creditor. It is an enforced proportional contribution, levied by authority of the state, and, as respondent claims, for public needs."

2. What Impositions or Exactions may be Sustained as Exercises of the Taring Power. The taxing power of the legislature, when unrestricted by constitutional limitation, is most extensive. Judge Cooley says: "Everything to which the legislative power extends may be the subject of taxation, whether it be person or property, or possession, franchise, or priv ilege, or occupation, or right. Nothing but express constitutional limitation upon legislative authority can exclude anything to which the authority extends from the grasp of the taxing power, if the legislature in its discretion shall at any time select it for revenue purposes. And not only is the power unlimited in its reach as to subjects, but in its very nature it acknowledges no limits, and may be carried to any extent which the government may find expedient. It may therefore be employed again and again upon the same subjects, even to the extent of exhaustion and destruction, and may thus become in its exercise a power to destroy": Cooley on Taxation, 2d ed., 5.

66

The legislature has an undoubted right to tax all offices and posts of profit, trades, professions, and occupations: People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46; 60 Am. Dec. 581; City of Newton v. Atchison, 31 Kan. 151; 47 Am. Rep. 486; Connecticut M. L. I. Co. v. Commonwealth, 133 Mass. 161; Simmons v. State, 12 Mo. 268; 49 Am. Dec. 131; Youngblood v. Sexton, 32 Mich. 406; 20 Ar.. Rep. 654; People v. Equitable Trust Co., 96 N. Y. 396; Brown's Appeal, 111 Pa. St. 72; Ould v. City of Richmond, 23 Gratt. 464; 14 Am. Rep. 139; Commonwealth v. Moore, 25 Gratt. 951; Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533; People v. Naglee, 1 Cal. 232; 52 Am. Dec. 312, note 331-335, where the power of the state to exact licenses and charge therefor is discussed at length. In the case of People v. Equitable Trust Co., 96 N. Y. 396, Earl, J., delivering the opinion of the court, said: 'The legislature can constitutionally impose the same poll tax upon every citizen without reference to his ability to pay. So it can impose a tax upon all watches, carriages, pianos, dogs, spirituous liquors, and other chattels, without reference to their value. On the same principle, it can impose an arbitrary tax upon any avocation or business without estimating its volume or value. It may impose a specific tax upon any saloon-keeper, or hotel-keeper, or banker, or broker, or trader." A state may impose a tax on a foreign corporation as a condition upon which it may enter the state and do business in it, and it may discrimi nate against such corporations in the imposition of taxation upon them: Commonwealth v. Milton, 12 B. Mon. 212; 54 Am. Dec. 522; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Welch, 29 Kan. 672; People v. Equitable Trust Co., 96 N. Y. 387; People v. Gold & S. T. Co., 98 Id. 67; People v. Horn Silver M. Co., 105 Id. 76; Commonwealth v. Germania L. I. Co., 11 Phila. 533; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 5 Bush, 68; 96 Am. Dec. 331, note 338–345, where this subject is considered at length.

The legislature of a state may impose a tax on the transmission of estates by devise or descent, notwithstanding a provision in its constitution requir ing that taxes shall be equal and uniform: Eyre v. Jacob, 14 Gratt. 422; 73 Am. Dec. 367; Schoolfield's Ex'r v. City of Lynchburg, 78 Va. 366; Matter of McPherson, 104 N. Y. 306; 58 Am. Rep. 502. Contra, Curry v. Spencer, 61 N. H. 624; 60 Am. Rep. 337. Earl, J., in delivering the opinion of the court in the Matter of McPherson, supra, said: "Taxes upon legacies and inheritances have been approved generally by writers on political economy and systems of taxation, and no tax can be less burdensome and interfere less with the productive and industrial agencies of society." A tax imposed on

