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inal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken without just compensation.

Former Jeopardy.-An award of punitive damages in an action for wrong, also punishable as a criminal offense, is not a violation of that portion of the Constitution which provides that "no person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Smith v Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117.

A conviction or acquittal, in order to be a bar to another prosecution, must be for the same offense, or for an offense of a higher degree, and necessarily including the offense for which the accused stands indicted. Boswell v State, 20 Fla. 869.

The discharge of a jury, in case of manifest necessity, such as sudden sickness of a juror, the illness of the prisoner, or other urgent cause, will not exempt the prisoner from again being tried for the same offense. Ellis v State, 25 Fla. 702, 6 So. 768.

A justice of the peace has no authority to try a person charged with felony, and such trial by a justice of the peace is no bar to subsequent trial of the same offense by the Circuit Court. Alford v State, 25 Fla. 852, 6 So. 857.

When there has been trial for an offense and a verdict of guilty, and on motion of the defendant the court arrests the judgment, or grants a new trial, such defendant has not been in jeopardy which forbids a second trial, whether upon the same indictment or a new one. Gibson v State, 26 Fla. 109, 7 So. 376.

Where a judgment entered upon a verdict of guilty on a trial for murder. has been reversed because the verdict did not ascertain the degree of the crime, and a new trial awarded, the accused can be tried again upon the same indictment, and such second trial will not put him in jeopardy a second time for the same offense. Lovett v State, 33 Fla. 389, 14 So. 837.

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The statute providing that, if the jury shall return to the court second time without having agreed upon a verdict, they shall not be sent out again without their own consent, unless they shall ask from the court some further explanation of the law; and such discharge of a jury in a criminal case does not entitle defendant to a discharge on his plea of former jeopardy. Adams v State, 34 Fla. 185, 15 So. 905.

A conviction or acquittal by a municipal court under a municipal ordinance is no bar to a prosecution under the state law. Theisen v McDavid, 34 Fla. 440, 16 So. 321; Hunt v City of Jacksonville, 34 Fla. 504, 16 So. 398; Bueno v State, 40 Fla. 160, 23 So. 862.

Where in a trial of a felony not capital the jury retired to consider their verdict on the evening of one day and about noon of the following day were discharged by the court upon the assurances given through their foreman that they could not agree upon a verdict, such discharge does not operate as a bar to further prosecution under the same information. Smith v State, 40 Fla. 203, 23 So. 854.

Neither a conviction of persons upon a charge of conspiracy to accuse various other persons of offenses of keeping bawdy-houses for the purpose of extorting money, nor an acquittal upon a charge of maliciously verbally threatening to accuse one of their victims of the offense of keeping a bawdy house for the purpose of extorting money, constitute any defence to a charge of maliciously verbally threatening to accuse another of their victims of the offense of keeping a bawdy house for the purpose of extorting money. Wallace v State, 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713.

A plea setting up that the defendant had previously been indicted and put on trial for an assault with intent to murder Pendee Taylor, is no defense to a subsequent indictment charging the defendant with an assault with intent to murder Phillip McNish; although the plea avers that the offenses were the same. McNish v State, 47 Fla. 66, 36 So. 175.

Reversal of a judgment by the appellate court in a criminal case and the granting of a new trial does not preclude the trial of the defendant again upon the same indictment, and such second trial will not put the defendant in jeopardy. McNish v State, 47 Fla. 69, 36 So. 176.

The silence of the defendant on trial for crime, or his failure to object or protest against an illegal discharge of the jury before verdict, does not constitute a consent to such discharge, or waiver of the constitutional inhibition against second jeopardy for the same offense. Allen v State, 52 Fla. 1, 41 So. 593.

A person is in legal jeopardy when he is put upon trial, before a court of competent jurisdiction, upon an indictment which is sufficient in form

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and substance, and a jury has been charged with his deliverance, and a jury is said to be thus charged when they have been impanelled and sworn. Ib.

The discharge of a jury without verdict does not constitute former jeopardy, where the jury were unable to agree upon a verdict after repeated insu ct.ons, and so stated to the court. Johnson v State, 54 Fla. 45, 44 So. 765.

To constitute a former jeopardy, the court in which the former prosecution took place must have had jurisdiction of the offense and of the person of the defendant. Strothar v State, 55 Fla. 167, 47 So. 4.

An acquittal in Georgia for a crime against the sovereignty of the State of Florida alone, can not constitute former jeopardy. Ib.

Where an offense was committed both in Georgia and Florida and was a transgression against the laws of both States, an acquittal or conviction in the State of Georgia will not prevent a prosecution in the State of Florida for the act in violation of the laws of Florida. Ib.

