gratify their passions, the respondent was not guilty. The second request was covered substantially by the charge as given, as was also the eighth.

The third and sixth requests were properly refused. The respondent was on trial for the offense created by the statute of seducing and debauching an unmarried female. Under this statute, the offense is committed if the man has carnal intercourse to which the woman assented, if such assent was obtained by a promise of marriage made by the man at the time, and to which, without such promise, she would not have yielded: People v. Millspaugh, 11 Mich. 278, 282, 283. The offense consists in enticing the woman from the path of virtue, and obtaining her consent to the illicit intercourse by promises made at the time. The evidence should be such as to satisfy the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, upon these points. The promise and yielding her virtue in consequence thereof is the gist of the offense. If she resists, but finally assents or yields, induced thereto or in reliance upon the promise made, the offense is committed: Boyce v. People, 55 N. Y. 644.

An act of intercourse induced simply by mutual desire of the parties to gratify a lustful passion would not constitute the crime charged in the information. The charge of seduction and debauchery implies that a pure woman will resist, and that the natural sentiment of virtue and of purity will be overcome by promise of marriage and other means, and submission to his desires finally obtained through such inducements. And it has been held that, when the female submitted through a promise of marriage conditioned upon the act resulting in pregnancy, the crime was committed: People v. Hustis, 32 Hun, 58; Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203; 84 Am. Dec. 177. The requests last referred to leave out of consideration the concurrent influence of the promise of marriage as a producing cause of yielding assent, or, to use the language of the request, in submitting to the act.

The fourth and ninth requests were properly refused. The crime of rape is not embraced in that of seduction; and it would be improper for the judge, upon a trial for seduction, to instruct the jury upon the law relative to the crime of rape: Reynolds v. People, 41 How. Pr. 179.

The judge, however, should charge that, if the jury should find that she did not assent to the act of intercourse, the offense was not committed. The respondent was entitled to

have his seventh request given. This request is not covered by the charge of the court, which was finally reduced to two propositions; namely, whether the act was done by the mutual consent of the parties, or whether it was upon a promise at that time of a future marriage on condition that she would submit to his embraces. He withdrew from the jury whether she gave no consent whatever, and the intercourse was obtained by force and compulsion. For this error assigned, the conviction must be set aside, and a new trial ordered.

It may be well, as there must be a retrial, to point out one or two errors in the charge not specifically assigned as error. The attention of the jury was called to the fact that the people rested their testimony upon the testimony of the complaining witness, and that her testimony stood before them uncontradicted by any other witness in the case. He also told the jury that the fact that the complaining witness and the defendant had sexual intercourse on that day, in that township, was not disputed; and the jury might take that. fact as established in examining the case. This was erroneous. The weight of the evidence, and the credit to be given to the testimony of the complaining witness, was a question exclusively for the jury, and it was error for the court to charge the jury that they should consider any facts testified to by her as established, simply because she had testified to them and had not been contradicted. These facts which he directed the jury to regard as established were a part of the res gesta. The law presumed the respondent innocent of the crime. charged until such presumption was rebutted and overcome. by evidence; and the jury must weigh this presumption against her testimony, and ascertain what the facts are. Her testimony may have been of such a character or so contradictory as not to obtain any credit with the jury. Indeed, the judge told the jury that they had no conflict of testimony to reconcile except it was the conflicting statements of the complaining witness.

Another error in the charge appears. It is the duty of the trial judge, in a criminal case, to instruct the jury in reference to the presumptions of law applicable to the case before them, distinguishing those which are conclusive from those which are disputable. The presumption of innocence is present in every criminal case; and he should instruct the jury to that effect, and that it stands good until overcome by evidence which convinces the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt,

that the respondent is guilty. The charge of the court entirely overlooks this presumption, and nothing was said upon the subject.

Let an order be entered reversing the judgment, and granting respondent a new trial.

CRIME OF SEDUCTION AS DEFINED IN THE AMERICAN STATUTES. — Səduction as a criminal offense is discussed, generally, in a note of considerable length appended to the case of State v. Carron, 18 Iowa, 372; 87 Am. Dec. 401, 405-411. Statutes defining the offense of seduction, and providing for its punishment, vary in their phraseology in the different states, rendering a uniform definition impracticable. But a number of recent decisions bearing upon the elements of the offense will be here given, in connection with the principal case, and intended to be supplementary to the note referred to above.