each suit at law, to be paid by the unsuccessful party, is valid: Harrison v. Willis, 7 Heisk. 35; 19 Am. Rep. 604; State v. Board of County Comm'rs, 4 Neb. 537; 19 Am. Rep. 641. And a statute imposing a fee of six dollars in each case decided by the supreme court of Alabama, for the benefit of the state library, was held to be a valid exercise of the taxing power: Swann v. Kidd, 79 Ala. 431. A state legislature has power to impose a tax on the gross receipts of railroad, express, and telegraph companies, although part of such receipts is from business done between points in the state and points without it: State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284; Osborne v. Miller, 16 Id. 479; Western U. T. Co. v. State Board of Assessment, 80 Ala. 273; Southern Express Co. v. Hood, 15 Rich. 66; 94 Am. Dec. 141. And a convention ordinance providing that an annual tax of ten and fifteen per cent on the gross earnings of a railroad company should be paid to the state in lieu of all other taxation, to be applied in payment of the debt due from the state on the bonds issued to the company by the state, was held to be a valid exercise of the taxing power: North Missouri R. R. Co. v. Maguire, 49 Mo. 490; 8 Am. Rep. 141. But in Erie R'y Co. v. State, 31 N. J. L. 531, 86 Am. Dec. 226, it was held that an act of the legislature of New Jersey relating to eorporations doing business in that state, not being corporations of that state, which provided that every such company should pay a transit duty of three cents on every passenger and two cents on every ton of goods carried by it in the state for any distance exceeding ten miles, was unconstitutional, because in conflict with the provisions of the federal constitution giving to Congress exclusive power to regulate commerce among the several states.

It is a legitimate exercise of the taxing power, and not an attempt to exercise the right of eminent domain, for the legislature to authorize the whole cost of an improvement to be assessed upon lands benefited: City of Bridgeport v. New York & N. H. R. R. Co., 36 Conn. 255; 4 Am. Rep. 63; Garrett v. City of St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505; 69 Am. Dec. 475; Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495; 72 Am. Dec. 276; Hill v. Iligdon, 5 Ohio St. 243; 67 Am. Dec. 289; Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. 146; 3 Am. Rep. 615; Soens v. City of Racine, 10 Wis. 271; Dalrymple v. City of Milwaukee, 53 Id. 178; People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; 55 Am. Dec. 266, note 285290, where this subject is discussed at length. But in Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. 146, 3 Am. Rep. 615, an act of the legislature of Pennsylvania which authorized a street already laid out and in good condition to be taken and improved for a public drive or carriage-way, and provided that the expense of the improvements should be assessed upon the property located on the street, was held to be unconstitutional, because it imposed a local assessment for improvements which were for the general public benefit. Sharswood, J., who delivered the opinion of the majority of the court in that case, said: "Local assessments can only be constitutional when imposed to pay for local improvements, clearly conferring special benefits on the properties assessed, and to the extent of those benefits. They cannot be so imposed when the improvement is either expressed or appears to be for general public benefit." And in Tide Water Co. v. Coster, 18 N. J. Eq. 518, 90 Am. Dec. 634, it was held that while the cost of a public improvement may be imposed upon the property peculiarly benefited, the cost beyond this measure must be levied on the public at large. Beasley, C. J., in delivering the opinion of the court in that case, said: "A legislative act, authorizing the building of a public bridge, and directing the expenses to be assessed on A, B, and C, such persons not being in any way peculiarly benefited by such structure, would not be an act of taxation, but a condemnation of so much of the

money of the persons designated to a public use." So in McBean v. Chandler, 9 Heisk. 349, 24 Am. Rep. 308, where the state constitution required all property to be taxed according to its value, it was held that a city ordinance authorizing the city to charge the cost of improving a street on the adjoining lots in proportion to their respective fronts was unconstitutional and void. See also Jones v. Board of Water Commissioners, 34 Mich. 273.

The constitutions of most of the states provide for uniformity and equality in the imposition of the burdens of taxation. Where such constitutional limitations exist, statutes which do not apportion taxes equally are vcid. Taxes are equal and uniform when no person or class of persons in the territory taxed is taxed at a higher rate than are other persons in the same district upon the same value or thing, and when the objects of taxation are the same by whomsoever owned or whatever they be: Norris v. City of Waco, 57 Tex. 635; City of Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 513; 35 Am. Dec. 159. In Livingston v. City of Paducah, 80 Ky. 656, a statute imposing a tax of three dollars on every vehicle kept in a city was held to be invalid, as imposing a tax grossly unequal and disproportionate to the taxes on other property. A city ordinance imposing a tax of fifteen cents on every thousand pounds of tobacco sold in the town, without regard to the value of the tobacco, is void, as imposing an unequal tax: Town of Danville v. Shelton, 76 Va. 325. A statute which imposes a tax on the gross receipts of some railroad companies, and upon the capital stock of others, is void for inequality: Worth v. Wilmington & W. R. R. Co., 89 N. C. 291; 45 Am. Rep. 679. For the same reason, a law imposing a tax on the owners of sleepingcars for running them over the railway of another, but exempting the act of running the same kind of cars over the road of the owners, is unconstitutional: Pullman Palace Car Co. v. State, 64 Tex. 274; 53 Am. Rep. 758. In Wisconsin all kinds of property must be taxed uniformly, or be absolutely exempted: Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock County, 9 Wis. 410. A city ordinance which requires a license fee of one hundred dollars for selling meat in one part of a city, and of twenty-five dollars only for selling it in other parts of the city, is void for inequality: City of St. Louis v. Spiegel, 75 Mo. 145. A law declaring a tax on the polls and property of persons of one color, for the exclusive education of children of that color, is void for lack of uniformity: Puitt v. Commissioners of Gaston County, 94 N. C. 709; 55 Am. Rep. 638. And in State v. Express Co., 60 N. H. 219, an act of the legislature of New Hampshire which required every expressman to pay annually to the state for a license either two per cent of the gross receipts of his business, or five dollars per mile, was held to be in violation of the constitutional provision of that state, which gives to the legislature power "to impose and levy proportional and reasonable assessments, rates, and taxes upon all the inhabitants of and residents within the said state, and upon all estates within the same."

