To warrant reversal in so far as the order directs adjustment and refund, it must clearly appear from the evidence before us that its enforcement, in respect of the period involved, would leave appellants less than enough to cover operating expenses, taxes and just compensation for the use of their property fairly attributable to the service covered by the divisions [373].

From the foregoing excerpts it appears that the court had in mind as the proper form of relief in this case an order requiring not only adjustment of accounts but a refund of amounts of money wrong. fully withheld. Such a refund can be effectually directed only under section 16 (1) providing:

That if, after hearing on a complaint made as provided in section thirteen of this part, the Commission shall determine that any party complainant is entitled to an award of damages under the provisions of this part for a violation thereof, the Commission shall make an order directing the carrier to pay to the complainant the sum to which he is entitled on or before a day named.

In arguing that our powers under section 16 (1) do not extend to retroactive adjustment of divisions, defendants say that in Pittsburgh & W. V. Ry. Co. v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co., 61 I. C. C. 272, we construed section 15 (6) as superseding other provisions so far as our powers to require retroactive adjustment of divisions was concerned. That decision does not support such a broad statement of its effect. One of the principal questions there presented was whether we could require retroactive adjustment of divisions of rates previously prescribed for a period prior to the filing of the complaint, and we said:

A reasonable construction of the statute makes it clear that paragraph 4 of section 1 and paragraph 6 of section 15, taken together, were intended by the Congress to supersede former provisions of the statute and constructions placed thereon with respect to divisions of joint rates, whether established voluntarily or pursuant to our finding or order [page 276]. [Emphasis supplied.]

Subsequently in the same report we said:

The provisions above quoted of the interstate commerce act leave no doubt as to our power to prescribe "just, reasonable, and equitable divisions" for the future or that the intent of the present law is to limit reparation (a) to cases "where the joint rate, fare, or charge was established pursuant to a finding or order of the Commission" and (b) to the "period subsequent to the filing of the complaint or petition or the making of the order of investigation. [Page 277.]

The use of the word "reparation" in the foregoing quotation, as well as elsewhere in the report in referring to retroactive adjustment of divisions, is significant, for this word ordinarily is used in our reports as the equivalent of damages.1 Far from supporting any interpretation of the amendment of 1920 as repealing section 16 (1), insofar as it may include the retroactive adjustment of divisions, the report in Pittsburgh & W. V. Ry. Co. v. Pittsburgh & L. E. R. Co.,

1 The Supreme Court has also used the word reparation in alluding to retroactive adjustment of divisions. Alton R. Co. v. United States, 287 U. S. 229, 240.

supra, indicates the opposite view. In a subsequent proceeding dealing with divisions, the applicability of section 16 (1) in such cases was treated as an open question. New England Divisions, 85 I. C. C. 482, 485.

There appears to be no fundamental difference between the legal concept represented by the word "damages" and that involved in retroactive adjustment of divisions. As used in the act, the term "damages" has been held to mean compensation for a specific pecuniary injury caused by a violation of the act. Pennsylvania R. Co. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U. S. 184. This definition appears to be broad enough to cover payments required by way of refund for a violation of section 1 (4).

Defendants argue that the inapplicability of section 16 (1) to divisions is shown by inconsistencies with section 15 (6). The principal differences have to do with the fact that generally, under section 16, reparation may be awarded for a period of two years prior to the filing of the complaint, while retroactive adjustment of divisions extends only to the date of the filing of the complaint, and the further fact that under section 16 damages are awarded after a hearing on a complaint while retroactive adjustment of divisions may be ordered after a hearing in an investigation instituted on our own motion. Consequently, it is contended, if section 16 (1) were held applicable to divisions it would defeat the provisions of section 15 (6). Such a conflict may be avoided by viewing the former section in its application to divisions as limited by the provisions of the latter section, which refer to retroactive adjustment. A harmonious interpretation in this manner seems to be required by the principle of statutory construction followed in Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426, in which the Supreme Court held that every provision of the act must be read in connection with the context of the act, and that, if the general terms of some section taken alone might sanction a conclusion destructive of certain rights conferred in other parts of the act, the context must be considered and the general terms must be so construed as to give full effect to the entire act.