In Alabama, the statute declares that "any man, who, by means of temptation, deception, arts, flattery, or a promise of marriage, seduces any unmarried female in this state, shall be deemed guilty of a felony," etc.: Ala. Code 1876, sec. 4188; Sess. Acts 1880-81, p. 48. The essential elements of the offense thus described by the statute are: 1. The woman must be unmarried; 2. She must be induced to a surrender of her chastity by a promise of marriage, or by the arts or deception of the man: Wilson v. State, 73 Ala. 527. These are two of the elements of the offense which, to authorize conviction, must be shown with that measure of proof requisite in criminal cases. The promise of marriage, arts, or deceptions, as the case may be, must sustain the relation to the accomplished purpose as cause to effect, or the case is not brought within the statute: Carney v. State, 79 Id. 14; Cunningham v. State, 73 Id. 51.

Under the Arkansas statute, the offense of seduction consists in having illicit connection with an unmarried female, who yields to the solicitations of her seducer under the inducement of a promise of marriage, and it may be committed by an infant upon an infant, if they have reached the age of puberty: Polk v. State, 40 Ark. 482; 48 Am. Rep. 17. And sexual intercourse may be inferred from circumstances, opportunities, and the relations and conduct of the parties: Polk v. State, 40 Ark. 482; 48 Am. Rep. 17. Corroborating evidence of the promise of marriage is required: Polk v. State, 40 Ark. 482; and so in Missouri: State v. Hill, 91 Mo. 423. In the latter state the good reputation of the prosecutrix is made by the statute an element of the offense, and it is proper for the state to prove that fact, in making out its case: State v. Patterson, 88 Id. 88; 57 Am. Rep. 374; State v. Hill, 91 Mo. 423. The promise to marry may be implied from the language used, and whether the prosecutrix is sufficiently corroborated is a question for the jury: State v. Brinkhaus, 34 Minn. 285. Generally, in order to establish a charge of seduction, it must be made to appear that the intercourse was accomplished by some artifice or deception; and it is held that something more than a mere appeal to the lust or passion of the woman must be shown before the law will inflict the penalty prescribed for that crime, or afford her a rem edy: Baird v. Boehner, 72 Iowa, 318; State v. Fitzgerald, 63 Id. 268; Haưn v. Banghart, Sup. Ct. Iowa, 1888.

In a prosecution under the Indiana statute, for the seduction, under a promise of marriage, of a female minor, it must be shown that the intercourse took place subsequent to the promise of marriage, and that such

promise was the inducement to the intercourse: Phillips v. State, 108 Ind. 406.

The North Carolina statute provides "that any man who shall seduce an innocent and virtuous woman under promise of marriage shall be guilty of a crime," etc.: Acts of 1885, c. 248. It is held that this statute plainly contemplates a seduction brought about by means of a promise of marriage in the nature of a deceit; and consent, if seduction be proved, is no defense to an indictment under the statute for seduction under promise of marriage: State v. Horton, 100 N. C. 443; 6 Am. St. Rep. 613.

To constitute the offense of seduction under the Texas statute, the female must, at the time of the commission of the act, be unmarried: Tex. Pen. Code, art. 814; and if the indictment for seduction fails to allege that the female seduced was unmarried, at the time of the commission of the act, it charges no offense against the laws of that state: Mesa v. State, 17 Tex. App. 395.

