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County Courts have no jurisdiction in penal actions, unless it is expressly given them by Statute. (a)

County Courts have jurisdiction, under Con. Stats. U. C., c. 124, s. 2, to try an action for a penalty against a Justice of the Peace, where the penalty claimed does not exceed $80. (b)

The Court of Quarter Sessions does not possess any greater powers than are conferred on it by Statute. It has, however, jurisdiction over offences attended with a breach of the peace. But forgery and perjury, not being attended with a breach of the peace, are not triable at the Sessions. (c)

Under 32 & 33 Vic., c. 20, s. 48, the Sessions of the Peace cannot try the offences specified in sections 27, 28, and 29 of that Act. A similar provision is made by c. 21, s. 92, as to certain offences under it. By c. 29 of the same year, s. 12, no Court of General or Quarter Sessions, or Recorder's Court, nor any Court but a Superior Court, having criminal jurisdiction, shall have power to try any treason, or any felony punishable with death, or any libel. The exceptions contained in the last three named Statutes, and the excepted cases of forgery and perjury, define, as nearly as may be, what the general jurisdiction of the Sessions of the Peace is. The unexcepted offences they may try. (d)

As the Court of Quarter Sessions has no jurisdiction in perjury, a recognizance to appear for trial on such a charge at the Sessions is wrong; but a certiorari to re

(a) O'Reilly q. t. v. Allan, 11 U. C. Q. B. 526.

(b) Brash q. t. v. Taggart, 16 U. C. C. P. 415.

(c) Reg. v. M'Donald, 31 U. C. Q. B. 337-9; Reg. v. Yarrington, 1 Salk. 406; Rex v. Haynes, R. & M. 298; Rex v. Higgins, 2 Ea. 5; Butt v. Conant, 1 B. & B. 548; ex parte Bartlett, 7 Jur. 649; Reg. v. Dunlop, 15 U. C. Q. B. 118; Reg. V. Currie, 31 U. C. Q. B. 582.

(d) Reg. v. M'Donald, supra, 339, per Wilson, J.

is discharged, the successful party is

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ng Sessions. It was not ad granted a new trial, solely defendant:-Held, that the Sessions

new trial, though there had been a judg sentence pronounced at the same Sessions, at the Superior Court had no authority to review udgment of the Sessions, in ordering a new trial. (d) The Court of Quarter Sessions has a general power to journ, unless an Act of Parliament plainly intimates an intention that they should not have such power. (e) The power of adjournment of any matter of which the Court of Sessions may be seized is inherent in the Court, and such adjournment need not be to the next, but may be to any future, Court. Nor need there be a formal adjournment, if some proceeding is adopted by the Court which, virtually, amounts to an adjournment. (ƒ)

Where a Statute enables two Justices to do an act, the Justices, sitting in Quarter Sessions, may do the same

(a) Reg. v. Currie, 31 U. C. Q. B. 582.

(b) Reg. v. M'Donald, 31 U. Č. Q. B. 338, per Wilson, J.; Campbell v. Reg. 11 Q. B. 799-814.

(c) Reg. v. Simpson, 1 Hannay, 32.

(d) Reg. v. Fitzgerald, 20 U. Č. Q. B. 546.

(e) See Reg. v. Murray, 27 U. Č. Q. B. 134.

(ƒ) Reg. v. Justices, Westmoreland, L. R. 3 Q. B. 457.

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are not the less Justices of the Peace, beitting in Court in that capacity. (a)

hat the Chairman of the Quarter Sesny order of the Court, except during ular or adjourned. (b)

e same powers as the Superior judgments during the same + purpose, the Sessions, as e day. (c)

Sessions might grant

gs or sessions at which the

of the Sessions, the appellant's counsel

proved his case. The respondent did not

It was not known that he had employed counand the Court ordered the conviction to be quashed. On the second day, counsel appeared, and stated he had been employed, and was taken by surprise, and explained the reason of his non-appearance, on the first day, to the satisfaction of the Court and the appellant's counsel, and applied to have the order of the Court, quashing the conviction, discharged. The Chairman intimated that the application must not be understood in the nature of a new trial, and that, if a jury had decided the case, the authority of the Sessions to disturb the verdict might be doubted; but held, on the authority of Holborn v. Danes, (d) that the Court had power to revoke the order quashing the conviction, for they could alter their judgment at any time during the same Session. (e)

It seems that the fact of a Bench warrant having no

(a) Fraser v. Dickson, 5 U. C. Q. B. 233, per Robinson, C. J.
(b) Re Coleman, 23 Ú. C. Q. B. 615.

