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tion of the bill of rights. Buckman v. State, 34 Fla. 48, 15 So. 697; Van Dorn v State, 34 Fla. 62, 15 So. 701.

Trials in municipal courts for infractions of municipal ordinances do not fall within the constitutional guaranty “the right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate forever." Hunt v. City of Jacksonville, 34 Fla. 504, 16 So. 398.

A statute providing that courts of chancery shall entertain suits to enjoin trespasses on timbered lands, and the cutting and removal of trees therefrom, and cause an account to be taken of the damage, to the extent of conferring jurisdiction on the court of chancery of an account for damages for mere trespass cognizable at law, in respect to which the court had no jurisdiction independent of the statute, impairs the right of trial by jury. Wiggins v. Williams, 36 Fla. 637, 18 So. 859; McMillan v. Wiley, 45 Fla. 487, 33 So. 993.

A statute authorizing persons claiming title to real estate to enter suit in chancery against parties in possession under adverse title, to determine the question of title, and recover possession is in derogation of the common law right of a trial by jury guaranteed by the Constitution. Hughes v. Hannah, 39 Fla, 365, 22 So. 613.

Section 3212 R. G. S. is unconstitutional and without force or effect insofar as it undertakes or has the effect of converting the remedy at law by ejectment into an action cognizable in equity, thereby depriving the defendant of his right of trial by jury. Trustees of the I. I. Fund v. Gleason, 39 Fla. 771, 23 So. 539.

Section 3519 R. G. S. providing for enforcement of the liens of mechanics and material men by bill in equity is not in derogation of the Constitution that “the right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate forever." Hathorne v. Panama Park Co., 44 Fla. 194, 32 So. 812.

Section 2886 R. G. S. providing a summary remedy for the failure or neglect of a sheriff or deputy to execute any writ and make due return thereof, without regard to, and independent of the question of damages to the party suing out the writ is not unconstitutional as depriving the officer of the right of jury trial, Johnson v. Price, Sheriff, 47 Fla. 265, 36 So. 1031.

The provisions of the Constitution guaranteeing the right of trial by jury, secure the right in those cases only in which it was enjoyed when the Constitution became effective, and does not confer upon every party in all classes of cases a right of trial by jury. Camp Phosphate Co. v. Anderson, 48 Fla. 226, 37 So. 722.

Sections 3202-3209 R. G. S. relating to partition having been enacted in 1844 before the first Constitution was adopted, is valid though it deprives parties of the right of trial by jury in the cases therein provided for. Ib.

A disbarment proceeding against an attorney is not a criminal prosecution and does not fall within that class om cases that require a trial by jury. State v. McRae, 49 Fla, 389, 38 So. 605.

It is competent for the legislature to give a new right to an injunction to restrain trespasses, but the legislature can not add to such new right to injunction the further right to an accounting and damages in equity, thereby depriving the defendant of the right to a jury trial. Cowan v. Skinner, 52 Fla. 486, 42 So. 730.

In cases where equity will, independent of statutes, enjoin the destruction of growing trees, the court may proceed to an accounting and award damages for the trespass as an incident to the relief by injunction, but when injunction is granted under a statute upon grounds which would not be sufficient independent of the statute, the court cannot legally proceed to an accounting and award damages, since in such a case the defendant is entitled to a jury trial. Ib.

When a convict has been released upon a conditional pardon and rearrested for an alleged violation of such pardon on a hearing such convict is not entitled to a jury trial as a matter of right except upon the question as to whether he is the same person who was convicted. State V. Horne, 52 Fla, 125, 42 So. 388.

Insofar as Section 9 of Chapter 5388, Laws of 1905, authorizes the commitment by a judge of the Circuit Court, or a county judge, of a person of incorrigible and vicious conduct to the State Reform School without a trial by jury, it is constitutional. Pugh v. Bowden, 54 Fla. 302, 45 So. 499.

Section 3213 R. G. s., which is intended to enlarge the jurisdiction of the courts of chancery in quieting title, if the section be otherwise constitutional, can not be construed so as to impair the constitutional right of trial by jury. Briles v. Bradford, 54 Fla. 501, 44 So. 937.

Sections 2308-2311 R. G. S. conferring upon county judges courts jurisdiction to enquire into the alleged insanity of persons, and to commit luna

of Rights.

tics to the asylum, does not violate this section is not providing for a jury trial in such lunacy proceedings. Ex parte Seudamore, 55 Fla. 211, 46 So. 279.

