district unions; but that, instead thereof, said defendants wrote said notice or letter of withdrawal and cancellation upon blank paper, omitting therefrom what purported to be the imprint of the seal of the said union and appending said signatures in print instead of in writing, and in such form and manner of execution forwarded and communicated the same to said membership, committees and local and district unions. Your informant further shows and gives the court to understand that upon receipt of said notice of withdrawal and cancellation said membership, committees and district and local unions generally throughout the bituminous coal fields to which such notice was sent, took the position, and so stated in the daily press and by word of mouth, that said withdrawal and cancellation notice was defective, invalid and without authority, because it did not purport to bear the seal of the order or purport to actually have been signed by such president and secretary-treasurer, and that by reason thereof said notice was ineffective and invalid and did not operate to withdraw, cancel and officially terminate said strike. Your informant further shows and gives the court to understand that said general objections and criticism of said notice by said membership, committees and district and local unions were promptly brought to the notice and knowledge of said defendants, and thereupon said complainant, by its attorneys, importuned, requested and urged the defendant, John L. Lewis, to immediately take steps to communicate to said membership, committees and district and local unions the fact that said notice of withdrawal and cancellation had been authoritatively issued and communicated in good faith, and that its purpose was to cancel and withdraw said strike order and terminate said strike; but said defendant, notwithstanding importunities and requests, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to comply therewith, or to notify, communicate with, counsel or advise said membership, committees and district and local unions that it was the intent and purpose of said notice of withdrawal and cancellation to officially cancel said strike order and terminate said strike. Your informant further shows and gives the court to understand that said defendants have further jointly and severally, knowingly and wilfully ignored, violated and disobeyed said temporary injunction, and that they are now further jointly and severally, knowingly and wilfully ignoring, violating and disobeying said temporary injunction in each of the following further particulars, towit: (a) In passively consenting that said strike is to be continued and enforced as previously announced. (b) In assuming and maintaining an attitude toward said membership, committees and district and local unions, by announcements through the public press and by statements to and interviews with representatives of the associated press and newspapers that said membership and committees will not go back to work, but will remain on strike. (c) By assuming and maintaining an attitude toward the public and to said membership, committees and district and local unions, that is tantamount to the issuing of further strike orders and equivalent to instructions to said membership, committees and district and local unions to keep such strike in effect, and is in support of such strike. (d) In encouraging said strikers to abstain from work, to continue on said strike, to remain out of and not return to the mines in pursuance of said strike order. (e) In countenancing, aiding, encouraging and abetting the taking of steps by local unions for the payment of strike benefits and the distribution among strikers of sums of money previously accumulated and subsequently acquired to assist such striking miners and mine workers to subsist while striking, and to thereby aid them during the pendency of such strike. (f) In conspiring, combining, agreeing or arranging with each other and among themselves, and with each other and other persons, to limit the facilities for the production of coal, and to restrict the supply or distribution of coal, and in aiding and abetting the doing of such acts. (g) In permitting the said strike order to remain in effect. (h) In aiding, by their general attitude, the continuance of said strike order in effect. (i) In communicating to said membership, committees and district and local unions a so-called withdrawal or cancellation of said strike order, irregular, unusual and different in form and manner of execution from orders regularly and usually sent out and communicated to withdraw and cancel a strike order and terminate a strike. (j) In communicating to said membership, committees and district and local unions a so-called withdrawal or cancellation of said strike order without the seal of the United Mine Workers of America purporting to be impressed or printed thereon. (k) In communicating to said membership, committees and district and local unions a so-called withdrawal or cancellation of said strike order written upon blank paper instead of being written or printed upon the letter heads or stationery of the United Mine Workers of America. (1) In communicating to said membership, committees and district and local unions a so-called cancellation of said strike order which did not purport to bear the written signatures of the president and secretary-treasurer of said United Mine Workers of America. (m) In communicating to said membership, committees and district and local unions a so-called withdrawal and cancellation, the authority and validity of which, on account of its form and manner of its execution, they knew would be questioned, ignored and disregarded. (n) In failing, neglecting and refusing, when advised and informed that the validity and authority of said so-called withdrawal and cancellation notice was being questioned, ignored and disobeyed by the membership, committees and district and local unions, because of its form and its manner of execution, to advise and notify said membership, committees and district and local unions that said so-called withdrawal and cancellation notice was genuine and valid and that it was issued by authority and in good faith for the purpose of withdrawing and cancelling said strike order and terminating said strike. (0) In failing, neglecting and refusing to issue a valid and authoritative withdrawal and cancellation of said strike order, and to communicate such withdrawal and cancellation to said membership, committees and district and local unions as fully and completely as the said strike order had been theretofore distributed and circulated to said membership, committees and district and local unions. (p) In receiving detailed reports from the membership, committees