assessment, or of an application to reduce any tax or assessment, willfully makes, as to any material matter, any statement which he knows to be false, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

CHAP. I. Arson.

TITLE XV.

Of Crimes Against Property.

II. Burglary and housebreaking.

III Forgery and counterfeiting.

IV. Larceny, including embezzlement.

V. Extortion.

VI. False personation and cheats.

VII. Fraudulently fitting out and destroying ships and vessels.

VIII. Fraudulent destruction of property insured.

IX. False weights and measures.

X. Fraudulent insolvencies by individuals.

XI. Fraudulent insolvencies by corporations, and other frauds in their management.

XII. Frauds in the sale of passage tickets.

XIII Frauds relative to documents of title to merchandise.
XIV

Malicious mischief.

CHAPTER 1.

ARSON.

SEC 486. Arson in first degree defined.

487. Id.; in second degree.

488. Id.; in third degree.

489. Arson, how punished.

490. Intent to destroy building requisite.

491. Contiguous buildings.

492. "Night-time" defined.

493. "Building," defined.

494. "Inhabited building," defined.

495. Ownership of building.

486. Arson in first degree defined.-A person who willfully burns, or sets on fire, in the night time, either

1. A dwelling-house in which there is, at the time, a human being; or

2. A car, vessel, or other vehicle, or a structure or a building other than a dwelling-house, wherein, to the knowledge of the offender, there is, at the time, a human being;

Is guilty of arson in the first degree.

See § 637, post. Dwelling-house, defined, § 502, post. People v. Orcutt, 1 Park. 252. Presence of human being. Woodford v. People, 3 Hun, 310. Adjoining buildings. Henessy v. People, 21 How. Pr. 239. Setting fire to one's own house. Shepard v. People, 19 N. Y. 537; Ball's case, 2 C. H. Rec. 85; People v. Smith, 3 How. Pr. 226. Firing jail for purpose only of aiding escape. People v. Cotteral, 18 Johns. 115. Attempts. People v. Bush, 4 Hill, 133; McDermott v. People, 5 Park. 102; Mackesey v. People, 6 id. 114. Offense complete, though only a portion of building consumed. People v. Butler, 16 Johns. 203. In tenementhouse in apartment of defendant only. Levy v. People, 19 Hun, 383. See Mary v. State, 24 Ark. 44; State v. Sandy, 3 Ired. 570; Com. v. Van Schaack, 16 Mass. 105; People v. Haggerty, 46 Cal. 354; Com. v. Tucker, 110 Mass. 403. Human being. Woodford v. People, 3 Hun, 310; 5 T. & C. 539; S. C., 62 N. Y. 117. Own house. State v. Hurd, 51 N. H. 176; Com. v. Van Schaack, 16 Mass. 105; State v. Sandy, 5 Ired. 570; Reg. v. Parker, 9 Carr. & P. 45; Reg. v. Russell, 1 Carr. & M. 541. See indictment. Levy v. People, 80 N. Y. 327; Morrill v. People, 7 Alb. L. J. 171. Evidence. 1 N. Y. Cr. 518; Carncross v. People, 17 W. Dig. 384; People v. McGrath, 5 N. Y. Cr. 4; 4 N. Y. State Rep'r, 629.

§ 487. Arson in second degree.-A person who,

1. Commits an act of burning in the day time, which, if committed in the night time, would be arson in the first degree; or

2. Willfully burns, or sets on fire, in the night time, a dwellinghouse wherein, at the time there is no human being; or

3. Willfully burns, or sets on fire, in the night time, a building not inhabited, but adjoining or within the curtilage of an inhabited building, in which there is, at the time, a human being, so that the inhabited building is endangered, even though it is not in fact injured by the burning; or

4. Willfully burns, or sets on fire, in the night time, a car, vessel, or other vehicle, or a structure or building, ordinarily occupied at night by a human being, although no person is within it at the time;

Is guilty of arson in the second degree.

Peverelly v. People, 3 Park. 59; People v. Durkin, 5 id. 243; People v. Taylor, 2 Mich. 250; State v. McLaughlin, 8 Jones, 354; People v. McGrath, 4 Ň. Y. State Rep'r, 629; 5 N. Y. Cr. 4.

