which attends them in consequence of their validity being so often questioned; and a system which would remove this uncertainty would make these arrangements more popular. This might be secured by referring the question of the validity of the deed to the district Court of Bankruptcy. Let a certain day be appointed when the deed might be submitted to the court, and when the creditors might be at liberty to appear to urge any objection which they might have to the deed. If these objections were held valid, creditors might immediately enter into another arrangement. If, however, the deed were held good, the judgment might be held binding, without being liable to be questioned in a court of common law. This system would have other advantages. One would be that the question would be decided by a better court for the investigation of fraud than the superior courts of common law; and another that it would be settled by a local and accessible tribunal.

Mr. BISSINGTON, Leeds: I represent the West Riding Trade Protection Society. I was present at the meeting in Birmingham in 1857, to which Mr. Hastings bas referred, when the best bill ever framed-the bill afterwards introduced by Lord John Russell-was originated. When commercial men complain of the present Act they are told it was their own measure, and that therefore they are to blame for the present state of the law. That is not so, and I hope that the able statement which Mr. Hastings has made, and which is the truth, will go forth to the public, and be distinctly understood. I am acquainted with the opinions of the Associated Chambers of Commerce, and with those of the Trade Protection Societies, and I believe I am stating the sentiments of these bodies when I say that the adoption of the Scotch law, with certain modifications better adapted to England, would be the best possible foundation for future legislation.

Mr. BATHGATE, Trade Protection Society, Edinburgh: In my opinion it would take away from the value of any measure if it abolished the power of imprisonment for debt. We have that power in Scotland, and I do not see why you should abolish it in England, if the Scotch system is to be followed. I regret that the Accountant of Bankruptcy in Scotland is not able to be here. He has recently written a report in which he says that if the clause abolishing imprisonment for debt were extended to Scotland it would give a rude shock to credit. "England," he says, may be differently situated in this respect, but there is a salutary fear of imprisonment which works wonderfully in Scotland."' It has been suggested that the bankrupt should pay 6s. Ed. in the pound, or not get a discharge within six years. I think it would be a great hardship that an honest debtor, after giving up his whole effects to his creditors, could not get his discharge until six years passed over his head; and I, for one, would not agree to any such proposal.

Mr. MOFFATT, M.P.: As regards the trustee in Scotch bankruptcies, Mr. Hastings has clearly shown that such a trustee is essentially different from the official assignee. A principle was announced by Mr. Hawes with regard to compositions which startled me extremely. In his view of compositions it would apparently be quite right for the debtor to keep as much of his estate as possible; but I have always understood the theory and principle of a composition to be that the creditors took all the assets which the debtor had, but that the debtor was left with the good-will of his business,—that the debtor found friends to enable him to carry on his business, but that he gave up his assets to the last shilling. A challenge was made that the returns I have given you were worth very little, because they did not include the statistics of insolvency. I regret I have not here the statement which I made when I first brought this question before the House of Commons, which showed the results of bankruptcy for two or three years prior to 1861, adding to them the number of cases of insolvency, and the amounts involved under that head, and showing what had been the operations of the Bankrupt Act of 1861, taking two comparative years. Those figures would thoroughly bear out the line of argument which the figures I have adduced to day are calculated to support. Prior to 1861 there used to be about 1,250 cases of bankruptcy in a year, and about 1,400 cases of insolvency, or about 2,650 in all; and the new cases in bankruptcy are about 7,000 in the year, so that it is altogether a mistake to charge any unfair use of the figures in the

