the notice must contain. But, whether they do or do not acquire actual knowledge of the fact or facts which the notice must contain, there should be, as a matter of public policy, some legal foundation for charging them with notice, which cannot be done where the act as to which some kind of notice should be had is left to the capriciously exercised option of an individual.

It follows from the views thus ventured that, conceding it to be true that lien claimants must file their claims of lien within thirty days after the happening of the first act which constitutes a completion, whether the same be actual or statutory, or, in other words, that they cannot exercise the option of filing their liens within thirty days after any one of several events of completion which have occurred on different dates, the plaintiffs were not bound by the fact of the occupation of the building on the 17th of October, assuming that such occupation amounted to the completion of the building within the contemplation of the statute in such case. They, in other words, could not be charged with notice of such completion, and even if they had been shown to have had actual knowledge of the fact, the defendants, under the express and mandatory terms of the statute, would have been estopped from basing any defense against the assertion of their right to the lien on the ground of the failure to file the same within time.

It further follows from the views above expressed that the finding that "on October 17, 1912, defendants, Charles H. Waldmann and Nellie V. Waldmann, entered into, and ever since have been in the actual and exclusive use and occupation of said building," was wholly unnecessary, and indeed, supererogatory, and is, therefore, immaterial, assuming that the finding was intended to declare as a fact that the building or contract had been constructively completed by occupation.

The lien upon which the plaintiffs rely, however, has reference to the actual completion of the building on the twentysixth day of October, 1912. This lien, as we have seen, was filed on the twentieth day of November, 1912, and is the lien pleaded in the first count of the complaint and the one to which the court found the plaintiffs to be entitled.

As above stated, it is contended by the appellants that the evidence does not support the finding that the building was

actually completed on the twenty-sixth day of October, 1912. The record does not support the contention.

The defendant, C. H. Waldmann, testified that the last work done on the building was by the painter on the twentysixth day of October, 1912. On that day he did some work of painting on the house. It required him about two hours to do the work. This work was done, it is to be assumed, in pursuance of the building contract or the specifications attached thereto as a part thereof. The court was justified from this testimony in finding, as it did, that the building was completed on the twenty-sixth day of October. So long as the work performed was called for by the contract and essential to the completion of the building, the extent of the work or the length of time required to do it is wholly immaterial, for in such case the last stroke of the painter's brush marked the time of the completion. It may be true that if, when the lien was filed and it was sought to enforce it through a judicial decree, the two hours' work of the painter was still unfinished, and such work constituted all that was necessary to complete the building according to the terms and conditions of the contract and specifications, the omission to do that work might justly be treated as a "trivial imperfection" in the work of completion; but this argues nothing against the proposition above stated that the finishing of the work of painting marked the date of the actual completion of the building, said work being all that was necessary actually to complete it.

But there is some other testimony, or, strictly speaking, an admission by the appellants, which tends to support the finding that the building was actually completed on the twenty-sixth day of October. The complaint, in the second cause of action therein stated, alleges that the appellants, on the thirtieth day of November, 1912, filed for record in the office of the county recorder of the city and county of San Francisco their notice "wherein it was stated that a cessation of labor on said building had occurred October 26, 1912," etc. This averment is not denied by the answer, and it therefore stands in the record as an admitted fact. It matters not what the purpose of the filing of said notice by appellants or the pleading of the fact by the plaintiffs was; the fact is consistent with and supports the finding that the

81 Cal. App.-17

building was actually completed on October 26th, and it constituted a fact in the case which it was competent and proper for the court to consider in reaching a conclusion upon the question of actual completion.

But it is further insisted, with respect to the finding of actual completion, that it constitutes no finding at all upon that question, inasmuch as the finding does not definitely fix the date upon which the actual completion occurred. The finding is, as seen, that the building "was duly completed and constructed, except for a trivial imperfection in such construction, by Felix Marcuse, according to the terms of the contract . . . on or about October 26, 1912, and subsequent to October 20, 1912."