It is a well-established principle of law that taxation can only be imposed for public purposes, and that taxes cannot be rightfully imposed for the purpose of aiding private business undertakings: Cooley on Taxation, 2d ed., 115; Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; Davis v. Gaines, 48 Ark. 370; Anderson v. Kerns D. Co., 14 Ind. 199; 77 Am. Dec. 63; National Bank v. City of Iola, 9 Kan. 689; Opinion of Judges, 58 Me. 591; Allen v. Inhabitants of Jay, 60 Id. 124; Jenkins v. Andover, 103 Mass. 94; Lowell v. City of Boston, 111 Id. 454; 15 Am. Rep. 39; People v. Township Board of Salem, 20 Mich. 452; 4 Am. Rep. 400; State v. Foley, 30 Minn. 350; Coates v. Campbell, 37 Id. 498; Weismer v. Village of Douglas, 64 N. Y. 91; 21 Am. Rep. 586; Sharpiess V.

Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. St. 147; 59 Am. Dec. 759; Grim v. Weissenberg S. D., 57 Pa. St. 433; 98 Am. Dec. 237; Philadelphia Ass'n v. Wood, 39 Pa. St. 73; Soens v. City of Racine, 10 Wis. 271; Brodhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Id. 624; 88 Am. Dec. 711; Curtis v. Whipple, 24 Wis. 350; 1 Am. Rep. 187; Whiting v. Sheboygan etc. R. R. Co., 25 Wis. 167; 3 Am. Rep. 30; Commercial Bank of Cleveland v. City of Iola, 2 Dill. 353. In National Bank v. City of Iola, 9 Kan. 702, Dillon, J., in delivering the opinion of the court, said: “I hold it to be sound doctrine that the mere incidental benefits to the public or the state, which result from the pursuit by individuals of ordinary branches of business or industry, do not constitute a public use in the sense which justifies the exercise of either the power of eminent domain or of taxation. If this salutary principle be abandoned, we unsettle the foundations of private property, and unwisely open the door for frauds and abuses of the most alarming character." But the legislature may impose a tax for the payment of claims not strictly legal, but founded in equity and justice, in the largest sense of those terms, or in gratitude or charity: Friend v. Gilbert, 108 Mass. 408; Freeland v. Hastings, 10 Allen, 570; Kunkle v. Town of Franklin, 13 Minn. 127; 97 Am. Dec. 226; Town of Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango County, 13 N. Y. 143; Grim v. Weissenberg School District, 57 Pa. St. 433; 98 Am. Dec. 237; Hilbish v. Catherman, 64 Pa. St. 154; Brodhead v. Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624; 88 Am. Dec. 711; State v. Tappan, 29 Wis. 664; 9 Am. Rep. 622. Denio, J., delivering the opinion of the court in Town of Guilford v. Supervisors of Chenango Co., 13 N. Y. 149, said: "The legislature is not confined in its appropriation of the public moneys, or of the sums to be raised by taxation in favor of individuals, to cases in which a legal demand exists against the state. It can thus recognize claims founded in equity and justice in the largest sense of these terms, or in gratitude or charity. Independently of express constitutional restrictions, it can make appropriations of money whenever the public well-being requires or will be promoted by it, and it is the judge of what is for the public good." But a tax cannot be imposed to raise money to refund money given to a town or state without expectation of repayment: Davis v. Gaines, 48 Ark. 370; Perkins v. Milford, 58 Me. 315. Nor have towns authority to impose a tax to raise money to pay militia, or for other purposes of defense: Stetson v. Kempton, 13 Mass. 272; 7 Am. Dec. 145. Railroads are now generally admitted to be such public uses as will justify the exercise of the taxing power to raise money to aid them: See a full discussion of this subject in the note to Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 59 Id. 782-788.

