that decedent, by his representations in the former action, intended to induce any action on the part of the plaintiff. It is further contended that nowhere is it alleged in the complaint that the testator had any reason to believe that the representations made by him were false. We think these and other points made by the defendant cannot be seriously urged. and it is not necessary to specifically discuss them.

For the reasons heretofore stated the judgment is affirmed.

Lennon, P. J., and Richards, J., concurred.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on December 18, 1916.

[Civ. No. 1904. Second Appellate District.-October 19, 1916.]

MARVIN G. TRACY, Respondent, v. K. SUMIDA, Appellant.

JUSTICE'S COURT APPEAL-AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT LACK OF JURISDICTION. The superior court is without jurisdiction upon an appeal taken to it from a judgment rendered in an action in a justice's court upon a contract to recover a sum of money less than three hundred dollars, to permit the complaint to be amended so as to state a cause of action for a sum in excess of three hundred dollars. ID.-EXTENT OF JURISDICTION OF SUPERIOR COURT.-Where jurisdiction is derived through an appeal from a judgment rendered in the justice's court, the superior court cannot, by permitting an amendment of the complaint, acquire jurisdiction in excess of that of the justice's court from which the appeal was taken.

ID.-APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF SUPERIOR COURT-LACK OF JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL DISMISSAL.-A judgment rendered on a justice's court appeal is not within the appellate jurisdiction of the district court of appeal, and an appeal taken therefrom must be dismissed.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. J. A. Allen, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Earl A. Bagby, and Farnsworth & McClure, for Appellant.

Bradley & Bradley, for Respondent.

SHAW, J.-This action was commenced in the justice's court to recover a balance of $171.80, alleged to be due plaintiff from defendant for wood furnished by plaintiff to defendant under a contract so to do. Defendant answered, denying all the allegations of the complaint, and also filed a crosscomplaint wherein he asked judgment against plaintiff. The case was tried by the justice, who gave defendant a judgment for $6.85 and costs, from which the plaintiff appealed to the superior court. After perfecting the appeal plaintiff, by leave of court, filed an amended complaint in said action wherein the cause of action based upon the contract was stated in the sum of $990.40, for which he asked judgment. Defendant demurred to this amended complaint upon the ground, among others, that the court had no jurisdiction of the action set out in said amended complaint. The demurrer was overruled; whereupon defendant filed his answer, consisting of a general denial, and a cross-complaint upon which he asked for judgment against plaintiff in the sum of $842.45. Trial was had by a jury which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $150, and from the judgment entered thereon defendant prosecutes this appeal.

Clearly, the action as brought, since it was upon a contract to recover a sum of money less than three hundred dollars (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 112), was one over which the superior court had no jurisdiction, except upon appeal. The effect of the amendment made in the superior court was to convert the action into one over which the justice's court had no jurisdiction; hence the case was one over which the superior court could not, by virtue of its appellate powers, derive jurisdiction by the procedure of an appeal. In Heath v. Robinson, 75 Vt. 133, [53 Atl. 995], it is said: "An amendment which, had it been made before the justice, would have ousted that court of its jurisdiction, . . . must consequently oust the county court of its appellate jurisdiction upon the same condition.' To the effect that where jurisdiction of an action is derived from a justice's court on appeal from a judgment rendered therein the superior court may not, by permitting an amendment of the complaint, acquire jurisdiction in excess

of that of the justice's court from which the appeal is taken, see Pecos etc. Ry. Co. v. Canyon Coal Co., 102 Tex. 478, [119 S. W. 294]; Missouri etc. Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 44 Tex. Civ. App. 436, [98 S. W. 415]; Rose v. Christinet, 77 Ark. 582, [92 S. W. 866]; Flanagan v. Reitemier, 26 Ind. App. 243, [59 N. E. 389]. In our opinion, since the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace in an action to recover money upon contract is limited to an amount not in excess of three hundred dollars, the jurisdiction of the superior court on appeal from a judgment rendered therein is likewise limited to such an amount. In other words, the superior court by virtue of the appeal acquires only such jurisdiction as the justice of the peace had.

