2. Modern education not only puts emphasis upon the inner life, but it also conceives that life broadly. Life is more than knowledge; it is also appreciation of what is lovely and of good report; it is sympathy with other life; it is righteousness of purpose. To teach is more than to train the intellect and fill it with information. It is to make men. The transformation in our schools from the idea of mere instruction to that of symmetrical development is not yet fully accomplished, but in principle the victory has been won. This victory is a move in the direction of religion. For, tho religion concerns the intellect, it is most of all a matter of the heart and the will. Jesus declared that he is come that we may have life, and that we may have it abundantly. There is a sense in which every true teacher could say this of himself, for he is to help his pupils, not only to know, but also to live. Whatever culture of the feelings and the will the school is able to impart is so much preparation of the soil for the reception of religious impressions.

3. Tho modern education emphasizes the inner life, it demands that this life come to outward expression. "No impression without expression" is its motto. It declares that a mental act is not complete until it has expressed itself by means of the motor apparatus, and hence that we do not really grasp an idea until we set it at work. Does not this remind us of the very words of Jesus when he said that one who hears his words without doing them is like a man who built his house on shifting sands, while he who both hears and does is like a man who built upon a rock? Entrance into the kingdom is accorded, not to those who say “Lord, Lord!" but to those who do God's will. In religion and in education alike the inner and the outer are indissoluble; they are the concave and the convex sides of the same curve. Hence education, working in its own way, enforces the lesson of religion. This lesson is especially significant in this day of practical affairs; for the only kind of faith that is convincing to a modern man is the faith that shows itself in its good works, the faith that spiritualizes conduct, business, and all our human relations.

4. Another side of the same principle requires that the sensible shall come before the rational, the concrete before the abstract, the reality before the symbol. The word, the rule, the theory, is not to be introduced until the pupil has something to express by means of it. Hence, education begins, tho it does not end, with things of sense. The training of the senses and of the muscles, which has become so prominent in our schools, proceeds from no unspiritual view of life, but from the actual structure of our minds. In the manual-training class the child learns vastly more than mere material things. He learns arithmetic, the laws of nature, selfcontrol; he cultivates attention, imagination, character. A laboratory, or a landscape, or a mass of clay for modeling, if only such meanings be found therein, is fully as spiritual as a book. Modern education busies.

itself with objects that are visible and tangible because of what they reveal, and because of their effect upon the inner life of the child or youth. Is not this principle a principle of religion also? What is the meaning of the central idea of Christianity, incarnation, unless it be that men come into relation with the invisible God thru a visible person? "That which we have heard, that which we have seen with our eyes, that which we beheld, and our hands handled, concerning the Word of Life"-this preface of St. John's first letter would serve with equal appropriateness to introduce a fundamental conception of modern education. When this principle has its perfect work in our schools, it will counteract two tendencies that are unfavorable to religion-the tendency to think of religion as abstract and speculative, and the opposite tendency to ignore the spiritual aspects of the visible world.

5. The educational principle of free self-expression is equally harmonious with religion. At first sight freedom may seem to clash with all authority, but the apparent conflict disappears when we understand what pedagogy means by freedom. Freedom certainly does not mean that the pupil is to do just as he likes; for what one likes may actually repress and enslave. Unwholesome food may give pleasure to the palate, tho it depresses our vital powers. Freedom is the active self-expression, not of incidental desires, but of the deeper demands of the nature. These deeper demands continually oppose our more superficial impulses, so that the attainment of freedom implies the learning of self-restraint and of obedience. Capricious indulgence of desire ends in slavery. We cannot be ourselves unless we train our vagrant impulses to bow before the deeper and higher things of the spirit. Freedom does not exclude authority, then, but requires it. What pedagogy insists upon under the name of freedom is simply that the teacher shall utilize the deeper currents of life so as to help the child from within rather than in any merely external fashion. The deeper currents, as well as the superficial ones, will manifest themselves in spontaneous interests which it is the duty of the teacher to seize upon. Artificial leverage is to be shunned. Whatsoever is done for the child must include a spontaneous expression of the child. When, for example, restraint must be used, it should be so applied as promptly to transform itself into self-restraint.

Here, once more, modern education prepares the way for religion; for religion is itself a proclamation of liberty. Its promise is to release us from bondage to sins and fears and the pettiness of our merely individual desires. It releases us from the sense of being oppressed by the bigness of the world, and makes us realize that all things are ours, whether things present or things to come, or life or death. But it grants us this liberty only thru self-surrender, only thru that losing of our life whereby we gain life. In other words, religion assumes that her commands

are also the commands of our own deepest self. It is thus that the obedience that we render to her is our highest freedom. Thus education and religion are at one in teaching us freedom thru obedience.

6. Modern education is likewise working with religion for the adjustment of the individual to society. The demand that every child shall have opportunity for education recognizes the ultimate worth of the person. It is in direct line with Christianity, which looks down thru wealth, position, nationality, social circumstance, to the individual heart. On the other hand, both education and religion recognize right relations. to one's fellows as a necessary part of true life. Christianity sets before us the ideal of a divine society in which each citizen loves all the others as he loves himself. Something like this is coming to be recognized as the end of education. No longer is it possible to look upon knowledge, power, intellectual and æsthetic culture, or anything else that is merely individual, as the aim of the school. The school is to make men, and strong men; but men strong in regard for one another, strong in their loyalty to law, strong in their spirit of co-operation.