A mistrial by reason of inability of the jury to agree after four hours of deliberation does not constitute former jeopardy. White v State, 63 Fla. 49, 59 So. 17.

Due Process of Law. The removal of an officer upon the recommendation of the Governor and consent of the Senate without notice or hearing is not in conflict with the Constitution which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. State v Ledwith,

14 Fla. 220.

A statute providing that the affidavit of the owner or some other person acquainted with the stock killed or maimed shall be conclusive evidence of the amount of damages sustained by the owner is void as not providing due process of law. S. F. & W Ry. Co. v Geiger, 21 Fla. 669.

A statute providing that implements, etc., commonly used in games of chance found in any house, etc., should be prima facie evidence that the said house, etc., where the same are found is kept for the purpose of gambling is not unconstitutional. Wooten v State, 24 Fla. 335, 5 So. 39.

An information filed by the prosecuting attorney of the criminal court of record of Lake County in the office of its clerk, in vacation, does not authorize the clerk to issue a warrant for the arrest of the person so accused of crime, and a person arrested on a warrant thus issued and held by the sheriff is deprived of his liberty without due process of law. Sims v State, 26 Fla. 97, 7 So. 374.

A writ of error proceeding is not such a new and original suit as to require the same strictness in the service upon the defendant therein of notice of its institution, as is required at the institution of a new and original action in a court of first instance, but is a continuation of an original suit, and a statute providing for constructive notice only of its institution and pendancy does not violate that provision of the organic law that prohibits the deprivation of property without due process of law. State v Canfield, 40 Fla. 36, 23 So. 591.

A regulation made by the railroad commissioners requiring a terminal company organized under the laws of Florida, and operating a common passenger terminal station wholly within the state, to admit a railroad company operating a railroad from a point in Florida to a point in Georgia to the privilege of its station and fixing just and reasonable rates for the privileges of such terminal to be paid by such railroad company, does not deprive the terminal company of its liberty or property without due process of law. State v Jacksonville Terminal Co., 41 Fla. 377, 27 So. 225.

Service by publication upon a domestic corporation, which has failed to provide officers or agents upon whom other service may be had, constitutes "due process of law." Clearwater Mercantile Co. v Roberts et al, 51 Fla. 176. 40 So. 136.

Rules and regulations made by the railroad commissioners are by law deemed and held to be prima facie reasonable and just, and in the absence of the showing of unreasonableness, the enforcement of such rules against a railroad company will not be a taking of property without due process of law. State v A. C. L. Ry. Co., 52 Fla. 646, 41 So. 705.

A statute conferring upon county judges' courts jurisdiction to enquire into the alleged insanity of persons, and to commit lunatics to the insane asylum, and to appoint guardians for them, does not violate the declaration of rights in the respect of depriving the citizen of his liberty and property without such notice as is demanded by due process of law, the personal presence of the lunatic being sufficient notice. Ex parte Scudamore, 55 Fla. 211, 46 So. 279.

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The provision of the State Constitution that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law, extends to the property held and used by corporations, since the beneficial ownership of such property is in natural persons, and the law forbids the doing by indirection that which is forbidden to be directly done. S. A. L. Ry. v Simon, 56 Fla. 545, 47 So. 1001.

A statute enacted after the acquisition by a private party of a tax sale certificate, requiring a particular notice to be given to the owner of the land before deed issues, when the right to a deed has not become absolute and the giving of a notice imposes no burden upon the holder of the certificate does not deprive the holder of property without due process of law. Starks v Sawyer, 56 Fla. 596, 47 So. 513; Clark-Ray-Johnson Co. v Williford, 62 Fla. 453, 56 So, 938.

When a regulation of the railroad commission is not a legally authorized regulation of public service, or is arbitrary and unreasonable and in effect deprives the beneficial owners of property used in rendering the public service of the property rights in a manner or to an extent not contemplated by law, such action, though under the form of regulation, is in law a deprivation of property without due process of law. State v A. C. L. Ry. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969.

A lawful governmental regulation of the service of common carriers, though it may be a burden is not a violation of constitutional rights to due process of law. State v F. E. C. Ry. Co., 57 Fla. 522, 49 So. 43.

The legislature may by a duly enacted law make any provisions within its discretion for the preservation of the game in the State, by regulating the taking or killing of all kinds of game in any part of the State and during any periods, where such laws do not deny to any one having rights in the premises the due process of law. Harper v Galloway, 58 Fla. 255, 51 So. 226.

