on cross-examination brought out the fact of other sales and the prices at which they were made, but such error is without prejudice, where it is obvious from the verdict that the jury did not accept the testimony of the witness as to value.

ID. OTHER SALES AND PRICES OBTAINED-PROPER CROSS-EXAMINATION -LIMITED PURPOSE.-In such an action it is proper to bring out on the cross-examination of a witness as to value the fact of other sales in the district and the prices at which they were made, for the purpose of testing the witness' knowledge and impeaching his opinion, but not for the purpose of fixing the value of the strip in suit.

ID.-VALUE OF LAND-Right OF OWNER.-The owner of land sought to be condemned is entitled to its actual market value for the most valuable use or uses to which it is adapted or may be put, and the prices at which other lands of like quality and adaptation and similarly situated may have been sold cannot reasonably be accepted as a just criterion for measuring, and finally ascertaining. the actual value of the land sought to be taken.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Yolo County. N. A. Hawkins, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Hudson Grant, and George Clark, for Appellant.

Arthur C. Huston, and Harry L. Huston, for Respondent.

HART, J.-This action is in eminent domain, and the appeal is by the defendant from the judgment in condemnation entered upon the jury's verdict.

The plaintiff is a reclamation district, entirely situated in Yolo County, organized as such under the laws of this state, the object for which it was organized being, as its name naturally implies, "to reclaim from overflow, flood, and seepage waters all the lands lying within the boundaries of said district."

The defendant is the owner of a tract of land situated within the boundaries of said district, and it is alleged in the complaint that a certain specifically described strip of said land, consisting of 9.8 acres, is necessary as a "right of way ... to excavate, build, construct, repair and maintain canals, drains, levees, embankments, and other works necessary for the reclamation of the lands in said district, and also to ob

tain material for the construction, maintenance, and repair thereof, and for the purpose of reclaiming the lands within said district from overflow and seepage waters." The strip of land sought to be taken by this action and which was by the verdict and the judgment condemned for the purposes above indicated constitutes a portion of the entire tract of land, situated in said district, owned by the defendant.

The answer alleges that upon the strip of land sought to be condemned are located the defendant's house, barn, and fences, and also a large, carefully constructed levee, and that all of said improvements "are to be taken or damaged by said plaintiff"; that the value of the house, barn, and fences is the sum of $9,655.65, the value of the land itself is in excess of the sum of $3,430.00, and that the value of the said levee is the sum of $2,725.65. It is further alleged that the said house, barn, and fences cannot be used by defendant, if left upon said right of way, and that to make any convenient use of the same, upon the taking of said right of way and the construction of said proposed improvements, it will be necessary to move said buildings and fences from said land, and that the placing and setting of the buildings on new foundations and the rebuilding of said fences will be at an expense and to the damage of the defendant in the sum of one thousand dollars; that the total damages suffered by the defendant by reason of the taking of said right of way and the construction of said proposed improvements, exclusive of the damage that will be suffered by the land not taken, "of which the part taken is a part, is the sum of $8,680.65"; that the damage which will accrue to the portion of the land not sought to be condemned will, by reason of the severance therefrom of the portion condemned and the construction of the improvements in the manner proposed by the plaintiff, amount to the sum of one thousand dollars.

The jury assessed and fixed the aggregate damages suffered by the defendant by reason of the taking of the strip of land at the sum of $2,862.95, the several items of said damages being found as follows:

The jury found that no damage whatever will accrue to the land not condemned by reason of the severance therefrom of the strip taken.

The points urged by the defendant against the legal integrity of the judgment involve alleged errors of the trial court in permitting certain testimony to be given and in disallowing a certain instruction proposed by him and bearing upon the testimony referred to.

The witnesses for the defendant estimated the value of the land sought to be condemned, variously, at $400, $375, $350, $325, and $300 per acre. The plaintiff's witnesses expressed the opinion that it was worth no more than $50 per acre. One of the witnesses for the plaintiff testified that the particular strip involved here could be used, if it remained the property of the defendant, for the purposes of a levee only— that "it is useless for anything else."

The testimony to which objection was made by the defendant at the trial was that of W. S. Kendall, one of the trustees of the plaintiff.

