the treasurer omitted to sign the deed, but attached to it the receipt of the tax rents, and the surplus due, and acknowledged the deed in open court, which acknowledgment was duly certified on the deed and entered on the records of the court, the purchaser was not deprived of the benefit of improvements made on the faith of his title. But in Robson v. Osborn,1 it was held, that a tax purchaser was not a possessor in good faith, and not entitled to improvements, if his deed was void, and if by proper diligence he might have known this want of power in the officer to sell.] And it seems to be conceded, that, in all cases where the purchaser knew of the illegality of the sale, he is entitled to no compensation whatever. But it is difficult to reconcile these cases upon principle. Whether the land is seated, exempted from taxation, or the taxes had in fact been paid at the time of the sale, the officer had no authority to sell, and all of these cases should stand upon the same footing in construing the statute. The only conceivable difference is, that where land is seated, the purchaser is bound, at his peril, to take notice of the fact. This is undoubtedly the rule in reference to a purchase made by one * indi- * 594 vidual from another, where a third person is in possession under the vendor, or even adversely; but no rule is remembered which devolves upon a bidder at a tax sale, before any right has become vested in him, and when the State is offering lands for sale, in hostility to the title of the true owner, to make inquiry. The fair construction of the statute would be, to compensate all purchasers at tax sales, for money and labor expended in improving the land purchased, unless the illegality of their titles appears upon the face of the proceedings under which they claim. 1 13 Texas, 307. 38 CHAPTER XLI. OF THE INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES RIGHTS of property depend for their existence upon natural law. But the evidence of those rights, and the remedies to enforce and protect them, are the inventions of civil society. Lord Camden remarks, that "the great end for which men entered into society was to secure their property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable, in all instances where it has not been taken away, or abridged by some public law, for the good of the whole. The cases where this right of property is set aside, by positive law, are various. Distresses, executions, forfeitures, taxes, &c., are all of this description, wherein every man, by common consent, gives up that right for the sake of justice and the general good."1 The American constitutions, as we have seen, furnish many safeguards for the protection of property from legislative spoliation and private invasion. The government can take it but in one or two ways; viz., for a public tax, levied upon principles of just equality, and for public use, upon making just compensation to the owners. And it is universally conceded to be the duty of the government to furnish adequate remedies to the owner, not only to recover the possession of it when wrongfully or unjustly withheld from him; but also to protect him in the possession and use of it, by the punishment of the wrong-doer. This remedial power of the government imposes upon it the duty of furnishing to creditors ample means to enforce *596 the collection of just debts, by subjecting the estate of the debtor to their payment. The only additional power * 1 Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's St. Tr. 1066. over private property, which may be exercised by strangers, is that implied in the common-law maxim, "Salus populi est suprema lex." There is an implied assent on the part of every member of society, that his own individual welfare shall, in case of necessity, yield to that of the community; and that his property shall, under certain circumstances, be placed in jeopardy, or even sacrificed, for the public good. The instances given of this class of powers are, the pulling down of private houses, or the raising of bulwarks upon private property, for the necessary defence of the State against a public enemy, and the demolition of a house, in a populous place, for the purpose of arresting the progress of a fire, and preventing a general conflagration. Upon the same principle, a private mischief must be endured, rather than a public inconvenience; thus, if a public highway be out of repair, and impassable, a passenger may lawfully go over the adjoining land. In every instance above given, an interference with private property is obviously dictated and justified summa necessitate - by State or private necessity — by a due regard to the public good and safety, or by the immediate urgency of the occasion. The sale of land to pay debts is an exception, that being founded upon principles of natural justice alone. It follows, as a necessary consequence, that all statutes which are made with the view of interfering with, or divesting, rights of property should be construed strictly -especially where they are penal in their character or effects.1 The various rules of interpretation and construction which have a