The finding would ordinarily be held to be rather indefinite and perhaps would, standing alone, be insufficient to support the judgment. But, as has been shown, the appellants admitted that there was a cessation from labor on October 26th, and this admission must be viewed as a part of the findings. And viewed as a part of the findings and considered with the finding above referred to, it becomes reasonably clear and certain from the findings that the actual completion of the building occurred on the twenty-sixth day of October. But we think that the phrase "on or about" should be held to mean either the day mentioned or a day in very near proximity thereto. It cannot reasonably be held to mean, in other words, if not the day designated, a day ten, fifteen, or twenty days therefrom. Ordinarily, it is understood to refer to a day or two before or subsequent to the day specifically named. The lien of the plaintiffs was filed on the twentieth day of November, 1912; the finding declares that the building was completed subsequent to the twentieth day of October, and "on or about" or within a day or two of the twenty-sixth day of October. In this view, the finding makes it reasonably clear and definite that the lien was filed within thirty days after the completion of the building.

The next objection is that the finding as to the extra work done and extra materials furnished by the plaintiffs, and as to the reasonableness of the value of the same, does not derive sufficient support from the evidence.

We cannot, at the expense of extending this opinion beyond its present length, reproduce herein testimony or the

substance thereof which we think sustains the finding referred to. It must suffice for us to say that we have carefully examined the testimony and therefrom have been convinced that the court was amply justified in making said finding. There are no other points requiring special notice. The judgment is affirmed.

Chipman, P. J., and Ellison, J., pro tem., concurred.

A petition to have the cause heard in the supreme court, after judgment in the district court of appeal, was denied by the supreme court on October 12, 1916.

[Civ. No. 1826. First Appellate District.-August 15, 1916.] GEORGE SELLERS, Appellant, v. SOLWAY LAND COMPANY (a Corporation), et al., Defendants; BALFOUR, GUTHRIE & CO. (a Copartnership), et al., Respond

ents.

REAL ESTATE BROKERS - ORAL AGREEMENT TO SHARE COMMISSIONS STATUTE OF FRAUDS -SECTION 1624, SUBDIVISION 6, CIVIL CODE. The provision of subdivision 6 of section 1624 of the Civil Code was only designed to protect owners of real estate against unfounded claims of brokers, and does not extend to agreements between brokers to co-operate in making sales for a share of the commissions.

ID.

CONTRACT BETWEEN REAL ESTATE BROKERS AGREEMENT TO PAY SPECIFIC COMPENSATION-AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE CONTRACT-WRITING ESSENTIAL.-A contract made by the manager of the land and loan department of a real estate partnership agreeing to pay a second broker a specific amount of money for the procuring of a purchaser for land for the sale of which the copartnership were the agents, is void, where the authority of the person signing the contract on behalf of the partnership is not in writing.

ID.-ACTION ON CONTRACT - PLEA OF STATUTE OF FRAUDS - KNOWLEDGE OF RENDITION OF SERVICES-LACK OF ESTOPPEL.-In an action to recover upon such a contract the copartnership is not estopped from setting up the statute of frauds, by reason of the fact that it knowingly held the signer of the contract out to the world as having the authority he assumed, and of its knowledge that such employee was dealing with the plaintiff, and had performed services under the

invalid contract, where it also appears that the sale was made without knowledge that the plaintiff was interested other than by a verbal notification made some time previously that he was endeavoring to sell the land to the purchasers.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco. A. E. Graupner, Judge.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

J. E. Rodgers, A. F. Bray, and Sterling Carr, for Appellant.

McCutchen, Olney & Willard, and J. M. Mannon, Jr., for Respondents.

LENNON, P. J.-In this action the plaintiff sued the defendants for the sum of $6,250, alleged to be due as a commission upon the sale of a large ranch in Contra Costa County, the complaint alleging that said sale was made. through the efforts of the plaintiff under the contract hereafter set out. The land was the property of the defendant Solway Land Company, and was being managed and handled by the defendants Balfour, Guthrie & Co., a copartnership, consisting of a number of individuals, some of whom are named as defendants, and upon the sale referred to the copartnership received a commission of two and one half per cent upon its sale price of one hundred and thirty thousand dollars, to wit, the sum of $3,250, as compensation for the care of the ranch during a certain period and for its sale. The agency of the defendants, Balfour, Guthrie & Co., was, however, unknown to the plaintiff, and the complaint charges them as owners. At the conclusion of the evidence a motion of defendant Solway Land Company to dismiss as to it was granted, and no question is raised as to the correctness of the court's action in this regard. Hereafter in this opinion the term "defendants" will refer only to Balfour, Guthrie & Co.

The negotiations between the plaintiff and the defendants for his contract were conducted by him with one R. F. McLeod, an employee of the defendants and the manager of a department of their business known as the land and loan