there is a fall in the value of the rupee, but it continues to decrease even when the rupee tends to rise in value. The accidental relation between the two phenomena, therefore, does not hold true. There are other causes, which lead to the fluctuations of that branch of Indian commerce. Edmond Théry, Poinsard1 and many other bimetallists however, have collected an enormous quantity of consular reports from China, Japan and India to demonstrate, on the authority of the consular agents, that the economic development of those countries, and the increasing competition which they bring to bear on European agriculture and industry, is the result of their silver currency. But either those reports are untrue, or else they contain dogmatic absurdities, or they are based on facts invented or badly interpreted. Francesco Ferrara was perfectly right when he declared, in his learned letters to Tullio Martello, that those diplomatic reports were not even worth the paper on which they are written.2 These reports, blindly mixed with the principles and corollaries of monetary and tariff protection, led to the most erroneous conclusions. Flooded as we are with monographs, pamphlets, reports, parliamentary speeches, etc., we must not be surprised if even the most sound and logical minds are led astray. Bare facts relating to money and elementary considerations now escape even the clearest intelligence. It could not be otherwise, when truth is buried under an enormous mass of groundless theories and data, which are badly gathered and worse interpreted. The following leading self-contradiction is one among the many very curious and characteristic ones. Bimetallists admit that their system can become practicable under one condition: it must be international. If all the civilized countries do not take part in the great reform, if England and Germany refuse to encouraged wheat exportation from India, but the facts do not correspond with the illogical and strange theories of protection.-Comte Rochaid, La campagne bimetalliste, Paris, 1896. 1 L. Poinsard, La Question monétaire, Paris, 1895, p. 86-. E. Théry, La crise des changes, Paris, 1895, pag. 104. See also Board of Trade Journal, April 1894. Consular Reports, 1893, No. 1391, 1394. Bulletin Consulaire Français, 1891. 2 F. Ferrara, Esame storico-critico di economisti e dottrine economiche del secolo XVIII e prima meta del XIX, Torino, 1895, v. IV, p. 418. join the rest of the nations, or are willing to come in only with their colonies, the experiment is bound to fail.1 But bimetallists do not realize the fact that if their system. were adopted by all countries, no one of them would be especially benefited by it. If it is true that India, Japan and China are better off on account of their silver currency, it is due, according to the theories of protectionists, to the very fact that the countries of Europe have a gold currency. On account of this difference in currency the countries of the extreme East enjoy the upper hand over the countries of the West in the economic. competition. But when western countries shall also have a silver currency, no advantage will accrue to them. The countries that now have a gold currency are the creditors of the countries with a silver currency or with an inconvertible paper currency. If they should abandon the gold to adopt the silver standard, they would suffer a heavy loss: all their gold credits would be transformed into silver: that is, they would be reduced one-half. This is a strong reason for England, Germany and France to maintain the gold standard; it is the argument of the creditor-countries, according to the saying of Mr. Balfour, who is the greatest representative of imperialism and economic empiricism." 1 The following is the bimetallistic principle as expounded at the last bimetallistic Congress of Bruxelles, 1896. The bimetallist Congress adopted Mr. Beermart's motion demanding the establishment of a fixed ratio in the value of gold and silver by means of a general or partial monetary agreement among civilized nations, and advocating the gradual rehabilitation of silver. The Congress approved of the recent resolutions adopted by the British and Belgian parliaments on the monetary question. They expressed the hope that Great Britain would take the initiative in raising an international discussion on the subject. It further declared that a preliminary and immediate agreement might result from the re-establishment of bimetallism by the United States, the reopening of the Indian mints for the coinage of silver, the turning into silver of part of the reserve of the Bank of England, and the absorption of a sufficient amount of silver by the various European states."-The Daily Courier, April 25, 1896, p. 12. In a recent debate on the monetary question in the House of Commons, Mr. Balfour said: "Then there is the creditor-country argument. There is no argument that has brought us into greater and juster discredit with foreign countries on the Continent of Europe, in America, and our own Colonies, than the creditor-country argument. He tells us that the debts of this country are paid with commodities; but the commodities are estimated on a gold basis, and Therefore, should the countries with a gold currency decide to abandon it in order to adopt a silver currency, the immediate result would undoubtedly be as follows: Ist. No benefit whatever would accrue to them in the international European commerce with the far eastern countries. 2d. Furthermore, their credits with those countries, more or less economically ruined, would be considerably reduced, and the interest which is paid annually with commodities, would accordingly diminish. 