Conceding, however, as claimed by appellant, that the superior court erred in its rulings and erroneously assumed jurisdiction to try and render judgment upon the cause of action over which it had no jurisdiction, nevertheless such rulings cannot be reviewed by this court on appeal from the judgment rendered. Cases of this character originating in justice's courts cannot be brought by appeal to this court. (Williams v. Mecartney, 69 Cal. 556, [11 Pac. 186]; Pool v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. App. 533, [84 Pac. 53]; Cox v. Southern Pacific Co., 2 Cal. App. 248, [83 Pac. 290].) We agree with respondent's contention that the appeal should be dismissed, and it is so ordered.

Conrey, P. J., and James, J., concurred.

[Civ. No. 1463. Third Appellate District.-October 19, 1916.] PACIFIC POWER COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., Appellants.

[Civ. Nos. 1460, 1461, 1462. Third Appellate District.-October 19, 1916.]

MONO COUNTY IRRIGATION COMPANY (a Corporation), Respondent, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al., Appellants.

APPEAL JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF STATE-PARTY AGGRIEVED.-The state of California is a party aggrieved and has the right of appeal from a judgment in its favor in an action brought against it to condemn land, notwithstanding the state in its answer denied any ownership in the land, and declared that the United States was the owner thereof. ID.-DEFAULT IN FILING OF BRIEF-SUFFICIENCY OF EXCUSE.-An appeal taken by the state from a judgment will not be dismissed for the failure of the appellant to file its points and authorities within the prescribed time, where it is made to appear that the time to file its briefs was inadvertently allowed to expire by reason of misunderstandings between representatives of the attorney-general's office and the deputy attorney-general, who had charge of the litigation, as to the obtaining of an extension of time from the court.

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Mono County. W. S. Wells, Judge presiding.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

U. S. Webb, Attorney-General, and John T. Nourse, Deputy Attorney-General, for Appellants.

Wm. O. Parker, and J. D. Murphy, for Respondent.

BURNETT, J.-A motion has been made to dismiss the appeal in each of the above-entitled causes. The facts are identical and the cases may be considered together. The motion is made upon the grounds: "(1) That the said defendant and appellant is not a 'party aggrieved' by the judgment in this case within the provisions of section 938 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the state of California. (2) That the said

defendant and appellant has failed to comply with the provisions of rule II, subdivision 4 of the rules of this court in that it has failed to file its printed points and authorities within the period prescribed."

As to the first point, it may be said that the state of California was the only party against whom the action was brought, except certain fictitious parties, and it is the only party against whom a judgment was obtained, said judgment being "that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment in its favor herein as prayed for in its complaint herein, and that it be adjudged and decreed in and by said judgment that the corporation plaintiff pay as compensation and damages to the said defendant, the state of California, for the land herein sought to be condemned, the sum of twelve hundred dollars," etc.

It is true that defendant in its answer had denied "that the defendant state of California claims to be or is the owner of the property sought to be condemned in said action and particularly described in paragraph IV of said complaint," and alleged "that by reason of the facts herein before set forth, the state of California is improperly joined as a party in said action and that the whole fee estate and interest in the land described in paragraph IV of said complaint is in the United States of America and not in the state of California," but the court was more generous toward the defendant than was demanded by its claims, and it was found that "it is not true that by reason of the facts, or any of the facts set forth in said answer, or by reason of any facts, the state of California is improperly joined as a party to this action; and it is not true that the whole fee or any part of the fee or any interest in the lands herein sought to be condemned is in the United States of America and not in the state of California." This was followed by a finding that the value of the land was one thousand two hundred dollars, and this, by the judgment, as we have before set out. The court, therefore, having found that defendant was the owner of the land and having decreed its condemnation, it would necessarily follow that appellant is an aggrieved party. It is said in Estate of Colton, 164 Cal. 5, [127 Pac. 643], "Under our decisions, any person having an interest recognized by law in the subject matter of the judgment, which interest is injuriously affected by the