Greek and introduces the influence of Aristotle, represents phases of the thought of Roman civilization under the Empire: (De Fato 7): Τὸ μέντοι [αἴτιον] κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅταν μὴ μόνον ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά του γίγνηται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡ προαίρεσις, τότε δὴ καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης προσαγορεύεται. 56 (De Fat. 5): Μόνα δ' εἱμαρμένα καὶ καθ' εἱμαρμένην τὰ ἀκόλουθα τοῖς ἐν τῇ θείᾳ διατάξει προηγησαμένοις. 57 (De Fat. 7): Διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτόματον κοινὸν ἐμψύχων τε καὶ ἀψύχων· ἡ δὲ τύχη ἀνθρώπου ἴδιον ἤδη πράττειν δυναμένου.58 In this distinction between Fortune, Fate, and chance, we have a new problem introduced, the question of free-will. I shall touch on that problem elsewhere. For the present, it suffices to show that the Fates have a predetermined plan and Fortune is purely capricious.59 The capricious goddess, then, is what we shall mean by the "pagan Fortuna." She is in control of the universe, but she is quite arbitrary about it. In this study of the meaning and philosophy of Fortune, the question arises what is the remedy for such a controlling force in the universe? One must necessarily suffer from a turn of the tide. What can we do about it? The good pagan could only answer: "Bear it; wait for still another reversal." This, carried a little further, became the advice to oppose your strength to that of 56 "Now the cause by accident, when it is found in a thing which not merely is done for some end but has in it free will and election, is then called Fortune." Trans. "A. G."; ed. Goodwin. Plutarch's Morals. This is Aristotelian. The influence of Aristotelian philosophy on Medieval discussions of Fortuna will be treated in another paper. 57 “In like manner, those things only are fatal and according to Fate, which are the consequences of causes preceding in the divine disposition." Ibid. 58 "Wherefore chance is common to things inanimate, as well as to those which are animated; whereas Fortune is proper to man only, who has his actions voluntary." Ibid. 59 One can parallel the methods of divination with this, Astrology and the predictions of soothsayers are ways of getting in touch with the great scheme of the universe, methods of discovering the plan; lots, geomancy, fortune-telling in general, aim to fit haphazard media to a haphazard order. See Pliny, N. H., 2, 23, "Pars alia et hanc pellit astroque," etc. Fortuna; to defy her. The philosopher then stepped in, and added that it was easy to defy her because Fortune had no power over the mind. And he went even further; he said that Fortune controlled only worldly affairs, that virtue was truly free. (1) Of the first kind of remedy, which opposes patience to Fortuna, we have plenty of examples. I shall call it the remedy of fortitude: Virgil (Aen. V, 710): Quidquid erit; superanda omnis fortuna ferendo est. Ovid (Metam. VI, 195): Major sum, quam cui possit fortuna nocere. Seneca (Medea, 159): Fortuna fortes metuit, ignavos premit.60 With this idea another is naturally harmonious, that Fortune is in the power of the courageous; and so the theme develops "Fortune. aids the bold": Terence (Phormio I, 4, 26): Fortis Fortuna adjuvat. Virgil (Aen. X, 284): Audentes fortuna juvat. Livy (Histor. VIII, 29): Eventus docuit fortes fortunam juvare.61 (2) The method of opposing the intellect to the disorder of Fortuna, which we may call the remedy of prudence, is found in the sneers of the philosophers at the belief in her.62 See, for example, Plutarch's discussion: Εἰ γὰρ ταῦτα γίγνεται διὰ τύχην, τί κωλύει καὶ τὰς γαλᾶς καὶ τοὺς τράγους καὶ τοὺς πιθήκους συνέχεσθαι φάναι διὰ τύχην ταῖς λιχνείαις καὶ 60 See also Ovid, Ex Pont. II, III, II. 51; Ennius (Mueller), Annales 257; with the opposition of animus to F.: Seneca, Epistola XCVIII, 7 and 2; ad Polyb. Consol. XXIII ff.; de Prov. VI, 5; Medea, 1. 176. A case where F. wins the struggle is found in Virgil, Aeneid, V, 22. 61 See also Claudian, Ep. III, 9; Cf. Ovid (Metam. X, 586) with the familiar "Audentes deus ipse juvat." It is, of course, akin to the proverb "God helps those who help themselves." 62 See Pliny, p. 135 above. ταῖς ἀκρασίαις καὶ ταῖς βωμολοχίαις; and again: ὅτι γὰρ τούτοις βραχεία τις παρεμπίπτει τύχη, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα καὶ μέγιστα τῶν ἔργων αἱ τέχναι συντελοῦσι δι' αὑτῶν,64 etc. These passages obviously limit the field of Fortuna's operation. In the second it is implied that man has certain qualities not under the control of the goddess. Such limitation is accomplished by the speculation of the philosopher; and by his very attitude reason is opposed to the whims of chance. The philosopher thus puts certain things out of Fortuna's control. So Juvenal (Satira X, 363): Monstro quod ipse tibi possis dare, semita certe nos facimus, Fortuna, deam caeloque locamus."'65 (3) This passage implies what the next step was to be. The philosopher proceeded to state clearly just what things were out of the control of Fortuna; and her cults reveal that the things within her control were conceived chiefly as external (not