In many of the states, the statute provides that the female shall be "of previous chaste character": See Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203, 84 Am. Dec. 177, and note 181, 182, in which the meaning of the words "previous chaste character" is discussed; see also State v. Brinkhaus, 34 Minn. 285; State v. McClintic, 73 Iowa, 663. And it is held that, under such a statute, the character of the prosecutrix may be impeached by proof of specific acts of lewdness: Kenyon v. People, 26 N. Y. 203; 84 Am. Dec. 177; People v. Clark, 33 Mich. 112; Polk v. State, 40 Ark. 482; 48 Am. Rep. 17. So under the Missouri statute, which provides that the female shall be “of good repute," on the trial of an indictment for seduction, evidence of previous acts of lewdness and unchastity by the complainant with other men is admissible: State v. Wheeler, 94 Mo. 252; State v. Patterson, 88 Id. 88; 57 Am. Rep. 374; overruling State v. Branfield, 81 Mo. 151; 51 Am. Rep. 234. There is held to be no such difference between the expressions "previous chaste character" and "good repute" as to call for any variation of the rules of evidence in the respect under consideration: State v. Hill, 91 Mo. 423. On the other hand, the Kansas statute uses the words "good repute," and it is held to be incompetent for the defendant on trial for the offense charged in the statute to prove particular acts of unchastity, or specific acts of illicit intercourse, by the prosecutrix with other persons: State v. Bryan, 34 Kan. 63. The same is held under the Ohio statute, which also employs the words "good repute" in respect to the female: Bowers v. State, 29 Ohio St. 542. But in prosecutions for seduction under the Georgia statute, which provides that "any person who, by persuasion and promise of marriage, or by other false and fraudulent means, shall seduce a virtuous unmarried female," shall be pun ished, etc., it is admissible to introduce in defense evidence which falls short of actual sexual guilt, but which shows that the prosecutrix was corrupt in morals and unchaste in mind prior to the offense charged, and therefore could not have been seduced, corrupted, or drawn aside from the path of virtue: Wood v. State, 48 Ga. 192; 15 Am. Rep. 664. But evidence that the prosecutrix had frequently been seen going home with another man is not a material circumstance, even to contradict the testimony that she had never "kept company" with any other man than the defendant: State v. Payson, 71 Iowa, 542.

The essential elements of the offense of seduction, under the New Jersey statute, are: 1. The defendant must be a single man, over the age of eigh teen; 2. The female must be a single woman; 3. She must be under the age of twenty-one; 4. She must be of good repute for chastity; 5. The sexual inter

course must have been had under a promise of marriage; 6. She must thereby become pregnant; 7. The evidence of the female must be corroborated to the extent required in case of indictment for perjury. The presence of each and all of these elements is necessary to conviction, and the absence of any one of them is fatal to the prosecution: Zabriskie v. State, 43 N. J. L. 640; 39 Am. Rep. 610. It is held that the state must prove the good repute of the prosecutrix affirmatively, and that it will not be presumed: Zabriskie v. State, 43 N. J. L. 640; 39 Am. Rep. 610; and see State v. Hill, 91 Mo. 423; Commonwealth v. Whittaker, 131 Mass. 224. But the rule is otherwise in some of the states, and in a prosecution for seduction, the chaste character of the prose cutrix is presumed until assailed as a matter of defense, and the burden of proof is then upon the defendant: State v. Curran, 51 Iowa, 112; State v. MeClintic, 73 Id. 663. Direct and positive corroborative evidence of the promise to marry is not required, but simply such facts and circumstances as fairly tend to support the evidence of the prosecutrix, and satisfy the jury that she is entitled to credit: State v. Brinkhaus, 34 Minn. 285. Evidence of circum. stances which usually accompany the marriage engagement has been held sufficient to satisfy the statute as to the corroborating evidence: State v. Hill, 91 Mo. 423. To corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix as to the seduction, evidence of a long courtship is competent, but not conclusive: State v. Curran, 51 Iowa, 112; and see State v. Wells, 48 Id. 671. The exact time of the seduction is never material in a prosecution for the offense, and it is not therefore essential that the prosecutrix should be corroborated as to the exact day: State v. McClintic, 73 Id. 663. Upon the trial of the defendant for seduction under promise of marriage, it is proper to admit evidence of the fact that a child was born, to show the fact of seduction: Hausenfluck v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. L. J. 134 (Va. Ct. of App.). Nor is it error to exhibit the child to the jury to enable them to trace resemblance to the alleged father, as corroborative of the fact of sexual connection between the parties, and thus only to be considered by the jury: State v. Horton, 100 N. C. 443; 6 Am. St. Rep. 613, and note 618.

A woman's reputation for chastity is the general credit for chastity which she bears among her neighbors and acquaintances; and if the latter say noth. ing of her, or do not question her character for chastity, her reputation in this regard should be considered good: State v. Bryan, 34 Kan. 63. Therefore, in a prosecution for seduction, the negative evidence of a witness "that he never heard anything against the character of the woman for chastity," on whose behalf he had been called, is admissible upon the trial, where the reputation of the woman for chastity is in question, and it is strong evidence of the woman's good repute: State v. Bryan, 34 Id. 63; citing 1 Wharton on Evidence, sec. 49; Gandolfo v. State, 11 Ohio St. 114; and see State v. Lee, Minn. 407.