way in which I have applied them. As to what has been said about America, it is quite true that there is no Federal law of bankruptcy in America; but then it must be borne in mind that almost every state in America has some law of bankruptcy or insolvency of its own. It was said by Mr. Hawes that it would be utterly impossible for an accountant to inspect several thousand cases of bankruptcy; but he forgets that if we abolish the Act of 1861, there will then be only two or three thousand cases of bankruptcy in which the skill of the accountant will be called into operation. Then it has been stated that the fact that deeds of arrangement are so largely resorted to is a clear proof that they work admirably; but the real explanation of the large number of deeds of assignment is that everybody shrinks from the Court of Bankruptcy, and people prefer to take these deeds rather than get nothing. Mr. Cox said that there should be some means of distinguishing between an honest and dishonest debtor; and he stated the extreme difficulty of defining fraud or of obtaining convictions on any accusation of fraud; but the suggestion I have made as to the payment of a dividend of at least 6s. 8d. before the debtor could obtain his discharge within a period of six years would be the best safeguard to the creditor against fraud, and the best inducement to the debtor not to be guilty of fraud. If you make it the inducement of the debtor to lay immediately a statement of his affairs before his creditors, and give them the option of acquitting him, that will obviate the necessity for any accusation of fraud almost completely. It may be quite right to have a Court of Appeal, but if you withdraw the inducement of the debtors to trade after they have become insolvent by rendering them liable in their after-acquired property, your Court of Bankruptcy, improve it as you will, will have comparatively little business, as the majority of creditors will rather take a small dividend at once than wait for a larger but uncertain gain. One gentleman agreed that the whole of the estate of the bankrupt should be given to the creditors, but said that it followed as a matter of course that the majority binds the minority. That does not follow as a matter of course. If they choose to acquit him they may do so, if not he remains liable. We have heard of some terrible cases of oppression from the operation of this rule of the majority binding the minority. I have heard of one case where the whole of the creditors were secured excepting one. Those whose debts were secured proved the amount of their claim irrespective of their security, and they were all in favour of taking a small composition, while the creditor whose debt was unsecured was against it. I am not responsible for the 6s. 8d. proposal, but I am so for the opinion that no debtor shall have any inducement to carry on business after he knows that he is really insolvent, by having the power to compel an acquittance in full from his creditors. The more you think upon the question, the more you will see that that is the point you will have to settle before you get any satisfactory solution of the law of debtor and creditor.

Mr. MILLER, Nottingham, thought that to abolish the power of imprisonment for debt would do a great injury, the knowledge by debtors that there is a power to imprison them having a strong influence, without that power being put into force. The proposals of Mr. Moffatt, or rather the report of the Select Committee, would do away with one valuable provision which is now in force, the power of arresting an absconding debtor. In these days of emigration many debtors leave the country, and under the proposed law they could get away and take the property of their creditors without any power to interfere. He was also of opinion that if the law required that debtors should pay 6s. 8d. in the pound, they would not carry on their business any longer than they found they could pay 6s. 8d. This would prevent carrying on trade years after they knew that they had become insolvent.

EXCLUDED EVIDENCE.

In addition to the paper by Dr. Waddilove, printed at p. 133, MR. G. J. HOLYOAKE read a paper which dealt with evidence, excluded through conscientious inability to take an oath. The

