CHAPTER SEVEΝΤΗ. REASONING. §. 1. The reasoning power a source of new ideas. We are next to consider the reasoning power, which is also one of the distinct sources of internal knowledge. For our knowledge of this faculty itself, we are indebted to Consciousness, as was remarked at §. 320. "The names of all intellectual powers and operations are expressive of the subjects of our coNSCIOUSNESS. Among others, the terms, thinking, attending, remembering, comparing, judging, abstracting, reasoning, imagining, &c.', Although, therefore, we may say with no want of propriety, that consciousness gives us a knowledge of the mental acts involved in any process of reasoning, yet that process is of itself a source of new views, of new ideas, of new knowledge. Nor is this a novel doctrine. It was proposed by some of the Greek philosophers; it was advocated by the learned Cudworth; and has been proposed and maintained by more recent writers both in France and England. A person proves, for instance, by a train of reasoning, that the vertical or opposite angels are EQUAL, when two strait lines cross each other. Now in this case, the train of reasoning evidently gives rise to the notion of equality. It is true, that we may have this notion or feeling, when there are only two objects compared together, and when there is nothing more than a simple act of judgment or relative suggestion. But we have it also, when there are combined acts of judgment; that is to say, when there is a process of reasoning.-Mr. Stewart. Philos. Essays, First, Ch. III,) has this remark; "What Locke calls agreements and disagreements, are in many instances, simple ideas, of which no analysis can be given; and of which the origin must, therefore be referred to reason.according to Locke's own doctrine.-Nor are other weighty authorities wanting. De Gerando. (De la Generation des Connoissances,) after holding up to view, that the Judgment or relative suggestion is a distinct source of knowledge, expressly adds; "The reasoning faculty also serves to enrich us with ideas; for there are many relations so complicated or remote, that one act of judgment is not sufficient to discover them. A series of judgments or process of reasoning is therefore necessary." But we would not be understood to limit the results of reasoning, considered as a distinct source of knowledge, to a few simple conceptions. It brings to light the great principles and hidden truths of nature; it gives grand and comprehensive views, which could not otherwise be obtained; and invests men, and external things, and events, in their origin and in their consequences, with a new char acter. This subject, however, cannot be pursued here at great length. On the contrary, it is to be remarked here as in respect to the memory, that our attention will be more taken up with the faculty itself and its action, than with a consideration of its immediate results on the increase of knowledge. §. 2. Of the object and excellency of reasoning. It is one of the traits, (perhaps we are not at liberty to say with some persons,it is one of the evils,) of our nature, that we cannot always perceive the truth intuitively, and at once. In many cases we can approach it only by a concatenation of thought; by a progress, oftentimes slow and toilsome, from one step to another. The power of reasoning, therefore, appears to have been given us, in compas sion to our weakness, that we may acquire knowledge, which otherwise would not be within our reach. The excellency of reason is a fruitful subject of remark, as undoubtedly it ought to be a rich and permanent source of gratitude. Its value is particularly discoverable in two things, viz, its flexibility and its growth or expansion. When we speak of the flexibility of the reasoning power, we mean to intimate the facility and perfect fitness, with which it can apply itself to the numerous and almost infinitely varied subjects of our knowledge. This remark is perhaps susceptible of illustration, by a slight reference to the instincts of the lower animals. Such instincts, according to the usual understanding of their nature, imply an original and invariable tendency to do certain things, without previous forethought and deliberation. There are often many specific instincts in the same animal; one perhaps has relation to the season of the year and the time of migration; another has relation to the nourishment and care of its young; another to the formation of its cell, nest, &c. But whatever, the particular form of the instinct, it secures its object promptly, and without mistake. Accordingly it has been observed, that a bird, which has always been confined in a cage, will build, when suitable materials are furnished it, a nest precisely similar to those of its own kind in the woods. It places with the greatest ingenuity the sticks, leaves, and clay of its frail dwelling, without going through a long process of previous training, and without incurring a debt to others for their assistance. But the instinct, in this and other analogous cases, is limited to its one definite object; it discovers an utter inflexibility, neither varying the mode of its action, nor extending its range so as to include other objects. It is not so with reason. It applies itself to almost every thing. It is not easy to designate and limit the vast number of objects in nature, in events, and individual conduct, where it furnishes its aid, and secures the most beneficial results. It is an instrument equally fitted to investigate the growth of a plant and the formation of a : |