government concerning the conduct of the late claims convention which had committed irregularities so gross that they annulled their awards. The Secretary of State said, in reply, that at this stage of the matter he could not consent to hear remarks of that kind. Mr. Castro had neither assigned nor mentioned any special error or irregularity, while he alleged that the convention was already annulled by the irregularities which had occurred; that as it takes two parties to make a convention, it equally requires the consent of both parties to abrogate it.

Mr. Castro stated that he expected to furnish the proofs, and he trusted that he should be able to convince the United States government that the proceedings of the convention were illegal, and ought to be set aside. The Secretary of State said that he would receive and give attention to any proposition which the Venezuelan government might have to make, but candor obliged him to inform Mr. Castro that this government could indulge no presumption in favor of the complaint which he proposed to make; that the convention had concluded its proceedings, made its awards, and the day is at hand when the first instalment of the sums awarded would be due. The Venezuelan government, instead of making provision for that payment, has, in the first place, submitted through the United States legation at Caracas financial propositions which would defer and postpone the payment of those debts liquidated and awarded by the convention in favor of unliquidated and unestablished debts due to the subjects of another nation. In the second place, at this late day the Venezuelan government came with a proposition to set all proceedings of the convention aside. The Secretary observed that, under these circumstances, he must insist that the complaint of the Venezuelan government should be submitted promptly if it was expected to be examined.

Mr. Castro replied that he expected to submit the formal complaint in a very few days, and in the mean time he had to ask of the justice of the United States that all proceedings on the part of the United States for collecting the awards would be suspended.

The Secretary replied that he could make no engagement of that kind; that in the absence of all knowledge of any error or irregularity in the proceedings of the convention, he could not assume a case which impeached not only the integrity and honesty of the Venezuelan commissioner, but also the integrity and honesty of the commissioner of the United States.

Mr. Castro remarked that the Venezuelan government entertained a high regard and respect for the United States, and placed entire reliance on their sense of justice.

The Secretary replied that if Venezuela entertained any other feelings, that government must be very unreasonable, for the utmost indulgence and forbearance had been practiced by this government in regard to

Washington, February 12, 1869.

Mr. SECRETARY: As I had the honor to inform you verbally at the time of presenting the letter of the secretary of foreign affairs for Venezuela, accrediting me as the representative of that republic near this government, I hold instructions from my government making it my urgent duty to present to your consideration certain acts of the mixed commission, sitting at Caracas for the purpose of hearing justly and deciding impartially the claims of American citizens against the government of Venezuela, which acts, contrary to the expectation of both nations, have seriously injured Venezuela, by an evident violation of right and insult to justice.

As it is the desire of my government, in accordance with your suggestion, that this communication be carried into prompt effect, I will not dwell upon all the acts of the American commissioner that have given just cause of complaint to the United States of Venezuela, many of which are incompatible with the character of judge; but as I wish to show the reasons for this proceeding on the part of Venezuela, I am compelled to say much about the awards of the commission.

To be brief, I will mention Mr. Talmage's attempt to impose an umpire on the commission by proposing a certain person, and declaring he would accept no other; his opposition to the proposal of the Venezuelan commissioner to select a member of the diplomatic corps, because the convention did not allow it, as he said, when he proposed the representative of Brazil; the unusual regulations for the proceedings of the commission, such as fixing a certain time for the decision of every claim under consideration, no matter how complicated, and prohibiting the commissioners from taking the papers to their houses to examine them; and the singular rule that after award was made, whether by the commissioners or umpire, as many certificates of fractional sums as each claimant desired should be issued, which the Venezuelan commissioner vainly opposed, because it was presuming to say what was best for the claimants, implied collusion with them, and was detrimental to the honor and probity of the commission. I will also say that the American commissioner, Mr. Talmage, although judge, did not hesitate to attest a document, in which lawyer Palenzuela and Mr. Murray, secretary of the American legation, agreed to divide the fees, salaries, and certificates that might fall to their share, by certain contracts, for attending to the business before the commission, for certain parties mentioned; and he openly declared himself the representative of the party in whose favor he had decided as judge, and claimed the certificates issued to the heirs of Jacob Idler, Seth Driggs, Clemencia de Willett, and Ralph Rawdon. No person can be an impartial judge who is interested with the claimants, as Mr. Talmage has here shown himself; in no case did he object to the largest claims, and often said they were too small. I could say

Such was the way in which the court of arbitration was composed, and we must now consider its decisions.

I will now call the particular attention of the government of the United States to the manifest injustice of many of the decisions of which the government of Venezuela complains, with the hope that they will be set aside.

