lished rate is not unlawful unless it can be shown that the degree of departure is different for different shippers. For instance, if a published rate of one dollar is assumed, and it can be shown that A secured a rate of ninety cents, the law has not been violated unless it can also be shown that B secured a rate of, say, eighty cents. In other words, departures from published rates are not discriminations unless such departures vary for different individuals, a fact which it is practically impossible to prove. While it was undoubtedly the intent of section x of the act to impose a penalty upon the corporation itself, under its peculiar phraseology, it has, however, been judicially determined that the corporation is not liable. The agent alone can be punished. Now the object of rate-cutting is to get business and make money, and the corporation, if any one, profits by the illegal act. It is the real offender, and ought certainly, as well as its officer, to pay the penalty. It is anomalous and unjust that the representative or employee only should be liable to prosecution, while the real offender, the corporation, the principal, and beneficiary in the transaction, is not. If every illegal act of that character subjected the carrier to a substantial forfeiture, so that the money result of the transaction was likely to be the other way, the inducement to commit such offences would be greatly diminished.

In the Cullom Bill the long and short haul section appears in a radically modified state by the

omission of the words "under substantially similar circumstances and conditions," thus absolutely prohibiting a greater charge for the shorter haul unless, as under the present law, the Commission authorizes the same. The change will prevent violations of the long and short haul principle that are justified on the ground of competition among carriers subject to the act.

From a theoretical point of view a single national classification of freight would be desirable, and in practice such a classification is perhaps not impossible, although the reduction of the number of classifications to three-excepting the state classifications—has greatly reduced the inconvenience and discriminations resulting from a diversity of classifications. The testimony before the Industrial Commission can scarcely be said to give very strong support to the idea of a national system; yet that same testimony offers no strong and decisive arguments against such a system. The objection that commodities like oranges and cotton must be classified differently in different sections of the country, which would not be permitted under a national classification, is more apparent than real; for these and similar articles could be carried, as they are in part at present, at commodity rates, properly adjusted to meet the conditions of transportation in different sections of the United States. Goods carried at commodity rates constitute the bulk1

1 The great mass of articles in point of numbers, and probably also in point of gross revenue, go at class rates.

of freight carried under the present system, and it is by no means improbable that the number of commodity rates necessary under a national system of classification would be smaller than that now in existence. The testimony is all but unanimous that commodity rates have been unduly extended. An experienced railway official of high rank stated to the writer not long ago that some day a Napoleon would arise in the railway world who would "demolish, with a heavy club," all the vast and needlessly complex classification structures, and substitute for this historical agglomeration a simple classification supplemented by a reasonable number of commodity rates. That the task of elaborating a national classification is not an easy or simple one is obvious; but that the task is not beyond the ability of men of capacity is equally obvious, and one can discover no insuperable obstacles in the way of the Commission's undertaking this work in conference with railway men.1

1 It is not desirable to enter into the details of the principles and problems of classification. However, two important disadvantages inherent in the present system should not be overlooked. (1) The unjust discriminations which occur in territories where the classifications overlap each other. For instance, the Official applies to Chicago and the Mississippi River, and the Western from Chicago and the Mississippi River; and in the territory between Chicago and the Mississippi numerous complaints of injustice from different classifications of the same articles have arisen. The Official applies on traffic from Chicago to Norfolk and Richmond; the Southern applies on through traffic from Chicago to Wilmington and other Carolina cities, and wide disparities in rates to competing Carolina and Virginia towns are found to be due to this cause. (2) The

The provisions of the Cullom Bill as to railway accounting are worthy of notice. The Commission is given discretionary power to prescribe forms of accounts. This has already been done to a considerable extent, and much progress has been made, moreover, toward uniformity in annual reports. The Commission is to have access to all accounts at all times, and may employ experts to do this work. Some railway men favor this provision, while others oppose it chiefly on the ground that it gives outsiders access to information which can be used against the road. This objection does not seem well taken unless we are again to assume lack of good judgment and fidelity in the examiner. There is no reason to suppose that the examiners will not be men of highest ability and integrity. Supervision of railway accounting may prevent improper management of stock and bond issues a matter which past railway legislation has generally neglected; and, in addition, the inspection of accounts might become an efficient method of stopping rebates. There is, perhaps, no single feature of railway evils which is more difficult to handle than this, and even the inspection of books need not lead to an undue optimism with respect to a final solution.

inability to fix joint through tariffs on an article not classified the same in two classifications, and where the local rates are added to make the total through charge. An example is the through traffic crossing the Mississippi, on which rates east and west of that river, based on two classifications, are combined.

The subject of agreements among railways is less adequately provided for in the Cullom Bill. If the history of competition in railway development the world over proves anything conclusively, it establishes the futility of competition as a workable basis of railway operation and administration. While a certain amount of competition may always persist and bring about improvements in the service, speaking generally, competition in railway affairs has failed at nearly every point, and any legislation which rests upon the doctrine of competition among railways must inevitably fail. A prudent course of action would recognize the inadequacy of competition and accept a reasonable amount of freedom for carriers in making agreements among themselves, subject to the supervision of the Commission. The agreements contemplated in this connection are more comprehensive than pooling arrangements, which are only a species of which the other is the genus. The history of railway pooling, however, does not afford a single forcible argument against granting to railways the privilege of coöperating in any manner which seems expedient to them, provided such cöoperative arrangements are based upon contracts properly scrutinized and supervised and enforcible in the courts. Hence a provision legalizing organizations like the former Joint Traffic Association and permitting agreements among railways on the eight or more different subjects which have hitherto been the object of railway agreements, would appear to