In the majority of instances, the shipments on which the reparation claims are based moved over the line of only one southern carrier, but in a number of cases two or more carriers participated in the haul south of the gateway. As to shipments of the latter character, complainants' claims are joint. This circumstance is relied upon by defendants in arguing that there is no evidentiary foundation for a finding of damage, for they contend that such a finding should relate to definite persons and not to a group or set of carriers, suggesting that a proper finding could not be made without determining

a divisional basis for apportioning the refunded amounts among the joint claimants. This is a matter of no concern either to defendants or to us. This proceeding does not involve a controversy among the complainants, and defendants cannot be allowed to import one into it. See Adams v. Mills, 286 U. S. 397, 407, and New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184.

In urging that interest should not be allowed, defendants reiterate their contention that retroactive adjustment of divisions does not partake of the nature of damages, with which interest is ordinarily linked. They also point out that the railway accounting rules governing settlement of disputed claims do not provide for interest, and that it is not customary to allow interest in connection with voluntary agreements concerning divisions. The legal principle here involved is in no way dependent on the practice followed by the railroads among themselves in settling controversies concerning divisions. The inability to reach an agreement by that means resulted in this complaint and apparently defendants have no intention to pay complainants' claims unless judgments are entered against them. Under such circumstances complainants are clearly entitled to interest, Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 269 U. S. 217; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ohio Valley Tie Co., 242 U. S. 288; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Minds, 250 U. S. 368. It is our practice to allow interest in our awards of reparation at the rate of 6 percent.

Defendants object to any finding bearing upon joint liability on their part for the payment of damages to be awarded in this proceeding. At the original hearing there were introduced in evidence copies of correspondence between representatives of the northern and southern railroads concerning the divisions which have been found unlawful. This correspondence shows that the divisions on which the settlements were based during the reparation period were fixed by a committee of officials of the trunk-line and New England railroads against the protests of the complainants. The undisputed showing of record is that the divisions in question were established as a result of joint action by defendants.

The cause of action for damages resulting from a violation of section 1 (4), like one based on an unreasonable joint rate, is of statutory origin. The Supreme Court has held that the establishment of a joint rate by the concurrence of connecting carriers is necessarily the act of each, because the establishment of the rate is done by their joint agreement; that in the case of an unreasonable joint rate the liability arises out of the wrongful exaction from the shipper, and not out of the unlawful receipt or unjust enrichment by the carrier; and that every carrier which participates in the infliction of this wrong is liable in solido like every other joint tort

feasor. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., supra. This principle seems clearly applicable here. In awarding reparation for the exaction of an unreasonable rate, the order entered runs collectively against the defendants that participated in the transportation and it is not necessary that the order state separately the amount due from each and every defendant. Our order accompanying this report will be in accordance with this practice. We find that during the period of retroactive adjustment from November 23, 1930, to May 31, 1934, inclusive, there were transported, from points in Florida to points in trunk-line territory and New England, carload shipments of citrus fruit of the number and weight shown in the statement incorporated in the record by the stipulation previously referred to in this report, amounting in the aggregate to 69,035 cars, at joint rates prescribed in Florida R. Commrs. v. Aberdeen & R. R. Co., 144 I. C. C. 603, over routes composed of lines of complainants and cross-defendants south of Richmond, Va., or Potomac Yard, Va., and lines of defendants and cross-complainants north thereof, as shown in that statement; that the divisions of the prescribed joint rates during the period of retroactive adjustment applied on the shipments hereinbefore referred to, which were jointly fixed and established by defendants and cross-complainants in the manner hereinbefore described, were unjust, unreasonable, and inequitable, as found in the original report herein, 194 I. C. C. 729; that the complainants and the crosscomplainants were damaged in the amount of the difference between the revenues allowed them on said shipments, based on the divisions which have been found unjust, unreasonable, and inequitable and those which would have accrued from the divisions found just, reasonable, and equitable for the period of retroactive adjustment in the original report; and that the complainants and cross-complainants are entitled to reparation from defendants and cross-defendants in the amounts set forth in the accompanying order, together with interest.

EASTMAN, Commissioner, dissenting:

This case is of some considerable importance, requiring as it does the payment by the northern carriers of $1,027,483.54, with interest, to the southern carriers. At the time of the original decision of the case, I dissented, believing that the Commission had grievously erred by prescribing divisions which were not just, reasonable, and equitable. Nothing has since occurred to lead me to change this view of the matter. While the Supreme Court sustained the order of the Commission in Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 349, it did not decide that the divisions prescribed were just, reasonable, and

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