ation of other matters bearing upon the major question. The record shows that the proposed motor-rail-motor service differs substantially from all-rail service. The rail carrier's part in the joint service is merely the hauling of the loaded trailers containing the shipments. This is a concentrated operation, in some respects resembling the handling of carload shipments. Many costly operations incident to movement of less-than-carload merchandise traffic in all-rail service are avoided. For example, much of the handling of the shipments which takes place in all-rail service of similar scope is avoided by the rail carrier under the proposed arrangement. The part of the joint service rendered by the motor carrier is substantially the same as the corresponding operations which are performed in all-highway service. In these circumstances we cannot conclude that the proposed joint service and the all-rail service are like kinds of service.

In Container Service, supra, we found that container rates, which, in many instances, were lower than the carload rates on similar commodities moving in ordinary equipment, applying as they did for a different kind of service, could not be construed as applying on "like kind of property" as compared with either carload or ordinary lessthan-carload traffic.

We find that the rates in situations such as those here considered are not applicable on "like kind of property" and that they would not be in contravention of section 4. This finding is not to be construed as having application to situations in which rail carriers, by the mere expedient of joining with motor carriers performing pickup and delivery service at one point and not at another would thereby seek to escape the provisions of section 4.

In the second type of situation the service for which the greater charge would be made would be of the same character as the service to the more distant point. The transportation in each case is partly by railroad and partly by motor vehicle.

Protestant rail carriers contend that these rates would violate the long-and-short-haul provision of section 4 of part I of the act. Respondents' position is that section 4 relates solely to all-rail rates and does not apply to joint motor-rail rates. The provisions of that section with respect to the charges of common carriers by railroad are well understood. There are no similar provisions affecting the charges of motor common carriers included in part II of the act, either in express language or by reference to part I.

Respondents contend that, since joint rates of this character were first authorized in part II, only the provisions of that part control the proposed rates. But there is nothing in the statute authorizing the establishment of joint motor-rail rates which relieves a rail carrier joining in such rates from the provisions of section 4. What is

en acting alone is not made lawanother carrier. While section 4 motor common carriers, when such ace and joint rates with a railroad it e railroad in a movement which is subcommon carriers are not required to join routes and rates but, having voluntarily rangement, the motor carrier assumes oblis of the participating rail carrier in the obSons of section 4.

es as described and which protestants claim would section 4, it is apparent that the departures are due

...y of respondents' routes and the fact that the rates are e same as the highway rates. We have frequently authorized eto circuitous all-rail routes to meet the motor-competitive rates c. duect rail routes from and to the same points. We are of the opinion that similar relief is justified here.

Applicant will be authorized to join with respondent motor carriers in establishing and maintaining rates on the bases described herein and to establish and maintain higher rates from and to intermediate points constructed on the same basis, provided that rates from and to the higher-rated intermediate points shall not be increased without authority of the Commission and shall not exceed the lowest combination of rates subject to the act.

Lawfulness of proposed routes.-One of the protestants contends that the proposed routes are inconsistent with the provisions of section 217 (a), which impose a duty upon a common carrier by motor vehicle to publish rates between points on its own route, and whenever it enters into a through-route and joint-rate arrangement with a common carrier by railroad to publish rates between points on its own route and points on the route of such railroad. This protestant claims that these provisions do not contemplate that such carriers may establish through routes and joint rates when similar arrangements would not be equally feasible between all points on the route of the motor carrier and all points on the route of the rail carrier. Stated otherwise, the argument is that joint rates are authorized only between a point on the route of a motor carrier, on the one hand, and a point on a rail line, on the other. We have frequently approved through routes and joint rates in connection with a rail carrier serving the points of origin and destination and another rail carrier participating only as an intermediate carrier in the transportation.

Section 216 (c) does not define the particular type of through routes therein authorized to be established, the only requirement

being that they shall be reasonable. In that connection the question arises whether the proposed routes are reasonable in view of the fact that points on the line of the participating rail carrier between the interchange points will not have the use of similar through routes, except in relatively few instances where those points are also stations on the routes of the participating motor carrier and will have through routes in connection with that carrier via the interchange point. If through routes of the same character were to be established from and to all points on the line of the rail carrier it would be necessary for it to arrange with motor carriers to originate and deliver traffic at those points and to interchange the loaded trailers with the railroad at each point or at such points as would make for economical operation.

As many considerations bear upon the feasibility and practicability of such arrangements, we cannot conclude that the proposed through routes are unlawful because similar routes are not provided from and to all points on the line of the participating rail carrier. Nor can we accept the contention that because the haul which a motor common carrier might receive on some traffic would be short, or terminal in character, that it may not participate in such a joint rail-motor route. On this point we see no reason for departing from the following conclusion reached in Trucking L. C. L. Freight in Lieu of Rail Service, 185 I. C. C. 71, 73:

And while terminal carriers may publish switching charges, and act as the agents of connecting road-haul carriers when the latter assume and pay those charges, there is nothing in the act which prohibits the terminal carriers from participation in their own right in joint through rates, as they have elected to do here.

