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in the courts, but no such limits are placed on collective action by labor unions. Indeed, the law confers privileges upon and grants immunities to labor unions which are enjoyed by no other institutions in our society.

It is this excess of union market power, rather than any inherent conflict between private economic endeavor and the public interest, that gives rise to the problems of avoiding critical strikes and of achieving settlements consistent with the public interest.

Since this power, and its consequences, are made possible by existing laws, they are the responsibility of Government and ultimately of all citizens. The appropriate remedy is not Government intervention of one kind or another in the actual processes of collective bargaining.

The remedy most consistent with economic freedom and health is to constrain the market power of labor unions through effective legal limitations and judicial review. In my view, the Committee's proposed study should be concerned with exploring ways to accomplish this end. It seems to me that we cannot divorce questions of procedures and techniques from questions of economic power and structure in our considerations if we hope to arrive at intelligent solutions to the problems before us.

I recognize that the membership of the Commit. tee is and will remain deeply divided on these issues. While the Committee should, of course, express whatever consensus or partial consensus the members may reach, I believe that the Committee's main goal should be to provide opportunity for a full expression of individual views on this important subject.

Separate Statement by George Meany, David Dubinsky, George M. Harrison, Joseph D. Keenan, David J. McDonald, and Walter P. Reuther to the Report on "Free and Responsible Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace"

Assertions that "dominant union power" constitutes a major threat to effective collective bargaining are an example of attributing to others characteristics which are in fact one's own. It is mere name calling, unbuttressed by facts or even any specifications of the nature of the supposed evil.

If it is intended to assert that the existence of so-called monopoly power on the union side causes disputes which would otherwise be settled peace

fully, the assertion is simply untrue. Recent experiences in the maritime and longshore industries to which the national emergency provisions of the present law have most often been appliedsurely demolish the notion that the cause of such disputes is the existence of a single union instead of several.

If what is meant, on the other hand, is that the settlements which are reached will be sounder, from the public viewpoint, if unions are fragmentized, that is also contrary to everything that experience teaches us-unless one makes the assumption that settlements dictated by employers are the only sound settlements. We freely concede that the effect of weakening unions would be to bring settlements more closely into accord with management views as to their proper terms. Eliminating unions altogether would go even further in that direction. Nothing but the blind assumption that management views and the public interest are identical, however, supports the proposition that this would improve collective bargaining.

There is no evidence that union bargaining power is today equal to, let alone in excess of, that of management, or that the use of what bargaining power unions do possess has resulted in settlements contrary to the public interest. Recent events indeed suggest that it is the power of certain companies which is excessive and that in the past they have sought to divert public attention from their abuse of power by falsely ascribing similar power to the unions which represent their employees.

The statement that the law places limits upon business enterprises which are not, but should be. applied to unions is likewise mere verbal sleight-ofhand. Business enterprises are not by law prevented from combining to deal with a union which represents their employees; and the author of this statement has himself publicly urged a shift to industrywide bargaining in his own industry. The freedom of employers in this regard is parallel to the privileges and immunities which it is erroneously charged are enjoyed exclusively by unions.

It is of course true that if a labor dispute results in a strike or threatened strike which "affects an entire industry or a substantial part thereof," the "national emergencies" provisions of the TaftHartley Act may be invoked, but at present its sanctions run only against unions. We agree that these national emergencies provisions should be strengthened-that is a major subject of this

report-but as, to repeat, the maritime industry demonstrates, disputes which result in "national emergencies" are as likely to be multiplied as to be minimized by the diffusion of collective bargaining responsibility.

The use of the phrase "union market power" is similarly misleading. Any effort by unions to control the market for commodities is already subject to antitrust restrictions, and there have been a number of prosecutions of unions on this score, even though the challenged activities were on a very minor scale.

If, on the other hand, by "market power" is meant power over the market for labor, the statement is based on the discredited concept that the

labor of a human being should be treated as a commodity, to be traded in the market and purchased at the lowest possible price. Such a suggestion implies the destruction of all unions and a return to a low-wage economy and the other evils of 19th century capitalism.

Only by combining can workers somewhat balance the power of employers in the labor market, and there is no evidence that suggests that that balance is unduly tilted in favor of workers. We believe that any objective study will show that collective bargaining has, over all, promoted not only the well-being of the workers directly concerned but of society as a whole.