On direct examination, he stated it to be his opinion that the market value of the strip of land involved in this action was $50 per acre. On cross-examination, he was asked whether he knew that several other tracts of land situated in said district belonging to other parties and which was adapted and had been devoted to the raising of alfalfa had been sold at prices ranging from $130 to $150 per acre in near proximity to the time at which the summons in this action was issued. His replies to the questions so propounded were that he had heard of such sales. On redirect, counsel for the plaintiff thus questioned the witness: "Mr. Huston: Explain to the jury why you placed the valuation of $50 an acre on this tract of land. Witness: Because it is what everybody in the district got. This answer was, on motion of the defendant, stricken out. Thereupon counsel for the plaintiff, naming six different owners of land in said district, asked the witness if he knew of the sales by said owners of their said lands, to which an affirmative reply was returned. "Mr. Huston: What did you hear was the sale price of these several tracts of land? Witness: Fifty dollars an acre." The witness then proceeded to say, on redirect, that the lands sold by the other parties named were in all respects similar in quality and in productive capacity to the land of the defendant and from

which the strip in question was proposed to be taken. All this testimony was duly and regularly objected to by the defendant, and the objections overruled.

On cross-examination, the witness was questioned: "Are you judging of the value of the Inglin lands by what these lands will produce? A. No, sir. Q. Are you endeavoring to fix the value on these lands simply by the standard of valuation which prevailed in the transfers to the district which were mentioned and enumerated by Mr. H. L. Huston in his questions to you? A. Yes."

Upon the conclusion of the witness' testimony, and before he left the witness-stand, counsel for the defendant moved to strike out all of said testimony on the ground that the basis of the witness' estimate of the value of the land in dispute was the prices at which other lands in the district had been sold, and that such prices do not constitute the legal criterion for estimating or determining value in a case of this character. The motion was denied.

Although the witness, we think, sufficiently qualified himself to give testimony upon the question of value by declaring that he had for many years been engaged in buying and selling real estate for himself and others, and that he had seen and was acquainted with the land in controversy, it is very clear that his testimony plainly and, indeed, conclusively showed that his opinion upon the value of the land in question was based entirely upon what other lands in said district of a similar character as to quality had been sold for to said district. The law provides that the owner is entitled to the actual value of the land sought to be condemned at the date of the issuance of summons in the action to condemn (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1249), and the standard adopted by the witness is not the proper one for the estimation and (finally) the ascertainment of such value./The owner of the land is entitled to the actual market value of the land for the most valuable use or uses to which it is adapted or may be put, and the prices at which other lands of like quality and adaptation and similarly situated may have been sold cannot reasonably be accepted as a just criterion for measuring and, finally, ascertaining the actual value of the land sought to be taken. The reasons for this are obvious, and hardly need be stated, although, it may be suggested that, in looking for such reaFons, it may readily be conceived how a person might, through

force of circumstances beyond his control, sell his land at a price far below its actual value, or how he might make such a sale through improvidence or for want of good judgment.

It is true that counsel for the defendant, in the cross-examination of Kendall, first brought out the fact of other sales of lands in the district and the prices at which they were made. As cross-examination, the questions and answers were proper, not, however, for the purpose of fixing the value of the land in dispute, but only "for the purpose of testing the witness' knowledge and impeaching his opinion." (Estate of Ross, 171 Cal. 64, 66, [151 Pac. 1138]; see, also, Central Pac. R. R. Co. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247, 262; Clark v. Willett, 35 Cal. 534, 544; Santa Ana v. Harlin, 99 Cal. 538, 544, [34 Pac. 224]; Spring Valley W. W. v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528, 532, [28 Pac. 681]; De Freitas v. Suisun City, 170 Cal. 263, [149 Pac. 553].) But such cross-examination does not justify the plaintiff on redirect examination, which often amounts in practical effect to an examination in chief, to take up the question of sales of other lands and thus show by the witness the prices paid by purchasers of such other lands; for the reason of the rule permitting the fact of the sales of other lands to be gone into on cross-examination ceases with the cross-examination. While in all cases witnesses may, upon their examination in chief, give the reasons upon which they base their opinions, they should never be allowed to go into details of particular sales or transactions. (2 Lewis on Eminent Domain, 3d ed., sec. 654.) It follows, of course, that the court not only erred in allowing the question of sales of other lands and the prices paid for such lands to be gone into on the redirect examination of the witness, Kendall, but erred in refusing to grant the motion to strike out the testimony of said witness, it having been made clearly to appear from said testimony that the witness had based his opinion upon the question of value wholly upon incompetent matters. (San Diego Land etc. Co. v. Neale, 88 Cal. 50, 63, [11 L. R. A. 604, 25 Pac. 977]; Pierson v. Boston Elevated Ry., 191 Mass. 223, 233, 234, [77 N. E. 769].)

But we think the errors thus considered were not prejudicial, for it is obvious from the verdict that the jury did not accept the testimony or opinion of the witness, Kendall, upon the question of the value of the property proposed to be taken. As seen, the strip to condemn which this action was brought