In general.-Protesting rail carriers challenge the legality of the proposed arrangement in that it will enable the Great Western to invade the local territory of competing railroads without first securing a certificate of public convenience and necessity. These rail protestants contend that the right to local territory is guaranteed by section 15 (4), or at least in reliance upon that section large investments have been made by western carriers in building branch lines and in acquiring short ones. They urge that public interest and carrier interest do not demand or justify through routes and joint rates between motor and rail carriers except to or from nonrailroad points or where truck service is used as an auxiliary to rail service in lieu of engines and cars.

No requirement of a certificate of convenience and necessity is imposed in connection with section 216 (c). As that section specifically authorizes rail carriers and motor carriers to establish through routes and joint rates, it is reasonable to conclude that it was not

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should be required to obtain such certificate hrough service would be over lines or routes of lig carriers which are in lawful operation. arriers contend that the proposed rates would that they will take away from them both azioad traffic unless some steps are taken to

They claim that such action on their part damental rate changes that it would result in railroad rate structure and in depleting railroad a directs us, in the exercise of our power to d reasonable rates for transportation subject to part caseration, among other factors, to the effect of rates en of traffic and to the need, in the public interest, of and elicient rail transportation service. Section 216 (i) ex: lar duty upon us in prescribing rates for transportation common carriers, and also a further duty, as to such rates, te vede consideration to the inherent advantages of transportation carriers. We have given due consideration in our conclusions e provisions of law.

One of the protestants argues with great insistence that it is unlawtu. for a motor carrier having authority to operate over particular Toes to "substitute transportation of its motor vehicles on flat cars over a totally different route for its highway operations." This argument asstanes that under the proposed arrangement the status of respondent motor carrier with respect to the rail portion of the transportation would be that of a shipper. Nothing in the evidence warranes that assumption. The motor carrier's status is that of a connecting carrier under a joint-rate arrangement which, as previously indicated, is specifically authorized by law. The novel way in which the traffic is handled does not affect the status of the participating carriers in that arrangement. It does not appear that any portion of the transportation which the motor carrier would perform under the arrangement would be over routes other than those over which it may law fully operate.

Another argument which is related to that just discussed pertains to curtailment of service. If the proposed arrangement is approved the motor carrier's through over-the-highway service between Chicago and the Twin Cities will be reduced to the extent that the vehicles move by rail. This curtailment, according to one of the protestants, is an unlawful abandonment of service. Section 208 (b) is relied upon to support this view. It provides that a common carrier by motor vehicle may under such general rules as we prescribe occasionally deviate from its specified route. Protestant argues from this that partial abandonment is not under any circumstances lawful. We are of the opinion that this matter has no bearing upon the lawful

ness of the proposed arrangement. An inevitable consequence of the establishment of such an arrangement, and of traffic moving thereunder, is that highway traffic will be reduced to the extent that rail service displaces the movement by highway.

Conclusions.-The record upon which we base our conclusions on the various issues considered herein is not as definite or complete as is desirable. To a large extent this is necessarily so because of the novel character of the proposed rates and service and the lack of experience therewith. The service appears to have advantages for both carriers and shippers, particularly with respect to those situations in which the part of the service to be rendered by the motor carrier is that for which it is peculiarly fitted and to the extent that the plan affords the rail carrier an opportunity to participate in traffic which would otherwise move by highway. The evidence at hand indicates with reasonable probability that most of the service under the proposed arrangement would be of that character.

While it is our duty to determine whether or not the rates and charges for the proposed service would be unlawful, we may not withhold our approval of the arrangement because the pattern for the proposed rates is the existing adjustment maintained by the respondent motor carriers instead of the all-rail adjustment. Nor may we condemn the plan of joint operation merely because it differs in some essential respects from existing methods of transportation or because experience may demonstrate that certain phases of that operation are not profitable. However, nothing herein shall be construed as approving the operation of respondent motor carriers over the routes herein involved.

We find that the proposed rates have not been shown to be unlawful in violation of any provision of the Interstate Commerce Act. Our order of suspension will be vacated.

By reason of the limited experience under the proposed or any similar arrangement at the time of the hearing, and by reason of the controlling importance which respondents have attached to the allhighway rates in determining the maximum level of the proposed rates, we find it necessary to continue on our own motion our investigation of the joint rates, regulations, and practices of these respondents. Appropriate orders will be entered.

PORTER, Commissioner, dissenting:

The suspended tariff contains purported joint through rates on less-than-carload (less-than-truckload) and on truckload shipments between Chicago and various points east thereof and the Twin Cities and certain points in contiguous territory. For convenience the situation between Chicago and the Twin Cities will be treated as typical and the discussion will be in terms of westbound less-than