147 U. S. 149, 37 L. ed. 118. A sum claimed for disbursements not alleged to have been made by the plaintiff is not included. Gorman v. Havird, 141 U. S. 206, 35 L. ed. 717. In a suit to remove a trustee, the value of the matter in dispute is the value of the trust estate, not the value of the trustee's commissions or other compensation. Kenaday v. Edwards, 134 U. S. 117, 33 L. ed. 853. But see Caffrey v. Territory of Oklahoma, 177 U. S. 316, 44 L. ed. 799. In a suit to recover land the value of the interest in the same claimed by the plaintiff is that of the matter in dispute. Green v. Fisk, 154 U. S. 668, and 26 L. ed. 486; Vicksburg, S. &. P. R. Co. v. Smith, 135 U. S. 195; 34 L. ed. 95; Black v. Jackson, 177 U. S. 349, 44 L. ed. 801; Cameron v. U. S., 146 U. S. 533, 36 L. ed. 1077. In a suit to recover the possession of leasehold premises, the amount expended by the lessee in the improvement of the premises may be considered in estimating the value of the matter in dispute. Harris v. Barber, 129 U. S. 366, 32 L. ed. 697. In a proceeding to recover summary possession of mortgaged property held by a tenant of the mortgagor, the value of the defendant's leasehold, not that of the land, was held to be that of the matter in dispute. Willis v. Eastern Tr. & B. Co., 167 U. S. 76, 42 L. ed. 83. Where the plaintiff sought to review a judg ment giving it possession of land upon the payment of money which was awarded to the defendant, the latter sum, not the value of the land, was the value of the matter in dispute. Pittsburg L. & C. Works v. State Nat. Bank, 154 U. S. 626, and 24 L. ed. 270. In a suit of

trespass quare clausum fregit and de bonis asportatis, the amount of the judgment for the value of ore taken from the land was the value of the matter in dispute, not the value of the land, where neither party set up title, although the judgment might collaterally affect the title. N. J. Zine Co. v. Trotter, 108 U. S. 564, 27 L. ed. 828. In a suit for an injunction, the value of the object sought to be gained by the bill, not the amount of the plaintiff's damages, is ordinarily the value of the matter in dispute. Miss. & Mo. R. Co. v. Ward, 2 Black, 485, 17 L. ed. 311; Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 112, 25 L. ed. 782. In a suit to enjoin the issue of municipal bonds, the jurisdictional amount is not the amount of the whole issue sought to be enjoined, but the amount of taxes which the complainant would Le compelled to pay for interest and a sinking fund. El Paso Water Co. v. El Paso, 152 U. S. 157, 38 L. ed. 396; Colvin v. Jacksonville, 158 U. S. 456, 39 L. ed. 1053. Cf. Elliott v. Sackett, 108 U. S. 132, 27 L. ed. 678. In a suit to enjoin an association of railway companies from enforcing a joint agreement in violation of the interstate commerce law, allegations that the daily interstate shipments thereunder exceeded in value $1,000, and that free competition would cause great losses and possibly financial ruin to the defendants, were held to be sufficient to show that the value of the matter in dispute exceeded $1,000. U. S. V. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290, 41 L. ed. 1007. But see El Paso Water Co. v. El Paso, 152 U. S. 157, 38 L. ed. 396. Where alternative relief was sought

and both alternatives denied below, if the matter in dispute as to either exceeds the statutory amount, jurisdiction of the appeal will be sustained. Shappirio V. Goldberg, 192 U. S. 232, 48 L. ed. 419. In a suit to compel an executor to account for certain assets, the value of plaintiff's interest in such assets, not the value of the assets, is that of the matter in dispute. Miller v. Clark, 138 U. S. 223, 34 L. ed. 966. So held of a suit by a judgment creditor to set aside an insolvent assignment and for an accounting. Hollander V. Fechheimer, 162 U. S. 326, 40 L. ed. 985. Where a number of plaintiffs claiming under the same title and having a common interest in the relief sought, unite in a suit, the adverse party having no interest in the apportionment or distribution of the amount recovered among them, their united interests constitute the matter in dispute. Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 27, 30, 30 L. ed. 1083, 1084, per Gray, J.; Estes v. Gunter, 121 U. S. 183, 30 L. ed. 884; Shields v. Thomas, 17 How. 3, 15 L. ed. 93; Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U. S. 112, 25 L. ed. 782; Davies v. Corbin, 112 U. S. 36, 28 L. ed. 627; Friend v. Wise, 111 U. S. 797, 28 L. ed. 602. So held of an action to recover damages for causing death where the damages were divided among several next of kin. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Gentry, 163 U. S. 353, 41 L. ed. 186. So held of a judgment against several defendants jointly for the possession of several parcels of land. Friend v. Wise, 111 U. S. 797, 28 L. ed. 602. But see Chamberlain v. Browning, 177 U. S. 605, 44 L. ed. 906. Where a suit is brought by