Without giving a list of all those which were not concurred in by the Venzuelan commissioner, I will proceed to explain a few as follows:

1. The case of Jacob Idler is prominent from the greatness of the claim awarded. It was of Colombian origin, and of course ought to be shared equally by Venezuela, New Granada, and Ecuador, once constituting the Republic of Colombia; yet the American commissioner condemned Venezuela to pay the whole amount he was pleased to award. The interest of this claim was greater than the principal; the question was a mere liquidation of the claim. Instead of examining it, the American commissioner finds a decision of the Supreme Court, allowing Idler certain sums, and adopts the decision as his own, although the same court had set aside the decision. But the decision suited the commissioner, and he adopted it without examination. Then the umpire comes to his assistance, and despite his oath to examine scrupulously and decide impartially, justly, &c., he relies on the probability of discovering errors in the former proceedings, and does not take the trouble to look into the accounts which it was his duty to examine. Thus saving trouble, without regard to the injury of either country, and in disregard to the decision of the plenary commission of the three republics into which Colombia split, and against the decision of the State council, which declared Idler to be the debtor and not the creditor of the State, as he wrongfully collected sums that had been already paid, the umpire divests himself of his title and confirms the award of a quarter of a million of dollars to the heirs of the pretended creditor Idler. Two friendly republics certainly did not appoint a commission to act in this manner in deciding such momentous questions.

2. No less a deviation from justice is perceived in the award made by the commissioner and umpire in favor of the widow and heirs of Captain Clark. This case is also of Colombian origin, and was justly condemned by the United States commissioner of claims against Ecuador, who considered Clark as a pirate who deserved exemplary punishment, and refused to encourage criminals, which act was very commendable in that commissioner.

But what would be thought of the justice and impartiality of this great republic if it sanctioned a crime in Venezuela that was not protected in Ecuador? This idea did not disturb the even mind of Commissioner Talmage, nor his obedient umpire, when they decided in favor of a claim that had already been paid, principal and interest, by error of a

ཅས་ ་པ ་ ་བས

ཟ་པ ་པ་

www

rial government, and refused to ratify Mr. Culver's recognition of it, and as it did not represent Venezuela its acts were not valid. It is to be observed that there is a clause in each contract stating that no claims shall be international. Besides this it was not necessary for Venezuela to annul those contracts, for they were null from illegality of the objects, and if the contractors suffered any damage, of which there is no proof, it was due to their rash speculations in an illegal business. This case is analogous to the contracts made by European sympathizers or speculators with the de facto southern confederation in this country. Their losses may be great, but their attempt to fix the responsibility on the government of the United States was not successful.

No one can believe that the government of the United States would pay any such indemnity, even if the commission about to be established to settle claims between the United States and Great Britain were to make awards.

Now, justice is the same in all nations, and the American commissioner in Caracas, with this example in view, ought to understand that the United States should not require of a friendly nation what they are not disposed to concede to any nation.

The decision of the commission in this case is based solely upon the common idea that a contract is annulled only by the joint consent of both parties; but the absurdity of this is so apparent that I will say no more about it.

It would be very easy to point out the injustice of the other decisions of the commissioner, but what I have said I hope will suffice for the present.

I have mentioned that the American commissioner was interested with many of the claimants; have told of his intimacy and his private business with the umpire; and I have demonstrated the injustice of many decisions, and suggested the presumption that the others are equally so. It is very unpleasant to me to have to make these grievous allegations in the name of my government; but I have said just so much in complaint of the conduct of Mr. Talmage as I was obliged to say, omitting many facts that transpired in the correspondence with my government, only to shorten this communication.

I am aware of the unfavorable impression the request to annul decisions supposed to be final will have upon the government of the United States, particularly when it is the ardent desire of both nations to have the differences settled; but it is the duty of my government to defend itself against all injustice; and it is conscious that it is now applying to a government that is imbued with the principles of rectitude, and will not tolerate the injury that one of its officials has done, or attempted to do, to a friendly nation; and, so long as the harm is not consummated,

Mr. Seward to Mr. Muñoz y Castro.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

Washington, March 3, 1869.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 12, 1869, in which you ask, in the name of your government, that the awards granted by Commissioner Talmage and Mr. Machado, whom you are pleased to designate as his umpire in the commission lately sitting at Caracas under the convention of April 25, 1866, be annulled, and that the cases be submitted to the consideration of a new convention.

The proposition thus made has been considered with the care and deliberation which its importance and its novelty require.

It may serve to abridge the discussion of the specific allegations which you present as the grounds upon which this government is asked to disregard the decisions of the tribunal to which it and the government of Venezuela have submitted the question at issue between them, growing out of private claims, if I invite your attention to an early exemplification of the light in which this government has regarded the character and office of such tribunals, and the relations to them of the governments by whom they are instituted. On the 29th day of April, 1823, my predecessor, John Quincy Adams, replying to a protest from the minister of his Catholic Majesty against an anticipated decision of such a commission, used this language:

I am directed to say in answer, that the government of the United States have no more than the government of Spain the right or authority to dictate or control the decisions of the commissioners appointed by the treaty of February 22, 1819; and that as the United States will not assume themselves, so they will not suffer from Spain, the exercise of any such dictation or control, alike repugnant to the principles of impartial justice and to that judicial independence which constitutes the excellence and the glory of the institutions both of this country and of Spain.

The reasons which forbid either government from interposing its influence to affect the deliberations of such a commission are equally if not more imperative in denying the right of both to bring under review awards definitively made and promulgated. The Supreme Court of the United States, when examining the effect of a finding by the commissioners under the treaty just referred to, declares:

The object of the treaty was to invest the commissioners with full power and authority to receive, examine, and decide upon the amount and validity of the asserted claims upon Spain for damages and injuries. Their decision within the scope of this authority is conclusive