ministration of criminal justice, as by a Corruption of the laws themselves. The personal character of a man ought to be examined by very severe tests, before the important duties of a judge be committed to his charge. Indeed, the whole course of his professional life ought to be reviewed, and more particularly all the intermediate offices which he has filled, ought to be considered as so many probationary stations on which he is exalted, that the predominant bias of his mind may be more distinctly seen. If a man had at any time, from the innate meanness or depravity of his mind, manifested a disposition to sacrifice the sacred principles of justice to considerations of base expediency, or to fashion or accommodate them to the varying appearance of existing circumstances; if he constantly discovered an inclination to protect in its most wanton excesses, that species of power, which in its natural station is the solid foundation on which the pillars of government must ultimately rest; but which, in its perversion and abuse, leads directly to the establishment of open despotism; if all his sympathies and predilections were alien from the nature of a free constitution; if there were beside, other infallible indications of an intemperate spirit, goaded on by an inherent despotism of character; if he had ever been guilty of any one act of flagrant oppression, which called forth the reprobation of every honest mind, and reduced even his most strenuous eulogists to the humble tone of apology, such a man ought not to receive power over the most worthless animals, much less ought he to be appointed judge of the lives and fortunes of a free people. The baneful effects of conferring othices of trust on those whose previous conduct and character, has afforded strong and general cause of suspicion and jealousy, and who have exhibited dispositions of mind too strongly marked to admit of a charitable interpretation, are deplorable in the extreme. Not only does it stunt the growth of all those moral energies, which are the surest supports of a state, but it tends to disunite talents from virtue, by shutting up the avenues of honourable ambition; if honours and distinctions are conferred on those, who with a blind and stupid rage trample without scruple on the most sacred principles of justice; adieu to that ardour of mind, which kindles at oppression, and rises up by the instinctive impulse of its own excellent nature, the voluntary champion of injured right; ad eu, to that proud spirit of independence and of bonour, which engages the heart and affec

tions on the side of virtue, which power cannot awe into a base acquiescence in its usurpations, and which, even in its corruption or abuse, never can be rendered directly instrumental in tyrannising over the meanest individual of the human race. Is it not, Sir, by a series of mistakes of this nature, that courts of justice fall at last from their natural elevation, and instead of fostering an attachment to liberty, and to all those manly virtues by which the genuine disciples of liberty are ever distinguished, degenerate at last into nurseries of servility, where men are trained to be the supple tools of their superiors? We cannot form a correct estimate of the virtues or vices of

those eminent personages, who have flourished in different ages of the world, unless we take into our consideration, the influence of the education which they have received, the manners of the age in which they have lived, and the circumstances in which they may have been placed; unless we also make a due allowance for the effect of other accidental causes, in checking or calling forth those elementary passions, by whose peculiar combination the prominencies of any character are formed. It is only by clearing men's actions of the extrinsic encumbrances with which they are connected, by stripping them in a manner, of the husk in which they are involved, that we are enabled to penetrate clearly into their true nature, and to mark those in whom the distinctive lineaments of tyranny are faithfully preserved. It would, for instance, be very unjust to fasten on the memory of Charles I. the odious charge of despotisin, because he entertained notions of the regal prerogative inconsistent with a free constitution, without reflecting that the station in which he was placed, disposed him to receive strong prepossessions in favour of the royal power; and, that the education which he received, instead of weakening the force of those pernicious prejudices, rivetted them more strongly on his mind. But there is a radical depravity of heart, an obstinate tendency in the mind to domineer and dragoon, which baffles the correcting influence of accidental causes. It is the pure spirit of mischief transmitted in its primitive inalignity through all the successive changes in the manners, laws, and customs of society, like the river which was fabled by the ancients to run through the sea without imbibing the slightest tincture from the surrounding elements.

