pressive, vindictive or corrupt motives, influenced the mind, and prompted the act complained against. (a)

On an application to file a criminal information against a Division Court Judge, for his conduct in imposing a fine, for contempt, upon a barrister employed to conduct a case before him :-Held that, even if his conduct were erroneously treated by the Judge as contemptuous, and, consequently, the adjudication of contempt would, on a full and deliberate examination, be found incorrect, this would afford no ground whatever for a criminal information. (b) It has been questioned whether a criminal information is proper in the case of a Judge of an inferior court of civil jurisdiction in relation to a matter over which he has exclusive jurisdiction. (c)

In Reg. v. Ford (d), an application was made for leave to file a qui tam information against a Judge of a Recorder's Court, upon the grounds that he had falsified the records of the Court, and maliciously condemned applicant as guilty of felony, upon the verdict of his peers, when, as alleged, no verdict whatever was found by the jury. The facts to support the application were, that the jury came into Court to render their verdict, and the foreman pronounced a verdict of guilty. The counsel of the accused then personally questioned some of the Jury as to the grounds of their verdict, when one of them said that he did not concur in the verdict The attention of the Court was not drawn to this dissent, nor did it appear that they were aware of it. A verdict of guilty was recorded by the presiding Judge, and when formally read to the jury by the clerk, no objection was made. The affidavits filed in answer totally denied that

(a) Re Recorder and Judge D. C. Toronto, 23 U. C. Q. B. 376. (b) Ib.

(c) Ib.

(d) 3 U. C. C. P. 209.

the Judge was actuated by any improper motives, and alleged that he was throughout desirous of doing his duty in a fair and impartial manner, without bias or affection for or towards any person or persons whomsoever. The affidavits further shewed that the Judge was not aware of what passed between the counsel of the accused and the jury, nor had he any information that the jury had not agreed, or the least intimation that there was any dissentient among them. The information was refused.

An attachment has been granted against Commissioners of a Court of Requests, for trying a cause in which they were interested. (a) And where a Magistrate acts in his office with a partial, malicious, or corrupt motive, he is guilty of a misdemeanor, and may be proceeded against by indictment or criminal information in the Queen's Bench. (b)

It is a well-established maxim of law that no one shall be a judge in his own cause, and the general rule applic able to judicial proceedings is, that the judgment of an interested judge is voidable, and liable to be set aside by prohibition, error, or appeal, as the case may be. (c) In cases of necessity, however, where all the Judges having exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter happen to be interested, the objection cannot prevail. And the objection does not apply to a party claiming the protection of an Act of Parliament, though he is a necessary party to its passing, as the Governor of a Colony, there being no analogy between judicial and legislative proceedings in this respect. (d)

A direct pecuniary interest in the matter in dispute disqualifies any person from acting as a Judge in such

(a) Rex v. M'Intyre Taylor, 22.

(b) Burns Jus., vol, iii. 144-5, 13 edn.

(c) Phillips v. Eyre, L. R. 6, Q. B. 22, per Willes, J. (d) Ib. 22, per Willes, J.

matter. (a) The interest, however, which disqualifies at common law must be direct and certain, not remote or contingent. (b)

The mere possibility of bias in favour of one of the parties does not ipso facto avoid the Justice's decision; in order to have that effect, the bias must be shewn at least to be real.

The Corporation of B. were the owners of water-works, and were empowered by Statute to take the waters of certain streams, without permission of the mill-owners, on obtaining a certificate of Justices that a certain reservoir was completed of a given capacity, and filled with water. An application was made to Justices accordingly, which was opposed by mill-owners; but, after due enquiry, the Justices granted the certificate. Two of the Justices were trustees of a hospital and friendly society respectively, each of which had lent money to the society on bonds, charging the corporate funds. Neither of the Justices could, by any possibility, have any pecuniary interest in these bonds; but the security of their cestui que trusts would be improved by anything improving the borough fund, and the granting of the certificate would indirectly produce that effect, as increasing the value of the water-works. There was no ground to doubt that the Justices had acted bona fide:-Held that the Justices were not disqualified from acting in the granting of the certificate, and the Court refused a certiorari for the purpose of quashing it. (c)

But if a Judge is really biassed in favour of one of the parties, it would be very wrong in him to act, and seems the Court would interpose in such case. (d)

(a) Reg. v. Rand. L. R. 1 Q. B. 232, per Blackburn, J.

