is obtained by the making of reprisals, ought to be enjoyed by either party to the certain disadvantage of the other. To render your making of reprisals, separate from war, justifiable, there must not only be a possibility, but a very evident probability, of your thereby obtaining redress for the wrong complained of; for, if by mere reprisals there be no such probability, must it not clearly appear, that your reprisals are made as subsidiary to your intended warlike operations; and that, therefore, you are availing yourself of the garb of moderation and humanity for the purpose of taking an unfair advantage of. the power, with whom you have resolved to go to war? In what degree, then, we may ask, did this probability exist in the instance before us? What were the wrongs of which we complained? That Spain had supplied France with money, and that she was, at the time we attacked and captured her ships, making warlike preparations in her ports, without being willing to give us the necessary satisfaction and security. What sort of satisfaction and security we required, and how far she is chargeable with having refused what was necessary upon this score, remains to be gathered from the particulars of the negotiation; but, if she did refuse us the necessary satisfaction and security, will any one pretend to say, that there was the most distant probability of our obtaining it by the capture of her plate ships? Could we have captured them all, and could we, at the same time, have seized the treasure in her mines, we might have pleaded the capture of the four frigates as part of a measure of prevention, for the future, for one of the wrongs complained of; but, as it was certain that we could not effect that, and, as it was also certain, that, as to the other wrong complained of, the capture would be totally useless, and could only tend to widen the breach, that capture cannot be regarded as having for its object to obtain redress without having recourse to war, an object essentially necessary to the justification of an act of reprisals. To be convinced of the soundness of this reasoning, we have only, for a moment, to consider, what would be the inevitable consequences of acting upon opposite principles. If, upon every provocation, or, in every case where a recourse to war would be justifiable, we were to allow it to be just to make reprisals upon the party offending, every state, secretly resolved upon war, would assuredly begin by making reprisals, and would, as we have now done, reserve its declaration of war to answer that of the enemy, on whom it had already been exercising all the acts of hostility within the

compass of its power. Hence would arise such a confusion of rights and of duties, such a constant suspicion, such a total uncertainty as to what each power would do, that all confidence must be destroyed, and the faith of treaties and of nations would soon cease to exist even in name. At peace with Spain, with a minister actually negotiating at her court, and with our ships of war as well as merchantmen hospitably received and riding in her harbours under the faith of a treaty of peace and amity, we did, under the name of reprisals, attack and capture her men of war upon the high seas. And would not Napoleon, after having made peace with us, find it very easy, under the same name, and without giving us an hour's notice of his intention, to justify his invasion of England or Ireland? Those who have set up the cry against "eternal war," will do well to reflect on the consequences which must proceed from the principles that they are now so desperately endeavouring to maintain.—Neither let it be forgotten to observe, how charmingly this pretext of reprisals harmonizes with the assertion, that the war with Spain is just, politic, and necessary, the only justification of reprisals being, that they are evidently intended, and are evidently likely, to prevent the having of recourse to car! I have before me a ministerial pamphlet entitled, "The justice and policy of a war with Spain de"monstrated." I could refer to, perhaps, twenty essays in the newspapers, some of which essays are said to have issued from the foreign office, professing the same object and one of the ministerial prints now lying upon my table, concludes its remarks on the Spanish declaration, by invoking (impious invocation!) the aid of The Almighty in this "just and necessary war!" All that has been proved, all that has been asserted, in these publications, is just so much proved and asserted against the making of reprisals, against that very, that sole ground of defence, to which I would pledge my life that the ministers will finally betake themselves To this dilemma, therefore are they reduced: the attack and capture of the Spanish frigates was an act of war, or it was an act of reprisals: if the former, England has made war without a previous declaration, and her honest and gallant sons, have, by the cupidity of her ministers, been led to do a deed at which honour blushes and humanity shudders; if the latter, the ministers did, in that very act, declare, that a war with Spain, that that which has now taken place, it was desirable to avoid, and, of course, that it was neither necessary nor politic, It will ap

"

"honourable or dishonourable, advantageous

or disadvantageous; they seemed only to "consider, that peace would make provi❝sions cheap, and save them from the pow

er of France.--The nation has now, "however, a much more dignified feeling, "and one better suited to its greatness, and "to its character. If the country now desire peace, it is not because it sees any thing to dread in the continuance of the war-it is not that it is mistrustful of ei"ther its strength or its resources: It wishes "an honourable and secure peace, founded "in the independence of other nations. Se

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cure itself from the ravages of an invading "army, both by its strength and its insular "situation, it wishes peace, principally with

a view of restoring to the continent of Europe, that tranquillity and happiness "which the consequences of the French "revolution, and the war which followed, "have so long banished from it. As to the internal affairs of France, although we would certainly prefer a Bourbon to a Bug

naparté, yet the age of chivalry is now so "far gone, that we begin very much to doubt "whether the continent of Europe will ever "rise in arms about the difference between one family and another. Buonapar é most probably wishes for peace, because it would, perhaps, be a recognition of him by this country, in his new capacity. This "recognition is of great consequence to him personally, but it is of none to this country. We have acknowledged the French republic in its jacobin form, in our nego"tiation at Lisle. At Amiens we acknow<< ledged Buonaparté as chief magistrate, or

Сс

governor of France; and it is indifferent to us by what title he governs, as long as "he keeps possession of the supreme "authority of the empire. We never "inquire by what acts an "Emperor "of Morocco," or a "Dey of Algiers," has

