Manning v. Stern. them, about the time of the assignment, and which was omitted from the schedules when first filed, is open to unfavorable comment. On his examination on the first November, on being asked whether the insolvent had transferred any property to him during the last year, he replied they had; that they owed him money-several hundred dollars-and that they gave him merchandise for it, and that they had transferred no other property to him. Upon his further examination on November 8, he stated that they had transferred to him merchandise to secure a debt for money loaned to the amount of about twenty thousand dollars, during the year. That this debt was paid, and he had re-transferred the property to them, about the time of the assignment. He "thinks" he so transferred the same before the assignment. This property was not inventoried in the schedules annexed to the assignment, and was not added thereto until after the defendant's examination. It may be said that this conduct affects chiefly the integrity of the assignors, as the duty of making this inventory to be annexed to the assignment would devolve upon them, and that its subsequent addition to the inventory corrects the prior omission, and will prevent loss from that direction. But it is unfortunate with respect to a transaction justly calculated to excite suspicion, that it grew out of dealings with the defendant, with whom the property in question was yet stored when the assignment was made. It may further give rise to the suggestion that there may be other property not inventoried by the assignors, and shows the reasonableness of the request for the examination of the books, which has declined. The trustee should not be one in any way hampered or compromised by the transactions with the Manning v. Stern. assignors, or in such a relation to them as will indispose him to act unreservedly in the interest of credi tors. The assignors were left in possession by the assignee. The refusal to the creditors to examine the books proceeded from one of them, after the assignee had himself stated that such examination could be had. The withdrawal of such consent leads to the conclusion that the assignors had inspired the refusal. The assignee should not be under the influence of assignors, to the prejudice of the right of creditors. It is true that the assignee states that when he learned that creditors objected, he superseded the assignors in their care of the assigned property. But the fact that he left them in practical possession until such objection, shows a disposition to favor them. I do not intend to decide at this time that the acts and omissions of the defendant absolutely justify his reinoval from his position as trustee. This action is brought for his removal, and that subject has to be considered and decided after full hearing on the merits. But the defendant is under injunction, and the assigned estate should be actively cared for. It is important that some suitable person should have possession of the assigned estate, until the trial and disposition of the action. And to this end I think a receiver should be appointed. Beebee. Pyle. BEEBEE v. PYLE. Brooklyn City Court; General Term, March, 1876. BANKRUPTCY.-COMPOSITION.-STATEMENT OF DEBT. A composition adjudicated in bankruptcy is not defeated by the mere omission of the debtor to state accurately the amount of one of his debts,- -e. g., to omit to specify that arrears of interest are due on it. The creditor whose demand is inaccurately stated must object before the bankrupt court. If he is a party there and does not do so, the State courts will not question the certificate for the error in statement. The entire debt, not merely the amount stated, will be deemed discharged. Appeal from a judgment. Clement E. Beebee brought this action on a judgment recovered by him in this court, against Cyrus Pyle, the present defendant, April 16, 1874, for $1267.68, upon a promissory note. The judgment was originally recovered by default, on April 16, 1874. In the action in which it was recovered the summons was for $1207.43, with interest from December 1, 1873. Less than a month before the recovery of the judgment a petition in bankruptcy was filed against defendant. After the recovery of the judgment, an amended petition was filed against defendant, on which he was adjudicated a bankrupt, in October 22, 1874. The default was opened, and the bankruptcy court allowed plaintiff to continue the action; and a few days after the adjudication plaintiff recovered a verdict on which the court ordered the original judgment to stand. The bankruptcy proceedings were conducted to a compromise, at the meeting for which the debtor stated the debt due to plaintiff at $1207.43, the original indebtedness, without mentioning interest. The plaintiff was a Beebee v. Pyle. party to and present at the proceedings, but filed no objection to the statement of his claim. Finally, the bankruptcy court, plaintiff being represented by counsel, made an order sanctioning the compromise. Plaintiff refused to receive his share, and obtained leave of this court to bring the present action on his judgment. Judge MCCUE, before whom the case was tried, held that "by failing to object at the proper time that the statement of the debt due to him. was not correct, the plaintiff is concluded by the final order of the bankruptcy court; and that all questions touching the debt and its amount are res adjudicata." He accordingly dismissed the complaint with costs. Plaintiff appealed. J. T. Marean, for appellant.-I. Interest should have been included (Re Hagan, 10 Bank. Reg. 383; Exp. Rooke, 1 Atk. 244; 4 Evans Stat. 407, § 49; 423, § 129; Sloan o. Lewis, 22 Wall. 150). II. Substantial under-statement prevents the composition from binding the creditor whose demand is under-stated. The law requires the debtor to state the whole, and gives the creditor no power of correction. III. There was no adjudication of the amount, but a mere unsworn statement; and the adjudication only determines that the resolution was properly passed and confirmed, and the composition for the best interest, &c. IV. The bankruptcy court left it to this court to adjudicate the amount of the debt. V. There is no pretense of an estoppel. VI. In no event is the claim barred as to the difference between the sum stated and the true amount (Clark v. Rowling, 3 N. Y. 216). John D. Taylor, for respondent.-I. The proceedings in bankruptcy against the defendant, and his Beebee v. Pyle. composition with his creditors as stated in the findings, are a bar to the plaintiff's recovery in this action. 1. Interest follows upon a liquidated debt as an incident, or is allowed as the measure of damages for the nonpayment of a debt when due, but is no part of the debt itself (Glass Factory v. Reid, 5 Cow. 610). 2. In the bankruptcy courts the rights of parties are adjusted as of the date of filing the petition, and no lien, right or priority can be acquired by any proceeding in a State court commenced thereafter (Bump's L. & Pr. 69, 367; In re Crawford, 3 Bank. Reg. 171; Archenbrown, 8 Id. 429; In re Preston, 5 Id. 293; Gardner v. Cook, 7 Id. 346; In re Vickery, 3 Id. 696, 698; In re Rosey, 8 Id. 509; In re Brown, 3 Id. 584; Shellington . Howland, 53 N. Y. 371-4; Mills v. Davis, 10 Bank. Reg. 340; In re Wynne, 4 Id. 5; In re Smith, 3 Id. 81 2 Id. 20; Monroe v. Upton, 50 N. Y. 593; Clark . Rowling, 3 Comst. 216). 3. The bankrupt act is highly remedial, and is to be liberally construed (In re Locke, 2 Bank. Reg. 123; In re Silverman, 4 Id. 173; In re Muller v. Brentano, 3 Id. 86; In re Dibblee, 2 Id. 185; 2 Id. 124, 77; 3 Id. 47, 17; 8 Id. 494; Platt v. Parker, 4 Hun, 135; U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5103). II. The final order ratifying the composition, is equivalent to a discharge in bankruptcy, and cannot be impeached or reviewed in a State court (Bankrupt Act, 34; In re Bechet, 12 Bank. Reg. 201; Ocean Bank v. Olcott, 46 N. Y. 12-15; 9 Bank. Reg. 74; Stern v. Nussbaum, 5 Daly, 332; 8 Bank. Reg. 494). BY THE COURT.-NEILSON, Ch. J.-It was the duty of the defendant to have stated the amount of the debt due to the plaintiff correctly, in the composition proceedings in bankruptcy. If, from inadvertence, or error of opinion, a mistake was committed, a correction could have been made by the district judge, on his attention being called to it. To illustrate: suppose a |