these objections could not be taken, for, where assuming the facts to be true, the Magistrate has jurisdiction, the conviction only can be looked to:-Held, also, as to objections 1, 4 and 6, that they were otherwise untenable, and, as to Nos. 2, 3, and 5, that the existence of the Corporation could not be enquired into, on the application to quash the conviction. (a)

Where the defendant, having been convicted on the information of a toll-gate keeper, of evading toll, appealed to the Quarter Sessions, where he was tried before a jury and acquitted, this Court refused a writ of certiorari to remove the proceedings, the effect of which would be to put him a second time on his trial, for which no authority was cited. (b)

The 32 & 33 Vic., c. 22, s. 40, enacts that whosoever, by any unlawful act, or by any wilful omission or neglect, obstructs, or causes to be obstructed, any engine or carriage, using any railway, or aids or assists therein, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

The prisoner unlawfully altered some railway signals at a railway station, from "all clear" to "danger" and "caution." The alteration caused a train, which would have passed the station without slackening speed, to slacken speed, and come nearly to a stand. Another train, going in the same direction and on the same rails, was due at the station in half an hour:-Held, that this was obstructing a train, within the meaning of the above clause. (c)

The Act is not limited to mere physical obstructions. The prisoner, who was not a servant of the railway company, stood on a railway, between two lines of rails, at a point between two stations; as a train was approaching

(a) Reg. v. Caister, 30 U. C. Q. B. 247.

(b) Stewart and Blackburn, 25 U. C. Q. B. 16.

(c) Reg. v. Hadfield, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 253; 39 L. J. (M. C.) 131.

he held up his arms, in the mode used by inspectors of the line when desirous of stopping a train between two stations. The prisoner knew that his doing so would probably induce the driver to stop or slacken speed, and his intention was to produce that effect. This, as the prisoner intended that it should, caused the driver to shut off steam and diminish speed, and led to a delay of four minutes:-Held, that the prisoner had obstructed a train, within the meaning of the Statute. (a)

The 13 & 14 Vic., c. 74, contained provisions prohibiting the sale of Indian lands, but these provisions were omitted in the Con. Stats. Can., c. 9, The subject is now regulated by the 31 Vic., c. 42, and 32 & 33 Vic., c. 6. The latter Act repeals the Con. Stats. Can., c. 9, and is to be construed as one Act with the 31 Vic.. c, 42. The 13 & 14 Vic., c. 74, made the purchasing of any Indian lands, unless under the authority and with the consent of Her Majesty, a misdemeanor, and various decisions took place as to what kind of contract was within the Act. (b)

The 31 Vic.. c. 42, imposes certain penalties on persons trespassing on Indian lands; but, it is apprehended, the decisions under the old Act will not apply to the 31 Vic., c. 42, as the clauses of the former have not been reenacted.

A conviction under the Pawn-brokers' Act, Con. Stats. Can., c. 61, for neglecting to have a sign over the door, as directed by the 7th section, is not sustained by evidence of one transaction alone, for the penalty attaches only on persons" exercising the trade of a pawn-broker," as mentioned in the first section, and a single act of receiving or

(a) Reg. v. Hardy, L. R 1 C. C. R. 278.

(b) See Reg. v. Hagar, 7 U. C. C. P. 380; Reg. v. Baby, 12 U. C..Q. B. 346; Totten v. Watson, 15 U. C. Q. B. 392; Little v. Keating, 6 U. C. Q. B. 0. S.

265.

taking a pawn or pledge is not an exercising the trade or carrying on the business of a pawn-broker. (a)

The return of convictions by Justices of the Peace is now regulated by the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 31, s. 72, the 33 Vic., c. 27, s. 3, and (Ont.) 32 Vic., c. 6, s. 4. The Consolidated Statute of Upper Canada has been repealed. (b)

Under the former Statute a Justice of the Peace was liable for a separate penalty of £20, for each conviction of which a return was not properly made to the Sessions. (c) Justices were not jointly liable in one penalty, but each in a separate penalty for not returning convictions. (d)

The object of the Legislature, in passing the Statutes, was to compel the Justices to make a return of whatever fines they had imposed, in order that their diligence in collecting the fines might be quickened, and also in order that it might be known what money they should admit themselves to have received, so that they might be made to account for it. (e)

The illegality of a conviction is no excuse for not returning it, but, if on that account the fine had not been levied, a return should be made explaining the circumstances. (f)

An order for the payment of money made by a Justice, under the Con. Stats. U. C., c. 75, is not a conviction, which it is necessary to return. (g) A conviction made by an alderman, in a city, must be returned to the next ensuing General Sessions of the Peace for the county, and not to the Recorder's Court for such city. (h)

(a) Reg. v. Andrews, 25 U. C. Q. B. 196.

(b) See 32 & 33 Vic., c. 36.

(c) Donogh, g. t. v. Longworth, 8 U. C. C. P. 437.

(d) Metcalf, q. t. v. Reeve, 9 U. C. Q. B. 263.

(e) O'Reilly, q. t. v.Allan, 11 U. C. Q. B. 415, per Robinson, C. J.

(f) O'Reilly, q. t. v. Allan, supra.

(g) Ranney, q. t. v. Jones, 21 Ú. C. Q. B. 370.

(h) Keenahan, q. t. v. Egleson, 22 U. C. Q. B. 626; see also Ollard, q. t. v. Owens, 29 U. C. Q. B. 515; Grant, q. t. v. M'Fadden, 11 U. C. C. P. 122; Kelly, q. t. v. Cowan, 18 U. C. Q. B. 104; Murphy, q. t. v. Harvey, 9 U. C. C. P. 528.

The form of order given in the schedule to Con. Stats. U. C., c. 123, respecting the costs of distress for rents, and penalties not exceeding $80, states the unlawful charges to have been taken from the complainant, " under a distress for (as the case may be)." In an order under this Statute, it is sufficient to follow the statutory form in stating " a distress for rent," and it is unnecessary to state such suit to have been under $80, in order to shew jurisdiction, and the words "(as the case may be)" direct only the insertion of mere words, specifying the kind of distress, rent or penalty, and an order, in other respects in the statutory form, is not liable to be set aside on the above grounds. (a)

The seller of flour, in barrels not marked or branded, is not liable to the penalty affixed by the 4 & 5 Vic., c. 89, s. 23, which applies only to the manufacturer or packer, and Magistrates have no summary jurisdiction, when the accumulated penalties are more than £10.

When the inspector, in a corporate town, is the informer, he is not entitled to half the penalty. (b)

The Statute only applies to flour made in this Province. (c)

The 8 Vic. c. 45, (d) was passed to prevent the profanation of the Lord's day.

Defendant was convicted, under the 8 Vic., c. 45, "for that he, Jacob Hespeler, of the village of Preston, Esquire, did on Sunday, the 26th day of July last past, at the township of Waterloo, work at his ordinary calling inasmuch as he, and his men, did make, and haul in hay, on the said day." He appealed to the Quarter Sessions,

(a) Reg. v. Stewart, 25 U. C. Q. B. 327.

(b) Reg. v. Beekman, 2 U. C. Q. B. 57. (c) Ib.

id) Con. Stats. U. C., c. 104.

where the question was tried before a jury, and the conviction affirmed. The proceedings having been removed by certiorari to this Court :-Held, that the Statute, 13 & 14 Vic., c. 54, extended to convictions under this Act, and authorized the trial by Jury; though, in the 8 Vic., c. 45, there is a provision for appeal to the Sessions, but not for such trial; that the conviction must be quashed, as not stating any offence within the Statute, for defendant was not alleged to be of, nor to have worked at, any particular calling, nor did it state any facts, from which this might be inferred. The Court also inclined to think the conviction was bad, for not negativing the exception in the Statute, by stating that the work done was not one of necessity. (a) And it seems clear the conviction was bad, on the latter ground, for the exception is contained in the clause creating the offence. (b)

A person is liable, under the Act, for plying with his steamboat, on Sunday, between the city of Toronto and the peninsula-persons carried between those places, not being "travellers" within the meaning of the exception in the first section. (c)

A note made on Sunday, in payment of goods sold, on that day, is void as between the original parties, but not as against an indorsee for value, and without notice. (d)

The giving or taking security, as an ordinary mortgage of personal property, on a Sunday is not void as a buying or selling," within the Act. (e)

But all sales or agreements for a sale of real or personal property made on a Sunday are void. (ƒ)

By 1 & 2 Wm., c, 32, s. 32. "If any person shall kill

(a) Hespeler and Shaw, 16 U. C. Q. B. 104.

() See post, pldg.

(c) Reg. v. Tinning, 11 U. C. Q. B. 636.

(d) Houliston v. Parsons, 9 U. C. Q. B. 681.

(e) Wilt v. Lai, 7 U. C. Q. B. 535.

(f) Lai v. Stall, 6 U. C. Q. B. 506.