one for himself and all others jointly interested, the aggregate interest of those who join with him, not that of the whole class, constitutes the disputed matter. Bruce v. Manchester & K. R. Co., 117 U. S. 514, 516, 29 L. ed. 990, 991; Handley v. Stutz, 137 U. S. 366, 34 L. ed. 706. But see Union Bank of Chicago v. Kansas City Bank, 136 U. S. 223, 34 L. ed. 341; Tupino v. La Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, 214 U. S. 268, 53 L. ed. 992. Where several persons join in one suit to assert separate and distinct interests, and these interests alone are in dispute, their interests upon appeal are considered separately, and the amount of the interest of each is the limit of the appellate jurisdiction even when they sue in behalf of themselves and all others similarly interested. Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 27, 34, 30 L. ed. 1083, 1086, per Gray, J.; Seaver v. Bigelows, 5 Wall. 208. 18 L. ed. 595; Russell v. Stansell, 105 U. S. 303, 26 L. ed. 989; Chatfield v. Boyle, 105 U. S. 231, 26 L. ed. 944; Adams v. Crittenden, 106 U. S. 576, 27 L. ed. 99; Schwed v. Smith, 106 U. S. 188, 27 L. ed. 156; F. L. & Tr. Co. v. Waterman, 106 U. S. 265, 27 L. ed. 115; Hassall v. Wilcox, 115 U. S. 598, 29 L. ed. 504; Fourth Nat. Bank v. Stout, 113 U. S. 684, 28 L. ed. 1152; Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U. S. 61, 29 L. ed. 329; Paving Co. v. Mulford, 100 U. S. 147, 25 L. ed. 591; Ex parte Phoenix Ins. Co., 117 U. S. 367, 29 L. ed. 923; Wheeler v. Cloyd, 134 U. S. 537, 33 L. ed. 1008; Union Bank of Chicago v. Kansas City Bank, 136 U. S. 223, 34 L. ed. 341; Smith M. P. Co. v. McGroarty, 136 U. S. 237, 34 L. ed.

346; Clay v. Field, 138 U. S. 464, 479, 480, 34 L. ed. 1044, 1049, per Mr. Justice Bradley: "The general principle observed in all cases is that if several persons be joined in a suit in equity or admiralty, and have a common and undivided interest, though separable as between themselves, the amount of their joint claim or liability will be the test of jurisdiction; but where their interests are distinct, and they are joined for the sake of convenience only, and because they form a class of parties whose rights or liabilities arose out of the same transaction, or have relation to a common fund or mass of property sought to be administered, such distinct demands or liabilities cannot be aggregated together for the purpose of giving this court jurisdiction by appeal, but each must stand or fall by itself alone." Supra, § 17. Distinct judgments in favor of or against separate parties, although in the same record, cannot be joined when determining the jurisdiction. Tupino v. La Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, 214 U. S. 268. Where different claimants obtain a decree in their favor for sums to be paid separately to each of them, the largest amount thus decreed is the value of the matter in dispute.

Ex parte Baltimore & O. R. Co., 106 U. S. 5, 27 L. ed. 78; The Nevada, 106 U. S. 154, 27 L. ed. 149. Where a man obtained a decree for the payment of two sums of money to him by the same persons, one to be retained by him for his own benefit, the other to be held by him as trustee for others, the aggregate of the two sums was held to be the value of the matter in dispute. The Propeller Burlington, 137 U. S. 386, 390, 34 L. ed. 731, 732. See Hawley v. U. S., 108 U. S. 543, 27 L. ed. 820.

33 Walsh v. Meyer, 111 U. S. 31, 28 L. ed. 338; U. S. v. Mosby, 133 U. S. 273, 33 L. ed. 625.

34 Wilson v. Blair, 119 U. S. 387,30 L. ed. 441; Street v. Ferry, 119 U. S. 385, 30 L. ed. 439; Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 27, 30 L. ed. 1083; Roura v. Government of the Philippine Island, 218 U. S. 386, 54 L. ed. 1080. For a case where the affidavits were held not to be sufficient, see Enriquez v. Enriquez, 222 U. S. 127, 56 L. ed. 124.

35 Wilson v. Blair, 119 U. S. 387, 30 L. ed. 441; Davie v. Heyward, 33 Fed. 93; Rector v. Lipscomb, 141 U. S. 557, 35 L. ed. 857.

36 Johnson v. Wilkins, 116 U. S. 392, 29 L. ed. 671; Wilson v. Blair, 119 U. S. 387, 30 L. ed. 441.

37 Gage v. Pumpelly, 108 U. S. 164; 27 L. ed. 668; Potts v. Hollon, 177 U. S. 365, 44 L. ed. 808; Red River Cattle Co. v. Needham, 137 U. S. 632, 34 L. ed. 799. It seems that where such a finding or order was made upon conflicting, affidavits below, new affidavits cannot be filed in the Supreme Court. Ibid. Cf. Moelle v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 21, 37 L. ed. 350.