§ 488. Arson in third degree. —A person who willfully burns, or sets on fire, either

1. A vessel, car, or other vehicle, or a building, structure, or other erection, which is at the time insured against loss or damage by fire, with intent to prejudice the insurer thereof; or

2. A vessel, car, or other vehicle, or a building, structure, or other erection, under circumstances not amounting to arson in the first or second degree;

Is guilty of arson in the third degree.

Sub. 1. Dedieu v. People, 22 N. Y. 178; Freund v. People, 5 Park. 198. Sub. 2. McGary v. People, 45 N. Y. 153; Carncross v. People, 1 N. Y. Cr. 518; Sheppard v. People, 19 N. Y. 537; People v. Henderson, 1 Park. 560; People v. Newton, 3 N. Y. Cr. 406; People v. O'Neill, 112 N. Y. 355; 6 N. Y. Cr. 274; 20 N. Y. State Rep'r, 754, aff'g 49 Hun, 422; 17 N. Y. State Rep'r, 956; 4 N. Y. Supp. 119 § 489. Arson, how punished.—Arson is punishable as follows: 1. In the first degree, by imprisonment for a term not less than ten years.

2. In the second degree, by imprisonment for a term not exceeding fifteen years.

3. In the third degree, by imprisonment for a term not exceeding seven years.

§ 490. Intent to destroy building requisite.- The burning of a building under circumstances which show beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no intent to destroy it, is not arson.

People v. Long, 2 Edm. S. C. 129; People v. Jones, id. 86.

S491. Contiguous buildings. Where an appurtenance to a building is so situated with reference to such building, or where any building is so situated with reference to another building that the burning of the one will manifestly endanger the other, a burning of the one is deemed a burning of the other, within the foregoing provisions, against any person actually participating in the original setting on fire, as of the moment when the fire from the one communicates to and sets on fire the other.

Roberts' case, 2 East's P. C. 1030; Isaac's case, id 1031; Reg. v. Fletcher, 2 Carr. & K. 215; Reg. v. Price, 1 id. 73; Rex v. Petley, Leach C. C. 277.

Adjoining building. Slate v. Laughlin, 8 Jones, 354; People v. Taylor, 2 Mich. 250; Olson v. Ins. Co. 35 Minn. 432; 59 Am. Rep. 333; Arkell v. Ins. Co., 69 N. Y. 193; Woodford v. People, 3 Hun, 310; 62 N. Y. 117; Hennessey v. People, 21 How. 239; overruled, but not on this ground, in Dedieu v. People, 22 N. Y. 178.

§ 492. "Night time," defined. The words "night time," as used in this chapter, include the period between sunset and sunrise, and every building or structure, which shall have been usually occupied by persons lodging therein at night, is a dwelling-house within the meaning of this chapter.

493. "Building" defined. Any house, vessel, or other structure, capable of affording shelter for human beings, or appurtenant to, or connected with a structure so adapted, is a "building" within the meaning of this chapter.

See § 504, post.

Com. v. Barney, 10 Cush. 478; State v. Johnson, 48 Ga. 116; State v. O'Toole, 29 Conn. 342; Rouse v. Catskill & N. Y. S. Co., 59 Hun, 82; 35 N. Y. State Rep`r, 493.

494. "Inhabited building," defined. A building is deemed an "inhabited building" within the meaning of this chapter, any part of which has usually been occupied by a person lodging therein at night.

People v. Orcutt, 1 Park. 252; Hooker v. Com., 13 Gratt. 763; Com. v. Barney, 10 Cush. 478; Rex v. Donovan, Leach C. C. 81; Reg. v. Connor, 2 Cox C. C. 65; People v. Cotteral, 18 Johns. 115; Smith v. State, 23 Tex. App. 357; 59 Am. Rep. 773.

§ 495. Ownership of building. To constitute arson it is not necessary that another person than the defendant should have had ownership in the building set on fire.

People v. Van Blarcom, 2 Johns. 105; Shepherd v. People, 19 N. Y. 537; State v. Taylor, 45 Me. 322; People v. Smith, 3 How. 226.

CHAPTER II.

BURGLARY.

SEC. 496. Burglary in first degree defined.

497. Id., in second degree.

498. Id., in third degree.

499. "Break," defined.

500. "Night time," defined.

501. "Enter," defined.

502. "

Dwelling-house," defined.