direct bearing upon this class of statutes, have been incidentally cited and discussed in the preceding portions of this work, especially those which govern statutes conferring powers to be exercised over real property. It is now proposed-contrary to the original plan of the work to conclude this * * chapter with a concise statement of those rules which 597 are generally applied in the interpretation and construc 1 Smith's Com. 854; Sharp v. Speir, 4 Hill, 76; Smith v. Spooner, 3 Pick. 229; Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 146; 9 Gill & J. 479; Broom's Legal Maxims, 3-6 and 465; ante, chapters 1 and 2. tion of statutes of every class, inasmuch as they indirectly aid in arriving at a proper conclusion in the exposition of statutes affecting real estate. "There is a primeval principle in man which ever urges him, with irresistible power, to represent outwardly that which moves him within: a pressing urgency of utterance." 1 Whatever may be our thoughts, emotions, will, desires, or commands, the object we have in view can alone be accomplished by resorting to outward manifestations. There is no direct communion between the minds of men. Signs are the only mediums of communication. "The signs which man uses the using of which implies intention for the purpose of conveying ideas or notions to his fellow-creatures, are very various; for instance, gestures, signals, telegraphs, monuments, sculptures of all kinds, pictorial and hieroglyphic signs, the stamp on coins and seals, beacons, buoys, insignia, ejaculations, articulate sounds, or their representatives,— that is, phonetic characters, on stones, wood, leaves, paper, &c.,- entire periods or single words, names in a particular place, and whatever other signs — even the flowers, in the flower language of the East-might be enumerated." 2 A tear, a blush, or a contortion of the countenance, may convey the emotion or thought of a human being, as clearly as an articulate sound, or a written statement. These signs are, therefore, used to convey ideas; and interpretation, in its widest sense, is the discovery and representation of the true meaning of them. The true meaning of any sign is that which the person who used it is desirous of expressing. In legal literature, we seldom deal with any other signs than words, written or spoken. All laws were originally written, or have been reduced to writing, by judges and commentators. Statute laws, of course, are invariably in writing or print. * The signs used by the legislature are words. With *598 the interpretation of such signs as are used by the lawmaking body, we purpose to deal. There is a manifest distinction between interpretation and construction, though they are frequently confounded, and used as synonymous 1 Lieber's Legal and Political Hermeneutics, chap. 1, sec. 2. 2 Lieber, chap. 1, sec. 3. terms. Interpretation is the art of finding out the true sense of any form of words; that is, the sense which their author intended to convey, and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea which the author intended to communicate. Construction, on the other hand, is the drawing of conclusions, respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expression of the text conclusions which are in the spirit, though not within the letter, of the text. Construction must, therefore, be bridled by the true principles of interpretation, else it becomes a dangerous weapon in the hands of a judge, giving to him a species of legislative discretion. The legislature may use words which every one understands, and which, for the case put in the text, are sufficiently clear; but if you were to ask each individual composing that body, as to the exact limits to which he wishes to see the rule extended, or put to him a number of cases, in progressive connection with each other, he himself would be doubtful, in most instances, how far he would extend the application of the rule. The consequence is, that interpretation may be according to the more or less comprehensive sense in which the words are used. There are but few words which have not a contracted and extended sense; it is this which creates the necessity of interpretation. The human mind is incapable of anticipating, in an order or law, every possible combination of facts which may arise, and fix a definite rule by which every case may be governed; this gives rise to the doctrine of construction. Interpretation gives effect to the intention of the legislature, as manifested by a sound exposition of the words of the text; while construction resorts to analogies, and treating the text as simply putting cases by way of example, holds, that all cases which stand upon the same footing of reason and justice, as those enumerated, were designed to be embraced by the law-giver. The one carries into effect the open, and the other the secret, intent of the law. But courts sometimes, in the exercise of that * 599 discretionary power which the doctrine of construction gives rise to, make some remarkable decisions. Indeed, the tendency of the doctrine is to drive the judges to extremes, neither of which is permissible on general principles. |