A statute enacting that a lien may be acquired as against the owner of land upcn the building and the land on which it stands, by the perfcrmance of labor or the furnishing of material, and providing that such lien shall be enforceable by persons in privity with the owner by bill in equity or by suit at law is not violative of the constitutional guaranty of a jury trial. Mills v. Britt, 56 Fla. 839, 47 So. 799.

In a proceeding by rule to enquire whether a convict has violated the conditions of his pardon, if he denies he is the same person who was convicted, sentenced and pardoned, he is entitled to have a jury summarily empanelled to try such issue. Carraway v. State, 58 Fla. 15, 51 So. 142.

The statutory proceeding for partition of realty, requiring the court to adjudicate the rights of the parties is not violative of the constitutional right to a jury trial. Christopher v. Mungen, 61 Fla. 513, 55 So. 273.

In directing that a remittiture be entered for stated amount upon a verdict awarding damages, and that upon failure to do so a new trial be granted, the court does not usurp the functions of the jury or deny to either party the right to jury trial. A. C. L. Ry Co. v. Pipkin, 64 Fla. 24, 59 So. 564; F. E. C. Ry. Co. v Hayes, 67 Fla. 101, 64 So. 504.

Section 4. All courts in this State shall be open, so that every person for any injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy, by due course of law, and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.

Writs of error in criminal cases, may under the rules of the court be voluntarily dismissed for the purpose of facilitating the administration of justice, but they may not be dismissed when the purpose is to delay a review of the case and thereby violate the Constitution that “right and justice shall be administered without delay," Owen v. State, 58 F12. 84, 50 So. 639.

The statute authorizes the Appellate Court to review by writ of error and bill of exceptions a refusal of the trial court to grant a motion for the continuance of the cause and other matters in pais, but in reviewing such motions the Appellate Court is governed by established principles of judicial procedure designed to affectuate the provisions of the Constitution that "right and justice shall be administered without delay." Moore v. State, 59 Fla. 23. 52 So. 971.

A statute making a direct legislative special assessment on lands embraced within the Everglades Drainage District for local benefits, and the apportionment of rates thereon, is not in conflict with Section 4 of the bill of rights. Lainhart v. Catts, 73 Fla. 735, 75 So. 47.

Section 5. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship shall forever be allowed in this State, and no person shall be rendered incompetent as a witness on account of his religicus opinions; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to justify licenticusness or practises subversive of, or inconsistent with the peace or moral safety of the State or society.

Section 6. No preference shall be given by law to any church, cect cr mode of worship, and no money shall ever be taken from the pub'ic treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect or religious denomination, or in aid of any sectarian institution.

Secticn 7. The writ of habeas corpus shall be grantable speedily and of right, freely and without cost, and shall never be suspended unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require its suspension.

Section 8. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines be imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment or indefinite imprisonment be allowed, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained.

A statute to the effect that any person convicted of carrying on a business for which a license is required, without having first obtained such license, shall be punished by a fine of not less than double the amount required for the license, does not violate the constitutional provision that "excessive fines shall not be imposed." Frese v. State, 23 Fla. 267, 2 So. 1.

A sentence to pay a fine, and that the “sherift do keep you in custody until the judgment of the court is complied with." is not itself a violation of Section 8 of the bill of rights. Ex parte Bryant, 24 Fla. 278, 4 So. 854.

A judgment of a municipal court which commits the person convicted to the custody of the chief of police until the “fine and costs" are paid does not constitute indefinite imprisonment, Ex parte Peacock, 25 Fla. 478, 6 So. 473.

Where the penalty prescribed for the violation of the act under which a defendant was convicted, was not less than double the amount of a license, a fine of nine hundred dollars for the violation of said act was not excessive. Baeumel v. State, 26 Fla. 71, 7 So. 371.

A municipal ordinance providing that any person convicted of fighting shall be fined in a sum not exceeding five hundred dollars or imprisoned in the city jail at hard labor on the streets or other public works of the city for a period not exceeding three months, or by both fine and imprisonment, is not a violation of the Constitution which forbids the imposing of "excessive fines" or the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishment.” Kinkaid v. Jackson, 66 Fla. 378, 63 So. 706.