§ 697. 1 Ex parte Jordan, 94 U. S. 248, 24 L. ed. 123; Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U. S. 276, 28 L. ed. 145; Williams v. Morgan, 111 U. S. 684, 28 L. ed. 559; Hassall v. Wilcox, 115 U. S. 598, 29 L. ed. 504; Savannah v. Jessup, 106 U. S. 563, 27 L. ed. 276; Perlman v. U. S., 247 U. S. 7, 38 Sup. Ct. 417, 62 L. ed. 950; Tuttle v. Claflin, C. C. A., 88 Fed. 122; Re Michigan Cent. R. Co., C. C. A., 124 Fed. 727. A person injuriously affected by a decision may be allowed to intervene for the purpose of taking an appeal or writ of error; even to review an application for a mandamus; Ex parte First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 207 U. S. 61, 65, 52 L. ed. 103, 105. No intervention in a court of review will be permitted in order to raise new issues not presented to the court below. Scrugham v. Shoup, C. C. A., 256 Fed. 325. The right to appeal from an order denying the right to

intervene is discussed supra, § 259; Ex parte Cutting, 94 U. S. 14, 24 L. ed. 49; Buel v. Farmers' L. & Tr. Co., C. C. A., 104 Fed. 839; Reid v. Judges of Circuit Court, C. C. A., 175 Fed. 774. A State which has refused to intervene in, or to become a party to, a suit affecting property in which it claims an interest cannot appeal. Georgia v. Jesup, 106 U. S. 458, 27 L. ed. 216; South Carolina v. Wesley, 155 U. S. 542.

A party does not lose his right to review an order because proceedings are pending against him for contempt in disobedience to the same. Exploration Mercantile Co. v. Pacific H. & S. Co., C. C. A., 177 Fed. 825. Cf. § 251 Supra.

2 He can appeal from an order refusing to confirm the sale or setting it aside. Magann v. Segal, C. C. A., 92 Fed. 252. See Davis v. Mercantile Co., 152 U. S. 590, 38 L. ed. 563. Thus, when not concluded by the terms of the sale, or of the order or decree under which the sale was made, he may appeal from a subsequent final order or decree which determines in what securities, if of diverse value, his bid shall be made good, Kneeland v. Am. L. & Tr. Co., 136 U. S. 89, 95, 34 L. ed. 379, 382; or the amount of compensation for trustees or others, Wil

liams v. Morgan, 111 U. S. 684, 28 L. ed. 559; or the validity and amount of claims by intervenors or others; which he has agreed to pay before the amount was adjusted. Kneeland v. Am. L. & Tr. Co., 136 U. S. 89, 95, 3 L. ed. 379, 382; Louisville, E. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wilson, 138 U. S. 501, 505, 34 L. ed. 1023, 1025. He should be made a party to an appeal from an order affecting his bid or denying a motion to set aside the sale. Davis v. Mercantile Tr. Co., 152 U. S. 590, 38 L. ed. 563. A purchaser cannot appeal from a decree establishing the validity of a receivers' certifi cates, or other claims, which he has agreed to pay without reserving the right to contest their validity. Swann v. Wright's Ex'r, 110 U. S. 590, 28 L. ed. 252; supra, § 243. A Circuit Court of Appeals refused to take judicial notice of the fact that an appellant who called himself a "purchasing trustee' had bought the property when the transcript did not show it. Fitzgerald v. Evans, C. C. A., 49 Fed., 426; supra, § 329.

3 Supra, §§ 311, 325. See Rust v. United Waterworks Co., C. C. A.,

70 Fed. 129. A party to a suit may appeal from a final order or decree by which his application to compel a receiver to account for or pay over money or deliver property to him has been denied; and the receiver is a proper party respondent to such an appeal. Hovey v. MeDonald, 109 U. S. 150, 155, 27 L. ed. 888, 889. A claimant who has been granted leave to file a petition for the surrender of the property has such a right of appeal. Dexter Horton Nat. Bank v. Hawkins, C. C. A., 190 Fed. 924.

4 Andrews v. Ill. Nat. Foundry & P. Works, C. C. A., 36 L. R. A. 139, 76 Fed. 166; s. c., C. C. A., 36 L. R. A. 153, 77 Fed. 774. As to a substituted receiver's rights, see Bowden v. Johnson, 107 U. S. 251, 27 L. ed. 386.

5 Andrews v. Thum, C. C. A., 61 Fed. 149; s. c., (C. C. A.), 67 Fed. 91; Cf. Hunt v. Oliver, 109 U. S. 177, 27 L. ed. 897.

6 Robb v. Security Trust Co., C. C. A., 121 Fed. 460.

7 Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U. S. 502, 507, 40 L. ed. 787, 789.

8 Bayard v. Lombardi, 9 How. 530, 13 L. ed. 245; Payne v. Niles,