(c) Reg. v. Fitzgerald, 20 U. C. Q. B. 546, per Robinson, C. J.
(d) 2 Salk. 494-606.

(e) M'Lean and M'Lean, 9 U. C. L. J. 217.

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move it will be refused, if the time for the appearance of the party has gone by. (a)

The Quarter Sessions is a Court of Oyer and Terminer, and a venire de novo may be awarded to it by the Queen's Bench. (b)

If an order of Justices, in Sessions, be defective in one part, it may be quashed as to that, and confirmed as to the rest, if the different parts can be separated. (c)

Defendant was convicted of an assault at the Quarter Sessions, and fined; but, during the same Sessions, and on the second day after the sentence was pronounced, on filing an affidavit of his own, he obtained a new trial, and was acquitted at the following Sessions. It was not shewn that the Sessions had granted a new trial, solely on the affidavit of the defendant:-Held, that the Sessions might grant a new trial, though there had been a judg ment, and sentence pronounced at the same Sessions, and that the Superior Court had no authority to review the judgment of the Sessions, in ordering a new trial. (d)

The Court of Quarter Sessions has a general power to adjourn, unless an Act of Parliament plainly intimates an intention that they should not have such power. (e) The power of adjournment of any matter of which the Court of Sessions may be seized is inherent in the Court, and such adjournment need not be to the next, but may be to any future, Court. Nor need there be a formal adjournment, if some proceeding is adopted by the Court which, virtually, amounts to an adjournment. (ƒ)

Where a Statute enables two Justices to do an act, the Justices, sitting in Quarter Sessions, may do the same

(a) Reg. v. Currie, 31 U. C. Q. B. 582.

(b) Reg. v. M‘Donald, 31 U. Č. Q. B. 338, per Wilson, J.; Campbell v. Reg. 11 Q. B. 799-814.

(c) Reg. v. Simpson, 1 Hannay, 32.

(d) Reg. v. Fitzgerald, 20 U. C. Q. B. 546.

(e) See Reg. v. Murray, 27 U. C. Q. B. 134.

(f) Reg. v. Justices, Westmoreland, L. R. 3 Q. B. 457.

act; for they are not the less Justices of the Peace, because they are sitting in Court in that capacity. (a)

It would seem that the Chairman of the Quarter Sessions cannot make any order of the Court, except during the Sessions, either regular or adjourned. (b)

The Sessions possess the same powers as the Superior Courts as to altering their judgments during the same Sessions, or term; and, for that purpose, the Sessions, as the term, is all looked upon as one day. (c)

In this case, it was held that the Sessions might grant a new trial at the same sittings or sessions at which the conviction took place.

On the first day of the Sessions, the appellant's counsel called on and proved his case. The respondent did not appear. It was not known that he had employed counsel, and the Court ordered the conviction to be quashed. On the second day, counsel appeared, and stated he had been employed, and was taken by surprise, and explained the reason of his non-appearance, on the first day, to the satisfaction of the Court and the appellant's counsel, and applied to have the order of the Court, quashing the conviction, discharged. The Chairman intimated that the application must not be understood in the nature of a new trial, and that, if a jury had decided the case, the authority of the Sessions to disturb the verdict might be doubted; but held, on the authority of Holborn v. Danes, (d) that the Court had power to revoke the order quashing the conviction, for they could alter their judgment at any time during the same Session. (e)

It seems that the fact of a Bench warrant having no

(a) Fraser v. Dickson, 5 U. C. Q. B. 233, per Robinson, C. J. (b) Re Coleman, 23 U. C. Q. B. 615.

(c) Reg. v. Fitzgerald, 20 U. C. Q. B. 546, per Robinson, C. J. (d) 2 Salk. 494-606.

(e) M'Lean and M'Lean, 9 U. C. L. J. 217.

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