The Constitution contains no express limitations upon the power of the legislature to provide for taxes on licenses, but such power should not be so exercised as to deprive any person of property without due process of law. Harper v Galloway. 58 Fla.. 255, 51 So. 226; Afro-American Ind. & Benefit Ass'n. v State, 61 Fla. 85, 54 So. 383.

A law regulating the transportation by carrier of lumber or timber on cars belonging to such carrier, does not amount to a taking of property without due process of law. King Lumber & Mfg. Co., v A. C. L. Ry. Co., 58 Fla. 292, 50 So. 509.

Valid governmental regulations of the use of property employed in rendering public service do not amount to taking of property without due process of law. Ib.

It is competent for the legislature to create by law prima facie presumption of evidence without denying due process of law. Goldstein v Maloney, 62 Fla. 198, 57 So. 342.

A duly enacted statute may authorize damages for mental pain and suffering of the plaintiff to be assessed by a jury without limiting or restricting the amount that may be so assessed. Such a proceeding is not a denial of due process of law. Davis v Florida Power Co., 64 Fla. 246, 60 So. 759.

Ordinarily due process of law is an observance of those general rules established in the law for the security of private rights. Ib.

The legislature may authorize cities to assess a special tax against lots ad'oiring which sidewalks shall be constructed, and if the proceeding to enforce the assessment is in the nature of a judicial proceeding in which notice is given to the property owner such proceeding constitutes due process of law and no prior notice seems to be necessary. Anderson v City of Ocala, 67 Fla. 204, 64 So. 775.

The provisions of the organic law that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law is not intended to hamper the State in the exercise of any of its appropriate sovereign governmental Towers, unless substantial private rights are arbitrarily invaded by illegal or palpably unjust, hostile and oppressive exactions, burdens, discriminations or deprivations. Dutton Phosphate Co., v Priest, 67 Fla. 370, 65 So. 282.

Taking Private Property Without Just Compensation.-Severing a portion of the territory of a county by act of the legislature, and the freeing of slaves by the sovereign power of State, thus lessening the aggregate value of the taxable property in a county, do not constitute a taking of private proverty for public use without just compensation. County Commissioners Columbia County v King, 13 Fla. 451.

The construction of street railways in cities is not such an additional burden upon the soil of the streets as to entitle adjoining land owners to compensation when the legislative authority for such construction and the

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consent of the municipal corporation as to the particular location have been obtained. Randall v Jacksonville Street R. R. Co., 19 Fla. 409.

The State may grant to an incorporated railroad company the right to condemn the property of a citizen to the extent that the property is necessary for the use of the corporation in accomplishing the purposes of its creation. The statute, however, must provide just compensation to the citizen for his property so authorized to be taken. Neither an award of damages, nor a judgment against a corporation for damages ascertained, or to be ascertained by commissioners, is a just compensation. Moody v J. T. & K. W. R. R. Co., 20 Fla. 597.

The statute for the incorporation of railroads, insofar as it authorizes a railroad company which has not acquired title to land upon which it has constructed its tracks to have an appraisal for the damages done to the owner, to remain in possession during the pendancy of the proceedings, on such company paying into court a sufficient sum to pay the compensation therefor when finally ascertained, is constitutional. State v J. T. & K. W. R. R. Co., 20 Fla. 616.

An owner of an estate abutting on a street has such property in his portion of the street as will prevent the taking thereof, or any part of his side of the street, by the laying of a railroad track thereon and the operation thereof by steam, without first making just compensation therefor. Florida Southern Railway Co. v Brown, 23 Fla. 104, 1 So. 512; Jarrett Lbr. Corp. v Christopher, 65 Fla. 379, 61 So. 831.

To require a railroad company to carry persons and property at rates of charges not sufficient to pay expenses of operating the road is to compel it to carry, without reward, and to take the use of property without just compensation. P. & A. R. R. Co. v State, 25 Fla. 310, 5 So. 833.

The provision of the Constitution that private property shall not be taken without just compensation does not render a municipality liable for mere consequential damages resulting to property abutting on a street from the lawful change of grade or other authorized improvement of the street by the municipality. Selden v City of Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457. The erection by a municipal government within the limits of a street and for street purposes and under street conditions justifying it, of a viaduct for the purpose of changing the grade of the street, and in the exercise of its power to change such grades, is not a "taking" or "appropriation" of private property. Ib.

It is competent for the legislature to authorize the construction of a street railway, operated by horse power, as distinguished from one operated by steam, in the public streets, without providing any compensation to abutting property holders. State v J. S. R. R. Co., 29 Fla. 590, 10 So. 590.

