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Aside from the patent rights transferred to it and possibly a small sum of money in the treasury, the only asset of the Automatic Car Coupler Company in March, 1910, seems to have been a certain contract dated November 1, 1909, made between that corporation and the Electric Traction Supply Company, a Missouri corporation, by which the latter company was given the exclusive right to manufacture and sell the said patented automatic couplings within the United States of America. Certain obligations were entered into by the Missouri company for the payment of royalties, and a minimum amount was named for a series of years commencing with the year beginning November 1, 1910. It was not shown that any business has ever been transacted under that contract or any income received therefrom. Prior to March, 1910, the Automatic Car Coupler Company had manufactured a limited number of car couplers, which had been given or loaned to certain railway corporations, evidently for advertising purposes. It is stated in the testimony of Mrs. Jenkins that when she consulted Mr. Soale about the proposed exchange involved in this case, he said that the Automatic Car Coupler Company stock was well worth a dollar per share, and perhaps more. He also told her of the contract with the Electric Traction Supply Company, and said that on account of this contract the stock would be as good as six per cent from the 1st of November, 1910; but he also gave her a copy of the contract and she took it away with her. On behalf of the accuser only one witness was questioned about the value of the Automatic Car Coupler Company's stock, and he did not claim to know anything about its value. Over defendant's objection this witness, J. W. Dubbs, was permitted to say that when he bought stock in the company about one year before March, 1910, he bought it from the company and paid ten cents a share. At the close of the case for the prosecution, defendant's counsel moved for a nonsuit, but as it was in general terms and did not specify any particular defect in the evidence, that motion should be disregarded. (Coffey v. Greenfield, 62 Cal. 602, 608; Schroeder v. Mauzy, 16 Cal. App. 443, 450, [118 Pac. 459].) The defendant introduced much evidence to support his claim that the market value of stock in this company was equal to or in excess of the par value, and it is our duty to consider all of the evidence and determine whether as a whole the evidence is sufficient to sus

tain the implied finding against defendant on this branch of the case; for notwithstanding testimony to the contrary, the finding must be sustained if the record contains evidence which by itself would be sufficient to support such finding. We will refer to defendant's witnesses in the order of the references to their testimony in the brief of his counsel. Karl Elliott was the secretary of the corporation. He knew of sales made early in 1910 at one dollar per share, and one sale at one dollar and twenty-five cents per share. The first stock sold by the company was at ten cents a share, the next price was twenty-five cents a share, next fifty cents a share, and late in 1909, eighty cents a share. After that the asked price was one dollar, but no sales made by the company at that price.

Frank R. Bonny was president of the corporation. His regular occupation was that of a conductor in the freight department of an electric railroad. He said that he knew the value of the Automatic stock in March, 1910, and that it was one dollar and twelve and one-half cents per share. He sold two hundred shares of his stock at that time and at that price. It was much sought after, and still worth one dollar per share even down to the date of the trial in April, 1913. He knew of other sales as follows: one thousand shares sold in August, 1909, by the corporation, at eighty cents; four hundred shares sold in August, 1909, by the corporation, at eighty cents; two hundred shares sold in December, 1909, at one dollar, by the witness to Mr. Heiss; five hundred shares sold by the witness in November, 1909, at one dollar per share; two hundred and fifty shares bought by the witness July 15, 1910, at one dollar and twenty-five cents per share; three thousand eight hundred shares bought July 1, 1910, by Mr. Goode, at one dollar per share; three thousand four hundred shares bought in March, 1911, by Mr. Goode at one dollar per share. The principal part of Mr. Bonny's stock consisted of ten thousand shares issued to him by the company in return for the patent rights which he transferred to it in March, 1909. He had a few other small transactions in the stock besides those above noted. The following occurred on his cross-examination : "Q. Did you ever place any of this on the public market for sale! A. No, sir. Q. Do you know whether any of it ever was placed on the market for sale! A. I don't know. Q. All the sales were among your own people and your associates,

were they not? A. It was. Q. Officers of the corporation and their associates; all of it was made that way? A. Yes."

E. S. Goode became a stockholder in this corporation in April, 1910, when he purchased between eleven thousand and twelve thousand shares at one dollar per share. While he asserted that he would not now take less than that amount for his stock, he did not claim that he knew at any time what the stock was worth in the market. On cross-examination this witness admitted that after purchasing the stock in ques tion he made an assignment for the benefit of his creditors and did not list this property as part of his assets. “I bought the stock in my name and transferred it to my wife and nephew, except fifty shares stood in my name. ... I was trying to buy a controlling interest in the company. Would do it to-day if I could get it."