Section 9. All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offences, where the proof is evident or the presumption great.

This section is designed to secure the right to bail in all cases, except where the evidence by which an alleged crime may be legally proven it appears with reasonable certainty that the accused is guilty of a capital offense. Russell v. State, 71 Fla. 236, 71 So. 27.

Section 10. No person shall be tried for a capital crime or other felony, unless on presentment or indictment by a grand jury, except as is otherwise provided in this Constitution, and except in cases of impeachment, and in cases in the militia when in active service in time of war, or which the State, with the consent of Congress, may keep, in time of peace.

"Presentment," in its limited sense, is a statement by the grand jury of an offense from their own knowledge, without any bill of indictment made before them, setting forth the name of the party, place of abode, and the offense committed, informally, upon which the officer of the court afterwards frames an indictment. Collins v. State, 13 Fla. 651.

A statute providing that every misdemeanor of which the Circuit Court shall have jurisdiction may be tried upon presentment or indictment by a grand jury, or upon information filed by the State Attorney is not in conflict with this section. King v. State, 17 Fla. 183.

Cases of petit larceny may be tried upon regulations made by the legislature without presentment or indictment by grand jury, and the legislature may determine what value of property stolen shall constitute the of'ense so triable. Ex parte Bell, 19 Fla. 608.

This section was designed as a guaranty and protection of the citizen against a trial in the enumerated cases in the Circuit Court, except upon presentment or indictment by a grand jury as was known at the common law. English v. State, 31 Fla. 340, 12 So. 689.

A grand jury at common law was composed of not less than twelve, nor more than twenty-three persons, and the concurrence of twelve of this number was essential to the finding of an indictment, and the provision of Chapter 4015, Acts of 1891, that the assent of eight shall be necessary to the finding of indictment is unconstitutional. English v. State, 31 Fla. 340, 12 So. 689; Donald v. State, 31 Fla. 255, 12 So. 695.

Section 11. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury, in the county where the crime was committed, and shall be heard by himself, or counsel, or both, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to meet the witnesses against him face to face, and have compulsory process for the attendance of witnesses in his favor, and shall be furnished with a copy of the indictment against him.

A copy of the charge of the court to the jury can not rightfully be sent to the jury in a criminal case after their retirement. The charge of the court is part and parcel of the trial of the cause, the whole of which the Constitution requires to be public, Holton v State, 2 Fla. 470.

Where it appears that two are indicted jointly, and one not being in custody, the other is tried immediately and convicted and obtains a writ of error, and in the following month the judgment is reversed, and at the succeeding term, the one not in custody at the former term having been arrested, the cause is continued on motion of the State, as to both they demanding immediate trial, no denial of the "right to a speedy and public trial" is shown. Ex parte Warris and Johnson, 28 Fla. 371, 9 So. 718.

Where a mortal wound is inflicted in one county from which the party stricken dies in another county, the perpetrator may be indicted, tried and punished in either county; and the statute as applied to such case is not repugnant to the constitutional provision, guaranteeing a speedy public trial in the county where the crime is committed. Smith v State, 42 Fla. 605, 28 So. 758.

The statute in force authorizing change of venue, without consent of the defendant, when it is impossible to secure an impartial jury in the county where the offense was committed is not unconstitutional. Hewitt v State, 43 Fla. 194, 30 So. 795.

Defendants in criminal cases have the right to an open public trial, and trial judges should not permit private conferences with them in reference to any question arising at the trial of any such cause before them, by the prosecuting attorney or any one else. Peason v State, 46 Fla, 124, 35 So. 204.

The constitutional provision in reference to the right of trial by an impartial jury in the county where the crime was committed is an important one to the accused, and such an important right must not be lightly treated. O'Berry v State, 47 Fla. 75, 36 So. 440.

The statute prescribing the requisites to be complied with by parties charged with crime in applications for the procurement of witnesses for their defense at the cost of the county, is not violative of this section. Pittman v State, 51 Fla. 94, 41 So. 385.

Where the record does not show affirmatively that an accused person of mature age unable to employ counsel was denied the benefit of assistance of one, it must be presumed that the trial judge did his duty and that the accused waived the benefit of counsel. Cutts v State, 54 Fla. 21, 5 So. 491.

If a person accused of felony is unable to employ counsel and signifies his desire to be represented by one, it has been the practice of the trial judge to appoint some attorney to represent the accused. This practice is in accord with the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Ib.