(b) Reg. v. M. S. & L. Ry. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 339, per Mellor, J. (c) Reg. v. Rand, L. R. 1 Q. B. 230.

(d) Ib. 233, per Blackburn, J.

Where the conviction is for a fine-as a fine is imposed by s. 22 for the first offence—it is not necessary to specify whether the conviction is for the first or second offence, as, from the punishment awarded, the Court would imply the first offence; and as the offence is selling liquor without license, it is not necessary to state to whom the liquor was sold. S. 25 of the Act provides that the Magistrate shall proceed in a summary manner, according to the practice and procedure, and after the forms, contained in c. 103 Con. Stats. of Canada. It was held, therefore, that the Magistrate following that Act, in awarding imprisonment in default of distress and commitinent, and conveying to gaol, was not acting illegally, and that it was also sufficient for the conviction to follow the forms given by same Statute. (a)

This Statute was intended as a guide to Magistrates, and to prevent failure of justice. A conviction, therefore, is sufficient if it follows the form prescribed by the Statute. (b)

Where the depositions returned to the Court by the convicting Magistrate, under a Certiorari, shewed that there was no evidence of a license produced before him, while the affidavits filed, on the application to quash, stated that the party had a license in fact, and produced evidence of it before the Magistrate, who, moreover, himself swore that he believed a license was produced, but it was either not proved, or given in evidence:-Held that the return to the Certiorari was conclusive, and that the Court could not go behind it. (c)

The informer is a competent witness, as he is expressly made so by the Statute. (d)

(a) Reg. v. Strachan, 20 U. C. C P. 182; Re Allison, 10 Ex. 568, per Parke, B.; Moffat v. Barnard, 24, U. C. Q. B. 498; Egginton v. Lichfield, 5 E. & B. 103.

(b) Reid v. M'Whinnie, 27 U. C. Q. B. 289.

(c) Reg. v. Strachan, 20 U. C. C. P. 182.

(d) Ib.

A conviction under this Statute, alleging that defendant sold spirituous liquors by retail, without license, stating time and place, is sufficient, without specifying kind and quantity, as this is a particular act, and it is enough to describe it in the words of the Legislature. (a) Under the Statute, the owner of a shop is criminally liable for any unlawful act done therein in his absence. by clerk or assistant, as, for instance, in this case, for the sale of liquor, without license, by a female attendant. But it would seem, if the act of sale was an isolated one, wholly unauthorized by him, and out of the ordinary course of his business, he would not be liable. (b)

In Reg. v. Lennox, (c) a conviction under a by-law of the Commissioners of Police, imposing a fine of $5 on a person holding a tavern license, for not exhibiting over his door the words "Licensed to sell wine, beer, and other spirituous and fermented liquors," was quashed, a greater fine than $1 not being authorized by law.

A conviction under Con. Stats., U. C., c. 54, s. 254, which does not negative that the persons to whom the sale is made are travellers, or ordinary boarders, lodging at the place where the liquor is sold, or a requisition for medical purposes, is void. Where the proof must negative the circumstances of exception, the allegations in the instrument of conviction ought to do the same, otherwise the conclusion contra formam Statuti will not remedy the defect. (d)

Where a licensed victualier has opened his house on Sunday, within the prohibited hours, for the bona fide supply of refreshments to travellers arriving at an adjacent railway station, the mere fact that refreshment has

(a) Re Donelly, 20 U. C. C.P. 165.; Reg. v. King, 20 U. C. C. P. 246. (b) Ib.; see ante, p. 104.

(c) 26 U. C. Q. B. 141.

(d) Mills and Brown, 9 U. C. L. J. 246; Reg. v. Jukes, 8 T. R. 542.