These are the essential characteristics of modern educational philosophy. Every one of them is not only reconcilable with religion, but actually included within the Christian view of life. We may therefore say that the modern educational movement as a whole has consisted in the working out of certain pedagogical aspects of Christian belief. It has by no means appreciated all the wealth of educational principle that is contained in Christianity, nor has it always kept itself free from un-Christian tendencies. of the times. Educational reformers have often been unconscious of their indebtedness to religion; now and then one of them has been hostile to the church. Doubtless, too, the administration of education has improved less rapidly than educational theory. Yet, for all that, the educational movement of modern times has never been really independent of religion. It has builded better than it knew, for its inspiration has come from the highest source. The separation of church and state, which every citizen is concerned to maintain inviolate, does not signify that education is an unspiritual fact. As far as it goes, the school is essentially a creation of the religious spirit, and its work is essentially religious and Christian.

It follows that the entire body of modern educational principle is adapted to the specific work of religious education. It contains the spirit that modern education received from religion, but enriched by new knowledge and wrought into a system. The contribution of modern education to religion, then, is a suitable form and method for religious ' education, a form which the church and the home must be relied upon to fill with the complete Christian content.

THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION ON THE MOTIVES OF CONDUCT

REV. EDWARD A. PACE, CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D. C.

The subject on which I have the honor to address this National Council seems to gather in one concise phrase some of the largest problems which can be offered either to our private thinking or to our public deliberation. Education, religion, conduct epitomize life. Each suggests the dualism of theory and practice. Each may be regarded alternately as end and as means. And each is apt to be taken, according to our individual fashion of thought, as the supreme standard by which all other values are determined.

It is significant, therefore, that our program asks us to discuss, not the respective worth of education, religion, and conduct, but rather their mutual relation. Our question is not whether religion shall enter into our scheme of education; but, assuming that a particular sort of training which we call religious education is to be given, we ask what is or may be its influence upon the motives of conduct.

You have also noted, I am sure, that the question proposed in these terms goes to the heart of the moral life; for the implication is, obviously, that the worth of conduct lies chiefly in the motives which prompt it, and not merely in the outward form of action. In other words, we are getting away from that plane of ethical theory on which a man's character is judged exclusively by his behavior. We are looking at facts in the light of purpose. And we are trying to determine how far the purposes which are supplied by religion and woven into the will by religious education avail toward the securing of right conduct.

That they are of some avail we are doubtless agreed. From our point of view as teachers, religious education is simply religion at work. It is the tangible shape that religion takes alongside of ourselves in the discharge of our professional duties. And since, as intelligent men, we must admit that "the religious element of human culture is essential," likewise, as intelligent teachers, we claim that "it must be presented to every child whose education aims at completeness or proportion."

It seems, then, that at least two important points are beyond dispute: first, that conduct should be guided by high motives and even by the highest motives; second, that religious education does in some measure influence the motives of conduct. If so much is clear, we are ready for the further question: In what way precisely does religious education exert its salutary influence? Wherein lies its power, if power it really have, for uplifting and strengthening and making purer the determination of our human will ?

The answer which the Catholic church gives to this question is found

most clearly in her insistence upon the need of the religious element in all forms and grades of education. As to her purpose in holding so tenaciously to this position, it is often said that she seeks thereby to spread and perpetuate her beliefs. In her judgment, the school is a nursery of faith and a training ground for the practical exercises of religion. Its chief lesson would therefore be her Credo, and the cardinal virtue of its pupils would be loyalty to those who wield her authority. That there is much truth in this appreciation, no Catholic need deny. The church, in fact, does maintain that religion must be based on definite beliefs; tho she also teaches that faith without works is dead. She does insist on sacrament and rite, tho she plainly says that the outward sign is worthless without the inward grace. And if she requires from her members obedience to her laws, it is only what she commands them to yield to all legitimate rule. In a word, the church holds that a large share of our duties is toward our Maker, that the discharge of these duties is or should be an essential portion of our conduct, and consequently that the motives. which shape our conduct in conformity with these duties can, in the very nature of things, be supplied by religious education alone.

Now, just as we know from the highest source that all the precepts are reducible to the one great commandment, so we might say that all our duties are included, either explicitly or implicitly, in the duty we owe to God. Religious education in the best sense would therefore be not only an education in religion, but an application to all the affairs of life of those principles and motives which religious belief supplies. To "do all things for the glory of God" would certainly make us men after the manner of St. Paul himself. And for men of this type "religious education" would be a prime necessity.

But again, facing actual conditions, we have to admit as a fact the distinction between religious obligations and other obligations, between religious motives and other motives. And it behooves us to inquire in what way the motives which religion furnishes may be brought to bear effectually upon our every day and every-hour conduct upon our working and planning, our business dealings and our social relations, our external behavior and our secret thought.

It seems to me that we need to keep steadily in view certain psychological principles respecting the nature of motives; and tho we have not at this time to make a thorogoing analysis such as the psychologist might demand, we can assure ourselves at any rate on this point: the efficacy of any motive is due chiefly to the habitual attitude of the mind to which that motive is presented. Merely as an idea in which the connection between a proposed action and our welfare is perceived, a motive may, and according to a well-known theory always does, produce some effect. It is, as we say, an "ideo-motor" process. But even on this theory, it remains true that the motor effect depends, not only on the afferent