The word public as used in this section is used in opposition to secret. The constitutional requirement is fairly observed, if without partiality or favoritism, a resonable portion of the public is suffered to attend. The exclusion by the court of all persons other than those interested in the case, where, from the character of the charge and nature of the evidence, public morality woud be injuriously affected, does not violate the constitutional right to a public trial. Robertson v State, 64 Fla. 437, 60 So. 118.

Section 12. No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, nor compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken without just compensation.

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Pormer Jeopardy.--An award of punitive damages in an action for wrong. also punishable as a criminal offense, is not a violation of that portion of the Constitution which provides that "no person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Smith y Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117.

A conviction or acquittal, in order to be a bar to another prosecution, must be for the same offense, or for an offense of a higher degree, and necessarily including the offense for which the accused stands indicted. Boswell v State, 20 Fla. 869.

The discharge of a jury, in case of manifest necessity, such as sudden sickness of a juror, the illness of the prisoner, or other urgent cause, will not exempt the prisoner from again being tried for the same offense. Ellis v State, 25 Fla. 702, 6 So. 768.

A justice of the peace has no authority to try a person charged with felony, and such trial by a justice of the peace is no bar to subsequent trial of the same offense by the Circuit Court. Alford v State, 25 Fla. 852, 6 So, 857.

When there has been trial for an offense and a verdict of guilty, and on motion of the defendant the court arrests the judgment, or grants a new trial, such defendant has not been in jeopardy which forbids a second trial, whether upon the same indictment or a new one. Gibson v State, 26 Fla. 109, 7 So. 376.

Where a judgment entered upon a verdict of guilty on a trial for murder, has been reversed because the verdict did not ascertain the degree of the crime, and a new trial awarded, the accused can be tried again upon the same indictment, and such second trial will not put him in jeopardy a second time for the same offense. Lovett v State, 33 Fla. 389, 14 So. 837.

The statute providing that, if the jury shall return to the court second time without having agreed upon a verdict, they shall not be sent out again without their own consent, unless they shall ask from the court some further explanation of the law; and such discharge of a jury in a criminal case does not entitle defendant to a discharge on his plea of former jeopardy. Adams v State, 34 Fla. 185, 15 So. 905.

A conviction or acquittal by a municipal court under a municipal ordinance is no bar to a prosecution under the state law. Theisen v McDavid, 34 Fla, 440, 16 So. 321; Hunt v City of Jacksonville, 34 Fla. 504, 16 So. 398; Bueno v State, 40 Fla. 160, 23 So. 862,

Where in a trial of a felony not capital the jury retired to consider their verdict on the evening of one day and about noon of the following day were discharged by the court upon the assurances given through their foreman that they could not agree upon a verdict, such discharge does not operate as a bar to further prosecution under the same information. Smith v State, 40 Fla. 203, 23 So. 854.

Neither a conviction of persons upon a charge of conspiracy to accuse various other persons of offenses of keeping bawdy-houses for the purpose of extorting money, nor an acquittal upon a charge of maliciously verbally threatening to accuse one of their victims of the offense of keeping a bawdy house for the purpose of extorting money, constitute any defence to a charge of maliciously verbally threatening to accuse another of their victims of the offense of keeping a bawdy house for the purpose of extorting money. Wallace v State, 41 Fla. 547, 26 So. 713.

A plea setting up that the defendant had previously been indicted and put on trial for an assault with intent to murder Pendee Taylor, is no defense to a subsequent indictment charging the defendant with an assault with intent to murder Phillip McNish; although the plea avers that the offenses were the same. McNish v State, 47 Fla. 66, 36 So. 175.

Reversal of a judgment by the appellate court in a criminal case and the granting of a new trial does not preclude the trial of the defendant again upon the same indictment, and such second trial will not put the defendant in jeopardy. McNish v State, 47 Fla. 69, 36 So. 176.

The silence of the defendant on trial for crime, or his failure to object or protest against an illegal discharge of the jury before verdict, does not constitute a consent to such discharge, or waiver of the constitutional inhi. bition against second jeopardy for the same offense. Allen v State, 52 Fla. 1, 41 So. 593.

A person is in legal jeopardy when he is put upon trial, before court of competent jurisdiction, upon an indictment which is sufficient in form

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