-Had Henry the VIIIth been destined to live in happier times, and to fill an inferior station, he never could have been guilty of those sanguinary excesses into which he was

hurried by the unlimited indulgence of his passions; but, he would, notwithstanding have exhibited decisive marks of his true character. His system of government would have been founded on force, not on conciliation; he would have been disgusted with the deliberate circuitous movements of civil judicatories, and would have recommended, on the slightest occasions, the direct and rapid march of military law. When questioned as to the nature of his office, fondly casting back a retrospective glance to an age more suitable to his genius and character, he would have carefully picked up all the scattered fragments of tyranny which he could find; these, after being patched together, he would have exhibited to the astonished beholders as a faint image of his authority. When any of his excesses had drawn upon him general odium, he would have sheltered his shivering nakedness from the storm of popular indignation; not in the durable. robe of immutable justice, but in the filthy rags and remnants of usurped power. In carrying into practical effect an important alteration in any political constitution, it requires a comprehensive, discriminating mind, skilfully to adapt new institutions to the system of which they are intended to form a part; to work them in a manner into the contexture and, constitution of the original fabric. In all those changes and improvements, which tend to give additional energy to a government by concentrating its scattered parts into greater simplicity of construction, a variety of inferior and collateral depositaries of authority, must necessarily be rendered useless, and the relations of subordination must be partially broken. One principal object with those who preside and direct, ought therefore, to be, to establish those relations on the same footing as for merly, and to guard against the growth of any unnatural, anomalous tyranny in the state, by fixing a regular channel of communication between the source of authority, and its most remote ramifications. If any of the mutilated fragments of power be allowed to lie scattered about, great confusion and uncertainty will immediately ensue, and they will be scrambled for and seized by those petty tyrants, who lie in wait for every opportunity to increase their authority, and to draw to themselves a variety of useless and pernicious prerogatives. Hence they are enabled to give the semblance of law and justice, to acts of the basest oppression, and to protect themselves with a strong line of powers and privileges from the consequences of their misconduct and delinquency. Of all the enemies to the liberties of the people,

they are the most formidable. They take their aim from a covert; they walk about with concealed arms; they are the odious reptiles of arbitrary power, who lurk amid the ruins and rubbish of the political edifice, from whence they issue out to harrass and pollute the land with their filthy ravages. These general speculations, I shall conclude with the following quere. If those who publish seditious doctrines are condemned to a long exile, what punishment is adequate to the offence of those, who are guilty of a practical satire on the blessings of a free government?--A SPECULATOR. Edinburgh, Jan. 2, 1805.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

Declaration on the

WAR WITH SPAIN.
Part of the King of England, laid before.
Parliament, and published on Thursday,
the 24th of January, 1805.

From the moment that hostilities had commenced between Great Britain and France, a sufficient ground of war against Spain, on the part of Great Britain, necessarily followed from the treaty of St. Lidehouso, if not disclaimed by Spain. -That treaty in fact identified Spain with the Republican Government of France, by a virtual acknowledgment of unqualified vassalage, and by specific stipulations of unconditional offence.--By the articles of that treaty Spain covenanted to furnish a stated contingent of naval and military force for the prosecution of any war in which the French Republic might think proper to engage. She specifically surrendered any right or pretension to inquire into the nature, origin, or justice of that war. She stipulated, in the first instance, a contingent of troops and ships, which, of itself, comprised no moderate proportion of the means at her disposal; but in the event of this contingent being at any time found insufficient for the purposes of France, she further bound herself to put into a state of activity the utmost force, both by sea and land, that it should be in her power to collect. covenanted that this force should be at the disposal of France, to be employed conjointly or separately for the annoyance of the common enemy; thus submitting her entire power and resources to be used as the instruments of French ambition and aggression, and to be applied in whatever proportion rance might think proper, for the avowed purpose of endeavouring to subvert the government and destroy the national existence of Great Brita n.--The characte of such a treaty gave Great Eritain an incor testible right to declare to Spain, that unlo