503. Dwelling-houses, etc., when deemed separate.

504. Building," defined.

505. Unlawfully entering building.

506. Burglar punishable separately for crime in building.

507. Burglary, how punished.

508. Possessing burglar's instruments, etc.

§ 496. Burglary in first degree defined.-A person, who, with intent to commit some crime therein, breaks and enters, in the nighttime, the dwelling-house of another, in which there is at the time a human being,

1. Being armed with a dangerous weapon; or

2. Arming himself therein with such a weapon; or
3. Being assisted by a confederate actually present; or

4. Who, while engaged in the night-time in effecting such entrance, or in committing any crime in such a building, or in escaping therefrom, assaults any person;

Is guilty of burglary in the first degree.

What constitutes breaking? People v. Bush, 3 Park. 552; State v. Boon, 13 Ired. 244; State v. Reid, 20 Iowa, 413; Lyons v. People, 68 Ill. 271; Com.v Strupney, 105 Mass 588. Inner door. State v. Wilson, Coxe, 439; State v. Scripture, 42 N. H. 485; Smith's case, 4 C. H. Rec. 62. Raising window. Frank v State, 39 Miss. 705; Dennis v. People, 27 Mich. 151. Grating. People v. Nolan, 22 Mich. 229. Moving loose plank. Com. v. Trimmer, I Mass. 476. Chimney. Com. v. Stephenson, 8 Pick. 354; State v. Willis, 7 Jones, 190. Entering. France v. State, 42 Tex. 276; State v. McCall, 4 Ala. 643; Allen v. State, 40 id. 834. Constructive breaking. State v Johnson, Phil. N. C. 186; State v. Mordecai, 68 N. C. 207; State v. Henry, 9 Ired. 403. Intent. State v. Bell, 29 Iowa, 316. Joint tenant. Clarke v. Com., 25 Gratt. 908; State v. Moore, 12 N H. 42. Tenementhouse. Mason v. People, 26 N. Y. 200; People v. Bush, 3 Park. 552; People v. Boujet, 2 id. 11; Guche's case, 6 C. H. Rec. 1; Robertson's case, 4 id. 63; Smith's case, id. 62; People v. Fralick, H. & D. 63. Indictment. Rodgers v. People, 86 N. Y. 360. See People v. Burns, 2 N. Y. 415; People v. Moran, 54 Hun, 279; People v. Meegan, 104 N. Y. 529; People v. Richards, 44 Hun, 283; 5 N. Y. Cr. 355, Sullivan v. People, 27 Hun, 35; People v. Fellinger, 24 How. 341; 15 Abb. 128; Foster v. People, 63 N. Y. 619, aff'g 3 Hun, 6; State v. Beal, 37 Ohio St. 108; 41 Am. Rep. 490; Myers v. People, 4 T. & C. 292; Com. v. Glover, 111 Mass. 402; Walker v. State, 63 Ala. 50; State v. Ryan, 12 Nev. 401; 28 Am. Rep. 802; Mack v. People, 82 N. Y. 235. See 3 N. Y. Supp. 813.

§ 497. Burglary in second degree.-A person, who, with intent to commit some crime therein, breaks and enters the dwelling-house of another in which there is a human being, under circumstances not amounting to burglary in the first degree, is guilty of burglary in the second degree.

498. Burglary in third degree.-A person who either

With intent to commit a crime therein, breaks and enters a building, or a room, or any part of a building; or

2. Being in any building, commits a crime therein and breaks out of the same;

Is guilty of burglary in the third degree.

Sub. 2. Sand's case, 6 C. H. Rec. 1; People v. Richards, 108 N. Y. 137, rev'g 44 Hun, 278; 5 N. Y. Cr. 355; People v. Park, 41 N. Y. 21, aff'g 1 Lans. 263; People v. Mason, 26 N. Y. 200; People v. Haight, 54 Hun, 9; 26 N. Y. State Rep'r, 33; People v. Hagan, 37 id. 661.

66

§ 499. Break," defined. The word "break," as used in this chapter, means and includes

1. Breaking or violently detaching any part, internal or external, of a building; or

2. Opening, for the purpose of entering therein, by any means whatever, any outer door of a building, or of any apartment or set of apartments therein separately used or occupied, or any window, shutter, scuttle, or other thing, used for covering or closing an opening thereto or therein, or which gives passage from one part thereof to another; or

3. Obtaining an entrance into such a building or apartment, by any threat or artifice used for that purpose, or by collusion with any person therein; or

4. Entering such a building or apartment by or through any pipe, chimney, or other opening, or by excavating, digging, or breaking through or under the building, or the walls or foundation thereof.

