ant to "make all necessary repairs and improvements" on a mill which was the leasehold property. Plaintiff in the Nevada case furnished materials and performed labor in repairing the mill. The court said:

"It may be conceded for the purposes of this case, that to authorize a lien there must be an employment by the owner of the building, or his authorized agent, and that an employment by a lessee does not constitute the employment contemplated by the statute; and, further, that to constitute the contractor, subcontractor, architect, builder or other person the statutory agent of the owner, such person must have been employed, directly or indirectly, at the instance of the owner, or his conventional agent."

The case finally holds that the owner of the property was charged with constructive notice of the work done by plaintiff, and his interest in the property was held subject to the lien because he had posted no notice disclaiming responsibility. The lien was upheld under a Nevada statute, substantially identical with Section 7419, L. O. L., providing that the interest of an owner shall be subject to liens for any work done with his knowledge, unless within three days after he obtains such knowledge he posts in a conspicuous place a notice to the effect that he will not be responsible.

Plaintiff also cites Santa Monica Co. v. Hege, 119 Cal. 376 (51 Pac. 555), and Evans v. Judson, 120 Cal. 282 (52 Pac. 585). These cases, like the Nevada case, hold that such a lease as that with which we are concerned in the case at bar charges the owner of the property with constructive notice of any work done by the tenant in fulfillment of the covenants of the lease. The liability in the above California cases is predicated on the failure of the owner to post a notice after the law charged him with knowledge of the work.

The case of Western Lumber Co. v. Merchants'

Amusement Co., 13 Cal. App. 4 (108 Pac. 891), was a case involving the construction of a building at the inception of the tenancy. The principle decided is identical with that announced by this court in Oregon Lumber Co. v. Nolan, 75 Or. 69 (143 Pac. 935, 146 Pac. 474).

In 2 Jones, Liens (3 ed.), Section 1280, the law is stated as follows:

"The estate of a lessor is not subject to a lien for labor contracted for by his lessee who has covenanted to make all necessary repairs and improvements at his own expense.

The principle announced in this text-book is supported by the following authorities: Francis v. Sayles, 101 Mass. 435; Conant v. Brackett, 112 Mass. 18; Aetna Elevator Co. v. Deeves, 125 App. Div. 842 (110 N. Y. Supp. 124); Garber v. Spivak (Sup.), 114 N. Y. Supp. 762; Boteler v. Espen, 99 Pa. 313; Hervey v. Gay, 42 N. J. Law, 168.

It is true that the foregoing cases involved the construction of statutes differing from the Oregon statute, but the mischiefs to be anticipated from acceding to the rule contended for by plaintiff in the case at bar are clearly set forth in the opinions in these cases, and these opinions set forth cogent reasons why the doctrine of Oregon Lumber Co. v. Nolan, 75 Or. 69 (143 Pac. 935, 146 Pac. 474), should not be extended to cover such cases as this.

2. Conceding, without deciding, that the Nevada and California courts have properly held that such a covenant as was contained in the Gevurtz lease is sufficient to charge the owner with constructive notice of the work done in its fulfillment, we think that the lien asserted by plaintiff cannot be sustained on this ground. It appears from the testimony that one year

prior to the time when plaintiff performed his work on the premises a notice was posted by appellants to the effect that they would not be responsible for any work done on the building under instruction from any one other than themselves. This notice was posted on the north side wall of the building at a point easily visible from the sidewalk on the Twenty-second Street side of the building. We think the evidence shows that it was posted in a conspicuous place. It clearly appears that the notice remained posted during all of the time while plaintiff was at work on the premises. Plaintiff has therefore failed to make out a case entitling him to a lien under Section 7419, L. O. L.

It follows that the decree should be reversed and the bill dismissed. REVERSED. SUIT DISMISSED.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MCBRIDE, MR. JUSTICE MOORE and MR. JUSTICE BEAN concur.

Argued January 25, affirmed February 20, 1917. SCOTT COMPANY v. ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF OREGON.