She

she decidedly renounced the treaty, or gave assurances that she would not perform the obligations of it, she would not be considered as a neut al power.This right, however, for prudential reasons, and from motives of forbearance and tenderness towards Spain, was not exercised in its full extent: and, in consequence of assurances of a pacific disposition on the part of the Spanish government, his Majesty did not, is the first instance, insist on a distinct and formal renunciation of the treaty. It does not appear that any express demand of succour had been made by France before the Month of July, one thousand eight hundred and three; and on the first notification of the war, his Majesty's minister at Madrid was led to believe, in consequence of communications which passed between him and the Spanish government, that his Catholic Majesty did not consider himself as necessarily bound by the mere fact of the existence of a war between Great Britain and France, without subsequent explanation and discussion, to fulfil the stipulations of the treaty of St. Ildephonso, though the articles of that treaty would certainly give rise to a very different interpretation. In the month of October a convention was signed, by which Spain agreed to pay to France a certain sum monthly in lieu of naval and military succours which they had stipulated by the treaty to provide, but of the amount of this sum, or of the nature of any other stipulations which that convention might contain, no official information whatever was given -It was immediately stated by his Majesty's minister at Madrid to the Spanish government, that a subsidy as large as that which they were supposed to have engaged to pay to France, far exceeded the bounds of forbearance: that it could only meet with a temporary connivance, as if it was continued, it might prove in fact a greater injury than any other hostility. In reply to these remonstrances, it was represented as an expedient to gain time, and assurances were given which were confirmed by circumstances, which came to his Majesty's knowledge from other quarters, that the disposition of the Spanish government would induce them to extricate thei selves from this engagement, if the course of events should admit of their doing so with safety. When his Majesty had first reason to believe that such a convention was concluded, he directed his minister at Madrid to declare that his forbearing to consider Spain as an enemy must depend in some degree upon the amount of the succours, and upon her maintaining a perfect neutrality in all other respects; but that it would be im

possible for him to consider a permanent payinent, to the amount of that which was stated to have been in agitation, in any other light than as a direct subsidy of war. Bis Majesty's envoy was directed, therefore, first to protest against the convention, as a violation of neutrality, and a justifiable cause of war; secondly, to declare, that our abstaining from hostilities must depend upon its being only a temporary measure, and that we must be at liberty to consider a perseverance in it as a cause of war; thirdly, that the entrance of any French troops into Spain must be refused; fourthly, that any naval preparation must be a great cause of jealousy, and any attempt to give naval assistance to France an immediate cause of war; fifthly, that the Spanish ports must remain open to our commerce, and that our ships of war must have equal treatment with those of France. His Majesty's minister was also instructed, if any French troops entered Spain, or if he received authentic informa tion of any naval armaments preparing for the assistance of France, to leave Madrid, and to give immediate notice to our naval commanders, that they might proceed to hostilities without the delay that might be occasioned by a reference home.---The execution of these instructions produced a variety of discussions; during which his Majesty's minister told Mr. Cevallos, in answer to his question, whether a continuance of such pecuniary succours to France would be considered as a ground of war, and whether he was authorised to declare it? that he was so cuthorised, and that war would be the infallible consequence.It was. however, still thought desirable by his Majesty to protract, if possible, the decision of this question; and it was therefore stated in the instructions to his minister at Madrid, that as the subsidy was represented by the Spanish government to be merely a temporary measure, his Majesty might still continue to overlook it for a time; but that his decision in this respect must depend upon knowing the precise nature of all the stipulations between Spain and France, and upon the Spanish government being determined to cause their neutrality to be respected in all other particulars. That until these questions were answered in a satisfactory manner, and the convention communicated to him, he could give no positive answer whether he would make the pecuniary succours a cause of war or not.- -Before the receipt of these instructions, dated January 21, 1804, the report of some naval armaments in the ports of Spain had occasioned a fresh correspondence between his Majesty's minister and the Spa