and district and local unions throughout the jurisdiction of the United Mine Workers of America respecting the refusal of the miners and mine workers to return to work and, in turn, giving out the substance of said reports to the public press under and by their authority as officers of said union, and thereby officially approving the conduct of said membership, committees and district and local unions, and thereby aiding and encouraging them to remain on strike and to concertedly refuse to return to work in the mines. Your informant further shows and gives the court to understand that following the receipt by said membership, committees and district and local unions of said so-called withdrawal and cancellation of said strike order they generally throughout the bituminous coal field assumed the position and stated the fact to be that said so-called withdrawal and cancellation of said strike order was not only deficient, invalid and without authority to cancel and withdraw said strike order and to terminate said strike, but that if said membership, committees and district and local unions were to recognize it as valid, and return to work in pursuance of its terms, they would then and thereby be violating the rules of their order and would then and thereby subject themselves to penalties and punishment for such violation, and would then and thereby jeopardize their rights to membership, and would then and thereby jeopardize the rights of the district and local unions to retain their charters, and, for said reasons, they neglected and refused to return to work in the mines; that full knowledge of said position assumed by said membership, committees and district and local unions, and of the statements and contentions made respecting the invalidity of said so-called withdrawal and cancellation of said strike order, and of their obligations to disregard it, and of the consequences that would follow, as to membership and charters as aforesaid, came to each of said defendants; that they and each of them fully understood all and singular said position, statements and contentions so assumed and made by said membership, committees and district and local unions; but that, notwithstanding said facts, neither of said defendants criticised said position or statements or corrected said membership, committees and district and local unions with respect thereto, but have, at all times, remained silent, thereby approving said position and statements and supporting said membership, committees and district and local unions with reference thereto. All and singular of which acts, attitude and conduct on the part of said defendants are contrary to the form of the statutes in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the United States of America. L. ERT SLACK, United States Attorney for the District of Indiana. STATE OF INDIANA, I L. Ert Slack, United States Attorney for the District of Indiana, being first duly sworn, on oath states that he has read the foregoing information and knows the contents thereof, and that he verily believes that the things therein contained are true. L. ERT SLACK. Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day of December, 1919. NOBLE C. BUTLER, Clerk of the United States District Court. CONTEMPT FORM V.-ORDER ADJUDGING PARTY GUILTY OF CONTEMPT. [Copied from Fischer v. Hayes, 6 Fed. 66.] [TITLE.] A motion for attachment for contempt herein having come on for further hearing on the question of punishment or terms, on this thirteenth day of February, 1880, and Charles F. Blake, Esq., having been heard for the motion, and J. H. Whitelegge, Esq., opposed; now, therefore, it is hereby ordered and decreed, that the defendant is adjudged to have committed the contempt alleged, and that he pay, as a fine therefor, the amount of all costs, charges and disbursements, whatsoever suffered, borne or incurred, by the complainant by reason of, or on account of, the said motion, and that the question of the amount of said fine be submitted to this court on affidavits, and without argument, as follows: The complainant to serve his affidavits on the solicitor for the defendant on or before Friday, February 20, 1880; that defendant serve his replying affidavits on counsel for complainant on or before Tuesday, February 24, 1880; and that complainant have the right to reply; and that all affidavits be filed on or before Friday, February 27, 1880. CONTEMPT FORM VI.-ORDER FINING DEFENDANT FOR CONTEMPT. [Copied from Fischer v. Hayes, 6 Fed. 67.] [TITLE.] This motion having been heard, on the first day of August, 1879, on affidavits and argument by counsel for the respective parties, and thereupon an order having been duly made that it be referred to John A. Shields to ascertain the fact of said infringement, if the same be so, and report his finding to this court, and upon the coming in of the report of said referee, and hearing counsel for the respective parties, in support thereof and in opposition thereto, said report was confirmed; and it was then further ordered that the complainant file with the court, and serve copies on defendant, affidavits showing the expenses incurred in the prosecution of this second attachment for contempt; that defendant file and serve answering affidavits, and that complainant may reply thereto; and an amended order, and the affidavit of George Hayes, the defendant, executed on the twenty-sixth day of February, 1880, having been filed in reply to said complainant's affidavits, it is, upon consideration thereof, ordered that the defendant pay into court the sum of $522.49, as set forth in the affidavit of Baron Higham, executed herein on the sixteenth day of February, 1880, and the further sum of $867.50, as set forth in the affidavit of Valentine Fischer, executed herein on the twentieth day of February, 1880, amounting altogether to the sum of $1,389.99, as a fine for said second contempt, within thirty days from the date of the entry of this order, to wit, the twelfth day of April, 1880; and that if not paid, the defendant stand committed till it be paid, and that, when paid, it be paid over to the plaintiff in reimbursement. CONTEMPT FORM VII.-ATTACHMENT FOR CONTEMPT. DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, District of The United States of America, to the Marshal of the GREETING: We command you, that you attach District of if they be found in your district, and them safely keep, so that you have them before us, the district court of the United States for the term thereof now being holden at district of -, at the in the district aforesaid, forth with, to answer to the United States of America for certain trespasses and contempts brought against them in our court before us, and have you then and there this writ. |