following is an abstract of the paper :-Christians having a "religious" objection to the oath can make affirmation, but those who are not Theists and have a secular objection to the oath as implying a faith they do not hold, cannot make affirmation at all. Those who believe in the creed upon which the oath is based, are not obliged to take it, if they have some slight doctrinal objection to it, but those who cannot believe in the creed at all, are obliged to take it or are denied justice. In the higher courts the oath-taker is obliged to swear upon the New Testament, the truth of which he is, by that act, assumed solemnly to admit, and he is required to believe in a God who will punish perjury in this life. On the magistrate's bench the oath is a larger, clumsier, and more degrading instrument. At Quarter Sessions a witness may be questioned and denounced, and to scruple about taking an oath, is a wanton perversity and a misdemeanour, punishable with imprisonment at the pleasure of the court. A man who doubts either the truth of the Bible, or the existence of an avenging Deity, however sincere his doubts may be, must lie in the presence of his neighbour, or be dismissed from the court as one incapacitated for promoting the ends of justice. There were two classes of persons, the writer contended, who might decently, and ought fairly to be exempted from the rule. First, the class who consider that the hateful consequences of lying are inseparably connected with its commission; that there is personal infamy in the very act; that its punishment has commenced in the degradation of the mind in which it is possible; and that it is libellous of the moral government of the world to suppose otherwise. Of this class are the men who maintain that it is insulting God's majesty to believe that He personally assists magistrates and policemen in ascertaining the truth as it is in petty larceny or street brawls, by engaging to issue celestial execution on common liars. Of this class was that intrepid and right-minded Lady, who, a short time ago, refused to be sworn to prove a debt of £15, saying "I will give my word, but I will take no oath. I think it would be a desecration of God's name in such a case ;" and was ordered by the pious County Court judge to leave the court "as a sad example to those in more humble stations in society." The second class who should be exempted are-Atheists or those who believe that human faculties can but inform us of what is, and not why it is, or how it is, and having endeavoured to found religion on theological principles, have failed. They do not deny that God is; but, not understanding whether he be a personal or impersonal entity keep a reverent silence upon what they do not know. Such men are not unmindful of the truth, it is with them not only a point of honour; it is also a point of interest. Knowing that society cannot exist without justice, and that justice cannot proceed except upon truth, the Atheist is jealous of its infraction, not only as a sin, but as a danger. But for that very reason he shrinks from taking an oath, for in the very act of taking it he tells the lie which he abhors. The writer proceeded to show, by a number of recent cases in our

courts, that the present position of persons belonging to these two classes is one of great hardship and injustice. They must either resign their rights or their conscience, for they are not allowed, as the Christian objectors to an oath, to make a simple affirmation. If they decline the oath, they are treated as utterly unworthy of credit, and are, in fact, at the mercy of all who like to ill-treat, rob, or insult them. For such persons it is not unreasonable to claim the simple justice of conceding to them the privilege of the Christian objector to an oath, and relieve them from their equally conscientious objection to taking it. The same affirmation, attended of course with the same civil penalties for its violation, should be allowed to both, and would certainly be as binding upon both.

DISCUSSION.

"Is it expedient to Remove any and what of the remaining Restrictions on the Admissibility of Evidence in Civil and Criminal Cases?"

Mr. Cox, Recorder of Falmouth: Differing entirely from the conclusions of my learned friend, Dr. Waddilove, as to the desirableness of the admission of prisoners as witnesses, I wish to state the arguments upon the other side of that question. The arguments of those who contend that it is desirable to admit prisoners as witnesses are of two classes. They base the demand first upon a question of reason and argument, and second as a matter of expediency. I will take first the view which they put of it as a question of abstract reason and argument. They say, "The object of a law is the dispensation of justice and the ascertainment of the very truth of the case." We have found in civil cases that the attainment of the very truth is best advanced by having before ns all those persons who can throw light upon the truth, making all persons competent; leaving it to the sagacity of the jury or the judge, aided by the test of cross-examination, to ascertain what is the value of the evidence so given. This," they say, "has been found highly conducive to the ascertainment of truth in civil courts," which I am quite willing to admit. But they go on to say "If truth is advanced by this course of procedure in civil courts, why should it not be also adopted in the criminal courts; your end is the same, why do you take different means to secure its accomplishment ?" Now upon that point I join issue. I say the end is not the same. In criminal cases the object of a trial is not the same as in civil cases, according to the law of England. In a civil case the object is the ascertainment of the very truth of the case, and the doing of justice between two parties. In a criminal case the question which the jury has to decide is not whether a man is guilty or not, but whether the prisoner has been proved to be guilty or not. Now that is all the difference between a civil and a criminal case, and therefore I say that in criminal cases you have one question only to try, whereas in civil cases you have to consider a balance of evidence and ascertain the very truth of the case. That makes the precise distinction between the two cases, and is the reason why I come to the conclusion that it would be unsafe and unjust, according to the law of England as it stands now, to make prisoners competent to give evidence, because I submit that if you make them competent you must also make them compellable. I now come to the question of expediency, and here I feel a great deal more difficulty. 1 feel, from my own experience, that there are a number of cases which can be adduced, and that strong facts can be brought forward, tending to show the expediency of admitting prisoners as witnesses. One case has very recently occurred (Madame Valentin's case), which goes far to show that there are strong reasons of expediency in favour of that view. The prisoner in that case having previously, by her oath, con. victed a man, was in her turn tried and convicted for perjury, so much against