K

nish government. In one of the notes présented by the former, he declares, that if the King was forced to begin a war, he would want no other declaration than what he had already made. The answers of the Spanish government were at first of an evasive nature; his Majesty's minister closed the correspondence on his part by a note delivered on the Eighteenth February, in which he declares that all further forbearance on the part of England must depend upon the cessation of all naval armaments, and a prohibition of the sale of prizes in their ports; and unless these points were agreed to without modification, he had orders to leave Madrid. On the second of these points a satisfactory answer was given, and orders issued accordingly; on the first a reference was made to former declarations. To the question about disclosing the treaty with France no satisfactory answer was ever given. As however no naval preparations appeared to be proceeding at that period in the ports of Spain, the matter was allowed to remain there for a time.--In the month of July, one thousand eight hundred and four, the government of Spain gave assurances of faithful and settled neutrality, and disavowed any orders to arm in their ports; yet in the subsequent month, when these assurances were recent, and a confident reliance reposed in them, the British Chargé d'Affaires received advice from the admiral commanding his Majesty's ships off the port of Ferrol, that reinforcements of soldiers and sailors had arrived through Spain for the French fleets at Toulon and Ferrol. On this intelligence two notes were presented to the Spanish ministers, but no answer was received to either of them. Towards the end of the Month of September, information was received in London from the British 'admiral stationed off Ferrol, that orders had actually been given by the court of Madrid, for arming, witnout loss of time, at that port, four ships of the line, two frigates, and other smaller vessels; that (according to his intelligence) similar orders have been given at Carthagena and Cadiz, and particularly that three first rate ships of the line were direct ed to sail from the last mentioned port; and as an additional proof of hostile intentions, that orders had been given to arm the pacquets as in time of war. Here then appeared a direct and unequivocal violation of the terms on which the continuance of peace had been acquiesced in; previou notice having been given to the Spanish government, that a state of war would be the im mediate consequence of such a ureasure, his Majesty on this event stood almost pledged

to an instant commencement of hostilities; the King however preferred a persevering adherence to the system of moderation so congenial to his disposition: he resolved to leave still an opening for accommodation, if Spain should be still allowed the liberty to adopt the course prescribed by a just sense of her own interests and security. It is here worthy of remark, that the groundless and ungrateful imputations thrown out against his Majesty's conduct in the Spanish manifesto, are built upon the foundation of this forbearance alone. Had his Majesty exercised, without reserve, his just rights of war, the representations so falsely asserted, and so insidiously dwelt upon, could not have been even stated under any colourable pretext: the indulgence, therefore, which postponed the actual state of war, was not only misrepresented, but transformed into a ground of complaint, because the forbearance extended to the aggressors was not carried to a dangerous and inadmissible extreme. In consequence of intelligence above stated, directions were sent to his Majesty's minister at Madrid, to make representations and remonstrances to the Spanish court, to demand explanations relative to the existing conventions between Spain and France; and, above all, to insist that the naval armaments in their ports should be placed on the same footing as they were previously to the commencement of hostilities between Great Britain and France: And he was further directed, explicitly to state to the Spanish government, that his Majesty felt a duty imposed upon him of ta king, without delay, every measure of precaution; and, particularly, of giving orders to his admiral off the port of Ferrol to prevent any of the Spanish ships of war sailing from that port, or any additional ships of war from entering it -No substantial redress, no satisfactory explanation, was afforded in consequence of these repeated representations; whilst, under the cover of his Majesty's forbearance, the enemy had received considerable remittances of treasure together with the facility of procuring other supplies. very circumstance of the conduct of Spain was peculiarly calculated to excite the attention of the British goveinment- the removal of Spanish shops out of their docks, to make room for the accommodation of the men of war of France. the march of French troops and seamen through the Spanish territory--the equipment of naval armaments at Ferrol - the consideration that the junction of this armyment with the French ships already in that harbour, would create a di ciddi s penority of numbers over his Majesty's squadron cruiz

