businesses of the character of that conducted by appellant cannot be seriously questioned. By § 1 of article 13 of the Constitution of this state it is provided that "All elevators or storehouses where grain or other property is stored for a compensation, whether the property stored be kept separate or not, are declared to be public warehouses."

In Hannah v. People, 198 Ill. 77, 64 N. E. 776, we pointed out that the framers of the Constitution deemed the adequate protection for the producers and shippers of grain and other commodities from the wrongs, frauds, and impositions that might be practised upon them by those engaged in the business of providing storage for their products, of such importance that the same was made a matter of a special constitutional provision. In Mayer v. Springer, 192 Ill. 270, 61 N. E. 348, in construing this provision of the Constitution, we held that, while the state has made no attempt to regulate purely private business and affairs, this section of the Constitution did bring under legislative control, as to rates of storage and other provision for the protection of the producers and shippers, all those public agencies, such as warehouses, where the business of receiving grain or property in store for the public for a compensation is carried. on. And in Chicago Dock & Canal Co. v. Garrity, 115 Ill. 155, 3 N. E. 448, we held that property becomes clothed with public interest whenever it is used in such a manner as to affect the community at large, and that, when one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he must submit to be controlled and regulated by the public in such use for the common good, to the extent of the interest that he has thus created for the public in the use of his property. As to what is meant by the word "public," when used in this connection, it is very difficult to define or explain it in any simpler language than by the use of the word "public" itself.

The Century Dictionary thus defines the word "public:" "Of or belonging to the people at large; relating to or affecting the whole people of a state, nation, or community;

not limited or restricted to any particular class of the community."

The New International Dictionary defines it:

"Of or pertaining to the people; relating to or affecting a nation, state, or community at large."

In 32 Cyc. 748, one of its meanings is given as: "Open to all the people; shared in or to be shared or participated in or enjoyed by people at large; not limited or restricted to any particular class of the community."

Used in this latter sense, it would not include those isolated instances in which a person might select a few individuals with whom he chooses to deal, but would include all those businesses or plants which were intended for and open to the use of all members of the public who may require it, to the extent that its capacity will permit of the public use. That such is the character of the business conducted by appellant is not disputed. Its warehouse and storage plant is not conducted or operated for the purpose of storing and preserving goods or merchandise purchased and owned by it, but, on the contrary, is devoted to receiving, storing, and preserving goods or merchandise generally, for the public or for all who may see fit to use its plant, to the full extent or limit of its capacity. We infer that without this public patronage appellant could not maintain or operate its plant profitably, and to the extent that it has held itself out as a public warehouseman and has impressed its business with a public use it is subject to legislative control as to rates of storage and other matters within the limitations prescribed by the Constitution. 40 Cyc. 402; Hannah v. People, supra; Ruggles v. People, 91 Ill. 256; Chicago v. Cicero, 210 Ill. 290, 71 N. E. 356; Munn v. People, 69 Ill. 80, affirmed in 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77; Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517, 36 L. ed. 247, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 45, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 468.

The principal question involved in the two cases last cited was the right of the legislature of a state to fix and control the charges made by the owners of grain elevators or warehouses. It was decided that the state legislature had that power, because such elevators or warehouses were, in effect, public warehouses engaged in serving the public. In discussing the question as to whether or not such warehouses were amenable to state regulation, in Munn v. People, supra (the leading case on this subject), the United States Supreme Court pointed out that when a person becomes a member of society he parts with some of the rights or privileges which as an individual, not affected by his relations to others, he might retain, and, in effect, covenants

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with every other citizen, and with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good, among which is that each citizen will so conduct himself and so use his own property as not unnecessarily to injure another, and that from this source the police power of the state is derived under which the government regulates the conduct of its citizens with one and another, and the manner in which each shall use his own property, when such regulation becomes a matter of public consequence or necessary for the public good. It was further said in the opinion:

"In their exercise [of this power] it has been customary in England from time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization, to regulate ferries, common carriers, hackmen, bakers, millers, wharfingers, innkeepers, etc., and in so doing to fix a maximum of charge to be made for services rendered, accommodations furnished, and articles sold. Looking, then, to the common law, from whence came the right which the Constitution protects, we find that when private property is 'affected with a public interest it ceases to be juris privati only.' This was said by Lord Chief Justice Hale more than 200 years ago in his treatise, De Portibus Maris, 1 Hargrave's Law Tracts, 78, and has been accepted without objection as an essential element in the law of property ever since. Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it a public consequence and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he in effect grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good to the extent of the interest he has thus created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use, but so long as he maintains the use he must submit to the control."