moral) gifts." In the golden age, which was likely to foster materialistic desires, the men went on voyages to gain wealth, and the dominating interest of the time was luxury. It does not appear that anyone went to Fortuna for spiritual advancement. She was not the goddess of the soul, but of worldly interests alone." For evidence of this characteristic, recall merely the frequent repetition of the great Fortuna theme: 63 "And if such things as these can come by Fortune, what hinders but that we may as well plead that cats, goats, and monkeys are constrained by Fortune to be ravenous, lustful, and ridiculous?" Trans. Baxter, Goodwin ed., Plutarch, de Fortuna (1), Frgt. 2, Chaeremon 64 "For that there falls in but little of Fortune to an expert artist, whether founder or builder, but that the most and greatest part of their workmanship is performed by mere art," etc. Ibid., Plutarch, de Fortuna (4), Frgt. 2, Chaeremon. "What I show Thyself may freely on thyself bestow; Dryden. Mortalem summum fortuna repente reddidit e summo regno ut famul infimus esset.66 She dispenses worldly honors. Those who would escape from her control can do so merely by cultivating an interest in virtue. This I shall call the spiritual remedy against Fortune. Take, for instance, the discussion in Seneca: (de Constantia Sapientio, V, 2) Nihil eripit fortuna, nisi quod dedit: virtutem autem non dat. (Ep. LXXIV, 1) "Unum Bonum esse, quod Honestum est." Nam, qui alia bona judicat, in fortunae venit potestatem, alieni arbitrii fit.67 The man who does not seek virtue, then, exposes himself to the power of fortune and has no just cause for complaint. Such are the three great remedies of Roman thought for the adversities of Fortune: the remedy of fortitude, that of prudence, and, finally, that of spiritual devotion. For the development of these remedies Stoicism was probably responsible. They correspond to the virtues of power, wisdom, and religious idealism: those respectively of the body, the mind, and the soul. We may observe that the more complete they are, the nearer they approach an annihilation of the goddess.68 If she were really conceived of as a ruler of the universe, it would be vain to oppose her with any means, certainly with that of ordinary endurance. If it is possible to overcome her with intellectual powers, the fact implies another god in the universe who has a sense of order, to which your reason may find clues. Finally, if we hold that by seeking virtue and neglecting the interests of Fortuna we may escape from her control, we are really presupposing a spiritual universe subject to an altogether different deity. 66 Ennius, Annal. ll. 312. "The most exalted of mortals, F. hath on a sudden brought from supreme power to be the most abject of slaves." Cf. Sallust (Cal. 8); Horace (I, XXXV); Nepos, (Dion. 6). Compare, too, in this discussion of the relation of F. to virtue the lines already quoted (Seneca, Phaedrus, 981 ff.): Vincit sanctos dira libido, fraus sublimi regnat in aula. 67 See also Seneca, Phaedrus 978; Cicero, de Leg. ii, 28: "Bene vero quod Mens, Pietas," etc., where the virtues and fortune are distinguished. 68 Cf. Fowler, Roman Ideas of Deity, p. 77. III. We have now defined "the pagan Fortuna” and have observed how she was treated in general and how accepted. Our next problem is to see what in detail Roman literature offers for the imaginative representation of the goddess, and what for the application to everyday life. That is, I shall now study: (1) the personal description of the goddess; (2) favorite themes in her depiction; and (3) the divisions of her cult, and how they were applied to everyday life. 71 Much of the description of Fortuna is an old story to us because the tradition has lasted even to our day. It is interesting to see the same expressions used in ancient Rome which are used now. (1) She is blind (caeca);9 (2) yet she uses her eyes sometimes;70 (3) she stands unsteadily-often on a globe;"11 (4) she walks unsteadily;72 (5) she remains in no place for long;73 (6) her face is sometimes joyful, sometimes bitter;74 (7) she is subject to envy;75 (8) she becomes a foe;76 (9) she is stubborn;77 (10) she goes on her own course;78 (11) she plays games, and men are the figures in the games, or the objects of her mirth;79 (12) she wounds men with her shafts;80 (13) she holds dialogues with men;81 (14) she is a harlot (meretrix); 82 (15) she is a frail (fragilis), untrustworthy acquaintance; 83 (16) much depends on her smile; (17) 38 ff. 69 See Pliny, N. H. 2, 22; Pacuvius (Ribbeck, 365-375). 70 See Apuleius, Metam. XI, 15; Ovid, Ex Pont. III, I, 125. 75 Virgil, Aen. XI, 43; Lucan, Phars. I, 82 ff. 76 Ovid, Ex Pont. III, I, 152. Cf. Plautus, Asinaria 727. 77 Ovid, Ex Pont. IV, VI, 7. 78 Ovid, Epist. XV, 59-60; Lucan, Phars. I, 226; cf. Tibullus, III, iii, 22. 79 Seneca, Ep. LXXIV, 6-7; Horace, Carm. III, XXIX, 49; Juvenal III, 80 Ovid, Ex. Pont. II, VII, 15, 41. 1 Cf. Seneca, ad Polyb. Cons. XXII, 4. 82 See, for a beginning of the idea, her relations with Servius Tullius, Ovid, Fasti VI, 569 ff. See Dübner, Anthol. Palat., II, 269. 83 Baehrens, Poet. Lat. Min., IV, p. 148, 145; Lucan, Phars. VII, 685. 84 Ovid, Trist. I, V, 27. |