3d. The advantage of those countries with inconvertible paper money over the countries with a silver currency would remain. In order to overcome such an advantage, every country that suffers the competition of another with a depreciated currency, should immediately adopt the currency of the latter. Bamberger, with reason, laughs at the position. in which Germany would be placed, should she decide to follow the advice of protectionists; Germany would not only adopt a depreciated currency, but she would also be constantly obliged to regulate its value according to the money of the country in question. In such a case Germany would not only be obliged to issue inconvertible paper money, but, in order to reach her object, it would be absolutely necessary for her to imitate, in every respect, the operations which the Russian Government would realize over her banknotes.1 All this is grotesque. If the bimetallists would for a moment be less blind than they appear to be, it is doubtful whether they would feel very much flattered by the last result of their system. They would soon realize how limited their view is, and how impracticable their proposals are, and what poor economists they are. But the appreciation of gold which has gone on during the last twenty years has resulted in this—that the creditor-country paying in commodities gets a larger proportion of commodities than on the original gold value they would have the slightest right to claim."-The Westminster Review, August, 1896, Vol. 146, p. 153. 1 Bamberger, L., Le metal argent à la fin du XIXme siècle, Paris, 1895. Had Russia secured a good currency, as she now seems to have in view, (Sartori, l'abbolizione del corso forzoso in Russia, in the Rivista di Sociologia, III, 410, 1896), Germany would then be forced to devise means to counteract the Argentine wheat competition or that of any other country. we have little chance to delude ourselves: protectionists are blinded by this real Moloch of liberalism, which they fear more than a Tamerlane. They cannot for a moment recognize the beneficent effects, the admirable equilibrium which results in the world's economy. Protectionism, however, affords an illusory economic balThe same is the case with bimetallism, which is only a manifestation of the same spirit of protectionism. Bimetallism believes in destroying all differences in the value of money between the eastern and western countries. But in England, in the United States, and in France, coined silver will never have the same importance and the same value as the silver money used in India, Japan and China. All the writers on economic history, from Thorold Rogers, who spent almost his whole life in such researches (as he himself states1), to the celebrated Tooke, Newmarch, D'Avenel, De Foville, Farraglia, Dupré de Saint-Maur and many others, have all confirmed the great limitation of the economic market of the past centuries, the economic differences, and have shown how the latter arise. And such great differences are verified very often between neighboring markets: the difference between Figeac and Rodez is hardly fifteen miles, and still, in 1692, the price of grain at Figeac was 130% greater than it was in Rodez. A. Bourgne has found in the archives of the department of Eure, in France, a Registre des appreciations des grains kept at the bailiwick of Gisors. Such a historical document is very precious on account of the times to which it refers: that is, from 1648 to 1652 and from 1698 to 1795; and it is especially valuable on account of the careful way in which it was kept. The Register of the Price of Grains kept at the bailiwick of Gisors gives the market price on each Monday of every year. The average prices which are derived from it are very trustworthy. From 1795, in which year this register ends, up to the year IX, the prices of the Gisors market are known. For the following years Bourgne has taken the data from the department of Eure, which the Ministry of Agriculture publishes. Thus Bourgne 1 1 J. E. T. Rogers, Economic Interpretation to History, Preface to the 2d edi has succeeded in giving us the prices of grain from 1648 up to our day. In the great abundance of statistical data and researches as to the price of commodities in the past centuries, no one had succeeded in furnishing us with the price of one commodity on the same market for the period of over two centuries. There is no doubt about the great value of these results given by him.1 Price for each hectoliter of grain, Gisors' market: In 1718 we find the price of wheat in the market of Gisors 1733 to 22.48 fr. in 1741, Later it rose and varied was 5.62 fr. It rose from 5.45 fr. in and fell again to 5.21 fr. in 1745. between 10 and 15 francs. From 1761 to 1768 it was somewhat lower, and often fell below 10 francs. A period followed, longer than the preceding ones, in which the price was higher. From 1789 to 1821 it rose: and now it is difficult to find the price of wheat at Gisors below 25 francs. On the other hand, from 1821 to 1852 said price was a little over fifteen francs. In the last period down to 1870, wheat at Gisors was dearer: from 1854 to 1856 it remained at a price above thirty francs, and in the following years never fell below twenty. It is true that at Gisors, in the last two centuries and a half, you cannot find the price to be the same for two consecutive years. But it is also true, and it is important to be noticed, that the prices, at times low and at times high, remain stationary during a given period of years, as can be readily seen. 1 A. Bourgne, Le prix du blé depuis 1650 jusqu à 1890, Economiste Français, 1894, p. II. |