The power to tax is necessarily limited to subjects within the jurisdiction of the state. The legislature of a state has no power to require the treasurer of a corporation of a state to pay to the state a percentage of the interest or dividends due on its shares of stock held by non-resident share-holders: State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; Oliver v. Washington Mills, 11 Allen, 268. The question where property may be taxed is fully discussed in the note to City of New Albany v. Meekin, 56 Am. Dec. 523-537. A city may tax lands lying within its corporate limits, although it is used for agricultural purposes exclusively: Turner v. Althaus, 6 Neb. 54. But see City of Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Mon. 491.

A corporation cannot be taxed on the value of the debts which it owes. Debts are not property of the debtors, but of the creditors, and in the latters' hands only can they be taxed: State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300; Porter v. Rock Island etc. R. R. Co., 76 Ill. 561.

The right to acquire and keep any particular species of property cannot be

taxed as a privilege: Stevens v. State, 2 Ark. 291; 35 Am. Dec. 72; Gibson V. County of Pulaski, 2 Ark. 309; Mayor of Washington v. Meigs, 1 McArth. 53; 29 Am. Rep. 578.

A state statute requiring all drummers to pay a sum for the privilege of making sales on behalf of persons residing and doing business in another state is a regulation of commerce between the states, and violative of the constitution of the United States. A state cannot tax interstate commerce at all, even though it imposes a like tax on its own domestic commerce: Robbins v. Shelby Co. T. Dist., 120 U. S. 489.

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES, VALIDITY OF: Ex parte Byrd, 84 Ala. 17; 5 Am. St. Rep. 328, and note 331; Poyer v. Village of Desplaines, 123 III. 111; 5 Am. St. Rep. 494; Matter of Frazee, 63 Mich. 396; 6 Am. St. Rep. 310, and note 319. Right of city to enact ordinances regulating railways using the streets of the city: City etc. R'y Co. v. Mayor, 77 Ga. 731; 4 Am. St. Rep. 106, and note 108.

WILLIAMS v. PULLMAN PALACE CAR COMPANY. 140 LOUISIANA ANNUAL, 87.1

SLEEPING-CAR COMPANY IS NOT LIABLE AS COMMON CARRIER FOR INJURY TO STRANGER, who, upon entering one of its cars to ask the privi lego of washing his hands, is wantonly and without provocation assaulted and beaten by the porter of the car. There is, in such case, no contractual relation between the stranger and the company, and its responsibility, if it exists, must be found in the general principles of the law of master and servant as applicable to all masters similarly situated. MASTER IS LIABLE FOR DAMAGE OCCASIONED BY HIS SERVANTS in the exercise of the functions in which they are employed. And the tendency of modern jurisprudence is to hold him liable, not only for the negligence, but also for the torts of his servants, when done within the scope of their employment. PORTER OF SLEEPING-CAR HAS NO AUTHORITY TO ENFORCE RULES and regulations of the company, or to forcibly prevent any person from entering the car, or to expel him therefrom after he has entered, and if he wan tonly assaults and beats one who enters the car for a lawful purpose, his act is outside of the functions in which he is employed, and the company will not be liable therefor, unless it had expressly or impliedly authorized the act, or been guilty of knowingly employing a dangerous

servant.

SLEEPING-CAR COMPANY IS NOT NEGLIGENT IN EMPLOYING PORTER who, for three years in its service, had borne a good character for sobriety, amiability, and politeness.

RATIFICATION CANNOT BE INFERRED FROM ACTS WHICH MAY BE READILY EX

PLAINED without involving any intention to ratify. A company cannot, therefore, be held to have ratified an assault and battery committed by its servant, by retaining him in its service, where it believed his account of the affair, and thought it just to maintain the status quo until a judicial determination of the matter had been had. Nor is the case affected by the fact that the servant was criminally convicted of assault and battery, where he was not permitted to testify in his own defense, and be might have been so convicted on evidence falling far short of the outrage charged.