"and durst no more oppose his projects; " and therefore he freely gave scope to his "boundless ambition.--Being now, how

ever, convinced that this country does not in the "the least fear his power, and that it has resources to carry on a war of any length against "him, it is not unlikely but he may really "desire a peace, which is full as necessary "to France as to any other conntry, and from "which no individual would gain so much, "personally, as he himself, who would be "firmly established in one of the finest em"pires of the world.But be these facts as they may, we feel a perfect confidence "that our present ministers will not suffer "themselves to be deceived by the name of peace; and that they will continue the contest so long as it may be necessary for "the honour of this country, and the inde"pendence of other nations."To say that Buonaparté treated this " as a conquered country" is false; to say that he treated our minister haughtily is true, but, did we go to war for that? No, says this ministerial wri ter we did not embark in the war for that alone, nor for the purpose of restoring the Bourbons, but we went to war, because Bu

onaparté oppressed and enslaved all those "feeble states that he was bound by treaty "to leave independent." Now, what states were these? Holland, Switzerland, and Italy. Has he ceased to oppress and enslave these states? or has he, since the beginning of the war, added Portugal, Hamburgh, and poor Hanover to the number? What a shame is it, then, to pretend, that we have succeeded in restoring the independence of the nations of the Continent! But, before the wer, "he evidently thought that this coun

66

try was completely humbled," and, by the war, we have convinced ihm, “that 66 we do not, in the least fear his power, and "that we have resources to carry on a

'

was because Buonaparté, intoxicated with "his successes on the Continent, oppressed "and enslaved all those feeble nations that he was "bound by treaty to leave independent; and be66 cause he even ventured to treat this country "as a conquered nation. He assumed a lofty ." and a menacing tone towards us, and "treated our ambassador with haughtiness

and insolence, He evidently thought "that this country was completely humbled,

war of any length against him." An essertion similar to this last was solemnly made by Mr. Pitt only sixteen months before be advised the making of the treaty of Amiens, a peace of necessity," indeed, but "a necessary peace." Napoleon is convinced that we are terribly afraid of his power, or that we are, towards both God and man, the greatest hypocrites that the world ever saw. Why all our alarms, our beacons, our orders for bolding in readiness all the means of speedy flight, and for laying waste our own country? Are such precautions taken by a people who are "not in the least afraid?" We shall not deceive Napoleon by such talk as this. He looks at our actions, and he sees marks of fear in every one of them.—“ Our pre"sent ministers will not be deceived by the

of Buckinghamshire (late Lord Hobart) is to be Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Mr. N. Vansittart, and Mr. John Sergent, are, as treading in the steps of George Rose and Mr. Long, to become Right Honourable Privy Counsellors; upon which list also Mr. R. P. Carew is to be placed. Mr. Hiley is supposed to be destined for the Paymastership in place of George Rose, whom we may reasonably expect to see rewarded for his "long and faithful services" with a pension and a peerage. What further changes of office will take place we shall probably learn in a few days. But, it is evident, that Mr. Bragge must have something, and also Mr. Bond. Not the worshipful Mr. Bond, but a Mr. Bond, who was lately a lord of the Treasury. The Chief Secretaryship of Ireland is, probably, kept open for one of these gentlemen. And this puts one in mind of the Right Honourable George Tierney, of whose services, it is greatly to be appre hended, His Majesty and the public will now be deprived, at least, for a considera. ble time. This gentleman's situation in par liament must, one would think, be somewhat awkward: he stands pledged always to remain opposed to Mr. Windham; and yet, it is hardly probable that he will side with the ministers, both of whom now appear to have left him to shift for himself. What will happen to Mr. Canning is, if possible, still more uncertain. It has been stated, in the public prints, that he has been admitted, in order to make his peace with Mr. Ad. dington, into the presence, not of the minister himself, but into that of the Right Honourable Hiley, who, it is said, signified both his and his brother's forgiveness. If this be true, Mr. Canning will probably remain in possession of his house, his salary of four thousand a year, and also of his other place, mentioned in the PLAIN REPLY." Of Mr. Yorke we hear nothing, in this grand distribution of power and profit. Mr. Addingten seems to have regarded him as having withdrawn himself from under his protection; and, indeed, this Mr. Yorke appears to have done by the intimation, which, at the time when the Addingtons were opposing the ministry, he gave of his intention to sup.

*In speaking of this gentleman's conduct in parliament, I stated, in the preceding sheet, that he voted with the ministry, through the several divisions on the Treaty of peace; but, I now find, that he voted on neither side.

port the ministry, on all future occasions; and also, by his keeping away from the subsequent debates and divisions, even upon the only measure which he thought proper to oppose.- -There are strong evidences, it is said, in the language of the two main branches of The Family, that little cordiality is, at last, likely to be found between them; but, the most formidable difference to the country is that, which, in all probability, will arise with regard to public measures. The Addingtons are said already to sigh after peace. If so, the two parts of the ministry will soon begin to be competitors for public opinion, or, rather, for the support to be de rived from the ignorance and baseness of the worst part of the people; and that, too, upon a subject of all others the most important. Mr. Addington declares for peace; "profound peace?" and though those, who expect real peace from him, may hereafter be called "nature's fools and not his," the odds are, that Mr. Pitt will think that the winning side; and, then, without any regard to the interests or safety of the country, a peace will be concluded, merely that one part of the ministry may not get an advantage over the other! What a noble exemplification is here of Mr Wilberforce's doctrine of consulting popular opinion, and of the system which has been invariably pursued for the last twenty years, namely, the choosing of measures with a view to the permanence of administration, and not of the greatness and sccurity of the country! Here we have the true secret of the decline of the empire. This is the box of our political Pandora. A man bent upon power, and comparatively indifferent to fame; ever fearful about his own interests, and always bold (that is to say, careless) about those of the country, would adopt precisely that rule of conduct, according to which this nation has been governed for many years past; and such conduct would naturally lead to precisely the consequences, which we now see to have taken place.