the fur-trader and the missionary. Penetrating the innermost wilds of the continent, one in search of the beaver, the other in quest of souls to save, together they extended the French domains, and brought the savage tribes into friendly relations with the French government, and into profitable relations with the French outposts. In the English colonies the fur-trader blazed the way and opened new trails, but it was the backwoods settler who hewed down the forest, and step by step drove back the Indian with whom he did not readily mingle. In the Spanish colonies the men to whom fell the task of extending and holding the frontiers were the conquistador, the presidial soldier, and the missionary.

All of these agents were important; but in my study of frontier institutions in general, and in my endeavor in particular to understand the methods and forces by which Spain's frontiers were extended, held, and developed, I have been more and more impressed with the importance of the mission as a pioneering agency. Taking for granted for the moment its very obvious religious aspects, I shall here devote my attention more especially to the mission's political and social meaning. My point of view embraces all of New Spain -all of the Spanish colonies, indeed-but more particularly the northern provinces, from Sinaloa to Texas, from Florida to California. My conclusions are based on the study of documents, unprinted for the most part, which have been gathered mainly from the archives of Mexico and Spain.

The functions of the mission, from the political standpoint, will be better understood if it is considered in its historical relations. The central interest around which the mission was built was the Indian. In respect to the native, the Spanish sovereigns, from the outset, had three fundamental purposes. They desired to convert him, to civilize him, and to exploit him. To serve these three purposes, there was devised, out of the experience of the early conquerors, the encomienda system. It was soon found that if the savage were to be converted, or disciplined, or exploited, he must

be put under control. To provide such control, the land and the people were distributed among Spaniards, who held them in trust, or in encomienda. The trustee, or encomendero, as he was called, was strictly charged by the sovereign, as a condition of his grant, to provide for the protection, the conversion, and the civilization of the aborigines. In return he was empowered to exploit their labor, sharing the profits with the king. To provide the spiritual instruction and to conduct schools for the natives-for Indian schools were actually prescribed and maintained the encomenderos were required to support the necessary friars, by whom the instruction was given. Thus great monasteries were established in the conquered districts.

But the native had his own notions, especially about being exploited, and he sometimes fled to the woods. It was soon discovered, therefore, that in order properly to convert, instruct, and exploit the Indian, he must be kept in a fixed place of residence. This need was early reported to the sovereigns by encomenderos and friars alike, and it soon became a law that Indians must be congregated in pueblos, and made to stay there, by force if necessary. The pueblos were modelled on the Spanish towns, and were designed not alone as a means of control, but as schools in selfcontrol as well.

Thus, during the early years of the conquest, the natives were largely in the hands of the encomenderos, mainly secular landholders. The friars, and afterward the Jesuit priests, came in great numbers, to preach and teach, but they lacked the authority of later days. In 1574 there were in the conquered districts of Spanish America nearly nine thousand Indian towns, containing about one and a half million adult males, representing some five million people, subject to tribute. These nine thousand towns were encomiendas of the king and some four thousand encomenderos.

The encomienda system then, by intention, was benevolent. It was designed for the conversion and the civilization of the native, as well as for the exploitation of his labor. But the flesh is weak, and the system was abused. The obligations to protect, convert, and civilize were forgotten, and the right to exploit was perverted into license. Practical slavery soon resulted, and the encomienda system became the black spot in the Spanish-American code. Philanthropists, led by Las Casas, begged for reform; abuses were checked, and encomiendas were gradually, though slowly, abolished.

This improvement was made easier by the decreasing attractiveness of encomiendas, as the conquest proceeded to the outlying dis