ing off that port-the additional naval exertions, and the consequent increase of expense which this conduct of Spain necessarily imposed upon Great Britain, All these together required those precautions, both of representation and action, to which his MaBesty had immediate recourse. While offi

cial notice was g ven of his Majesty's intention to adopt those necessary measures, the Spanish government was at the same time assured, that his Majesty still felt an earnest desire to maintain a good understanding with Spain; but that the continuance of such a state of things must be subject to the condition of abstaining, on their part, from all hostile preparations, and on inaking without hesitation or reserve, that full and explicit disclosure of the nature and extent of the subsisting engagements with France, which had hitherto been so frequently and so fruitlessly demanded. The precautions adopted by his Majesty were such only as he deemed indispensably necessary to guard against the augmentation by Spain of her means of naval preparation during the discussion, and against the possible consequences of the fafe arrival of the expected American treasure in the Spanish ports; an event which has more than once, in former times, become the epoch of the termination of discussions, and of the commencement of hostility on the part of Spain -The orders issued by his Majesty, on this occasion, to the admirals commanding his fleets, afford the most striking example of a scrupulous and indulgent forbearance; the most strict limitation was given, as to the extent and object - of the measures proposed; and the execution of those orders was guarded with the strongest injunctions to avoid, by every means consistent with attainment of their object, any act of violence or hostility against the dominions or subjects of his Catholic Majesty. The hostile preparations in the harbour of Ferrol rendered it necessary, in the first instance, that a reinforcement should be added to the squadron cruizing off that port; and orders were at the same time conveyed to the British admirals, to send intination to the Spanish government of the instructions they had received, and of their determination in consequence to resist, under the present circumstances, the sailing cither of the French or Spanish fleets, if any attempt should be made by either of them. His Majesty's pleasure was at the same time sigantied, that they were not to detain, in the first instance, any ship belonging to his Catholic Majesty, sailing from a port of Spain; but to require the commander of such ship to return directly

to the port from whence she came, and only, in the event of his refusing to comply with such requisition, to detain and send her to Gibraltar or to England. Further directions were given not to detain any Spanish homeward-bound ships of war, unless they should have treasure on board, nor merchant ships of that nation, however laden on any account whatsoever. That in the prosecution of those measures of precaution, many valuable lives should have been sacrificed, is a subject of much regret to his Majesty, who laments it as an event produced alone by an unhappy concurrence of circumstances, but which can in no degree affect the merits of the case. The question of the just principle.and doe exercise of his Majesty's right, rests upon every foundation of the laws of nature and of nations, which enjoin and justify the adoption of such measures as are requisite for detence and the prevention of aggression.

-It remains only further to observe, that if any additional proof were requisite of the wisdom and necessity of precautionary measures, that proof would be found even in the declaration relied upon in the manifesto of Spain, in which its government now states itself to have contemplated from the beginning of the war, the necessity of making itself a party to it, in support of the pretensions of France, expressly declaring, that "Spain and Holland, who treated conjointly with France at Amiens, and whose "interests and political relations were so "closely connected with her, must have "with difficulty refrained from taking part "against the injuries and insults offered to "their ally."- It will further appear, by a

reference to the dates and results of the several representations made by his Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at the court of Spain, that the detention of the Spanish treasure ships never was in question during the discussions which preceded his departure from Madrid. That ground of complaint therefore, which has since been so much relied upon, formed no part of the motive of the previous hostile character so strongly manifested by the Spanish court in their mode of treating the points in discussion, nor (as will appear in the sequel) of the final rupture of the negotiation at Madrid. On the twenty-sixth of October, one thousand eight hundred and four, his Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presented a note to the Spanish minister, in which the following conditions were insisted upon, as preliminary to the appointment of a minister from Great-Britain, who might treat of the adjustment of other matters which remained for discussion. The conditions were three: