When a record of acquittal or conviction is produced at nisi prius, the Court cannot enquire into the circumstances under which it is brought forward.

In a case of felony, as well as misdemeanor, a copy of the record of acquittal may be, and, indeed, must be, received in evidence when offered, without its being necessary to shew that an order of a Judge has been obtained, sanctioning the delivery of a copy, though it seems the officer having the custody of the records should not deliver it without an order. (a)

Where a conviction has been returned to the Sessions, and filed by the Clerk of the Peace, but quashed on appeal afterwards made to the Sessions, the quashing may be proved by an order under the seal of that Court, signed by its clerk, directing that the conviction should be quashed the conviction itself being in evidence, and the connection between it and the order being shewn. (b) After the return of the conviction, it becomes a record, and may be proved as other records.

It is not necessary to make up a formal record of the judgment on the appeal, for the Con. Stats. U. C., c. 114, enables the Court of Quarter Sessions to dispose of the conviction, "by such order as to the Court shall see meet."

It would seem that the minute book of the Sessions, having an apparently proper caption, and signed by the Clerk of the Peace, would not be sufficient proof per se of the judgment of the Court quashing the conviction without proof of the order following it; but, if the further proof were added that, in practice, no other record is kept or made up, the minute book would be evidence. So the minute book would be evidence as to indictments,

(a) Lusty v. Magrath, 6 U. C. Q. B. O. S. 340.

(b) Neill v. McMillan, 25 U. C. Q. B. 485.

verdicts, and judgments in criminal matters, at the sessions. (a)

A conviction, before a Police Magistrate, can only be proved by the production of the record of the conviction, or an examined copy of it. Where a Police Magistrate, after hearing a case of common assault, ordered the accused to enter into a recognizance and pay the recogni zance fee, but did not order him to be imprisoned, or to pay any fine-Held, that this was not a conviction within the corresponding English section of the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 20, s. 45, and secondly, if a conviction, it was not proved by the magistrate's clerk stating the above facts, without producing a record of the proceedings. (b)

An information, and other proceedings before a Justice of the Peace, returned to the Supreme Court with a certiorari, and filed with the Clerk of the Crown, becomes a record, and may be proved by an examined copy taken before the original was filed. (c)

To prove the finding of an indictment at the Sessions, it is not sufficient to produce an exemplification of the record of acquittal, without any general heading or caption to it, (d) and it would seem the proper way of proving it is to have the record regularly drawn up, and produce an examined copy. (e)

The production of the original indictment is insufficient to prove an indictment for felony, and a record shewing a proper caption must be made up. (ƒ)

A judgment of the Court of Quarter Sessions, affirming a conviction of the defendant before a Magistrate, on a charge of assaulting H. M., " by using insulting and abu

(a) Neill v. McMillan, 25 U. C. Q. B. 494, per Draper, C. J.

(b) Hartley v. Hindmarsh, L. R. 1 C. P. 553.

(c) Sewell v. Olire, 4 Allen, 394.

(d) Aston v. Wright, 13 U. C. C. P. 14.

(e) Ib. 19, per Draper, C. J.

(f) Henry v. Little, 11 U. C. Q. B. 296; Rex v. Smith, 8 B. & C. 341. See also on this 32 & 33 Vic. c. 29, s. 77.

sive language to him, in his own office and on the public street, and by using his fist in a threatening and menacing manner to the face and head of the said H. M.," is sufficient proof of a breach of the peace. (a)

The Court will judicially notice a public Statute. (b) By the Interpretation Act, 31 Vic., c. 1, s. 7, thirty-eighthly every Act shall be deemed to be a Public Act, and shall be judicially noticed by all Judges, Justices of the Peace and others without being specially pleaded, and all copies of Acts public or private, printed by the Queen's Printer, shall be evidence of such Acts and of their contents, and every copy purporting to be printed by the Queen's Printer shall be deemed to be so printed, unless the contrary be shewn.

Where an Act of Parliament makes a Gazette evidence if it purport to be printed " by the Queen's Printer," or "by the Queen's Authority," a Gazette purporting to be printed by A. B., without giving his style as Queen's Printer, and purporting to be printed "by authority," is not receivable: quare would evidence aliunde be admissible to shew that A. B. was the Queen's Printer, and that the authority was the Queen's Authority. (c)

On a charge of murder, threats made by the prisoner to a third person, more than six months before the commission of the crime, that the prisoner would take the law into his own hands are clearly admissible, though, there are friendly relations between the parties, afterwards, and, if undue prominence is given to these threats in the charge to the jury, the prisoner's counsel should call the attention of the Court to it, and request that the jury

(a) Reg. v. Harmer, 17 U. C. Q. B. 555.

(b) See Reg. v. Shaw, 23 U. C. Q. B. 616.

(c) Reg. v. Wallace, 2 U. C. L. J. N. S. 138; 10 Cox, 500.

should be told that, if there were subsequent acts of kindness and expressions of friendliness, they would raise a presumption of kindness to rebut that of malice. (a) The reception of evidence in reply is as a general rule in the discretion of the Judge, subject to be reviewed by the Court. Evidence in explanation of some matter, brought out by the prisoner's witnesses, is properly received in reply. (b)

According to the strict practice, a party cannot, after closing his case, put in any evidence, unless by permission of the Judge. (c)

In an action for libel, the plaintiff cannot, after closing his case, have a paper, which he proved before, read and and filed, except in the discretion of the Judge trying the case. (d)

Before the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 29, s. 80, did away with the granting of new trials in criminal cases, it was held that the rule is the same in the latter as in civil cases; at any rate, where the prisoner is defended by counsel, that any objection to the charge of the presiding Judge, either for non-direction or for mis-direction, must be taken at the trial, when it can be directly cured; and if not then taken, it cannot be afterwards raised on motion for new trial, or otherwise, especially when the evidence fully sustains the verdict-that non-direction is not an available objection when the verdict is not against evidence; and where the law is clear, it is no mis-direction to leave the facts simply to the jury, for they are judges of the evidence that mis-direction could only be on a point of law, and not on a matter of fact. (e)

(e) Reg. v. Fick, 16 U. C. C. P. 379. See also Cousins v. Merrill, 16 U. C. C. P. 120.

The improper reception of evidence upon a criminal trial is not necessarily a ground for quashing the conviction, if the other evidence adduced be amply sufficient to sustain it. (a)

It would seem that, as the law now stands in Canada, when material evidence has been incorrectly admitted or rejected, or the verdict, though regularly obtained, is manifestly contrary to the evidence, the proper remedy for the prisoner is an application to the Crown for a pardon. (b)

A bill of exceptions will not lie in a criminal case. (c) It follows that, in a criminal case, a question as to the reception of evidence, or the rulings of the Judge thereon, or his directions to the jury, cannot be raised on the record, so as to constitute a ground of error; (d) for the effect of a bill of exceptions is to raise the point excepted to specifically on the record, so as to be subject to revision in error. (e)

An indictment in a criminal prosecution of the defendant is not admissible as evidence in a civil suit against him. (f)

The fabrication of evidence, by a prisoner or inducing a witness to swear in his favour, is most damaging to the prisoner's case. (g)

The reading to witnesses of the Judge's notes of their evidence, taken on a former trial, should be discouraged. Where, on a second trial, at the same sitting, before

(a) Reg. v. Foster, 1 U. C. L. J. 156.

(b) Reg. v. Kennedy, 2 Thomson, 216, per Bliss, J.; ib. 225, per Wilkins, J. (c) Whelan v. Reg. 28 U. C. Q. B. 132, per Draper, C. J. (In E. & A.); Reg. v. Pattee, 5 U. Č. P. R. 292; 7 C. L. J. N. S. 124, per Dalton, J.; Duval dit Barbinas v. Reg. 14 L. C. R. 74, per Meredith, J.; ib. 79, per Ďural, C. J. (in error.)

(d) Winsor v. Reg. L. R. 1 Q. B. 312, per Cockburn, C. J.

(e) Duval dit Barbinas v. Reg. 14 L. C. R. 52.

(f) Winning v. Fraser, 12 L. C. J. 291.

(g) Reg. v. Jones, 28 U. C. Q. B. 416.