extradited from the United States, on a charge of forgery. (a)

It is a good cause of challenge to a juror, if he has said he would hang the prisoner, if on his jury. (6)

A Statute directed a jurors' book to be made up in each year, for use in the year following, and declared that such book should be in use from the first of January, for and during one year. In November, 1865, at a sitting of a special commission, a panel was returned from the then existing jury book. The jurors were not then called, but the sitting was duly adjourned to the 19th of January, 1866, at which time the trial took place, when the jurors named in the return of November, 1865, were called. One of the jurors, who had been duly returned in November, 1865, not being in the list for 1866 :-Held, that this was not a ground of challenge to him. Nor did these facts shew any ground for challenge to the array. (c)

If one party apprehend the array will be challenged, on account of relationship between himself and the Sheriff, he may have the process directed to the Coroner, with the consent of the other party; and if the other do not consent, but insists there is no cause for the change of process, he cannot afterwards take advantage of the objection which he has himself alleged to be futile. (d)

At any time, before a juror is sworn, he may be examined as to his qualification, whether before or after the peremptory challenges are exhausted, in order to ascertain whether he is a person qualified to be a juror. (e)

If thirteen jurors are sworn to try the prisoner, the

swearing of the thirteenth would be void, and the other twelve would constitute the jury. (a)

Though a challenge has been improperly disallowed, yet, if no improper person get on the jury, their verdict, when none of them are disqualified, supports the judg ment on the indictment. (b)

If, after a prisoner's challenge to a juror is disallowed, the Crown then challenged him, and the prisoner objected to it, unless the Crown shewed cause, in the first instance, or the prisoner contended the cause shewn by the Crown was insufficient, this would be a consenting to the juror as a proper juryman to be admitted to try the cause, or a waiver of all objection to him, and the prisoner could not, after that, revive his own original exception. (c)

So, after the improper disallowance of a challenge to one juror, the prisoner would be bound to renew his exceptions specifically to any jurors called afterwards, in order to establish a ground of error, or cause of complaint as to them. (d)

It is settled law that, unless a juryman is challenged before he is sworn, he cannot be challenged afterwards, except by consent. (e)

A prisoner cannot challenge at all until a full jury appears, and he must challenge to the array before he challenges to the polls. He must abide by his peremptory challenge when he makes it, and cannot withdraw it, and challenge another juror instead. The prisoner must also shew all his causes of objection before the Crown is called upon to shew cause. The party begin

(a) Reg. v. Coulter, 13 U. C. C. P. 303, per Draper, C. J.

(b) Whelan v. Reg., 28 U. C. Q. B. 137, per Draper, C. J. (c) Ib. 53-4.

(d) Ib. 61, per A. Wilson, J.

(e) Reg. v. Coulter, 13 U. C. C. P. 301, per Draper, C. J.; Reg. v. Mellor, 4 Jur. N. S. 214.

ning to challenge must finish all his challenges before the other begins, and all challenges of the same kind and degree must be suggested against the juror at the same time. (a)

When there are two prisoners for trial, it would not be ground of error if the Judge directed one of them to challenge first, and to make his peremptory challenges before his challenges for cause, and then allow the other his challenges in like order. In such latter case, on a juror being called against whom there was a cause of challenge to the favour, he would not be challenged peremptorily, but would go into the jury box, to abide the result of all the challenges; and, when the peremptory challenges were through, those for cause would be proceeded with, and the juror would then be reached. (b)

When a prisoner, on his trial, assumes to challenge a juror for cause, it is competent for the Crown either to demur or to counterplead-that is, set up some new matter consistent with the matter of challenge, to vacate and annul it, as a ground of challenge, or to deny the truth, in point of fact, of what is alleged for matter of challenge. (c) The latter mode is the only one calling for the intervention of triors. (d)

A writ of error lies for every substantial defect appearing on the face of the record, for which the indictment might have been quashed, or which would have been fatal on demurrer, or in arrest of judgment. A writ of error is, therefore, the proper remedy for certain substantial defects appearing on the face of the record. (e)

A court of error is confined to errors appearing on the face of the record, and cannot exercise an appellate juris

(a) Whelan v. Reg., 28 U. C. Q. B. 49.

