terms offered by such third party, and that if he should elect to so purchase, he should have thirty days in which to close the transaction. If, however, he did not so elect, then Smith was to be at liberty to sell the property. To avail himself of this option required strict compliance on the part of Gibbs. The precise condition had occurred here which terminated this option. There was an offer to purchase, notice by Smith to Gibbs of the offer, and failure of Gibbs to make an election to purchase at the price offered, within ten days after the notice. The fact that there had been a deed made under the offer was of no consequence to Gibbs. His was the superior right, and the exercise of his option, within the time limited, would have avoided the conveyance which had been made. The conveyance rather strengthened the case of appellant. It showed, not only an offer to purchase, but demonstrated that the offer was a real one. Had there been but a mere offer to purchase, there might have been doubts as to its genuineness. Whether the notice was given by Smith or Harding seems but a matter of so merely a technical character that it should not have favor in a court of equity. There is no substantial equity in it. The terms of the agreement required the notice to be given by Smith, as it was; but whether given by Smith or Harding, Gibbs knew there was a chance to sell the land, and his plain duty under the agreement was to exercise his option at once, within the ten days, and not let pass the opportunity to make a sale of the land. He could not consistently with any principle of fair and honest dealing, under the contract which he had made, destroy the opportunity of making a sale wait until the expiration of the year to see if there might not be an increase in value of the land, and then exercise his option to purchase. We conceive, too, that Smith had the right under the agreement to give the notice in order to the protection of his interest under the agreement. If only the purchaser from him, where there had been a sale, could give the notice, then, on the purchaser's omission to give the notice, Smith might lose the benefit of such sale, as Gibbs could avoid it by the exercise of his option thereafter. The decree of the superior court will be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. UNILATERAL CONTRACT IN WRITING SIMPLY GIVING OPTION TO PURCHASE LAND within a specified time, for a given time, is binding upon the party only who signs it, and is binding upon him only for the time stipulated for the exercise of the option: Coleman v. Applegarth, 68 Md. 21; 6 Am. St. Rep. 417, and note 422. TIME WHEN OF ESSENCE OF CONTRACT TO CONVEY: Green v. Covillaud, 10 Cal. 317; 70 Am. Dec. 725; Dark v. Johnston, 55 Pa. St. 164; 93 Am. Dec. 732; Belford v. Crane, 84 Am. Dec. 155, note. KREITZ V. BEHRENSMEYER. [125 ILLINOIS, 141.] COUNTY COURT IN ILLINOIS HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DETERMINE ELECTION CONTEST concerning the office of county treasurer, and such proceeding should be heard at the probate term. PROCEEDING TO CONTEST AN ELECTION IS NOT A SUIT AT LAW. PETITION IN PROCEEDING TO CONTEST ELECTION need not show names of persons whose ballots have been improperly counted, where the contest concerns a county office, and the ground of action is a miscount or neglect to properly count the ballots by the judges of election. IDENTITY OF BALLOTS IN ELECTION CONTEST - WAIVER OF RIGHT TO DEMUR. Although petition is demurrable because it does not specifically show the identity of certain ballots sufficiently to warrant a decree for their examination, yet if a party answers, makes an issue of fact, and gives evidence upon the general and indefinite as well as the specific allegations of the bill, he waives the objection. ELECTION CONTEST. ·ORDER WILL BE MADE THAT BALLOTS BE RECOUNTED if petitioner makes a prima facie case that there is a necessity therefor, and that they have not been tampered with. ELECTION CONTEST. -LESS PARTICULARITY IS REQUIRED IN ANSWER OF DEFENDANT THAN IN PETITION. . BURDEN IS UPON PETITIONER ALLEGING ELECTION TO OFFICE to prove that a majority of legal votes were cast for him, and the production of ballots cast for him raises presumption prima facie that they were legal. IN ELECTION CONTEST, PRESUMPTION THAT BALLOTS FOR PETITIONER WERE LEGAL may be overcome by evidence in rebuttal that such ballots were not those of legal voters when the allegation of election to office is denied by answer. ELECTION CONTEST — WAIVER OF OBJECTION TO PLEADINGS- EVIDENCE. — Answer is subject to exception which alleges in general terms, without more specific mention, that ten illegal votes were cast for contestant, but the right to object to evidence relating to such votes is waived where no objection is raised to such indefinite allegations. PAROL EVIDENCE TO CONTRADICT OR CHANGE BALLOT. In election contest, witness may testify in rebuttal upon