The defendant, Wilson H. Soale, testifying about the stock transferred to Mrs. Jenkins, was asked: “Is that stock worth any money now?" to which he replied: "Certainly; it is worth more than it was traded for." C. M. Gruell, a shipping clerk, testified that the stock was quoted at from one dollar to one dollar and thirteen cents in the early part of 1910. Cross-examination developed that he had very little actual knowledge of the subject. C. H. Wills testified that the market value of the stock in the early part of 1910 was eighty cents per share. He had bought some of the stock from the company when it was ten cents per share, and later sold some to Mr. Bonny at one dollar per share. F. H. Norwood, the original patentee of the automatic car coupler, testified that the value of the stock in March, 1910, was eighty cents per share; that shortly before that time he sold some stock to Mr. Bonny at one dollar per share. Norwood also testified that he received ten thousand shares of the stock in consideration of the transfer of his patent rights to the company. Whether he and Bonny received ten thousand shares each for the transfer of separate patents, or received that number of shares jointly for a joint transfer of patents, does not clearly appear. Frank L. Heiss, clothing merchant, testified that the value of this stock on the market in February and March, 1910, was one dollar per share. He bought his stock from Bonny at that price and knew of other sales at the same price.

On this record was the court justified in determining that the accused violated his oath and his duties as an attorney and counselor at law? One of the stipulations in the statutory oath is that the person admitted will faithfully discharge the duties of an attorney and counselor at law to the best of his knowledge and ability. One of these duties requires the attorney and counselor "to maintain inviolate the confidence

of his client." (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 282, subd. 5.) In order to support the charges here, it must have appeared that Mrs. Jenkins was Mr. Soale's client, that she reposed confidence in him as a counselor at law, and that he violated that confidence. On behalf of the accused it is contended that in connection with the exchange of Mrs. Jenkins' Summit Avenue property for corporation stock, he was not acting in his capacity as an attorney, “because in its nature the act complained of was a personal business transaction requiring no skill of attorney and no knowledge or understanding of law." The causes for which an attorney may be removed or suspended are stated in section 287 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Under that section as amended in 1911 this defense could not be maintained; but if the nature of the facts is such as claimed by the accused, that would be a good defense against charges based, as these are, upon transactions occurring in the year 1910. Thus, in the case of In re Collins, 147 Cal. 8, 12, (81 Pac. 220), where it clearly appeared that the acts complained of were not done by the respondent in his professional capacity or in connection with any matters in which his duties as an attorney were involved, it was held that “to the extent that an attorney may be disbarred for causes which affect his moral integrity in dealings with others of a purely personal character, and transacted in his private capacity, the statute has provided that it shall be done by the court only when he has been convicted of a felony, or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude." It is our opinion, however, that in these transactions Mrs. Jenkins reposed confidence in Mr. Soale as a counselor at law. The evidence does not indicate that he was engaged in business as an agent or broker or maintained his office for any purpose other than in the course of his profession as an attorney and counselor. She went to him in that office and called upon him for advice and assistance in the conduct of her business affairs, without any notice or suggestion that in accepting the employment he was

representing her in any way other than in his professional capacity. The occupation of a lawyer is not confined to appearances for parties in actions in courts of justice. A very large part of the professional work done by them consists in advice given to clients for the general purpose of aiding them in the conduct of their business affairs. At the time of these transactions Mrs. Jenkins was consulting Mr. Soale concerning a proposed action at law, and it appears that she consulted him about her other business affairs indiscriminately and without any attempted classification of the transactions as being partly within and partly without the scope of his professional business. She was entitled to believe that she was under his care as a counselor employed by her. The fact that in this particular transaction he did not enter any fee charges against her does not change the situation at all, for he was entitled to charge such fees if he so desired. We conclude, therefore, that she did repose confidence in him as her counselor at law, and the only remaining question is as to whether or not he maintained inviolate that confidence. The phrase, “maintain inviolate the confidence," as contained in section 282 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not confined merely to noncommunication of facts learned in the course of professional employment; for the section separately imposes the duty to “preserve the secrets of his client."

Appellant contends that under the evidence in this case it appears that he did not intend to wrong Mrs. Jenkins or to defraud her in any way in the trade, and that even if false representations and concealments occurred which are chargeable against him, no cause of action has been established, since the stock was in fact worth the four thousand dollars which it cost her. Some of the circumstances involved, to which we have referred, tend to show that the accused secretly treated as his own property which, by his advice and pursuant to a plan conceived by him, she was induced to transfer to a third person without knowledge of the fact that in reality her property was passing into appellant's hands. The court was entitled to believe, and did believe, these to be the facts; and this being so, the conclusion is clearly warranted that he considered the transaction as one favorable to himself, and to which he believed that she would not consent if she had known his real interest therein. Under these circumstances, it should be determined that a lawyer is violating

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