(b) Ib. 47.50.

(c) Whelan v. Reg., 28 U. C. Q. B. 168-9, per Gwynne, J. (d) Ib.

(e) Duval dit Barbinas v. Reg., 14 L. C. R. 71.

diction, and enquire into the facts of the case, or, for any purpose, consider a matter not appearing on the record. (a)

Unless there be manifest error on the face of the record, it is the duty of the Court to affirm the judgment. (6)

The matter is to be decided as a strictly legal proposition, and, no consideration of the effect which the decision may have upon the parties, will be permitted to be taken into consideration, to mould the judgment of the Court by the exercise of discretion. (c)

A writ of error will lie where a venire facias for the summoning of jurors is addressed to improper parties. (d) No writ of error will be allowed in any criminal case, unless founded on some question of law which could not have been reserved, or which the Judge presiding at the trial refused to reserve for the consideration of the Court having jurisdiction in such cases. (e)

Whether the Police Court is a Court of Justice, within 32 & 33 Vic., c. 21, s. 18, or not, is a question of law, which may be reserved by the Judge at the trial, under Con. Stat. U. C., c. 112, s. 1; and where it does not appear, upon the record in error, that the Judge refused to reserve such question, it cannot be considered upon a writ of error. (f)

There is no case in which the discretion of a Judge, exercised on a mixed question of law and fact, has been reviewed in error. (g)

It would seem that, when a Judge has a discretion to do or omit to do a particular thing, his judgment, in the

(a) Duval dit Barbinas v. Reg., 14 L. C. R. 79, per Duval, C. J., 75, per Meredith, J.

(b) Whelan v. Reg., 28 U. C. Q. B. 139, per Draper, C. J.

(c) Ib. 94.

(d) Reg. v. Kennedy, 26 U. C. Q. B. 332, per Draper, C. J.; Crane v. Holland, Cro. El. 138. See also Willoughby v. Egerton, Cro. El. 853.

(e) 32 & 33 Vic. c. 29, s. 80; Reg. v. Mason, 32 U. C. Q. B. 246.

(f) Reg. v. Mason, supra.

(g) Winsor v. Reg. L. R. 1 Q. B. 316.

exercise of that discretion, is not subject to revision in error. Rules of practice or procedure, on a criminal trial, rest pretty much in the discretion of the Judge, and cannot be made the foundation of a writ of error. (a)

The right of postponing the hearing and trial of the cause, urged by a prisoner as a ground of challenge, is discretionary with the Judge, and the question is only one of practice or procedure, and, therefore, not examinable in error. (b)

A challenge to the array overruled would be a ground of error, if the party did not afterwards challenge to the polls. (c)

The improper granting or refusing of a challenge is alike the foundation of a writ of error. (d)

The proceedings, on a rule for contempt, on the Crown side of the Court of Queen's Bench, do not constitute a criminal case within Con. Stat. L. C., c. 77, s. 56, and, as a writ of error does not lie, at common law, on an adjudication for contempt, for it is a judgment in immediate execution not examinable in any other tribunal; therefore, a writ of error does not lie with respect to judg ment rendered on such a rule. (e)

For an improper award of a venire de novo, a writ of error lies for the subject. (ƒ)

The proper proceeding to reverse a judgment of the Court of Quarter Sessions is by writ of error, not by Habeas Corpus and certiorari, as in the case of summary convictions. (g)

No writ of error lies upon a summary conviction, and

(a) Winsor v. Reg., L. R. 1 Q. B. 316; Whelan v. Reg., 28 U. C. Q. B. 1 et seq.

(b) Ib. 133.

(c) Ib. 61, per Wilson, J.

(d) Ib. 93.

(e) Ramsay v. Reg., 11 L. C. J. 158.

(f) Reg. v. Charlesworth, 9 U. C. L. J. 51, per Crompton, J.

(9) Reg. v. Powell, 21 U. C. Q. B. 215.