issue properly raised by the pleadings that he had voted a ballot designated by a certain number, may state whose name was on the ballot, and that its condition when recounted was different than when voted, as that it had been changed by a paster, or that the ballot was destroyed after it was cast, and another and different one put in its place. IT WILL NOT BE CONSTRUED AS AN ADMISSION PRECLUDING CONTESTER FROM SHOWING THAT BALLOTS RECOUNTED WERE NOT GENUINE or were changed during the recount, where before the recount contestant stated to contestee that if any question as to identity of ballots cast with those to be recounted were made, the contestant wanted a judge or clerk of the district present, and that contestee making no question as to said identity, the recount proceeded without such judge or clerk being present. ORDER TO RECOUNT BALLOTS DOES NOT CONCLUDE ALL INQUIRY as to whether they were really the ballots cast, or that they have the same names upon them as when cast. PAROL EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT BALLOT IS MISSING. It may be shown in rebuttal that a ballot designated by number was voted for a certain candidate, and that at the time of recount there was no such ballot among the ballots of that precinct. PAROL EVIDENCE THAT NO BALLOTS WERE RETURNED CORRESPONDING TO NUMBERS ON POLL-BOOKS. It may be shown that certain persons were electors, for whom they voted, that each name appeared on the pollbooks as having voted, and that no corresponding ballots were returned in the box. IN ELECTION CONTEST, THE TIME OF OFFERING EVIDENCE IS UNIMPORTANT, where court at opening of trial states that offers of certain testimony might be made during the progress of the hearing, but that it would not hear or admit any such testimony at any time, such ruling being then excepted to by counsel. WHERE Statute Requires BaLLOTS TO BE Numbered, IT WILL BE PRESUMED THAT OFFICERS DO THEIR DUTY until the contrary is shown, and that ballots were numbered as they were cast, and where no ballots were returned in the box corresponding to the required numbers, it will be presumed that they have since been abstracted or lost from the ballotbox. WHERE STATUTE REQUIRES BALLOT TO BE NUMBERED, AND NO BALLOTS ARE RETURNED CORRESPONDING TO THE REQUIRED NUMBERS, it may be explained by evidence that they were omitted to be numbered, or were inaccurately numbered through mistake. DESTROYING UNNUMBERED BALLOTS. Where the statute provides that before an unnumbered ballot shall be rejected it shall be ascertained by the judges of election that the number of ballots in the box exceeds the number of names entered on each of two poll lists required by law to be kept, it will be presumed on a recount that the judges discharged their duty, and if there is an unnumbered ballot, that the poll lists did not agree; in such case it is erroneous for the court to destroy one of two unnumbered ballots without ascertaining whether the poll lists did agree. DESTROYING UNNUMBERED BALLOTS.- Where the statute contemplates that ballots shall be correctly numbered, and that every ballot cast will have the voter's number thereon, a ballot unnumbered is improperly in the box, and should be destroyed; otherwise, if such ballot was actually cast by a legal voter. VOTER MAY NOT TESTIFY AS TO WHAT FAMILY RECORD CONTAINS RELATIVE TO HIS BIRTHDAY, where he has never heard of such record until after election, and it is directly contrary to his father's prior statements and to the reputation in the family before that time. The record should be produced, and be shown when and by whom made, or if that is impossible, a proved copy should be produced. BALLOT CONTAINING NAMES OF TWO PERSONS FOR SAME OFFICE, ONE WRIT TEN, THE OTHER PRINTED, SHOULD BE REJECTED under statute providing that "if more persons are designated for any office than there are candidates to be elected," such part of the ticket shall not be counted. TWO BALLOTS FOLDED TOGETHER MAY BE REJECTED, one being within the other, and the outside one alone being numbered, the statute requiring the names of the candidates voted for to be all on the same piece of paper; such ballots containing the names of the candidates on each is plainly an attempt to vote twice. VOTER WHO KNOWS THAT HIS BALLOT WAS NOT ACCEPTED OR DEPOSITED IN THE BALLOT-BOX MUST INSIST UPON HIS RIGHTS, and furnish the evidence required by statute, to entitle his vote to be received; otherwise, it cannot be counted, notwithstanding he offered such vote to one of the judges, who took it and said "he would see about it." EVIDENCE TO EXPLAIN A BALLOT. — IF VOTER HAS USED LETTERS OF A FOR- ERASURE OF NAME being shown, it may be proven that it was not done by voter, or that it was the result of accident, and not of intention, but where erasure is deliberate act of voter, it cannot be explained that by it he intended a different result from that implied by law. BALLOT WITH ONLY