The legislature may require railroad companies whose roads cross or meet each other to construct such switches, side tracks, and connections as will enable them to transport cars, to and from each other's line. Such regulations do not amount to a taking of the companies' property, for which compensation must be provided. A. S. R. & G. Ry. Co. v State, 42 Fla. 358, 29 So. 319.

Where the fee in the street is in the abutting owner, and the public have only an easement in the street or highway, the laying of a steam railroad track along said street on his soil without his consent and without taking and paying just compensation therefor, is an unlawful appropriation of the property of such owner, and the abutting owner has all the remedies of any other owner of the soil. S. A. L. Ry. v Sou, Inv. Co., 53 Fla. 832, 44 So. 351.

Even where a particular regulation causes a pecuniary loss to a common carrier, if the regulation is reasonable and does not arbitrarily impose an unreasonable burden on the carrier, the regulation will not be a taking of property without just compensation. State v F. E. C. Ry Co., 57 Fla. 522, 49 So. 43.

The riparian owner has special rights in the use of water opposite his holdings, among them being the right of access from the water to the riparian land. These special rights are easements incident to the riparian holdings and are property rights that may be regulated by law but may not be taken without just compensation. Broward v Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50 So. 826.

The legislature may create, or authorize the creation of, special taxing districts and charge the cost of a local improvement upon the property in such district or according to valuation or superficial area, or frontage, without violating the constitutional provision that property shall not be taken without just compensation. Anderson v City of Ocala, 67 Fla. 204, 64 So. 775.

Witness Against Self In Criminal Cases.-The right of privilege against disclosure of incriminatory statements or evidence is personal to the witness,

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he alone being entitled to invoke its protection, and it may be waived by him. Ex parte Ed. Senior Jr., 37 Fla. 1, 19 So. 652.

The court should inform a witness of his right of privilege when the circumstances of the case call for it, but when he, with full knowledge of his rights, consents to testify about the very matter that may criminate him, without claiming his privilege, he must submit to a full, legitimate cross examination in reference thereto. Ib.

Where a witness has testified to certain facts having no apparent tendency to criminate him, and a question is then asked, and an affirmative answer to which, taken in connection with the other facts testified to, would furnish pertinent evidence against the witness upon a criminal prosecution against him, the court may permit the witness to avail himself of his privilege of not answering, without requiring him to say that the answer would tend to criminate him, or to explain how it would tend to do so. Wallace v State, 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713.

For the purpose of discrediting a witness a wide range of cross examination is permitted as a matter of right, in regard to his motives, interest or animous as connected with the cause of the parties thereto, upon which matters he may be contradicted by other evidence, and a like range of cross examination is, in the discretion of the trial court, allowed into the past life and history of a witness, when the matters enquired about tend to effect credibility; but if answer to questions of this nature would tend to criminate the witness and he claims his privilege of declining to answer, he should not be compelled to answer. Ib.

Section 13. Every person may fully speak and write his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no laws shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions and civil actions for libel the truth may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it shall appear that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published for good motives, the party shall be acquitted or exonerated.

Where the plea of justification is interposed in an action for slander for imputing a crime, the party justifying must produce evidence of the acts and intent which are material elements of the crime imputed, sufficiently preponderant to overcome in the minds of the jury the legal presumption of innocence as well as the opposing testimony, but this proof need not go to the extent of convincing the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the truth of the words imputing the crime. Abraham v Baldwin, 52 Fla. 151, 42 So. 591.

A party injured by a publication can not recover damages therefor if the publication is true and is made in good faith in such a manner and under such circumstances as to properly serve the rights of others by and to whom the publication was made. Such a publication is privileged when properly made to serve the rights of others. The damage to the injured party if not needlessly done is not wrongful and gives no right of action. Briggs v Brown, 55 Fla. 417, 46 So. 325.

This section which provides that every person may fully speak and write his sentiments on all subjects being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no laws shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press, does not secure immunity from punishment to any person who falsely and with the purpose to defame, attacks in the newspapers the character of any other person, or impugns the integrity, honor and authority of the courts. In re proceedings against Hayes & Mack, 72 Fla. 558, 73 So. 362.

The exercise of the right to fully speak and write one's sentiments on all subjects, a right secured by our Constitution, is always subject to the preservation of the governmental authority of the State as conferred by law. Ib.

Publishers of newspapers have the right, but no higher right than others, to publish the conduct of the courts, but such right is limited by the obligation to observe respect for truth and fairness. Ib.

Under the right of freedom of speech and of the press the public have 4 right to know and discuss all judicial proceedings, but this does not include the right to attempt, by wanton defamation and groundless charges of unfairness and partizanship, to degrade the tribunal and impair its efficiency. Ib.

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