(163 Pac. 88.)

Covenants Restrictions as to Use of Premises-Validity.

1. A clause in various deeds from a land company limiting the buildings to be erected on the lots to those designed for residential purposes is valid, even where the building proposed is intended for school purposes or for the erection of a church in absence of written consent, the right to grant which was reserved in the grantor.

Covenants-Restrictions as to Use of Premises-Validity.

2. Where the common grantor by a clause in all its deeds restricted buildings to residential purposes, but reserved the right to consent to erection of buildings for school and church purposes, he had the power as against his grantees to give his consent to erection of buildings for such purposes.

88 Or.-7

Covenants-Restrictions as to Use of Premises-Validity.

3. Restrictive covenants in a deed are to be construed most strictly against the covenant.

Covenants-Restrictions as to Use of Premises-Validity.

4. Provision in deed granting land in an addition restricting buildings to residential purposes, but reserving right to consent to buildings for church and school purposes, was sufficient notice to the vendees that such consent might be granted.

Covenants Building Restrictions - Church Purposes-"Convent""Nun."

5. Where grantor in several deeds reserved right to waive residential restrictions in favor of church or school purposes, he could validly grant privilege of erecting a convent, which is a house or building occupied by nuns, who may be designated as women of Catholic religion who live in a convent under vows of poverty, chastity and obedience.

Covenants-Building Restrictions "Church Purposes"—"Church."

6. In such case the erection of a convent may be deemed a "church purpose," since the word "church" applies not only to a building used for worship, but to any body of Christians holding and propagating a particular form of belief, and any building intended primarily for purposes connected with a faith is used for "church purposes."

[As to covenants restricting use of land, see note in 21 Am. St. Rep. 485.]

From Multnomah: ROBERT G. MORROW, Judge.

An injunction suit by the Scott Company, a corporation, and others, against the Roman Catholic Archbishop for the Diocese of Oregon, A. Christie, a corporation. From a decree dismissing the complaint the plaintiffs appeal. AFFIRMED.

Department 1. Statement by MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MCBRIDE.

This is a suit to enjoin the construction by the defendant of church, school and convent buildings on certain property in the City of Portland and the use of any buildings constructed thereon for church, school or convent purposes. The complaint alleges that in the year 1909 Laurelhurst Company, an Oregon corporation, was the owner of a tract of land which

it platted as "Laurelhurst" and put on the market. The complaint contains the following allegations:

"That for the purposes of rendering said tract, so divided, platted, and laid out as 'Laurelhurst,' more attractive and desirable as a residence and home section, and with the intention, and for the purpose of inducing persons desiring to build and maintain homes, to purchase lots and sites in said addition, said Laurelhurst Company did evolve and make public a general plan, or scheme, for the development of said Laurelhurst Addition as a high class residence and home section, which said plan or scheme consisted of placing certain restrictions on the use and improvement of the blocks, lots and sites in said addition; that as a part of, and for the purpose of rendering said plan, or scheme, effective, said restrictions as to the use and improvement of lots and sites in said addition, said Laurelhurst Company did place in, and include in, each deed executed by it to the purchasers of lots and sites in said addition, a uniform clause setting out said restrictions, a copy of which is hereto attached, marked exhibit 'A' and made a part hereof; that it was the intention of said Laurelhurst Company that the lots and sites so covered by said restrictions should be mutually bound, and should mutually profit by said restrictions."

The restrictions are as follows:

"During the period of twenty-five (25) years from and after the first day of January, 1909, no structure other than (here is inserted the number of dwelling houses, depending upon the number of lots purchased), single detached dwelling house, costing not less than (here is inserted the cost of the dwelling house which varies slightly in different sections of the tract) dollars each, and also, if desired, any outbuildings which may be necessary or usual, other than stables, shall be erected upon said premises; nor shall any portion or projection of any such dwelling house or outbuilding (except the steps thereof), be within twenty (20) feet from the nearest side line of