MIDDLE NAME OF CANDIDATE WRONG SHOULD BE COUNTED for him, as John M. Kreitz for John B. Kreitz, the latter being ordinarily known and called John Kreitz, and being the only candidate of that name for the office in question, the former being ordinarily known and called Matt Kreitz, but not being a candidate for any office at that election. BALLOT MAY BE COUNTED WHICH CONTAINS CANDIDATE'S SURNAME ONLY, although there are other persons in the county having same surname, it being shown that there was no other person of such name who was candidate for the same or any other office. BALLOTS OBSCURELY IMPRESSED AND IMPERFECTLY WRITTEN MAY BE EXPLAINED by evidence that voter intended and attempted to express a certain candidate's name as he understood it, so far as such ballots could, by one able to read them, be given a sound which might be understood to be intended to express such name, or such name as it was pronounced by any number of people. But if there is no similarity of sound between the name as written on the ballot and the candidate's name, as might induce the one to be reasonably mistaken for the other, or to indicate that it was intended as a contraction for candidate's name, the ballots cannot be aided by extraneous proof. ALTHOUGH CANDIDATE'S NAME IS WRITTEN ABOVE NAME OF OFFICE ON BALLOT, IT WILL BE CONSTRUED AS A VOTE FOR HIM where the printed name below name of office is erased. VOTES ARE INTENDED FOR DIFFERENT OFFICES, INSTEAD OF BEING TWO VOTES FOR ONE OFFICE, although ballot contains the words "For County Treasurer," with candidate's name printed underneath, and under that and above the printed words "For County Superintendent of Schools" another name is written; the candidate's name which is printed under the last-named office being erased. EVIDENCE IS NOT ADMISSIBLE TO SHOW FOR WHAT OFFICE VOTE WAS INTENDED, where printed name under the designation "For County Treas urer" is stricken out, and the name of one of the candidates for such office is written below the designation of a different office, and below the name of the candidate therefor. CANCELLATION SHOULD NOT BE PRESUMED FROM MERE FACT THAT TORN BALLOT WAS FOUND IN THE Box, the presumption being that the tearing was accidental, unless it be proved that it was done by the voter and was intentional, when the ballot will be deemed canceled. BALLOTS SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED WHERE NAME OF OFFICE IS COMPLETELY CANCELED, although name of one of the candidates is written beneath such canceled name. BALLOTS. THERE IS NO CANCELLATION WHERE CANDIDATE'S NAME IS WRITTEN INTO NAME of Office, obscuring and partially obliterating it, such fact being susceptible of explanation as being accidental or unintentional. RESIDENCE OF VOTER. - INTENT in good faith of voter to make a place his home for all purposes is a determining factor upon question of his residence, although he may know that at the end of a certain period, or at some future time, he must remove elsewhere, and designs so to do. FOR THE PURPOSES OF VOTING, A DOMICILE ONCE GAINED DOES NOT CONTINUE UNTIL A NEW ONE IS ACQUIRED, nor does a right to vote at a particular poll or district continue until the right to vote elsewhere is shown. WHAT CONSTITUTES ABANDONMENT OF RESIDENCE. The shortest absence, if intended as a permanent abandonment, is sufficient, although the party may soon afterwards change his intention, but an extended absence, intended all the time as a temporary absence for a temporary purpose, followed by resumption of former residence, is not an abandonment. ON THE QUESTION OF INTENTION TO ABANDON RESIDENCE, DECLARATION OF PARTY, THOUGH ADMISSIBLE, IS NOT CONCLUSIVE, but may be disproved by his acts. DECLARATIONS OF VOTER SUBSEQUENT TO ELECTION ARE NOT COMPETENT TO PROVE THAT HE WAS DISQUALIFIED TO VOTE. ALIEN-BORN WOMAN BECOMES CITIZEN UNDER ACT OF CONGRESS of February 10, 1855, where any such woman who might be naturalized is in a state of marriage to a citizen. The citizenship of a woman thus acquired is not lost by the subsequent death of her husband and her afterwards intermarrying with an alien, and her children under twenty-one also become citizens; but the effect of this naturalization does not extend to members of the family not children. SECONDARY EVIDENCE OF THE CONTENTS OF NATURALIZATION RECORDS may be given when such records are destroyed. Such records are no wise different from other records. PETITION to contest an election. It was alleged upon information and belief that, in certain places and districts specially noted in the opinion, the judges of election refused to count legal votes cast for the petitioner, etc., designating the number of votes so cast in each place, precinct, and district. In addition thereto, it was further alleged generally that in certain other places, precincts, and districts divers legal votes were cast for contestant which were not counted for him; and that certain |