the opinion of the judge that, on his recommendation, she has been pardoned. Then there was the well-known case of Hatch, and all who have had experience in criminal courts must be aware of cases constantly occurring in which it would be desirable to have the evidence of the prisoner. But the question is not merely whether certain cases do occur now and then in which it would be of advantage to hear the evidence of the prisoner, but whether, upon the whole, the ends of a criminal court are not better secured by refusing this privilege to criminals than by giving it to them. It is undoubtedly an advantage to innocence in certain cases, but there are often cases occurring in which it would, even to an innocent man, be disadvantageous, though probably, taking all innocent cases together, more would be benefited than would be injured by it. But let us see how it would work in practice. A prisoner is upon his trial, and let us suppose that the facts against him are pretty strong, forming grounds for suspicion, but not enough to convict him. In the present state of the law the case goes to the jury, and the counsel for the prisoner, or the judge in summing up, would say to the jury-"Gentlemen, there are strong facts against the prisoner, but it is not your duty to convict upon suspicion, however strong; you are bound, before you can convict a man of a crime, to be satisfied that he is proved guilty of the crime by evidence." But the effect of the proposed change in the law upon such a case, would be that the counsel for the prose. cution might say to the jury, "These circumstances form a strong ground of suspicion against the prisoner; if he is innocent, he can put himself in the witness-box and explain them; if he does not give that explanation, you know what conclusion to form in your own minds." Whether the counsel for the prosecution, or the judge in summing up, made any remark of that nature to the jury or not, they would know that the prisoner could put himself in the witness box if he pleased, and if the prisoner did not choose to enter the witness-box and explain the suspicious crcumstances against him, that fact would weigh upon the minds of the jury and he would be convicted. It may be said of such a case. "Well, justice would be done, a guilty man would be convicted, and therefore the object of the criminal law has been gained." But it must be kept in mind that this would be a practical abrogation of the existing law, which says that a man shall be convicted by evidence, not by suspicion. Before, then, you can make this proposed alteration, you must destroy the principle upon which the criminal law of England is at present founded. I do not say whether that is right or wrong-there may be doubts whether the principle of the French criminal law is not better than ours, that principle being the ascertainment of the truth. But suppose the prisoner did put himself in the witness-box, he would be subject to cross-examination, and if he was guilty, undoubtedly you would further the ends of justice; because in the course of cross-examination he would, in all likelihood, say something that would lead to his conviction; on the other hand, you would seriously endanger an innocent man by putting him in that position. It is all very well to say, "An innocent man can protect himself; the more you look into his case the more an innocent man will be seen to be innocent." That is not the case; and the reason of it is this, that no man is ever put to trial upon a criminal charge without strong facts against him. Now suppose such a man, with a great number of facts and circumstances telling most formidably against him, to be perfectly innocent; and that he is put in the witness-box. In the course of the cross-examination the facts which tell most strongly against him are brought out strongly, and in the reply, any man with experience as a prosecuting counsel would be able so to represent these suspicious facts to the jury, that it would be two to one that the man would be convicted. There is another difficulty attending it. In the case of husband and wife, if the husband is made competent as a witness, and also compellable- [Dr. WADDILOVE: No, not compellable.]-Well, if he is made competent you cannot make the husband competent without making the wife competent also. Well, if he is competent at the trial, the wife must be competent not only at the trial but throughout the whole proceedings, and long before the husband had exercised his privilege she would be competent for the prosecution as well as for the defence. In any case, between husband and wife, therefore, the prosecutor would be putting the wife against the husband. There is, however, an enormous class of cases