Unlatching cellar door. McCourt v. People, 64 N. Y. 583, Closed door. People v. Bush, 3 Park. 552; Tickner v. People, 6 Hun, 657. Breaking inner door. Smith's case, 4 C. H. Rec. 62. Window sash. People v. Edwards, 1 Wh. Cr. C. 171. Chimney. Robertson's case, 4 C. H. Rec. 63. Trap-door. People v. Fralick, Lalor, 63. Open window. People v. Arnold, 6 Park. 638. Intent sufficient. People v. Myers, 2 Hun, 6. Attempt. People v. Lawton, 56 Barb. 126. Foster v. People, 3 Hun, 6; aff'd, 63 N. Y. 619; Clark v. People, 5 T. & C. 33; Guche's case, 6 C H. Rec. 12; People v. Boujet, 2 Park. 11; Com. v. Strupney, 105 Mass. 588; 7 Am Rep. 556, Walker v. State, 63 Ala. 49; 35 Am Rep. 1; Brown v. State, 55 Ala. 123; 28 Am. Rep. 693; Johnston v. Com., 85 Penn. St. 54; 27 Am. Rep 622; Rolland v. Com., 82 Penn. St. 306; 22 Am Rep. 758; Timmons v. State, 34 Ohio St. 426; 32 Am. Rep. 376; State v. Groning, 33 Kans 18; Nicholls v. State, 68 Wis. 416, 60 Am Rep. 870; State v. Ward, 43 Conn. 489; 21 Am. Rep. 665; Robinson v. State, 53 Md. 151, 36 Am. Rep. 399; State v. McPherson, 70 N. C. 239; 16 Am. Rep. 769; Adkinson v. State, 5 Baxt. 569; 30 Am. Rep. 69. See 3 N. Y. Supp. 813.

§ 500. "

Night time,” defined.-[Repealed by ch. 677 of 1892.]

§ 501. " "Enter," defined. The word "enter," as used in this chapter, includes the entrance of the offender into such building or apartment, or the insertion therein of any part of his body or of any instrument or weapon held in his hand, and used, or intended to be used, to threaten or intimidate the inmates, or to detach or remove property.

See People v. Burt, 3 A. L. J. 96; People v. Fellinger, 24 How. Pr. 341; People v. Bush, 3 Park. 552; Sullivan v. People, 27 Hun, 35; Harrison v. State, 20 Tex. App. 387; 54 Am. Rep. 529.

$502. "Dwelling-house," defined. A building, any part of which is usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, is, for the purposes of this chapter, deemed a dwelling-house.

Bar-room under roof with dwelling. Quinn v. People, 11 Hun, 336; S. C., 71 N. Y. 561; People v. Snyder, 2 Park. 23; Store. Mill's case, 3 C. H. Rec. 192; People v. Parker, 4Johns. 424; People v. McCloskey, 5 Park. 57; Rodgers v. People, 86 N. Y. 360; Smith's case, 5 C. H. Rec. 167; Wood's case, id. 10; Robertson's case, 4 id. 63; Jones' case, 1 id. 183.

§ 503. Dwelling-houses, etc., when deemed separate. - If a building is so constructed as to consist of two or more parts, intended to be occupied by different tenants usually lodging therein at night, each part is deemned the separate dwelling-house of a tenant occupying the same. If a building is so constructed as to consist of two or more parts occupied by different tenants separately for any purpose, each part or apartment is considered a separate building within the meaning of this chapter.

Rodgers v. People, 86 N. Y. 360; Mason v. People, 26 id. 200; People v. Bush, 3 Park. 552; Rolland v. Com., 85 Penn, St. 66; 27 Âm. Rep. 626; Smith v. People, 115 Ill. 17.

§ 504. "Building," defined. The term "building," as used in this chapter, includes a railway car, vessel, booth, tent, shop, or other erection or inclosure.

People v. Richards, 108 N. Y. 137; People v. Haight, 54 Hun, 9; Rouse v. Catskill & N. Y. S. Co., 59 id. 82; 35 N. Y. State Rep'r, 493; People v. Hogan, 37 id. 661; People v. Stickman, 34 Cal. 242; Anderson v. State, 48 Ala. 665; 17 Am. Rep. 36; Barnett v. State, 38 Ohio St. 7; Orrell v. People, 94 Ill. 456; 34 Am. Rep. 241.