It was there further pointed out that it was a matter of no importance that the business was one of recent origin, for wher once it was established that the business was one in which the whole public had a direct and positive interest, the case presented then was one "for the application of a long-known and wellestablished principle in social science, so as to meet this new development of commercial progress," and that to do so did

not constitute an attempt to compel a person to grant the public an interest in his property, but only declared his obligations to the public if he use his property in that particular manner. It was further said: "It matters not in this case that these plaintiffs in error had built their warehouses and established their business before the regulations complained of were adopted. What they did was from the beginning subject to the power of the body politic to require them to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good. They entered upon their business and provided themselves with the means to carry it on subject to this condition. If they did not wish to submit themselves to such interference they should not have clothed the public with an interest in their concerns. The same principle applies to them that does to the proprietor of a hackney carriage, and as to him it has never been supposed that he was exempt from regulating statutes or ordinances because he had purchased his horses and carriage and established his business before the statute or the ordinance was adopted.'

As has been stated, the decision in this case depended upon whether or not the business sought to be regulated was, in fact, a public business, or what might now be termed a public utility. The courts decided that grain elevators and warehouses for handling grain were subject to regulation, not because they had been declared by law to be public warehouses and so subject to regulation, but because they were, in fact, public warehouses and proper subjects for statutory regulation. When the law first assumed the regulation of those lines of business which were of a public nature, they were not nearly as numerous or important as at the present time. They included inns, common carriers, and wharves. In our own state at an early day the legislature enacted laws fixing the charges and otherwise regulating such lines of business. It is clear from the history of legislation on this subject, culminating in the passage of the act of 1913, and from the construction placed by the courts on legislation previously enacted, as shown by an unbroken line of authorities, that the regulation of so-called public utilities has kept pace with invention, the increase of population, and the demands of civilization that have been brought about by the

changing order of things. Within the memory of man, railroads and telegraphs have come into use in this state. With the railroads, elevators or grain warehouses came into. use as necessary adjuncts in handling the grain, which was a large and important part of the freight carried by the railroads. In the course of events the city of Chicago became the converging point for many railroads, which carried the products of Illinois and of the other great agricultural states of the West and Northwest. At Chicago some of this grain was used, but much of it was transferred to other railroads or to vessels traversing the Great Lakes for shipment to the East. As a necessary means of handling this grain, large elevators or grain warehouses were established at Chicago. When the Constitution of 1870 was adopted, it was seen fit to include these elevators and warehouses among the public utilities of that day. By reason of the great development of the country the city of Chicago has become one of the greatest receiving and distributing points in the world for many kinds of products, including the class of commodities handled by appellant. The railroad lines have grown into great systems, with many different kinds of service that were unknown in 1870. Refrigerating and cold storage plants have, among other things, come into general use. When the entire act under consideration is read, and its general purpose considered, it is very plain that the legislature intended to bring under the law every business. which could be properly classed as a public utility. The act not only confers upon the State Public Utilities Commission which is provided for in the act, all the powers and duties theretofore exercised by the Board of Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners, but specifically names and includes every other business of a public nature which is subject to regulation as a public utility. It is inconceivable that it was intended by the legislature to leave out, as not subject to regulation, any business in this state which might be termed a public utility. This being true, the principal question before us is whether or not the business of appellant is such that we would be justified in terming it a public utility.

In the case of Cawker v. Meyer, 147 Wis. 320, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 510, 133 N. W. 157, it was held that a building owner does not come within the meaning of a statute constituting a