tems, the dictates of his conscience, and obey the divine mandate within him, and then what end shall there be to his noble aspirations! He will be prepared to enter-aye, will actually have already entered on immortal life.

Alas, that so many pure natures should have struggled and sorrowed under so much ignorance and superstition in endeavoring to reconcile their own inward promptings with the so-called inspired, but really most unreasonable faith, said to have been once delivered to the saints!"

VII.

THE NATURE OF BELIEFS AND OPINIONS.

I now pass to the consideration of the second main proposition, viz.: that all belief is involuntary, and is that which, of our own will, we can neither choose, change, nor control. It is therefore not blameworthy.

This position is not new, having received the sanction of some of the best minds in every age. Concerning the followers of the once famous Duns Scotus, Sir James Mackintosh says: "The

"Scotists affirmed the blamelessness of erroneous

66

opinions; a principle which is the only effectual security for conscientious enquiry, for mutual "kindness and for public quiet." "'*

Mackintosh also declares: "It is as absurd "to entertain an abhorrence of intellectual inferior"ity or error, however extensive or mischievous, as "it would be to cherish a warm indignation against "earthquakes or hurricanes." †

Other writers are equally to the point. A very old one says: "We know that faith comes by per"suasion, and is not to be controuled."

Another, still older, and of high authority in the Church, says: "Religion by compulsion is no "longer religion; it must be by persuasion, and "not by constraint. Religion is under no control, "and cannot by power be directed."§

Citations from more modern philosophers and thinkers might be added without number. A few will suffice: "Our will hath no power to determine "the knowledge of the mind one way or the other. "No more than in objects of sight it depends on "the will to see that black which appears to be yel

*Eth. Phil. Vol. I. p. 46.

Fléchier, Bishop of Nismes, Lett. 19.

+ Eth. Phil. Vol. I. p.150.

§ Lactantius, B. 3.

THE PROTESTANT FAITH.

"low, or in feeling to persuade ourselves that what "scalds us feels cold." *

"It does not depend on man to believe or not to "believe." †

"It is not in our power to judge as we will." ‡

"In total and absolute error all consciousness

'perishes."§

"Thought and belief have not yet become choice." ||

"Our opinions on any subject are not voluntary "acts but involuntary effects."¶¶

"Belief is not an act of volition." **

"He [man] is impelled by the very constitution "of his nature, to believe if there is evidence; and, on the other hand, he is utterly unable to believe "if evidence is wanting." ††

Philosophical belief is a spontaneous assent or "adhesion of the mind." ++

"Be not deceived; belief of, or mere assent to

* Locke, "Essay on the Human Understanding," Vol. II. Chap. 13.

+ Locke, Letter on Toleration.

Reid, Essay on the Intellectual Powers, p. 545.

Cousin, Hist. Mod. Phil. p. 136.

Hickok, Moral Phil. p. 212.

Samuel Bailey, Essay on Opinions and Truth. **Percy Bysche Shelley.

++ Upham, Treatise on the Will, p. 92.

Sir William Hamilton, Philosophy, p.158.

"the truth of propositions upon evidence is not a "virtue, nor unbelief a vice; faith is not a volunItary act, it does not depend upon the will; every man must believe or disbelieve, whether he will "or not, according as evidence appears to him. If "therefore men however dignified or distinguished

command us to believe, they are guilty of the "highest folly and absurdity, because it is out of "our power; but if they command us to believe, "and annex rewards to belief, and severe penalties "to unbelief, then they are most wicked and immoral, because they annex rewards and punish"ments to what is involuntary, and therefore nei"ther rewardable or punishable.'

These conclusions appear to be fully warranted for the following reasons:

First: If belief be voluntary, why should there be any doubt, or uncertainty, or degrees of probability in the world? It is plain that were belief consequent upon the will, there need be no such thing as doubt; for then one would only will to have any belief in order to possess it.

Let one reflect whether he can change or choose his belief at pleasure; he will find he cannot, and

* Letter of William Pitt.

that it is beyond his power, even with a dishonest or evil purpose, to believe for the time otherwise than he does. It is true that he may and must, from time to time, change his belief as new evidence is presented to him, or as he more carefully considers that already before him; but for the time being he cannot, if he would, believe otherwise than he does.

Second: Belief is simply the result of thought; it is a mental state or condition. Its primary signification is to assent to*. Hence it depends wholly upon evidence; and in the very same ratio as the evidence appeals to our consciousness for its reception, so is our belief. Thus we speak of "full," "firm," and "strong" belief— belief which we call knowledge-belief which admits of doubt-and various degrees of probability. We may repel the evidence, but over the belief consequent upon that evidence, are powerless.

Third: It will be seen, on reflection, that one cannot rationally retain a belief which his judgment repudiates. Therefore, one cannot rationally admit his present beliefs to be erroneous; for just as soon as he thinks that they are erroneous, they cease to be his beliefs; and since he can

*Webster.